Gittin 83a — the Talmud in English

If you should say,

even if you resolve this uncertainty and say that

what he forbade he permitted,

and his intention is to permit her both to the entire world and to Reuven and Shimon, there is still a question in a case where he initially said, “Except for Reuven and Shimon,” and afterward returned and said that he permits her

“to Reuven,”

but did not add and say also “to Shimon”

what is [the law]?

How shall we interpret his intention?

Does he intend to say that he wishes to permit her

to Reuven, and the same law applies to Shimon. And this that he said,

and what he said only

to Reuven

and did not say “to Reuven and to Shimon”

is because when initially he said “except for Reuven and Shimon,”

at the beginning, when he said “except for Reuven and Shimon,”

he began with him,

he mentioned Reuven first, and therefore now as well he began with Reuven, but his intention was to permit her also to Shimon:

Or perhaps,

or shall we say that his intention is

to Reuven specifically.

And if you should say,

if we wish to resolve

to Reuven specifically,

that his intention is to permit her only to Reuven and not to Shimon,

there is still a question in a case where he initially said “except for Reuven and Shimon,” and afterward returned and said

to Shimon—

what is [the law]?

How shall we interpret his intention?

“To Shimon, and the same law applies to Reuven.”

Does he intend to permit her not only to Shimon but also to Reuven?

And this that he said,

and what he mentioned only

Shimon, because he had just finished with him,

for when initially he excluded Shimon from the general rule, he mentioned Shimon last, and therefore now he continued with Shimon’s name; however, his intention is to permit her also to Reuven:

Or perhaps,

or shall we say that his intention is to permit her

to Shimon specifically,

and not to Reuven.

He inquired

he was uncertain

Rav Ashi:

If you wish to resolve that when he said “to Shimon” his intention was “to Shimon specifically,” what is the law if he initially said “except for Reuven and Shimon,” and afterward returned and said

“also to Shimon”?

What is [the law]?

How shall we interpret his intention?

Does it refer also to Reuven,

does he intend to permit her also to Reuven—

or perhaps

or shall we say that when he said

“also”

to Shimon, he did not intend to permit her also to Reuven; rather, his intention was

that it refers to everyone else,

that he permits her not only to the entire world, but also to Shimon, while he still forbids her to Reuven?

It stands unresolved!

The uncertainty was not resolved. 13 .

The Sages taught: After the death of Rabbi Eliezer, four elders entered to respond

and raise objections

to his words

of Rabbi Eliezer, concerning what he said: If one gives a get to his wife and says to her, “Behold, you are permitted to every man except so-and-so,” this is a valid get, and she is permitted to every man except that particular person—

and

these are

the four elders who entered to raise objections to Rabbi Eliezer’s words:

Rabbi Yose the Galilean, Rabbi Tarfon, Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, and Rabbi Akiva.

Rabbi Tarfon raised

he raised his voice

and said

and replied:

The Gemara explains that Rabbi Tarfon interpreted Rabbi Eliezer’s words as referring to a case where he said to her, “On condition that you do not marry so-and-so.” According to Rabbi Eliezer’s words, that it is possible to divorce a woman “on condition that you do not marry so-and-so,” then

it follows that

a woman

this

after her divorce

married the brother of

the man

this one, who had been forbidden to her

because of her first husband [who permitted her to the entire world except him],

and he died

that brother

without children,

and now she falls before his brother for yibbum, he cannot perform yibbum with her because she is forbidden to him, since her first husband stipulated in the get that she not marry him.

And if so,

is it not found

that

this

one who stipulated with her that she not marry so-and-so

uproots

he

something from the Torah!

For he causes the mitzva of yibbum to be uprooted: had her husband not forbidden her to that particular man, she could have performed yibbum with him, whereas now she cannot perform yibbum!

You have thus learned,

from here we learn

that

when he says to her, “On condition that you do not marry so-and-so,”

this is not

included in what the Torah said, “And he shall write for her a scroll of

severance,”

for it is impossible that the Torah would validate a get that causes something from the Torah to be uprooted.

