Gittin 82a — the Talmud in English

Because he skips and teaches one by one.

The tanna omits only one link in each skip—for example, from seven to six and from six to five. It follows that if more than one link was not signed, there is no dispute between Ben Nannas and Rabbi Akiva, and according to everyone the additional link can be completed only by a fit witness.

And we conclude:

This proves it!

Abaye said: This proves it

from the Mishna, that

this relative,

who completes a get karuach,

signs

on the get wherever he wishes,

if he wishes,

if that is his desire:

either at the beginning,

before the fit witnesses,

or in the middle,

between them,

or at the end.

And Abaye proves:

From where,

from where do I know this from the Mishna?

From the fact that it did not establish a place for him.

The tanna in the Mishna does not establish where the gap of the get karuach is; rather, it simply says, “A get karuach—all complete it,” and it follows that wherever it has a gap, it may be completed by relatives.

And

likewise

this proves it,

from the fact that there is no fixed place where the relative can complete it, and from the law that we stated above, that it may not be completed with more than one relative—from these two laws together we learn that a get mekushar that comes to court to have it validated by witnesses who recognize the signatures of the witnesses—

From any three we validate it,

for the validation may be performed through any three witnesses from among all the witnesses who signed,

and we do not require,

we do not need the signatures of the three to be

consecutive

specifically. Rather, if, for example, ten witnesses signed, it is also possible to validate it by recognizing the first signature, the third, and the fifth.

For if it enters your mind that we require

validation through recognition of three signatures

consecutive

specifically, this would be difficult: Why did they not permit completing a get karuach with more than one relative? And we said that the reason is lest the court that validates the get err and validate it through two relatives and one fit witness.

But we have a solution for this:

to establish a place for this relative

who completes it: either

at the beginning,

establishing that he is first in every triad of witnesses—that is, one relative followed by two fit witnesses, and so on—

or in the middle,

so that before each relative one fit witness would sign and after him one fit witness,

or at the end,

two fit witnesses and a relative, two fit witnesses and a relative.

And we would thereby make it fit very much.

And then they could permit many relatives to complete it, and no mishap would result from this, since it would be necessary to validate it specifically from consecutive witnesses, and in every three consecutive witnesses there would necessarily be, according to this arrangement, at least two fit witnesses?

Rather, certainly, it is not necessary to validate it specifically from consecutive witnesses; therefore, establishing a place for the relatives would also not help, because even then it is possible that, among three scattered witnesses, two of them would be relatives.

When it came before Rav Ami,

when a get mekushar was brought before him in which the husband had not summoned a sufficient number of witnesses corresponding to the number of links,

he said to him,

Rav Ami said to the husband:

Go and complete it with a slave from the marketplace!

In accordance with the view of Ben Nannas in our Mishna, that even a slave may complete a get karuach.

We have returned upon you, chapter “The One Who Throws.”

Mishna:

One who divorces his wife and says to her

at the time of delivering the divorce document,

“Behold, you are permitted to every man, except for so-and-so,”

and the Gemara will explain what “except for so-and-so” means: whether its meaning is “apart from so-and-so,” or whether it is a condition, on the condition that she not marry that so-and-so.

Rabbi Eliezer permits

her to marry any other man, apart from that so-and-so, as the law of a woman who was divorced with a valid divorce document.

And the Sages prohibit

her from marrying any other man, since the giving of the divorce document in such a manner is an invalid giving.

And the Mishna explains, according to the Sages, who hold that this is an invalid giving:

What shall he do?

What shall the husband do in order to rectify the invalid giving?

He shall take it from her,

he shall take the divorce document from the woman,

and he shall give it to her again

a second time,

and he shall say to her

at the time of delivering the divorce document:

“Behold, you are permitted to every man.”

But if

they wrote inside it,

that the husband wrote inside the divorce document, “Behold, you are permitted to every man, except for so-and-so,”

even though he went back and erased it,

what he added, “except for so-and-so,” it is a divorce document

invalid.

Gemara:

It was raised as a question before them,

the members of the academy were uncertain:

This,

whether the wording that he said,

“except”

for so-and-so—is it the wording of “apart from”: “Behold, you are permitted to every man

apart

from so-and-so,”

is it?

Or

what he said, “except for so-and-so”—is it the wording of a condition: “Behold, you are permitted to every man

on the condition

that you not marry so-and-so,”

is it?

