Gittin 83a (פג.) — the Talmud in English

If you should say,

even if you resolve this uncertainty and say that

what he prohibited, he permitted,

meaning that his intention was to permit her both to the entire world and to Reuven and Shimon as well, there is still a doubt in a case where he initially said: “Except for Reuven and Shimon,” and afterward returned and said that he permits her

“to Reuven,”

but did not add and say also “to Shimon”

—what is

the interpretation of his intention?

Did he intend to say that he wishes to permit her

to Reuven, and the same is true of Shimon. And the reason he said,

that he mentioned only

to Reuven

and did not say “to Reuven and to Shimon”

is because

at the beginning, when he said “except for Reuven and Shimon,”

he began with him,

he mentioned Reuven first; therefore, now too he began with Reuven, but his intention was to permit her to Shimon as well:

Or perhaps

we should say that his intention was

specifically to Reuven.

And if you should say

that we wish to resolve

specifically to Reuven,

that his intention was to permit her only to Reuven and not to Shimon,

there is still a doubt in a case where he initially said “except for Reuven and Shimon,” and afterward returned and said

to Shimon—

what is

the interpretation of his intention?

To Shimon, and the same is true of Reuven.

Did he intend to permit her not only to Shimon but also to Reuven?

And the reason he said,

that he mentioned only

Shimon, because he had concluded with him,

is that when he initially excluded Shimon, he mentioned Shimon last; therefore, now he continued with Shimon’s name. However, his intention was to permit her to Reuven as well:

Or perhaps

we should say that his intention was to permit her

specifically to Shimon,

and not to Reuven.

He inquired

—he raised the following uncertainty—

Rav Ashi:

If you wish to resolve that when he said “to Shimon” his intention was specifically to Shimon, what is the halakha if he initially said “except for Reuven and Shimon,” and afterward returned and said

also to Shimon?

What is

the interpretation of his intention?

Does “also” refer to Reuven,

meaning, did he intend to permit her to Reuven as well—

or perhaps

we should say that when he said

also

to Shimon, he did not intend to permit her to Reuven as well; rather, his intention was that

“also” refers to the entire world,

meaning that he permits her not only to the entire world but also to Shimon, while he still prohibits her to Reuven .

Teiku!

The uncertainty remains unresolved. 13 .

The Sages taught: After the death of Rabbi Eliezer, four elders entered to respond

and raise difficulties

against his words,

against what Rabbi Eliezer had said: If one gives a bill of divorce to his wife and says to her, “You are hereby permitted to marry anyone except so-and-so,” it is a valid bill of divorce, and she is permitted to marry anyone except that particular man—

and

these are

the four elders who entered to raise difficulties against Rabbi Eliezer’s words:

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, Rabbi Tarfon, Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, and Rabbi Akiva.

Rabbi Tarfon raised his voice

and

said,

and responded: [The Gemara explains that Rabbi Tarfon interpreted Rabbi Eliezer’s words as referring to a case where he said to her: “On the condition that you not marry so-and-so.”] According to Rabbi Eliezer, who permits divorcing a woman “on the condition that you not marry so-and-so,” if so,

if

this

woman

indeed

went after her divorce

and married the brother of

the man

to whom she was prohibited

because of her first husband [who permitted her to marry the entire world except him],

and

that brother

died without children,

and she now falls before his brother for yibbum, he cannot perform yibbum with her because she is prohibited to him, as her first husband stipulated in the bill of divorce that she not marry him.

And if so,

is it not found

that

this

man who stipulated with her that she not marry so-and-so

overturns

the

word of the Torah!

For he causes the mitzva of yibbum to be overturned: had her husband not prohibited her to that man, she could have performed yibbum with him, whereas now she cannot perform yibbum with him!

You have therefore learned

from here

that

when he says to her, “On the condition that you not marry so-and-so,”

this is not

included in what the Torah said: “And he shall write for her a scroll of

severance,”

for it is impossible that the Torah would validate a bill of divorce that causes a matter of Torah law to be overturned.