Rabbi Yose the Galilean raised

he raised his voice,

and said,

he too replied to Rabbi Eliezer’s words—

The Gemara explains that Rabbi Yose the Galilean interpreted Rabbi Eliezer’s words as referring to a case where he said to her, “Except for so-and-so.”

Where do we find

in the Torah

forbidden to this one,

a woman who is forbidden to one person,

and permitted to this one,

to a second person—

rather, the rule is:

that which is forbidden is forbidden to every

person,

and that which is permitted is permitted to every

person.

You have thus learned,

from here you learn,

that

when one says, “Except for so-and-so,”

this is not severance

stated in the Torah, because through this get she is not permitted to every person.

Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya raised

he raised his voice

and said,

he too replied to Rabbi Eliezer’s words—

Since the Torah says that one must divorce her with a scroll of

severance,

the get must be

something that severs between him and her,

and after the divorce she must have no connection whatsoever to her first husband. But when he retains “except for so-and-so,” she is still not completely severed from him and is still dependent upon him, since because of him she cannot marry that particular man.

You have thus learned that this is not severance

stated in the Torah, and it is not a valid get.

Rabbi Akiva raised

he raised his voice,

and said,

he too replied to Rabbi Eliezer’s words—

The Gemara will explain that this objection follows the possibility that Rabbi Eliezer’s words were stated with reference to a case where he said to her, “On condition that you do not marry so-and-so.”

It follows that

a woman

this,

whose husband permitted her to every person on condition that she not marry so-and-so,

married one of the men of the marketplace,

whom she was permitted to marry,

and had sons

from him,

and became widowed

became a widow

or was divorced, and

afterward

arose and married this one

the man

who had been forbidden to her

because of her first husband — is it

not found that the get is void,

for her husband stipulated with her that she not marry so-and-so, and since she violated the condition, the get was retroactively void, with the result that when she married one of the men of the marketplace, she was a married woman

and her sons were mamzerim—

You have thus learned that this is not severance

stated in the Torah, for it is impossible that the Torah would say that it is possible to divorce a woman in a manner that can cause mamzerim .

Alternatively,

Rabbi Akiva raised another objection to Rabbi Eliezer’s words—

The Gemara explains that this objection follows the possibility that Rabbi Eliezer’s words were stated with reference to a case where he said to her, “Except for so-and-so.”

If the one to whom she had been forbidden

because of her first husband

was a priest, and the divorcer died,

and now she is permitted to marry even that priest because she is a widow,

is she not found to be a widow for him and a divorcee for everyone else.

That is, although with regard to the priest she is considered only a widow and not a divorcee, because her first husband did not divorce her with regard to him, nevertheless, since with regard to other people she is considered a divorcee, she is forbidden to that priest because of the trace of the get, as we learned above [82b], that even if he divorced her only with regard to him, she is forbidden to the priesthood.

And

if so, we can derive from this

a kal va-chomer: Just as a divorcee

to a priest,

which is lenient,

which is a lenient transgression, being nothing more than a prohibition, nevertheless she is

forbidden

to the priesthood

because of the aspect of divorce in her,

because she bears the designation of a divorcee, even though with regard to the one who consecrates her she is not a divorcee but a widow—

a married woman, which is severe

compared with the prohibition of a divorcee to a priest, as it carries the punishment of stoning,

all the more so

should she be forbidden to marry another because she bears the designation of a married woman with regard to that particular man, even though with regard to him she is not a married woman—

You have thus learned,

rather, from here we learn that wherever she bears

the

designation of a married woman because of that particular man whom her husband retained in the get,

this is not severance

stated in the Torah, and she is considered a married woman with regard to the entire world.

He said to them,

to the four elders,

Rabbi Yehoshua: One does not respond to the lion after its death.

For had Rabbi Eliezer been alive, perhaps he would have given you an answer!

Rava said: All of them,

for all the responses that they gave to Rabbi Eliezer’s words

have

there is upon them

a refutation,

and it is possible to refute them.

Except

for

the

question of

Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, which has no refutation,

for we have no answer to his question.

