Gittin 82b — the Talmud in English

for Rabbi Eliezer permits

her

to every man, apart from that man. And the Sages prohibit

her from marrying any man, since this is an invalid divorce document.

But when he says to her, “Behold, you are permitted to every man apart from so-and-so,” everyone agrees that this is an invalid divorce document.

And the Gemara explains the rationale of Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis according to the method of the beraita, that Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis disagree regarding “on the condition”:

What is the rationale of Rabbi Eliezer,

who holds that this is a valid divorce document?—

As is the case with every ordinary condition.

Because this resembles every ordinary condition and is not a reservation in the divorce. For with this divorce document he permits her to every man, and the fact that she is forbidden to marry the man regarding whom he stipulated—that if she marries him the divorce document will be nullified—is not a contradiction to the permission of the divorce document; rather, she is forbidden to marry only because of the condition within it.

And the Rabbis

hold that this does not resemble an ordinary condition. For

every ordinary condition

does not invalidate the divorce document because

he did not make a reservation for her in the divorce document,

for the divorce document permits her to every man. But

here, he made a reservation for her in the divorce document.

Since he said to her, “on the condition that you not marry so-and-so,” it emerges that because of the condition the divorce document does not permit her to every man; therefore the Sages hold that she is not divorced.

And the Gemara continues and explains:

And our Mishna, which we established as referring to “apart from,”

our Mishna, which we have now established as referring to a case in which Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis disagree when he says to her “apart from so-and-so”—

What is the rationale of Rabbi Eliezer?

Why does Rabbi Eliezer hold that this is a valid divorce document?

Rabbi Yannai said in the name of one elder:

The verse says

in the passage concerning divorce [Deuteronomy 24],

“And she shall leave his house, and she shall go and become another man’s.”

And the Sages expound from the wording of the verse that

even if he did not permit her

her husband, through the divorce document,

except

only

to one

other man,

she is divorced.

And all the more so, if he permitted her to the whole world apart from so-and-so, she is divorced.

And the Rabbis,

what do they expound from this verse?—

This “man,”

the intention of the Scripture is not to say that it is sufficient for her to be permitted to only one man through the divorce document. Rather, on the contrary, she must be permitted

to every man and each man.

And if he said to her “apart from so-and-so,” since he did not permit her to every man and each man, she is not divorced.

And

had

Rabbi Yohanan said

another explanation for Rabbi Eliezer’s rationale:

The rationale of Rabbi Eliezer,

that if he said to her “apart from so-and-so,” this is a valid divorce document, is

from here:

It is stated concerning the marriages of a koen [Leviticus 21]:

“And a woman divorced from her husband they shall not take.”

And the Sages expound from the wording of the verse that

even if she was not divorced

the woman

except from her husband,

but she was not permitted to marry any man, nevertheless she

is disqualified from the priesthood.

That is, even if she was divorced only from her husband—for example, if he said to her, “Behold, you are divorced only from me, but you are forbidden to every man”—nevertheless she is forbidden to the priesthood, by virtue of the “scent of a divorce document,” which disqualifies her from the priesthood—

Evidently, it is a divorce document.

That is, since we see that even if she is divorced only from him and forbidden to every man, nevertheless she is disqualified from the priesthood because of the scent of the divorce document, and although she is forbidden to marry the whole world, it nevertheless has the status of a divorce document, all the more so when he permits her to every man apart from so-and-so, such a divorce document is a divorce document, and through it she is permitted to every man apart from that so-and-so.

And the Rabbis,

what will they answer concerning Rabbi Eliezer’s proof from the scent of the divorce document, that “apart from so-and-so” is considered a valid divorce document?—

The prohibition of the priesthood is different.

Although she is forbidden to the priesthood, this is not proof that it is considered a valid divorce document, for regarding priests the Scripture added additional mitzvot, and therefore even the scent of a divorce document disqualifies them from the priesthood.

But concerning the permission provided by this divorce document to marry through it, this is considered an invalid divorce document.