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili raised his voice,

and

said,

and he too responded to Rabbi Eliezer’s words—

The Gemara explains that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili interpreted Rabbi Eliezer’s words as referring to a case where he said to her: “Except for so-and-so.”

Where do we find

in the Torah that a woman is

prohibited to one,

meaning, prohibited to one man,

and permitted to another,

meaning, permitted to a second man—

rather, the principle is:

That which is prohibited is prohibited to everyone,

and

that which is permitted is permitted to everyone

.

You have therefore learned

from here,

that

when one says, “Except for so-and-so,”

this is not severance

as stated in the Torah, because she is not rendered permitted by this bill of divorce to marry everyone.

Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya raised his voice

and

said,

and he too responded to Rabbi Eliezer’s words—

Since the Torah says that he must divorce her with a scroll of

severance,

the bill of divorce must be

a document that severs the bond between him and her,

so that after the divorce she has no connection whatsoever to her first husband. However, when he retains a restriction “except for so-and-so,” she is still not completely severed from him and remains dependent upon him, since because of him she cannot marry that particular man.

You have therefore learned that this is not severance

as stated in the Torah, and it is not a valid bill of divorce.

Rabbi Akiva raised his voice,

and

said,

and he too responded to Rabbi Eliezer’s words—

The Gemara will explain that this difficulty follows the possibility that Rabbi Eliezer’s words were said with reference to a case where he said to her: “On the condition that you not marry so-and-so.”

If this

woman

indeed,

whom her husband permitted to marry anyone on the condition that she not marry so-and-so,

married one of the men of the marketplace,

whom she was permitted to marry,

and had sons

from him,

and was widowed

—became a widow—

or was divorced, and

afterward

arose and married this one,

the man

to whom she was prohibited

because of her first husband — is

the bill of divorce not found to be void,

for her husband stipulated with her that she not marry so-and-so, and once she violated the condition, the bill of divorce became retroactively void; consequently, at the time she married one of the men of the marketplace, she was a married woman,

and her sons are mamzerim—

You have therefore learned that this is not severance

as stated in the Torah, for it is impossible that the Torah would say that it is possible to divorce a woman in a manner that could result in mamzerim .

Alternatively,

Rabbi Akiva raised a different difficulty against Rabbi Eliezer’s words—

The Gemara explains that this difficulty follows the possibility that Rabbi Eliezer’s words were said with reference to a case where he said to her: “Except for so-and-so.”

If the one to whom she was prohibited

because of her first husband

was a priest, and the divorcer died,

she is now permitted to marry even that priest, since she is a widow,

is she not found to be a widow with regard to him and a divorcee with regard to everyone else?

That is, although with regard to the priest she is considered only a widow and not a divorcee, because her first husband did not divorce her with regard to him, nevertheless, since with regard to everyone else she is considered a divorcee, she is prohibited to that priest because of the impression created by the bill of divorce, as we learned above [82b]: even if he divorced her only with regard to him, she is prohibited from marrying into the priesthood.

And

if so, we can derive from this

a kal va-chomer: Just as a divorcee

with regard to a priest,

which is a lenient matter,

which is a relatively minor prohibition, merely a negative prohibition, is nevertheless

prohibited

from marrying into the priesthood

because of the aspect of divorce in her,

because she bears the status of a divorcee, even though with regard to the man who betrothed her she is not a divorcee but a widow—

a married woman, which is a severe matter,

more severe than the prohibition of a divorcee to a priest, as it carries the punishment of stoning,

all the more so

should she be prohibited from marrying another because she bears the status of a married woman with regard to that particular man, even though with regard to him she is not a married woman—

you have therefore learned

rather, we learn from here that wherever she bears the

status

of a married woman because of that particular man whom her husband retained in the bill of divorce,

this is not severance

as stated in the Torah, and she is considered a married woman with regard to the entire world.

Rabbi Yehoshua said to them,

to the four elders,

“One does not respond to the lion after its death.”

For had Rabbi Eliezer been alive, perhaps he would have given you a response!

