Gittin 85a (פה.) — the Talmud in English

According to everyone, it is valid.

And as for our Mishna, which teaches

if

they wrote

it inside the get, the get is invalid,

and we established

at the beginning of our chapter that the Mishna is speaking

of

a case in which he said to her,

“Except

for so-and-so,”

but

in a case in which he stipulated with her,

“On condition

that you do not marry so-and-so,” even if they wrote it inside the get,

it is not invalid,

unlike the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima—this must be explained in two ways:

If you wish, say:

The Mishna is speaking of a case in which he made this stipulation

before

the writing of

the essential part, and

the Mishna follows the opinion of

the Rabbis,

who do not issue a decree treating an “on condition” clause like an “except” clause.

And if you wish, say:

The Mishna follows even Rabbi’s opinion, and it is speaking of a case in which he wrote the condition

after

the writing of

the essential part, and

the Mishna is

according to everyone,

as Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima also concedes in this case.

And Rava said:

The entire

dispute

between Rabbi and the Rabbis as to whether an “on condition” clause invalidates a get applies specifically when he wrote the condition in the get

after

the writing of

the essential part, for Rabbi holds that we issue a decree

when he says to her, “On condition that you do not marry so-and-so,”

lest it be confused with

a case in which he stipulates with her

before

the writing of

the essential part

that she may not marry so-and-so, in which case, according to everyone, the get is invalid;

whereas the Rabbis hold that we do not issue a decree

when he says to her, “On condition that you do not marry so-and-so,”

lest it be confused with

a case in which he stipulates with her

before

the writing of

the essential part—

but

in a case in which he wrote the condition

before

the writing of

the essential part,

according to

everyone

the get is

invalid.

And

accordingly,

as for our Mishna, which teaches

if

they wrote

it inside the get, the get is invalid,

and we established

at the beginning of our chapter that the Mishna is speaking

of

a case in which he said to her

“Except

for so-and-so,”

but

in a case in which he stipulated with her

“On condition

that you do not marry so-and-so,” even if they wrote it inside the get,

it is not invalid—

it must be said that this is speaking of a case in which he stipulated with her

after

the writing of

the essential part, and it follows the Rabbis,

who do not issue a decree lest it be confused with a condition made before the essential part.

The father of Rabbi Avin taught before Rabbi Zeira: “If one wrote a get subject to a condition, according to everyone it is invalid.”

And we challenge this: Is it really

according to everyone invalid? But they plainly disagree!

Rabbi and the Rabbis disputed whether a condition invalidates a get. [As for Rava’s position, it is understandable: their dispute concerns a case in which he wrote the condition after the writing of the essential part, whereas when he wrote the condition before the essential part, according to everyone it is invalid. Thus, the beraita can be established as referring to a case in which he wrote the condition before the essential part, and therefore according to everyone it is invalid. But according to Rabbi Zeira, there is no case in which the get is invalid according to everyone.]

And we answer:

Rather, say

that the beraita must be read as follows:

If one wrote a get subject to a condition,

according to everyone

the get is

valid.

And what are the circumstances?—

He wrote the condition

after

the writing of

the essential part,

and this follows Rabbi Zeira’s opinion, that even Rabbi concedes that the get is valid.

And we challenge this:

Let him say:

Why did Rabbi Zeira have to alter the reading of the beraita from “invalid” to “valid”? It could have been read as

“It is invalid,”

and it would be speaking of a case in which he wrote the condition before the writing of the essential part,

and

the beraita would follow the opinion of

Rabbi,

who issues a decree treating an “on condition” clause like an “except” clause; and we would not read in the beraita, “according to everyone it is valid.”

And we answer: It is preferable to alter the reading from “invalid” to “valid,” rather than to delete the words “according to everyone,” for it is clear that the

tanna

who received the beraita from his teachers

had the words “according to everyone” taught to him.

