Gittin 82a (פב.) — the Talmud in English

Because he skips and teaches one by one.

The tanna omits only one connection in each skip—for example, from seven to six, and from six to five. This implies that if more than one connection was left unsigned, there is no dispute between ben Nannas and Rabbi Akiva, and according to everyone the additional connection can be completed only by a fit witness.

And we conclude:

Learn from this!

Abaye said: Learn from this

from the Mishna that

this relative,

who completes a deficient get,

signs

the get wherever he wishes,

if he wishes,

that is, if he desires to do so:

either at the beginning,

before the fit witnesses,

or in the middle,

between them,

or at the end.

And Abaye proves this:

From where,

do I know this from the Mishna?

As it does not establish a place for him.

The tanna of the Mishna does not establish where the deficiency in the deficient get is located; rather, it simply says: “With regard to a deficient get, anyone may complete it.” This implies that wherever it is deficient, it may be completed by relatives.

And

likewise

learn from this,

from the fact that no fixed place is established for where the relative may complete it, and from the rule stated above, that it may not be completed by more than one relative: From these two laws together we learn that when a linked get or another linked document—because of gittin, the Sages instituted for all documents that they could be prepared in linked form. Rashi comes before a court for validation by witnesses who recognize the signatures of the witnesses—

we validate it from any three,

as the validation may be performed on the basis of any three witnesses from among all the witnesses who signed,

and we do not require

that the signatures of the three be

consecutive

specifically. Rather, if, for example, ten witnesses signed, it is possible to validate the document by recognizing the first, third, and fifth signatures.

For if it could enter your mind that we require

validation through recognition of three signatures that are

consecutive

specifically, this would be difficult: Why did they not permit more than one relative to complete a deficient get? We said that the reason is concern that the court validating the get might err and validate it on the basis of two relatives and one fit witness.

But we have a solution for this:

establish a place for this relative

who completes it—either

at the beginning,

establishing that he is first in every group of three witnesses, meaning one relative followed by two fit witnesses, and so on;

or in the middle,

with one fit witness signing before each relative and one fit witness after him;

or at the end,

two fit witnesses and a relative, two fit witnesses and a relative.

And this would be much better.

Then many relatives could complete the document, and no mishap would result, since validation would have to be performed specifically from consecutive witnesses, and in every group of three consecutive witnesses there would necessarily be, according to this arrangement, at least two fit witnesses.

Rather, it is certainly not necessary to validate specifically from consecutive witnesses. Therefore, establishing a fixed place for the relatives would not help either, because even then it is possible that, among three nonconsecutive witnesses, two would be relatives.

When a linked get came before Rav Ami,

when a linked get was brought before him in which the husband had not summoned a sufficient number of witnesses corresponding to the number of connections,

he said to him,

Rav Ami said to the husband:

Go and have a slave from the marketplace complete it for you!

This accords with the opinion of ben Nannas in our Mishna, that even a slave may complete a deficient get.

We shall return to you, chapter HaZorek.

Mishna:

One who divorces his wife and says to her

at the time of handing her the bill of divorce,

“You are hereby permitted to marry any man, except so-and-so,” in the Gemara it will be explained what the phrase “except so-and-so” means: whether its meaning is “except for so-and-so,” or whether it is a condition, stipulating that she may not marry that particular man.

the Gemara will explain what the phrase “except so-and-so” means: whether it means “apart from so-and-so,” or whether it is a condition, meaning that she is permitted to marry anyone on condition that she not marry that particular man.

Rabbi Eliezer permits

her to marry any other man, apart from that particular man, as is the law with a woman who was divorced with a valid bill of divorce.

And the Sages prohibit

her from marrying any other man, since the handing over of the bill of divorce in this manner is an invalid handing over.

And the Mishna explains, according to the opinion of the Sages, who maintain that this is an invalid handing over:

What should he do?

What must the husband do in order to rectify the invalid handing over?

He must take it from her,

taking the bill of divorce back from the woman,

and give it to her again

a second time,

and say to her

at the time of handing her the bill of divorce,

“You are hereby permitted to marry any man.”

But if

he wrote inside it,

that the husband wrote inside the bill of divorce, “You are hereby permitted to marry any man, except so-and-so,”

even though he subsequently erased it,

namely, what he had added, “except so-and-so,” it is nevertheless a

invalid bill of divorce.

Gemara:

They raised a dilemma:

The members of the academy were uncertain:

This

phrase that he said,

“except” for so-and-so—is it an expression of exclusion, meaning, “You are hereby permitted to marry any man

so-and-so”—is it an expression meaning “apart from”: “You are hereby permitted to marry any man

except

so-and-so,”

or is it?

Or

does what he said, “except for so-and-so,” constitute an expression of a condition: “You are hereby permitted to marry any man

on condition

that you do not marry so-and-so,”

or is it?

