Gittin 82b (פב:) — the Talmud in English

For Rabbi Eliezer permits

her

to marry any man except that man. And the Sages prohibit

her from marrying any man, since this is an invalid bill of divorce.

But when he says to her, “You are hereby permitted to marry any man except for so-and-so,” everyone agrees that this is an invalid bill of divorce.

The Gemara explains the reasoning of Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages according to the method of the beraita, that Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages disagree concerning “on condition”:

What is the reason for Rabbi Eliezer,

who maintains that this is a valid bill of divorce?—

It is analogous to any ordinary condition.

It is similar to any ordinary condition and is not a reservation in the divorce. For through this bill of divorce he permits her to marry anyone, and the fact that she is forbidden to marry the man concerning whom he stipulated that if she marries him the bill of divorce will be annulled does not contradict the permission granted by the bill of divorce; rather, she is forbidden to marry him only because of the condition it contains.

And the Sages

maintain that this is not similar to an ordinary condition. For

every ordinary condition

does not invalidate the bill of divorce because

he did not reserve anything for her in the bill of divorce,

since the bill of divorce permits her to marry anyone. But

here, he reserved something for her in the bill of divorce.

Since he said to her, “on condition that you do not marry so-and-so,” it follows that because of the condition the bill of divorce does not permit her to marry everyone. Therefore, the Sages maintain that she is not divorced.

The Gemara continues and explains:

And our Mishna, which we established as referring to “except,”

our Mishna, which we have now established as referring to a case where he says to her, “except for so-and-so”—

What is the reason for Rabbi Eliezer?

Why does Rabbi Eliezer maintain that this is a valid bill of divorce?

Rabbi Yannai said in the name of a certain elder:

The verse states

in the passage concerning divorce [Deuteronomy 24]:

“And she leaves his house, and goes and becomes another man’s.”

The Sages expound the wording of the verse to mean that

even if he did not permit her

through the bill of divorce

except

only to

one

other man,

she is nevertheless divorced.

And all the more so, if he permitted her to marry the entire world except for so-and-so, she is divorced.

And the Sages,

what do they expound from this verse?—

This “man,”

the verse does not mean that it is sufficient for her to be permitted by the bill of divorce to marry only one man. On the contrary, she must be permitted

to every man and every man.

And if he said to her “except for so-and-so,” since he did not permit her to marry every man and every man, she is not divorced.

And

if

Rabbi Yohanan had said

another explanation of Rabbi Eliezer’s reasoning:

Rabbi Eliezer’s reasoning,

that if he says to her “except for so-and-so” this is a valid bill of divorce, is

from here:

It is stated concerning the marriage of a kohen [Leviticus 21]:

“And a divorced woman from her husband they shall not take.”

The Sages expounded the wording of the verse to mean that

even if the woman was divorced

only

from her husband,

but was not permitted to marry anyone at all, nevertheless she

is disqualified from the priesthood.

That is, even if she was divorced only from her husband—for example, if he said to her, “You are hereby divorced from me alone, but you remain forbidden to everyone”—nevertheless she is forbidden to marry a kohen, by the law of the “scent of a bill of divorce,” which disqualifies a woman from the priesthood—

Apparently, it is a bill of divorce.

That is, since we see that even if she is divorced only from him and remains forbidden to everyone, she is nevertheless disqualified from the priesthood because of the scent of a bill of divorce, and although she is forbidden to marry the entire world, it is nevertheless called a bill of divorce, all the more so in a case where he permitted her to marry everyone except for so-and-so: such a bill of divorce is indeed a bill of divorce, and by virtue of it she is permitted to marry everyone except that particular man.

And the Sages,

what will they answer Rabbi Eliezer’s proof from the scent of a bill of divorce, that “except for so-and-so” is considered a valid bill of divorce?—

The prohibition concerning the priesthood is different.