Rava said: All of them,

all the responses that they gave against Rabbi Eliezer’s words,

have

a

refutation,

and it is possible to overturn them.

Except

for

the

question

of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, which has no refutation,

as we have no answer to his question.

It was also taught so:

And similarly we learned in a beraita:

Rabbi Yosei said: I regard the words of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya as superior to the words of all of them

because there is no refutation of his response to Rabbi Eliezer’s words.

And now the Gemara proceeds to explain the responses and the refutations:

The Master said: We learned

above in the beraita:

Rabbi Tarfon raised his voice and said: If this

woman

indeed,

whose husband stipulated with her that she not marry so-and-so,

married the brother of this one,

the man

to whom she was prohibited

because of her first husband, who divorced her except with regard to him,

and

that brother

died without children,

and she now falls for yibbum, but he cannot perform yibbum with her because she is prohibited to him, as her first husband stipulated in the bill of divorce that she not marry him—

is this one not found

who stipulated with her that she not marry so-and-so

to be overturning a matter of Torah law!

For had he not prohibited her to that man, she could have performed yibbum with him after his brother died without children, whereas now she cannot perform yibbum.

And we raise an objection: Is he really

“overturning”

anything!? Is this comparable to a case where, by divorcing her in this manner,

he himself overturned it,

meaning, is he actively overturning the mitzva of yibbum? The mitzva of yibbum is not incumbent upon him; rather, he caused the yavam to be unable to fulfill the mitzva of yibbum, and he is not considered to have actively overturned a matter of Torah law.

And we answer:

Rather,

Rabbi Tarfon’s intention is to say

that

by imposing a condition in the divorce that she not marry that particular man, he

stipulates to overturn a matter of Torah law .

.

And we raise an objection:

“Stipulates”!?

Does he stipulate a condition that overturns a matter of Torah law?

Did he say to her

that he stipulated with her

that she has no choice but to marry

anyone except

him, the brother of that man,

the brother of that particular man to whom he prohibits her!? She can, after all, marry another man; why, then, is this considered that he stipulates to overturn a matter of Torah law?

And we answer:

Rather,

Rabbi Tarfon’s intention is to say that because of the condition he stipulated with her that she not marry so-and-so, he

causes a matter of Torah law to be overturned.

For because of the condition she cannot perform yibbum, although he does not overturn it actively.

And we raise an objection:

“Causes”!?

Is he called, in such a case, one who causes a matter of Torah law to be overturned?

If that is so—

he should not marry his brother’s daughter!

A man should be prohibited from marrying his brother’s daughter, because

perhaps

he will

die without children,

and she will fall for yibbum before his brother, who is her father; yet she is prohibited to him for yibbum because of the prohibition against a daughter.

And it is found

that this man

causes a matter of Torah law to be overturned.

Yet we have never heard that it is prohibited to marry one’s brother’s daughter .

Rather,

this is the refutation.

This is Rava’s intention when he said that there is a refutation of Rabbi Tarfon’s response. Indeed, just as one who marries his brother’s daughter is not considered to cause a matter of Torah law to be overturned, so too, retaining a restriction in a bill of divorce is not considered overturning a matter of Torah law.

And now the Gemara explains the substance of Rabbi Tarfon’s words:

And with regard to what

did Rabbi Tarfon raise his difficulty against Rabbi Eliezer?

For there are two ways to explain Rabbi Eliezer’s words. According to the tanna of the Mishna, Rabbi Eliezer disagreed with the Rabbis in a case where he said, “Except for so-and-so,” whereas according to the tanna of the beraita, Rabbi Eliezer disagreed with the Rabbis in a case where he said, “On the condition that you not marry so-and-so.”