The Gemara now explains the nature of the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages according to the two sides of the dilemma:

According to the possibility that the expression “except”

“except”

for so-and-so

is

one may say that it is only

when he says, “You are hereby permitted to marry any man

apart

except

for so-and-so,”

that the Sages disagree with Rabbi Eliezer,

for only then do the Sages maintain that the bill of divorce is invalid,

because he reserved a portion for her in the bill of divorce.

For by saying “except for so-and-so,” he limits the permission granted by the bill of divorce, since the bill of divorce does not permit her to marry everyone.

But when he says to her, “You are hereby permitted to marry any man

on

on condition

that you do not marry so-and-so,” which is an expression of a condition,

they agree with him,

the Sages agree with Rabbi Eliezer that the bill of divorce is valid.

As is the case,

for this condition is similar

to any ordinary condition, to any ordinary condition, since the bill of divorce is given to her in an absolute manner, permitting her to marry anyone. The fact that she cannot marry that particular man is solely because of an ordinary condition: if she does not fulfill the condition, the bill of divorce will be annulled. However, this does not contradict the permission granted by the bill of divorce, by which she is permitted to marry anyone, including that man, and it is not considered a reservation in the bill of divorce.

like any ordinary condition: the bill of divorce is given to her absolutely, permitting her to marry anyone. The fact that she cannot marry that particular person is only because of an ordinary condition—if she does not fulfill the condition, the bill of divorce will be annulled. But this does not contradict the bill’s permission, that she is permitted by virtue of the bill to everyone, including that person, and it is not considered that something was left out of the bill.

Or perhaps, the expression “except,” as though he said to her,

“

“on condition”

that you do not marry so-and-so

is.

And

according to this, it is only when he says to her, “You are divorced

on condition

that you do not marry so-and-so,”

that Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with the Sages,

maintaining that this is a valid bill of divorce, since it is merely a condition—

But when

he says to her, “You are hereby permitted to marry any man

except

for so-and-so,”

Rabbi Eliezer concedes

to the Sages that this is an invalid bill of divorce,

because he reserved a portion for her in the bill of divorce.

For by saying “except for so-and-so,” he causes the bill of divorce not to permit the woman to marry that particular man, and the bill of divorce lacks complete severance; therefore, even Rabbi Eliezer concedes that this is an invalid bill of divorce.

Ravina said: Come and hear

a proof that will resolve the dilemma concerning the subject of the dispute, from the words of the Mishna that we learned in tractate Negaim [12a]:

All the houses

of Jews in Eretz Yisrael, if a blemish appears in a house, are

rendered impure with the affliction, except for those of gentiles.

Ravina proves:

Granted, if you say

that the word “except” is an expression of

“except for”—

well,

the intention of the Mishna is understood: all the houses in Eretz Yisrael that belong to Jews are rendered impure, except for the houses of gentiles, which are not rendered impure.

But if you say

that the word “except” is an expression of

“on condition,”

how is the Mishna to be understood? For according to this, you must explain that the Mishna means that Jewish houses are rendered impure with the affliction

“on condition that gentile houses are not rendered impure.”

That is, only on condition that gentile houses are not rendered impure with the affliction,

are Jewish houses rendered impure,

only then are Jewish houses rendered impure with the affliction.

But if gentile houses are rendered impure,

if gentile houses are rendered impure with the affliction,

Jewish houses are not rendered impure!

But this statement has no meaning or intelligibility!

Furthermore,

there is a difficulty:

Gentile houses—are they rendered impure?

Is it at all applicable to say that gentile houses become impure through the affliction—

But it was taught

that we learned in a beraita:

It is written in the Torah [Leviticus 14], concerning the affliction of houses:

“And I place the affliction of leprosy in a house of the land of your inheritance,”

and the Sages expounded from the wording of the verse that specifically

“the land of your inheritance,”

that is, the inheritance of [the houses of] Jews,

becomes impure through the affliction, but the houses of gentiles do not become impure through the affliction.

Rather, conclude from here

that it is proven from here that “except” is an expression of

“except for.”

And the conclusion of the Gemara is: Indeed,

conclude from here.

The intention of the Mishna is that only Jewish houses become impure through the affliction, whereas gentile houses do not become impure through the affliction.

Accordingly, Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages in our Mishna disagree in a case where he says, “You are hereby permitted, except for so-and-so,” whether she is divorced or not.

The Gemara now explains that according to Ravina’s explanation, necessarily

the Mishna,

our Mishna, in which Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages disagree in a case where he says, “You are divorced except for so-and-so,” whether this is a valid bill of divorce or not,

is not like this tanna

and is not as we learned in the beraita—

As it was taught: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, said:

Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages did not disagree concerning one who divorces his wife and says to her

at the time of handing her the bill of divorce,

“You are hereby permitted to marry any man except for so-and-so,” that she is not divorced.

For Rabbi Eliezer too concedes that the bill of divorce is invalid.

Concerning what did they disagree,

Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages?

Concerning one who divorces

his

wife and says to her, “You are hereby permitted to marry any man on condition that you do not marry so-and-so,”