Gittin 85a — the Talmud in English

According to everyone, it is valid.

And as for our Mishna, which teaches

if

they wrote

inside it, the bill of divorce is invalid,

and we established

and established at the beginning of our chapter that the Mishna is speaking

in

a case in which he said to her

“except

for so-and-so,”

but

in a case in which he stipulated with her

“on condition

that you shall not marry so-and-so,” even if they wrote it inside it,

it is not invalid,

and not in accordance with Rabbi Judah ben Tema—this must be explained in two ways:

If you wish, say:

the Mishna is speaking of a case in which he stipulated this

before

the writing of

the toref, and

the Mishna follows the opinion of

the Rabbis,

who do not decree on condition on account of except.

And if you wish, say:

the Mishna follows even the opinion of Rabbi, and it is speaking of a case in which he wrote the condition

after

the writing of

the toref, and

the Mishna is in accordance with

everyone’s words,

for Rabbi Judah ben Tema also concedes this.

And Rava said:

all the

dispute

between Rabbi and the Rabbis as to whether a condition of on condition invalidates a bill of divorce applies specifically when he wrote the condition in the bill of divorce

after

the writing of

the toref, for Rabbi holds that we decree

when he says to her, “on condition that you shall not marry so-and-so,”

on account of

when he stipulates with her

before

the writing of

the toref,

that she shall not marry so-and-so, in which case, according to everyone, the bill of divorce is invalid,

and the Rabbis hold that we do not decree

when he says to her, “on condition that you shall not marry so-and-so,”

on account of

when he stipulates with her

before

the writing of

the toref—

but

in a case in which he wrote the condition

before

the writing of

the toref,

according to

everyone’s words

the bill of divorce is

invalid.

And

according to this,

our Mishna, which teaches

if

they wrote

inside it, the bill of divorce is invalid,

and we established

and established at the beginning of our chapter that the Mishna is speaking

in

a case in which he said to her

“except

for so-and-so,”

but

in a case in which he stipulated with her

“on condition

that she shall not marry so-and-so,” even if they wrote it inside it,

it is not invalid—

it must be said that it is speaking of a case in which he stipulated with her

after

the writing of

the toref, and it is the Rabbis,

who do not decree on account of before the toref.

Abaye’s father taught before Rabbi Zeira: “If one wrote a bill of divorce with a condition, according to everyone it is invalid.”

And we challenge this: Is it indeed

according to everyone invalid? But they are in dispute!

Rabbi and the Rabbis disputed whether a condition invalidates a bill of divorce. [And this is well according to Rava, that their dispute is in a case in which he wrote the condition after writing the toref, but in a case in which he wrote the condition before the toref, according to everyone it is invalid; if so, it is possible to establish the baraita as referring to a case in which he wrote the condition before the toref, and therefore, according to everyone, it is invalid. But according to Rabbi Zeira, we have no case in which, according to everyone, the bill of divorce is invalid.]

And we answer:

Rather, say:

this is what must be read in the baraita:

“If one wrote a bill of divorce with a condition,

according to everyone

the bill of divorce is

valid.”

And what are the circumstances?—

That he wrote the condition

after

the writing of

the toref, and in accordance with Rabbi Zeira, who says that even Rabbi concedes that the bill of divorce is valid.

And we challenge this:

And we challenge this:

Let him say:

Why did Rabbi Zeira need to alter the version in the baraita from “invalid” to “valid”? It could have read,

“It is invalid,”

and be speaking of a case in which he wrote the condition before writing the toref,

and

the baraita would follow the opinion of

Rabbi,

who decrees on condition on account of except, and we would not read in the baraita, “according to everyone, valid.”

And we answer: It is preferable to alter the version from “invalid” to “valid,” rather than erase the words “according to everyone,” for it is clear that the

tannai

who received the baraita from his teachers

taught it with “according to everyone.”

He certainly heard the words “according to everyone” from his teachers, and it is impossible that he erred in this. This is not comparable to an error between valid and invalid, for in

“valid and invalid”

it is possible that he erred

and it became confused for him,

and he exchanged “valid” and “invalid.” But

“it is” with “according to everyone”—

it cannot become confused for him!