Rabbi Abba raised a problem: With regard to kiddushin -

how?

What is the law with regard to kiddushin, if he says, “Be betrothed to me in order to be forbidden to every person with the prohibition of a married woman, except for so-and-so”: are the kiddushin valid or invalid? -

Let the question be raised,

there is uncertainty about this

according to

the view of

Rabbi Eliezer,

who says that one who says “except for so-and-so”—this is a valid bill of divorce.

And likewise,

let the question be raised according to

the view of

the Rabbis,

who hold that if he said to her “except for so-and-so,” this is an invalid bill of divorce -

Let the question be raised according to Rabbi Eliezer -

Shall we say:

Rabbi Eliezer stated this only here,

with regard to divorce, that even if he said “except for so-and-so,” this is a valid bill of divorce,

because verses are written

[to teach it].

Because this is learned from the verses, as the Gemara explained above.

But there,

with regard to kiddushin,

a proper acquisition is required,

he must acquire her with a complete acquisition, which forbids her to the entire world; and if he says to her “except for so-and-so,” she is not betrothed -

Or perhaps,

perhaps even with regard to kiddushin it is effective if he betroths her except for so-and-so, because we learn by means of an analogy from kiddushin to divorce, since it is stated in the passage concerning divorce,

“And she shall go out, and she shall be,”

the verse equates havaya [from the expression “coming into existence,” meaning kiddushin] with going out. And just as with regard to a bill of divorce, if he says, “You are divorced from me except for so-and-so,” she is divorced, so too with regard to kiddushin, if he says to her, “Be betrothed to me except for so-and-so,” she is betrothed.

Let the question be raised according to the Rabbis -

Shall we say:

The Rabbis stated this only here

that he cannot make a reservation,

but

with regard to divorce, because

we require “severance,” and there is none,

for the bill of divorce must sever the relationship between him and her; and if he makes a reservation concerning so-and-so, this is not complete severance, since because of him she is forbidden to so-and-so.

But there,

with regard to kiddushin, the Rabbis hold that

an acquisition

of kiddushin

of any sort is sufficient,

which forbids her only to part of the world, and it is not necessary that it forbid her with regard to the entire world -

Or perhaps, “And she shall go out, and she shall be,”

the verse equates havaya with going out. And just as with regard to divorce it is impossible to make a reservation concerning so-and-so, so too with regard to kiddushin, saying “except for so-and-so” is not effective.

After he had raised the question for himself,

after Rabbi Abba was uncertain,

he then resolved it,

he returned and resolved his uncertainty:

Both according to

the view of

Rabbi Eliezer,

and

both according to

the view of

the Rabbis, we require “And she shall go out, and she shall be.”

We learn kiddushin from divorce by analogy. And according to the Rabbis, who hold that in divorce it is impossible to make a reservation concerning so-and-so, the same applies to kiddushin: it is impossible to make a reservation concerning so-and-so. Whereas according to Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that in divorce it is possible to make a reservation concerning so-and-so, the same applies to kiddushin: it is effective if he betroths her so as to forbid her to the entire world except for so-and-so.

Abaye said: If you should conclude,

if it is said

that Rabbi Abba’s teaching is established,

that Rabbi Abba’s statement is correct, namely, that according to Rabbi Eliezer, if he says to her, “Behold, you are betrothed to me to be forbidden to the entire world except for so-and-so,” the kiddushin take effect with regard to the entire world except for that particular person, the law will be as follows: If

Reuben came and betrothed her,

so that she would be forbidden to the entire world

except for Simeon

his brother,

and

afterward

Simeon came

to whom she was still permitted, since his brother Reuben had betrothed her except for him,

and betrothed her,

but he did not forbid her to his brother Reuben; rather, at the time when he betrothed her, he said that he [too] forbade her to the entire world, but

except for Reuben,

his brother -

Simeon’s kiddushin are entirely ineffective, as the Gemara will explain immediately,

and

therefore, if afterward

both of them died,

Reuben and Simeon, she

is subject to yibbum,

she may undergo yibbum

with Levi,

the brother of Reuben and Simeon -

And I do not apply to her,

we do not forbid her from undergoing yibbum with Levi because of the law of

“the wife of two

brothers

who died.”