Although she is forbidden to marry a kohen, this is no proof that it is considered a valid bill of divorce, since with regard to kohanim the Torah imposed additional mitzvot, and therefore even the scent of a bill of divorce disqualifies a woman from marrying into the priesthood.

But with regard to the bill of divorce permitting her to marry, it is considered an invalid bill of divorce.

Rabbi Abba raised a dilemma: With regard to betrothal -

how?

What is the halakha with regard to betrothal if he says: “Be betrothed to me in order to be forbidden to everyone else by the prohibition of a married woman, except for so-and-so”? Are the betrothal valid or invalid? -

It may be raised as a dilemma

to examine this

according to the

opinion of

Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that one who says “except for so-and-so”—this is a valid get.

And likewise,

it may be raised as a dilemma

according to the

opinion of

the Rabbis, who hold that if he says to her “except for so-and-so,” this is an invalid get -

It may be raised as a dilemma according to Rabbi Eliezer -

Should we say:

Rabbi Eliezer stated this only here,

with regard to divorce, that even if he says “except for so-and-so,” this is a valid get,

only because the verses

are written

because this is learned from the verses, as the Gemara explained above.

But there,

with regard to betrothal,

a complete acquisition is required,

he must acquire her completely, so that she is forbidden to the entire world; and if he says to her “except for so-and-so,” she is not betrothed -

Or perhaps

the same would be effective with regard to betrothal if he betrothed her except for so-and-so, because we learn betrothal from divorce by means of a hekesh, based on what is stated in the passage concerning divorce,

“and she shall depart and she shall be”:

the verse juxtaposes havaya—literally, “becoming,” meaning betrothal—to departure. Just as with regard to a get, if he says, “You are divorced except for so-and-so,” she is divorced, so too with regard to betrothal, if he says to her, “Be betrothed to me except for so-and-so,” she is betrothed.

It may be raised as a dilemma according to the Rabbis -

Should we say:

The Rabbis stated this only here,

that he cannot make a reservation,

but

with regard to divorce, because

“complete severance” is required, and there is none,

for the get must completely sever the bond between him and her; and if he makes a reservation with regard to so-and-so, this is not complete severance, since she remains forbidden to so-and-so on his account.

But there,

with regard to betrothal, the Rabbis maintain that an

acquisition

of betrothal

of any degree is sufficient,

so that he need only forbid her to part of the world, and need not forbid her to the entire world -

Or perhaps, “and she shall depart and she shall be,”

the verse juxtaposes havaya to departure. Just as with regard to divorce one cannot make a reservation except for so-and-so, so too with regard to betrothal, it is not effective for him to say “except for so-and-so.”

After the dilemma was raised for him,

after Rabbi Abba raised the question,

he then resolved it,

he returned and resolved his uncertainty:

Both according to the

opinion of

Rabbi Eliezer,

and

both according to the

opinion of

the Rabbis, “and she shall depart and she shall be” is required.

We learn betrothal from divorce by means of the juxtaposition. According to the Rabbis, who hold that in divorce one cannot make a reservation except for so-and-so, the same applies to betrothal: one cannot make a reservation except for so-and-so. And according to Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that in divorce one can make a reservation except for so-and-so, the same applies to betrothal: it is effective if he betroths her so that she is forbidden to the entire world except for so-and-so.

Abaye said: If you should say

that

Rabbi Abba’s ruling is valid,

that Rabbi Abba’s statement is correct, namely, that according to Rabbi Eliezer, if he says to her, “You are betrothed to me in order to be forbidden to the entire world except for so-and-so,” the betrothal takes effect with regard to the entire world except for that person, the halakha would be as follows: If

Reuven came and betrothed her,

so that she would be forbidden to the entire world

except for Shimon

his brother,

and

afterward

Shimon came

to whom she was still permitted, since his brother Reuven had betrothed her except for him,

and betrothed her,

but he did not forbid her to his brother Reuven; rather, when he betrothed her he said that he too was forbidding her to the entire world, but

except for Reuven,

his brother -

Shimon’s betrothal is entirely ineffective, as the Gemara will explain immediately,

and

therefore, if afterward

both of them died,

Reuven and Shimon, she

performs yibbum

and may undergo yibbum

with Levi,

the brother of Reuven and Shimon -

And I do not apply to her

the prohibition against undergoing yibbum with Levi on account of the law of

“the wife of two

brothers

who died.”