It is not plausible that he erred in this, and if he taught “according to everyone,” it is impossible not to read it.

Mishna:

One who divorces his wife and says to her at the time of delivery,

“Behold, you are permitted to every man, except

for—

my father

and

your father,

my brother and your brother, a slave and a gentile,”

and

also, “except

anyone with whom she does not have valid kiddushin,” so that if he betroths her, his kiddushin will not take effect, this is a bill of divorce

то есть если он совершит с ней кидушин, они не вступят в силу, — это гет

valid,

for this is not considered that he retained something in his bill of divorce, since in all these cases, even without the husband’s retention in the permission of marital relations, kiddushin with these men would not take effect for her.

But if he said to her,

“Behold, you are permitted to every man, except

for

a widow to a High Priest,”

that is, his wife had been widowed from her previous marriage, and now he divorces her from himself but forbids her to marry a High Priest.

And likewise if she had been

a divorcee and a halutza,

and he now forbade her to marry

an ordinary priest.

And likewise if she had been

a mamzeret and a netina

and he forbade her to marry

an Israelite.

Or if his wife had been

a fit Israelite woman,

and he forbade her to marry

a mamzer or a netin.

And

likewise if he forbade her to marry

anyone with whom she has valid kiddushin,

so that if he betroths her, the kiddushin will take effect,

even

if these kiddushin were performed

in transgression—

in all these cases the bill of divorce is

invalid.

For had the husband not retained something in the bill of divorce, kiddushin with these men would take effect for her; it is only because he retained something in the bill of divorce that their kiddushin does not take effect for her.

Gemara:

The general rule of the first clause,

the rule stated in the first clause of the Mishna—that when he retained in the bill of divorce anyone with whom she does not have valid kiddushin, the bill of divorce is valid—comes

to include

that if he also retained in the bill of divorce

the other people liable to karet,

the bill of divorce is valid, and it is not considered a retention, for even without the husband’s marital status she is forbidden to them.

And

the general rule of the latter clause,

the rule stated in the latter clause, that anyone with whom she has valid kiddushin renders the bill of divorce invalid,

comes to include

that also among

the other people liable for prohibitions, such as an Ammonite, a Moabite, a netin, an Egyptian, and an Edomite,

since had he not retained them, their kiddushin would take effect for her, this is considered a retention in the bill of divorce, and the bill of divorce is invalid.

Rava raised a question before Rav Naḥman:

“Except for the kiddushin of a minor,”

that is, he said to her, “except for so-and-so,” and that so-and-so was a minor, whose kiddushin does not take effect for her,

what is the law?

Do we say

since

at present, in any event, he is not eligible,

for now he is a minor and cannot betroth her, this is not considered a retention, since at present she cannot be betrothed to him because of his minority?

Or perhaps,

since

he will come within the category of eligibility,

for he will eventually grow up and then be able to betroth her, therefore this is already now considered a retention, since when he grows up she will not be able to marry him because of the marital status of her first husband—

he said to him,

Rav Naḥman to Rava:

You have learned it:

we have learned this law in a Mishna:

A minor girl is divorced

after her father’s death by accepting her bill of divorce, even if she had been betrothed to that man

through her father’s kiddushin,

through her father having betrothed her to this man—and they are complete biblical kiddushin—nevertheless, she can accept a bill of divorce for herself—

and

why? But do we not require “and she shall depart and become”?

For we learn by juxtaposition that the laws of divorce are equal to the laws of kiddushin. If so, we should also learn that she cannot accept a bill of divorce for herself so long as she is not fit to betroth herself and is not included in the category of “becoming,” for she is a minor?

Rather,

necessarily, since

she will come,

that she will reach in the future

the category of eligibility,

when she grows up, she is already now considered an adult with regard to “becoming,” and therefore she can accept a bill of divorce for herself.

And if so—

here too,

with regard to the retention of a minor in a bill of divorce, since

he will come within the category of eligibility,

for he is destined to grow up and reach the stage at which kiddushin takes effect, this is already now considered a retention, and the bill of divorce is invalid.