If you say

that Rabbi Tarfon raised his difficulty against Rabbi Eliezer’s statement in the Mishna, in which he disagreed with the Rabbis

in

a case where he said to her, “You are hereby divorced

except

for so-and-so,” and Rabbi Tarfon responded that if she marries that particular man’s brother and he dies, she will be prohibited from performing yibbum with that particular man —

This is impossible. For

it is permitted,

she is permitted, even according to

Rabbi Eliezer,

to marry that particular man in such a case, and there is no overturning of a matter of Torah law—

and this is

as it was taught,

as we learned in a beraita:

Rabbi Eliezer concedes

in the case of one who divorces his wife and says to her, “You are hereby permitted to marry anyone except so-and-so,” and she went and married one of the men of the marketplace, and

afterward she

was widowed

—became a widow—

or was divorced

from him,

that she is permitted to the man to whom she had been prohibited.

That is, she may marry even that particular man to whom her husband stipulated that she not marry.

Rather,

Rabbi Tarfon's answer follows the tanna of the beraita, according to whom Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with the Rabbis

in

a case where he said to her, “Behold, you are permitted to every man

on condition

that you do not marry so-and-so”—

Rabbi Tarfon responded to this that if she marries the brother of that so-and-so and he dies, she will be forbidden to perform yibbum with that so-and-so, even if in the interim she married another man. For if she performs yibbum with that so-and-so, the get will be retroactively invalidated because of its condition.

We learned further in the beraita:

“Rabbi Yosei HaGelili responded and said: Where do we find

in the Torah

that this one is forbidden

a woman who is forbidden to one man,

and is permitted to that one,

and permitted to a second man—

Rather, the rule is:

That which is forbidden is forbidden to everyone,

a man,

and that which is permitted is permitted to everyone,

a man.”

The Gemara raises an objection:

And

is it the case that

we do not

find things that are forbidden to one person and permitted to another?

But

we find this with regard to eating

teruma and

eating

sacred offerings, which is forbidden

the eating of teruma and sacred offerings

to this one,

an Israelite,

and is permitted

their consumption

to that one,

a kohen.

The Gemara answers:

We are speaking of the prohibition involving a woman.

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili's intention was to respond that we do not find a woman who is permitted to one man and forbidden to another.

The Gemara raises an objection:

But

with regard to the prohibition of

forbidden sexual relations,

we find that she is forbidden to her relatives and permitted to others!?

The Gemara answers:

We are speaking of marital status.

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili's intention was to respond that we do not find a woman who becomes forbidden to one man through kiddushin while remaining permitted to another.

The Gemara raises an objection:

But

even with regard to kiddushin we find a woman who is permitted to one man and forbidden to another, for every

married woman

is permitted to her husband and forbidden to the entire world!?

The Gemara answers: Indeed,

this is the refutation.

This is Rava's intention in saying that there is a refutation of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili's response.

The Gemara now explains the substance of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili's statement:

And with regard to what,

that is, which of Rabbi Eliezer's statements did Rabbi Yosei HaGelili challenge—

If you say

that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili challenged Rabbi Eliezer's statement cited in the beraita, which refers

to

a case where he said to her, “Behold, you are divorced

on condition

that you do not marry so-and-so,” and this is a valid get—and Rabbi Yosei HaGelili challenged this by saying that we do not find a woman who is forbidden to one man and permitted to another—

this cannot be so. For when he stipulated to her on condition that she not marry so-and-so, she is not considered forbidden to him,

as she is permitted to him for licentious relations.

Since the entire condition was only that she not marry so-and-so, she nevertheless remains permitted to have intercourse with him. This is not called “permitted to this one and forbidden to that one,” because the fact that she is forbidden to marry him is merely a condition.

The Gemara answers:

Rather,

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili's refutation is directed at Rabbi Eliezer's statement in the Mishna,

in

a case where he said to her, “

Except

for so-and-so,” since he completely reserved that man, and with regard to him she remains forbidden as a married woman. Therefore, she is considered “permitted to this one and forbidden to that one.”