It was also taught so,

and so we learned in a beraita:

Rabbi Yose said: I regard the words of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya as superior to the words of all of them

because there is no refutation of his response to Rabbi Eliezer’s words.

And now the Gemara comes to explain the responses and the refutations:

The Master said: We learned

above in the beraita:

Rabbi Tarfon raised and said: It follows that

a woman

this

whose husband stipulated with her that she not marry so-and-so,

married this one’s brother

the man

who had been forbidden to her

because of her first husband, who divorced her except with regard to him,

and he died

that brother

without children,

and now she falls for yibbum, but he cannot perform yibbum with her because she is forbidden to him, since her first husband stipulated in the get that she not marry him—

is this one not found

who stipulated with her that she not marry so-and-so

to be uprooting something from the Torah!

For had he not forbidden her to that particular man, she could have performed yibbum with him after his brother died without children, whereas now she cannot perform yibbum.

And we challenge this: Is he really

“uprooting”

it!? When he divorces her in this manner, is

he himself uprooting,

as though he were actively uprooting the mitzva of yibbum? Surely the mitzva of yibbum is not incumbent upon him; rather, he caused the yavam to be unable to fulfill the mitzva of yibbum, and he is not considered to be actively uprooting something from the Torah.

And we answer:

Rather,

Rabbi Tarfon’s intention is to say

that

through imposing a condition in the divorce that she not marry that particular man, he

stipulates to uproot something from the Torah .

.

And we challenge:

“Stipulates”!?

Does he stipulate a condition that uproots something from the Torah?

Does he say to her

does he stipulate with her

“that she has no option but to marry,”

that she cannot marry anyone except

him, the brother of that man,

the brother of that particular man whom he forbids her to marry!? Surely she can marry another person; why, then, is this considered that he stipulates to uproot something from the Torah?

And we answer:

Rather,

Rabbi Tarfon’s intention is to say that because of the condition he stipulated with her, that she not marry so-and-so, he

causes something from the Torah to be uprooted.

For because of the condition she cannot perform yibbum, but he is not actively uprooting it.

And we challenge:

“Causes”!?

Is he called in such a case one who causes something from the Torah to be uprooted?

From now,

he should not marry his brother’s daughter!

A person should be forbidden to marry his brother’s daughter, because

perhaps

he

will die without children,

and she will fall for yibbum before his brother, who is her father, and she is forbidden to him for yibbum because of the prohibition of a daughter.

And it is found

that this one

causes something from the Torah to be uprooted.

Yet we have never heard that it is forbidden to marry one’s brother’s daughter .

Rather,

this is the refutation.

This is Rava’s intention when he said that there is a refutation of Rabbi Tarfon’s response. Indeed, just as one who marries his brother’s daughter is not considered to cause something from the Torah to be uprooted, so too, retention in a get is not considered the uprooting of something from the Torah.

And now the Gemara explains the substance of Rabbi Tarfon’s words:

And with regard to what?

To which matter in Rabbi Eliezer’s words did Rabbi Tarfon raise an objection?

For we have two ways of explaining Rabbi Eliezer’s words. According to the tanna of the Mishna, Rabbi Eliezer disputed with the Rabbis in a case where one says, “Except for so-and-so,” whereas according to the tanna of the beraita, Rabbi Eliezer disputed with the Rabbis in a case where one says, “On condition that you do not marry so-and-so.”

If you say,

if we say that Rabbi Tarfon raised his objection to Rabbi Eliezer’s words in the Mishna, in which he disputed with the Rabbis

in

the case where he said to her, “Behold, you are divorced

except

for so-and-so,” and concerning this Rabbi Tarfon replied that if she marries the brother of that particular man and he dies, she will be forbidden to perform yibbum with that particular man —

This is impossible. For

it is permitted,

she is permitted, even according to

Rabbi Eliezer,

in this manner to marry that particular man, and there is no uprooting of something from the Torah—

and as

as it was taught,

as we learned in a beraita:

Rabbi Eliezer concedes

in the case of one who divorces his wife and says to her, “Behold, you are permitted to every man except for so-and-so,” and she went and married one of the men of the marketplace, and

afterward she

became widowed

became a widow

or was divorced

from him,

that she is permitted to the one to whom she had been forbidden.