Certainly he heard the words “according to everyone” from his teachers, and it is impossible that he erred concerning this. This is not comparable to confusing “valid” and “invalid,” for with

“valid” and “invalid”

it is possible that he erred

and confused them

and exchanged “valid” and “invalid.” But

“It is” with “according to everyone”—

he would not confuse them!

It is not plausible that he erred in this, and if he taught the wording “according to everyone,” it cannot be that it should not be read.

Mishna:

One who divorces his wife and says to her at the time of delivery,

“Behold, you are permitted to every man, except

for—

my father

and

your father,

my brother, your brother, a slave, and a gentile,”

and

likewise, “Except

for anyone to whom she has no valid betrothal,” such that if he betroths her, his betrothal will not take effect—this get is

valid,

as this is not considered that he retained a portion in his get, since in all these cases, even without the retention concerning the husband’s marital relationship, betrothal with these men would not take effect.

But if he said to her,

“Behold, you are permitted to every man, except

for

a widow to a High Priest,”

meaning that his wife had been widowed from her previous marriage, and now he divorces her but forbids her to marry a High Priest.

And likewise, if she was

a divorcée and a ḥalutza,

and he now forbade her to marry

an ordinary priest.

And likewise, if she was

a mamzeret or a netina

and he forbade her to marry

an Israelite.

Or if his wife was

a proper Israelite woman,

and he forbade her to marry

a mamzer or a netin.

And

likewise, if he forbade her to marry

anyone to whom she has valid betrothal, such that if he betroths her, the betrothal will take effect,

even

if this betrothal was performed

in violation of a prohibition—

in all these cases, the get is

invalid.

For had the husband not retained anything in the get, betrothal with these men would take effect, and it is only because he retained something in the get that their betrothal does not take effect.

Gemara:

The general principle of the first clause—

the principle stated in the first clause of the Mishna, that if he retains in the get anyone to whom she has no valid betrothal, the get is valid—comes

to include

that if he retained in the get

the other people liable for karet,

the get is valid as well, and this is not considered a retention, since she is forbidden to them even without the husband’s marital relationship.

And

the general principle of the final clause—

the principle stated in the final clause, that concerning anyone to whom she has valid betrothal the get is invalid—

comes to include

that also among

the other people liable for negative commandments, such as an Ammonite, a Moabite, a netin, an Egyptian, and an Edomite,

since had he not retained them, their betrothal would take effect, this is considered a retention in the get, and the get is invalid.

Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman:

“Except for the betrothal of a minor,”

meaning that he said to her, “Except for so-and-so,” and that person was a minor, whose betrothal does not take effect with her,

what is the law?

Do we say that since

at present, at any rate,

he is not eligible for marital status,

as he is now a minor and cannot betroth her, this is not considered a retention, since at present she cannot be betrothed to him because of his minority?

Or perhaps that since

at present

he will eventually attain marital eligibility,

for he will eventually grow up and then be able to betroth her, this is already considered a retention from now, since when he grows up she will not be able to marry him because of her first husband’s marital relationship—

he said

Rav Naḥman to Rava:

You have learned this

for we learned this very law in a Mishna:

A minor girl can be divorced

after her father’s death by receiving her get, even if she had been betrothed to that same man

through her father’s betrothal,

by her father betrothing her to this man, and the betrothal is a fully valid betrothal by Torah law; nevertheless, she can receive her own get—

and

why? But we require “and she shall go out and become”?

For we learn through a juxtaposition that the laws of divorce are equivalent to the laws of betrothal. If so, we should likewise learn that she cannot receive her own get so long as she is not fit to betroth herself and is not included in the category of marital eligibility, since she is a minor.

Rather,

it must necessarily be that since

she will come

in the future

within the category of marital eligibility,

when she grows up, she is already considered an adult from now with regard to marital eligibility, and therefore she can receive a get for herself.

And if so—

here too,

with regard to retaining a minor in a get, since

he will come within the category of marital eligibility,

for he is destined to grow up and become eligible for betrothal, this is already considered a retention from now, and the get is invalid.

Rava further asked Rav Naḥman:

What is the law if he said to her, “Behold, you are permitted to every man

except those who will be born,”

who will be born after the divorce,

what is the law?