We learned further in the beraita:

“Rabbi Akiva responded and said: Suppose that this

woman

who

her husband permitted to every man “except for so-and-so”

married one of the ordinary men,

whom she was permitted to marry,

and she had sons

from him,

and was widowed

and became a widow,

or was divorced, and

afterward

proceeded to marry that one

the man

to whom she had been forbidden

because of her first husband—

would the get not thereby be invalidated,

for since she failed to fulfill the condition and married that so-and-so, the get was retroactively invalidated, and it follows that while she was married to one of the ordinary men, she was a married woman,

and her sons

born from him would be

mamzerim?” —

The Gemara raises an objection:

If so,

if we are concerned that she may fail to fulfill the condition,

in every ordinary condition,

wherever a condition is imposed in a get such that if she fails to fulfill the condition the get will be invalidated,

she should likewise not marry,

we should forbid her to marry, because

perhaps she will not fulfill its condition,

and we should be concerned that she may fail to fulfill the condition,

and the get will thereby be invalidated and her sons will be mamzerim.”

The Gemara answers: Indeed,

this is the refutation.

This is Rava's intention in saying that there is a refutation of Rabbi Akiva's response.

The Gemara now explains the substance of Rabbi Akiva's statement:

And with regard to what

of Rabbi Eliezer's statements did Rabbi Akiva respond?

If you say

that Rabbi Akiva challenged Rabbi Eliezer's statement cited in the Mishna, in which he disagreed with the Rabbis

in

a case where he said to her, “Behold, you are divorced

except

for so-and-so,” and Rabbi Akiva responded that we are concerned that she may marry another man and have sons with him, and then become widowed from him and marry that so-and-so, with the result that the get will be invalidated and her sons will be mamzerim—

this cannot be so. For

it has already been permitted,

she is permitted, even according to

Rabbi Eliezer,

to marry that so-and-so—

as

we learned,

as we learned in a beraita:

“Rabbi Eliezer concedes with regard to one who divorces his wife and says to her, ‘Behold, you are

permitted to every man except for so-and-so,’ and she proceeded to marry one of the ordinary men, and

afterward she

was widowed

became a widow

or was divorced

by him,

that she is permitted to the one to whom she had been forbidden.

She may marry that so-and-so, despite the fact that her husband said that he was permitting her to the entire world except for him, since her marriage to another man intervened.

Rather,

Rabbi Akiva's response follows the tanna of the beraita, according to whom Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with the Rabbis

in

a case where he said to her, “Behold, you are permitted to every man

on condition

that you do not marry so-and-so”; even if she married another man in the interim, nevertheless, if she marries that so-and-so, the get is retroactively invalidated—

We learned further in the beraita:

“Alternatively,

Rabbi Akiva responded to Rabbi Eliezer's statement in another manner:

Suppose that the one to whom she had been forbidden

because of her first husband

was a kohen, and the divorcer died.

Now she is permitted to that kohen because she is a widow

, would she not thereby be a widow with regard to him and a divorcee with regard to everyone else?

Even though with regard to the kohen she is considered only a widow and not a divorcee, nevertheless, since with regard to other men she is considered a divorcee, she is forbidden to that kohen because of the taint of divorce, as we learned above [82b], that even if he divorced her only with regard to that man, she is forbidden to marry into the priesthood—

And

if so, we can derive this by means of a

kal va-chomer:

And

just as a divorcee

to a kohen,

which is a lenient matter,

whose prohibition is a lesser prohibition, as it is only a prohibition derived from a negative commandment, is nevertheless

forbidden

to the priesthood

because of the aspect of divorce in her,

because she bears the status of a divorcee, even though with regard to the man who sanctified her she is not a divorcee but a widow—

a married woman, which is stringent,

whose prohibition is more severe than that of a divorcee to a kohen, as the punishment for a married woman is stoning,

all the more so

she must certainly be forbidden to marry another man because she bears the status of a married woman with regard to that so-and-so, even though with regard to him she is not a married woman”—

The Gemara now explains Rabbi Akiva's second response:

And with regard to what?

With regard to which statement of Rabbi Eliezer does Rabbi Akiva's second response apply—

If you say

that Rabbi Akiva responded to Rabbi Eliezer, who disagreed with the Rabbis

in

a case where he said to her, “Behold, you are divorced

on condition

that you do not marry so-and-so” —