Rava further asked Rav Naḥman:

What is the law if he said to her, “Behold, you are permitted to every man

except those yet to be born,”

who will be born after the divorce,

what is the law?

Should we say:

at present, in any event, they have not been born,

since they have not yet been born, this is not considered a retention, and the bill of divorce is valid?

Or perhaps, they are destined to be born.

Since they are destined to be born, this is considered a retention, and the bill of divorce is invalid.

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman to Rava:

You have learned it:

we have learned this law in the Mishna, that if he permitted her to everyone except

a slave and a gentile,

this is not considered a retention, since she has no kiddushin with them, and the bill of divorce is valid.

And

if it is so,

if we say that since those yet to be born are destined to be born this is considered a retention in the bill of divorce, then

a slave and a gentile too, they are likely to convert,

for it is also possible that a slave and a gentile will convert in the future, so why are they not considered a retention? Necessarily, since at present they are not fit to betroth, this is not a retention in the bill of divorce, and the bill of divorce is valid.

And we reject this:

those,

a slave and a gentile,

are not destined to convert.

They are not generally expected to convert, and therefore this is not considered a retention.

But

these are destined to be born!

For it is the way of the world that people are born, and therefore this is considered that there is a retention in the bill of divorce, and it is an invalid bill of divorce.

Rava further asked Rav Naḥman:

What is the law in a case in which he said to her

“except for her sister’s husband”; what is the law?

At present, in any event, she is not fit for him.

For now she is not fit to marry him, since she is forbidden to him by the prohibition of his wife’s sister, and therefore this is not considered a retention.

Or perhaps, sometimes her sister dies, and she becomes fit for him.

Since if her sister dies she will become permitted to him, this is considered a retention, and the bill of divorce is invalid.

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman to Rava:

You have learned it:

we learned in the Mishna that if he permitted her to everyone except

a slave and a gentile,

this is not considered a retention, since she has no kiddushin with them, and the bill of divorce is valid.

But

a slave and a gentile too, they are likely to convert;

they may convert in the future, and nevertheless this is not considered a retention. It follows that when one retains in a bill of divorce someone with whom kiddushin will take effect only in the future, but not now at the time of delivery of the bill of divorce, this is not a retention. Therefore, when he retains her sister’s husband, this is not a retention, for now, at the time of delivery of the bill of divorce, he cannot marry her.

And we reject this:

conversion is uncommon!

Therefore, retaining someone who is destined to convert is not considered a retention. But

death is common.

Therefore, if he said to her “except for her sister’s husband,” this is considered a retention, and the bill of divorce is invalid.

Rava further asked Rav Naḥman:

What is the law in a case in which he said to her

“except for your sexual relations,”

that after she is divorced from me she shall not have intercourse except through marriage and not through prostitution,

what is the law?

Should we say: Behold,

with marriage, he did not retain,

for he permitted her to marry anyone, and therefore the prohibition against intercourse through prostitution is not considered a retention, and the bill of divorce is valid.

Or perhaps,

since he

retained something concerning intercourse,

even such a retention is considered a retention, and the bill of divorce is invalid.

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman to Rava:

You have learned it.

We learned this law from what we learned in the Mishna, that if he said to her, “except

for my father and your father,”

the bill of divorce is valid.

And with regard to what?

What was the husband’s intention in stipulating?

If you say

that his intention was to stipulate

with marriage,

that she should not marry his father or her father, it is impossible to say this, because:

But do

my father and your father have the capacity for marriage!?

Their kiddushin does not take effect, and if so, even without the condition she is forbidden and cannot marry them.

Rather, no—through prostitution.

Necessarily, his intention was that she should not engage in prostitution with them, and concerning this the Mishna says that this is not a retention.

And

if so, it is proven from the Mishna that specifically when he said to her, “except

for my father and your father” [

that he retains that she should not engage in prostitution with them]

he did not retain,

it is not considered a retention.

But with regard to another,

if he said to her that she should not engage in prostitution with another man with whom kiddushin takes effect for her,

he retained!

This is considered a retention, and the bill of divorce is invalid.