A woman upon whom there rests the “bond of two brothers who died” is forbidden to undergo yibbum; rather, she leaves through halitza. For example, there were three brothers, Reuben, Simeon, and Levi, and Reuben died first without children, and Reuben’s wife fell before Simeon and Levi for yibbum. Simeon came and performed maamar with her [he did not betroth her through intercourse as is the law of a yevama, but betrothed her with money or a document, which are called, with regard to a yevama, “kiddushei maamar”]. Before Simeon managed to take her as a wife, he died. She now falls before Levi, the third brother, for yibbum, by virtue of two deceased men: by virtue of Reuben, to whom she had been married, and by virtue of Simeon, to whom she had been betrothed through the kiddushin of maamar.

Since Simeon had still not taken her, the bond arising from Reuben had not lapsed [but if Simeon had performed yibbum with her through intercourse, the bond that had arisen because of Reuben would have lapsed, and she could have undergone yibbum with Levi by virtue of Simeon]; and now that Simeon has also died, an additional bond has been added to her also because of Simeon’s kiddushin. And since she is now subject to yibbum with Levi both by virtue of Reuben and by virtue of Simeon’s maamar, she cannot undergo yibbum and is considered the wife of two deceased men.

And the Gemara explains:

What is the reason

that she is not considered the wife of two deceased men? -

Since only

Reuben’s kiddushin were effective.

For only Reuben’s kiddushin were effective and took effect to forbid her to the entire world. But

Simeon’s kiddushin were not effective,

they were effective for nothing, since as far as being forbidden to the entire world, she was already forbidden by virtue of Reuben’s kiddushin.

If Simeon had betrothed her without qualification and had not said “except for Reuben,” his kiddushin would have been effective to forbid her to Reuben. But now, since Simeon betrothed her except for Reuben, his kiddushin were therefore effective for nothing , and therefore she is not considered “the wife of two deceased men,” and she is permitted to undergo yibbum with Levi.

And the Gemara adds and explains:

But, “the wife of two deceased men” -

how can you find it?

How is a case of the wife of two deceased men possible in Rabbi Abba’s case? -

For example, Reuben came and betrothed her

to be forbidden to the entire world

except for Simeon,

his brother.

And Simeon came,

his brother,

and betrothed her without qualification,

and did not say “except for Reuben.” Simeon also died, and then she is considered the wife of two deceased men, because -

For Reuben’s kiddushin were effective to forbid her to everyone,

for Reuben’s kiddushin were effective to forbid her to the entire world,

and Simeon’s kiddushin

and Simeon’s kiddushin

were effective to forbid her to Reuben,

were effective to forbid her to Reuben with the prohibition of a married woman. Therefore, when Simeon dies, she cannot undergo yibbum with Levi, because she is considered the wife of two deceased men .

Abaye raised a problem:

he was uncertain,

Abaye:

What will the law be if

he said to her, “Behold, you are permitted to every person, except for Reuben and Simeon,”

and he had not yet handed her the bill of divorce,

and then said to her again

at the time of handing over the bill of divorce that he permits her also

to Reuben and Simeon -

what is [the law]?

How do we interpret his words?

Do we say

that his intention is to retract, and

that which he forbade,

what he initially forbade her to Reuben and Simeon by stipulation, now

he permits,

he permits her also to Reuben and Simeon -

Or perhaps,

or perhaps we say:

that which he forbade,

what he initially forbade her to Reuben and Simeon,

he permits,

he now permits her,

and that which he permitted, he forbids.

What he initially permitted her to the entire world, he now retracts from and comes to forbid her, and his intention is that she be forbidden to the entire world except for Reuben and Simeon.