Do we say:

At present, at any rate, they have not yet been born;

since they have not yet been born, this is not considered a retention, and the get is valid?

Or perhaps, they are destined to be born.

Since they are destined to be born, this is considered a retention, and the get is invalid.

Rav Naḥman said

to Rava:

You have learned this,

for we learned this law in the Mishna: if he permitted her to everyone except

a slave and a gentile,

this is not considered a retention, since she has no valid betrothal with them, and the get is valid.

And

if it is so—if we say that since those who will be born are destined to be born, this is considered a retention in the get—then

those who will be born are included, and

a slave and a gentile as well are likely to convert;

a slave and a gentile too may convert in the future, so why are they not considered a retention? It must be that since at present they are not eligible to betroth her, this is not a retention in the get, and the get is valid.

And we reject this:

These—

a slave and a gentile—

are not destined to convert.

They are not ordinarily expected to convert, and therefore this is not considered a retention.

But

these are destined to be born!

It is the nature of the world that people are born, and therefore this is considered that something was retained in the get, and the get is invalid.

Rava further asked Rav Naḥman:

What is the law in a case in which he said to her,

“Except for her sister’s husband; what is the law?”

At present, at any rate, she is not fit for him.

She is not currently fit to marry him, since she is forbidden to him as his wife’s sister, and therefore this is not considered a retention.

Or perhaps, sometimes her sister dies, and she becomes fit for him.

Since if her sister dies she will become permitted to him, this is considered a retention, and the get is invalid.

Rav Naḥman said

to Rava:

You have learned this,

for we learned in the Mishna that if he permitted her to everyone except

a slave and a gentile,

this is not considered a retention, since she has no valid betrothal with them, and the get is valid.

But

a slave and a gentile as well are likely to convert;

they may convert in the future, and nevertheless this is not considered a retention. It follows that when one retains in a get someone who will become eligible for betrothal only in the future, but is not eligible at the time the get is delivered, this is not a retention. Therefore, when he retains her sister’s husband, this is not a retention, since at present, at the time the get is delivered, he cannot marry her.

And we reject this:

Conversion is uncommon!

Therefore, retaining someone who will convert in the future is not considered a retention. But

death is common.

Therefore, if he said to her, “Except for her sister’s husband,” this is considered a retention, and the get is invalid.

Rava further asked Rav Naḥman:

What is the law in a case in which he said to her,

“Except for your promiscuous intercourse,”

meaning that after she is divorced from me, you may have intercourse only through marriage and not through promiscuity,

what is the law?

Do we say: Behold,

“with marriage, he did not retain,”

as he permitted her to marry anyone, and therefore the prohibition against intercourse through promiscuity is not considered a retention, and the get is valid?

Or perhaps,

since

he retained something concerning intercourse,

even such a retention is considered a retention, and the get is invalid?

Rav Naḥman said

to Rava:

You have learned this.

We learned this law from what is taught in the Mishna: if he said to her, except

for her father and your father,

the get is valid.

And with regard to what?

What did the husband intend to stipulate?

If you say

that he intended to stipulate

concerning marriage,

that she may not marry her father or her husband’s father, this cannot be said, because:

Is it conceivable that

her father and your father are eligible for marriage!?

Their betrothal does not take effect, and therefore even without the condition she is forbidden and cannot marry them.

Rather, is it not concerning promiscuous intercourse.

It must be that he intended to prohibit her from having promiscuous intercourse with them, and concerning this the Mishna says that it is not a retention.

And

if so, it is proven from the Mishna that specifically when he said to her, except

for her father and your father

[meaning that he retained the prohibition against her having promiscuous intercourse with them],

he did not retain anything,

and this is not considered a retention.

But with regard to another man,

if he said to her that she may not have promiscuous intercourse with another man with whom betrothal with her takes effect,

he retained something!

This is considered a retention, and the get is invalid.