And the Gemara now explains in what Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis disagree, according to the two sides of the uncertainty:

According to the possibility that the wording “except” is “

apart

from so-and-so,”

is,

one may say that specifically

when

he says, “Behold, you are permitted to every man

apart

from so-and-so,”

the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer,

for only then do the Rabbis hold that the divorce document is invalid,

for he made a reservation for her in the divorce document.

For by his statement “apart from so-and-so,” he limits the permission of the divorce document, since the divorce document does not permit her to the whole world.

But

when he says to her, “Behold, you are permitted to every man

on the condition

that you not marry so-and-so,” which is the wording of a condition,

they agree with him,

the Sages agree with Rabbi Eliezer that the divorce document is valid.

As is the case,

for this condition resembles

every ordinary condition,

like every ordinary condition, since the divorce document is given to her absolutely, to permit her to every man. And the fact that she cannot marry that so-and-so is only because of an ordinary condition: if she does not fulfill the condition, the divorce document will be nullified; but this does not contradict the permission of the divorce document, by which she is permitted through the divorce document to every man, including that so-and-so, and it is not considered a reservation in the divorce document.

Or perhaps, the wording of “except,” as though he said to her,

“

“on the condition

that you not marry so-and-so,”

is.

And

according to this, specifically when he says to her, “Behold, you are divorced

on the condition

that you not marry so-and-so,”

Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with the Rabbis,

and holds that this is a valid divorce document, since it is only a condition—

But when

he says to her, “Behold, you are permitted to every man

apart

from so-and-so,”

Rabbi Eliezer concedes

to the Sages that this is an invalid divorce document,

for he made a reservation for her in the divorce document.

For by his statement “apart from so-and-so,” he causes the divorce document not to permit the woman to that so-and-so, and there is a deficiency in the absolute severance of the divorce document; therefore even Rabbi Eliezer concedes that this is an invalid divorce document.

Ravina said: Ta shma

a proof to resolve the uncertainty as to what they disagree about, from the words of the Mishna that we learned in tractate Nega'im [12a]:

All the houses

of Israelites in the Land of Israel, if a lesion appears in a house, are

rendered impure through lesions, except those of idolaters.

And Ravina proves:

If you say that it is reasonable,

if you say that the word “except” is the wording of

“apart from”—

well,

the intention of the Mishna is understood: to say that all the houses in the Land of Israel that belong to Israelites are rendered impure, apart from the houses of idolaters, which are not rendered impure.

But if you say

that the word “except” is the wording of

“on the condition,”

how is the Mishna to be interpreted? For according to this, you must explain that the intention of the Mishna is to say that the houses of Israelites become impure through lesions

“on the condition that the houses of idolaters not become impure.”

That is, on the condition that the houses of idolaters not become impure through lesions,

the houses of Israelites become impure,

only then do the houses of Israelites become impure through lesions.

If the houses of idolaters become impure,

but if the houses of idolaters become impure through lesions,

the houses of Israelites do not become impure!

But this matter has no meaning or comprehension at all!

And furthermore,

there is a difficulty:

The houses of idolaters—who renders them impure?

Is it at all possible to say that the houses of idolaters become impure through lesions—

And it was taught

for we learned in a beraita:

It is written in the Torah [Leviticus 14], concerning a lesion of houses:

“And I shall place a leprosy lesion in a house of the land of your possession,”

and the Sages expounded from the wording of the verse that specifically

“the land of your possession,”

that is, the possession of [the houses of] Israelites,

becomes impure through lesions, but the houses of idolaters do not become impure through lesions.

Rather, infer from here,

it is proven from here that “except” is the wording of

“apart from.”

And the conclusion of the Gemara is: indeed,

infer from here.

And the intention of the Mishna is to say that only the houses of Israelites become impure through lesions, but the houses of idolaters do not become impure through lesions.

And according to this, Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis disagree in our Mishna when he says, “Behold, you are permitted, apart from so-and-so,” whether she is divorced or not.

And now the Gemara explains that according to Ravina’s explanation, necessarily,

the Mishna,

our Mishna, in which Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis disagree when he says, “Behold, you are divorced apart from so-and-so,” whether this is a valid divorce document or not,

is not like this tanna

It is not like what we learned in a beraita—

For it was taught: Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Judah said:

Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages did not disagree concerning one who divorces his wife and says to her

at the time of delivering the divorce document,

“Behold, you are permitted to every man apart from so-and-so,” that she is not divorced.

For Rabbi Eliezer too concedes that the divorce document is invalid.

About what did they disagree,

Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages—

About one who divorces

his

wife and says to her, “Behold, you are permitted to every man on the condition that you not marry so-and-so,”