That is, she may marry even that particular man concerning whom her husband stipulated with her that she not marry him.

Rather,

Rabbi Tarfon’s answer follows the tanna of the beraita, according to whom Rabbi Eliezer disagreed with the Rabbis

in

the case where he said to her, “Behold, you are permitted to every man

on condition

that you do not marry so-and-so”—

And Rabbi Tarfon answered concerning this that if she marries the brother of that so-and-so and he dies, she will be prohibited from performing yibbum with that so-and-so, even if in the interim she married another. For if she performs yibbum with that so-and-so, the divorce document will be retroactively nullified because of its condition.

We learned further in the beraita:

Rabbi Yosei the Galilean responded and said: Where do we find

in the Torah

that it is prohibited to this one,

a woman who is prohibited to one person,

and permitted to that one,

and permitted to the second person—

Rather, the rule is:

That which is prohibited is prohibited to everyone,

every person,

and that which is permitted is permitted to everyone,

every person.

And we raise an objection:

And

is it so that

we do not

find things that are prohibited to one person and permitted to another?

But

we find this with regard to eating

teruma and

eating

sacred offerings, which is prohibited

the eating of teruma and sacred offerings

to this one,

an Israelite,

and permitted

their eating

to that one,

a kohen.

And we answer:

We are speaking of the prohibition of a woman.

Rabbi Yosei the Galilean’s intention is to answer that we do not find a woman who is permitted to one person and prohibited to another.

And we raise an objection:

But

we find this with regard to the prohibition of

forbidden sexual relations,

where she is prohibited to her relatives and permitted to others!?

And we answer:

We are speaking of marital status.

Rabbi Yosei the Galilean’s intention is to answer that we do not find a woman who becomes prohibited to one person through betrothal and is permitted to another.

And we raise an objection:

But

even with regard to betrothal we find a woman who is permitted to one person and prohibited to another, for every

married woman

is permitted to her husband and prohibited to the entire world!?

And we answer: Indeed,

this is the refutation.

This is Rava’s intention, that there is a refutation of Rabbi Yosei the Galilean’s answer.

And now the Gemara explains the substance of Rabbi Yosei the Galilean’s words:

And with regard to what,

which of Rabbi Eliezer’s statements did Rabbi Yosei the Galilean raise the difficulty—

If you say,

if we say that Rabbi Yosei the Galilean raised the difficulty against Rabbi Eliezer’s words brought in the beraita, where the case is

in

the situation in which he said to her, “Behold, you are divorced

on condition

that you do not marry so-and-so,” and this is a valid divorce document; and concerning this Rabbi Yosei the Galilean raised the difficulty that we do not find a woman who is prohibited to one person and permitted to another—

This is not possible. For in a case where he stipulated with her, “on condition that you do not marry so-and-so,” this is not considered that she became prohibited to him, for

she is permitted to him through illicit intercourse.

Since the entire condition was only that she not marry so-and-so, she nevertheless remains permitted to have intercourse with him; and this is not called “permitted to this one and prohibited to that one,” because her being prohibited to marry him is nothing more than a condition.

And we answer:

Rather,

Rabbi Yosei the Galilean’s refutation is against Rabbi Eliezer’s words in the Mishna,

in

the situation in which he said to her,

“except

for so-and-so,” because since he completely reserved that so-and-so, and with regard to him she remains prohibited as a married woman, she is therefore considered “permitted to this one and prohibited to that one.”