And we reject this:

Perhaps

the Mishna is speaking

of marriage,

that he stipulated with her that she may not marry them, and he did not stipulate that she may not have promiscuous intercourse with them. Although their betrothal would not take effect in any event, nevertheless, his intention is to stipulate

that

even if

she transgresses and marries them,

so that if she transgresses and marries them, their betrothal will not take effect also because of the marital status he retained in her, in addition to the prohibition.

And the Mishna teaches that since even without his retaining in the get the prohibition against her marrying them their betrothal would not take effect, this is not considered a retention.

There is another unresolved question: What is the law in a case in which he permitted her to every man

except with regard to intercourse not in the usual manner,

meaning that she may not have intercourse not in the usual manner,

what is the law?

Do we say: Behold,

“with intercourse in the usual manner, he did not retain,”

since he did not retain anything concerning intercourse in the usual manner, this is not considered a retention and the get is valid?

Or perhaps, “the intercourse of a woman” is written,

and since the Torah writes “the intercourse of a woman” in the plural, we learn from this that the verse juxtaposes her two forms of intercourse [in the usual manner and not in the usual manner]. Therefore, just as when he retains intercourse in the usual manner the get is invalid, so too, when he retains intercourse not in the usual manner, this is considered a retention and the get is invalid.

There is another unresolved question concerning a case in which he said to her

“except for the annulment of your vows,”

retaining for himself the right to annul her vows, which the Torah granted a husband the power to annul, while she remains permitted to marry every man,

what is the law—

“with marriage, he did not retain,”

since she is permitted to marry every man, the get is valid.

Or perhaps, “It is written: ‘A woman may uphold it and a woman may annul it,’”

since the Torah defines the right of annulling vows as a right pertaining to marriage, if he retains this right for himself, this is considered retaining part of the marital bond, and therefore the get is invalid.

There is another matter that requires clarification: if he said to her,

“Except for your teruma,”

meaning that if you marry a kohen, he will not enable you to eat teruma,

what is the halakha?

With regard to marriage, he has not retained anything,

since with regard to marriage he retained nothing, and she is permitted to every man, the get is valid.

Or perhaps,

“his monetary possession”

shall eat of it

is written.

Since her kohen husband cannot enable her to eat teruma, it necessarily follows that she is not considered his monetary possession. Thus, part of the marital bond still remains with the divorcing husband, and he is considered to have retained something in the get; therefore, the get is invalid.

There is another matter that requires clarification: if he said to her,

“Except for your inheritance,”

meaning that if you die, I will inherit you,

what is the halakha?

With regard to marriage, he has not retained anything,

since with regard to marriage he retained nothing, the get is valid.

Or perhaps, “To his kin, and he shall inherit her,” is written,

and from this verse we learn that a husband inherits his wife. Since her first husband inherits her, it necessarily follows that she is still his wife, and he is considered to have retained something in the get; therefore, the get is invalid.

There is another matter that requires clarification: if he said to her,

“Except for your kiddushin by document,”

meaning that if someone betroths you by means of a document, the kiddushin will not take effect, it follows that he retained one of the methods of kiddushin,

what is the halakha?

Do we say that it is possible for another man to betroth her with money or through intercourse,

and since another man can betroth her through kiddushin by money or through kiddushin by intercourse, this is not considered retaining something in the get, and the get is valid?

Or perhaps,

since it is written in the passage concerning divorce,

“And she shall go out and she shall be,” the forms of becoming are juxtaposed to one another,

for the expression “and she shall be” includes all forms of becoming, and divorce is equated with becoming married, so that the divorce too must be effective with regard to all the various forms of becoming married; therefore, the get is invalid.

Teyku.

Mishna:

The essential text of a get,

the main wording that must be written in a get is:

“You are hereby permitted to every man.”

Although it is not written in the get that the husband is the one divorcing her with this get from him, nevertheless, since the get is in her possession, this itself is proof that the get was given so that she would be divorced through it. For no one writes a get for his wife unless he wishes to divorce her. Therefore, this wording is sufficient for writing the get.