A woman who is subject to the “bond of two brothers who died” is forbidden to undergo yibbum and instead leaves through halitza. For example, if there were three brothers—Reuven, Shimon, and Levi—and Reuven first died childless, his wife fell before Shimon and Levi for yibbum, and Shimon performed maamar with her [he did not betroth her through intercourse as is the law regarding a yevama; rather, he betrothed her with money or a document, which is called kiddushei maamar in the case of a yevama], and before Shimon managed to marry her, he died, she now falls before Levi, the third brother, for yibbum by virtue of two deceased brothers: by virtue of Reuven, to whom she had been married, and by virtue of Shimon, to whom she had been betrothed through maamar.

Since Shimon had not yet married her, the bond resulting from Reuven was not removed [but if Shimon had performed yibbum with her through intercourse, the bond resulting from Reuven would have been removed, and she could have undergone yibbum with Levi by virtue of Shimon]; and now that Shimon too has died, an additional bond has been added to her on account of Shimon’s betrothal. Since she is now obligated to undergo yibbum with Levi both by virtue of Reuven and by virtue of Shimon’s maamar, she cannot undergo yibbum and is considered the wife of two brothers who died.

And the Gemara explains:

What is the reason

that she is not considered the wife of two brothers who died?

Because only

Reuven’s betrothal was effective.

For only Reuven’s betrothal was effective and took effect to forbid her to the entire world. But

Shimon’s betrothal was not effective,

it accomplished nothing, since she was already forbidden to the entire world by virtue of Reuven’s betrothal.

Had Shimon betrothed her without qualification, and had he not said “except for Reuven,” his betrothal would have been effective in forbidding her to Reuven. But now, since Shimon betrothed her except for Reuven, his betrothal accomplished nothing , and therefore she is not considered “the wife of two who died,” and she is permitted to undergo yibbum with Levi.

The Gemara further adds and explains:

But if so, “the wife of two who died” -

how can you find such a case?

How is it possible to have a case of a wife of two who died in the case presented by Rabbi Abba? -

For example, Reuven came and betrothed her

so that she would be forbidden to the entire world

except for Shimon,

his brother.

And Shimon came,

his brother,

and betrothed her without qualification,

and did not say “except for Reuven.” If Shimon too died, she is considered the wife of two who died, because -

For Reuven’s betrothal was effective in forbidding her to everyone,

since Reuven’s betrothal was effective in forbidding her to the entire world,

and Shimon’s betrothal

and Shimon’s betrothal

was effective in forbidding her to Reuven,

it was effective in forbidding her to Reuven with the prohibition of a married woman. Therefore, when Shimon dies, she cannot undergo yibbum with Levi, because she is considered the wife of two who died .

Abaye raised

the following dilemma:

Abaye

wondered what the halakha would be if he

said to her, “You are hereby permitted to every person, except for Reuven and Shimon,”

but had not yet handed her the get,

and then said to her

at the time he handed her the get that he was permitting her also

to Reuven and Shimon -

what is the halakha?

How should we interpret his words?

Do we say

that his intention was to retract, and

that which he forbade,

what he initially forbade her through the condition concerning Reuven and Shimon, he now

permits,

he permits her even to Reuven and Shimon -

Or perhaps,

perhaps we should say:

that which he forbade,

what he initially forbade her to Reuven and Shimon, he

permits,

he now permits her to them,

and that which he permitted, he forbade.

What he initially permitted her to the entire world, he now retracts and comes to forbid her, and his intention is that she be forbidden to the entire world except for Reuven and Shimon.