We learned further in the beraita:

Rabbi Akiva responded and said: Suppose this

woman

who

her husband permitted to every person “except for so-and-so,”

and she married one of the men of the marketplace,

to whom she was permitted to marry,

and she had sons

from him,

and became widowed

and was widowed,

or became divorced, and

afterward

proceeded and married this one

the man

to whom she had been prohibited

because of her first husband—

would the divorce document not be found nullified,

for since she did not fulfill the condition and married that so-and-so, the divorce document was retroactively nullified, and it turns out that at the time when she was married to one of the men of the marketplace, she was a married woman,

and her sons

who were born from him are

mamzerim—

And we raise an objection:

If so,

if we are concerned that she will not fulfill the condition,

with regard to every ordinary condition,

in every place where one imposes a condition in a divorce document such that if she does not fulfill the condition the divorce document will be nullified,

she should also not marry,

we should prohibit her from marrying, because

perhaps she will not fulfill its condition,

let us be concerned lest she not fulfill the condition,

and it will turn out that the divorce document is nullified and her sons are mamzerim.

And we answer: Indeed,

this is the refutation.

This is Rava’s intention, that there is a refutation of Rabbi Akiva’s answer.

And now the Gemara explains the substance of Rabbi Akiva’s words:

And with regard to what

which of Rabbi Eliezer’s statements did Rabbi Akiva answer —

If you say,

if we say that Rabbi Akiva raised the difficulty against Rabbi Eliezer’s words brought in the Mishna, where he disagreed with the Rabbis

in

the situation in which he said to her, “Behold, you are divorced

except

for so-and-so,” and Rabbi Akiva answered concerning this that we are concerned lest she marry another and they have sons, and afterward she become widowed from him and marry that so-and-so, and it will turn out that the divorce document is nullified and her sons are mamzerim—

This is not possible. For

it has been permitted,

it is permitted for her, even according to

Rabbi Eliezer,

to marry that so-and-so—

And this is

as it was taught,

and as we learned in a beraita:

Rabbi Eliezer concedes in the case of one who divorces his wife and says to her, “Behold, you are

permitted to every man except for so-and-so,” and she proceeded and married one of the men of the marketplace, and

afterward she

became widowed

and was widowed

or became divorced

from him,

that she is permitted to the one to whom she had been prohibited.

She may marry that so-and-so, despite the fact that her husband said that he was permitting her to the entire world except for him, since there was an interruption through her marriage to another person.

Rather,

Rabbi Akiva’s answer follows the tanna of the beraita, according to whom Rabbi Eliezer disagreed with the Rabbis

in

the situation in which he said to her, “Behold, you are permitted to every man

on condition

that you do not marry so-and-so,” for even if in the interim she married another person, nevertheless if she marries that so-and-so, the divorce document is retroactively nullified—

We learned further in the beraita:

Alternatively,

in another manner Rabbi Akiva answered Rabbi Eliezer’s words:

Suppose the one to whom she had been prohibited

because of her first husband

was a kohen, and the divorcer died,

and now she is permitted to that kohen because she is a widow

, would she not be a widow with him and a divorcee with everyone,

even though with regard to the kohen she is considered only a widow and not a divorcee, nevertheless, since with regard to the rest of humanity she is considered a divorcee, she becomes prohibited to that kohen because of the trace of the divorce document, as we learned above [82b], that even if he divorced her only from him, she is prohibited to the kehuna—

And

if so, we can derive from this

a kal va-chomer:

And

just as a divorcee

to a kohen,

which is a lenient matter,

whose prohibition is a lenient prohibition, being only a negative commandment, nevertheless she is

prohibited

to the kehuna

because of the aspect of divorce within her,

because she bears the designation of a divorcee, even though with regard to the one who betrothed her she is not a divorcee but a widow—

a married woman, which is stringent,

whose prohibition is more stringent than the prohibition of a divorcee to a kohen, since the punishment of a married woman is stoning,

all the more so

she will certainly be prohibited from marrying another because she bears, with regard to that so-and-so, the designation of a married woman, even though with regard to him she is not a married woman—

And now the Gemara explains Rabbi Akiva’s second answer:

And with regard to what?

Concerning which matter of Rabbi Eliezer’s words does Rabbi Akiva’s second answer revolve—

If you say,

if we say that Rabbi Akiva answered Rabbi Eliezer, who disagreed with the Rabbis

in

the situation in which he said to her, “Behold, you are divorced

on condition

that you do not marry so-and-so” —