And we reject this:

Perhaps

the Mishna is speaking

with marriage,

that he stipulated with her that she should not marry them, and he did not stipulate that she should not engage in prostitution with them. And although in any event kiddushin does not take effect for her, nevertheless his intention is to stipulate

that

even if

he transgressed and married,

if she transgresses and marries them, their kiddushin will not take effect for her also because of the marital status that he retained with her, in addition to the prohibition.

And the Mishna teaches that since even without his retaining in the bill of divorce that she should not marry them, their kiddushin would likewise not take effect for her, this is not considered a retention.

There is a further doubt concerning a case in which he permitted her to every man,

except with regard to intercourse unnaturally,

that she should not have intercourse through unnatural intercourse,

what is the law?

Should we say: Behold,

with regard to natural intercourse, he did not retain,

since he did not retain anything with regard to natural intercourse, it is not considered a retention, and the bill of divorce is valid.

Or perhaps, “the sexual relations of a woman” is written,

since in the Torah “the sexual relations of a woman” is written in the plural, it can be learned from here that the verse equates her two forms of intercourse [naturally and unnaturally]; therefore, just as if he retained natural intercourse the bill of divorce is invalid, so too, when he retained unnatural intercourse, this is considered a retention and the bill of divorce is invalid.

There is a further doubt concerning a case in which he said to her

“except for the annulment of your vows,”

that he retained for himself the right to annul her vows, the power to annul which the Torah granted to the husband, but she is permitted to marry every man,

what is the law—

with marriage, he did not retain,

since she is permitted to marry every man, the bill of divorce is valid.

Or perhaps, “It is written: ‘A woman shall uphold it, and a woman shall annul it,’”

since the Torah defines the right of annulment as a right of marriage, if so, if he reserved this right for himself, this is considered that he reserved part of the marriage, and therefore it is an invalid get .

There is another matter about which to raise a doubt: in a case where he said to her

“except for your teruma,”

so that if you marry a priest, he will not let you eat teruma ,

what is [the law]?

With regard to marriage, he did not reserve [anything],

since with regard to marriage he did not reserve [anything], and she is permitted to every person, the get is valid.

Or perhaps, “‘

the acquisition of his money

shall eat of it’”

is written,

and since her priest-husband cannot enable her to eat it, it is necessarily the case that she is not considered the acquisition of his money, and part of the marriage still remains with the divorcer; therefore, it is considered that he reserved something in the get, and the get is invalid.

There is another matter about which to raise a doubt: in a case where he said to her

“except for your inheritance,”

so that if you die, I shall inherit you,

what is [the law]?

With regard to marriage, he did not reserve [anything],

since with regard to marriage he did not reserve [anything], the get is valid.

Or perhaps, “To his kinsman, and he shall inherit her” is written,

and from this verse it is learned that the husband inherits his wife; and since her first husband inherits her, it is necessarily the case that she is still his wife, and it is considered that he reserved something in the get, and therefore the get is invalid.

There is another matter about which to raise a doubt: in a case where he said to her

“except for your betrothal by document,”

so that if they betroth you by document, the betrothal will not take effect; it emerges that he reserved one of the methods of betrothal,

what is [the law]?

Do we say, it is possible for another to betroth her with money and with intercourse,

since another person can betroth her with betrothal by money and betrothal by intercourse, it is not considered that he reserved something in the get, and the get is valid.

Or perhaps,

since it is written in the section of divorce

“and she shall depart, and she shall be,” the forms are juxtaposed to one another,

for the expression “and she shall be” includes all the forms of becoming, and it juxtaposes departure with becoming, so that the departure, too, must be through all the types of becoming; therefore the get is invalid.

Teyku.

Mishna:

The essential text of a get,

the principal wording that must be written in the get is—

“Behold, you are permitted to every person,”

and although it is not written in the get that the husband is the one divorcing her with this get from him, nevertheless, since the get is in her possession, this itself is proof that the get was given so that she would be divorced through it, for no person writes a get for his wife unless he wishes to divorce her; therefore, this wording is sufficient for the writing of the get.