Gittin 77b (עז:) — the Talmud in English

For Rava said:

Every

one who says:

“

I do not desire

I do not want

the rabbinic enactment

that they instituted for my benefit,”

such as this

case explained below,

we heed him.

Since the enactment was made solely for his benefit, he can say that he does not want this benefit, and the enactment does not apply to him.

The same applies here: the husband can relinquish his right to his wife's property, which is a rabbinic enactment instituted for his benefit; therefore, she can receive the get in her courtyard.

And we explain:

What does “such as this” mean?

Which rabbinic enactment was Rava discussing?—

It is like the statement of Rav Huna in the name of Rav.

For Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: A woman can say to her husband, “I will not be sustained,”

I do not want you to sustain me,

“and I will not work”

for you!

This is because the Sages enacted that a husband is obligated to sustain his wife, and they instituted this lest her labor not suffice to cover the expenses of her sustenance. They subsequently enacted that the woman's labor would belong to her husband, so that there would not be strife between them because he sustains her while she keeps the proceeds of her labor for herself.

Since the primary purpose of the enactment was her benefit, she can say that she does not want this benefit.

Rava said

another answer as to how the woman can receive her get in her courtyard, despite the difficulty based on “whatever a woman acquires, her husband acquires,” without having to say, as Rabbi Elazar did, that the husband relinquished his rights to the woman's courtyard.

Rava stated his answer in the form of a question on the Gemara's question: how can it be said that the courtyard's acquisition, which belongs to the husband, can prevent her from receiving her get in her courtyard?

Is it so

that

her hand

the woman's own hand,

is it not acquired by him, by the husband?

The woman's hand itself is also acquired by her husband, since whatever a woman acquires, her husband acquires [as will be explained below, why Rava assumed that the woman's hand itself is acquired by her husband]. Why, then, do you not ask how she becomes divorced through receiving the get in her hand?

Rather,

you must say that

her get and her hand come simultaneously.

That is, since through the get she acquires her “hand,” we consider, with regard to receiving the get, the hand as though it already belonged to her at the moment she receives the get in it.

And if so,

here too,

you should answer that likewise, with regard to receiving the get in her courtyard, we say:

“Her get and her courtyard come simultaneously,”

so that the courtyard is already considered her courtyard at the moment the get is given, for the purpose of receiving the get, since through the get the courtyard becomes hers.

Ravina raised an objection to Rava's answer:

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Is it possible to say that

Rava's difficulty was

“the woman's hand”

[How does the woman become divorced through receiving the get in her hand, since her hand belongs to her husband?], and that on the basis of this difficulty he proved that her get and her hand come simultaneously for the purpose of receiving the get, and that the same applies to her courtyard?

But this is not correct! For

although,

despite the fact that

he acquires

the husband

the proceeds of her labor,

so that the products of the woman's labor belong to him,

but does he acquire her hand itself!?

The hand itself belongs to the woman and not to her husband, so no proof can be brought from here that her get and her hand come simultaneously. If so, what proof is there regarding a courtyard, which itself indeed belongs to the husband [by virtue of his right to its produce], that she can become divorced by receiving the get there on the basis of “her get and her courtyard come simultaneously”?

He said to him,

Rav Ashi answered Ravina: Rava did not prove his point from the woman’s hand.

Rather,

Rava was troubled by the hand of a slave.

How does a Canaanite slave receive his writ of emancipation from his master,

according to the one who says

in the Mishna in tractate Kiddushin [22b] that the emancipation

through a writ

of a Canaanite slave is effected

by himself,

meaning that the slave himself receives the writ from his master in his hand?

Rava raised the following difficulty concerning this: Is it not the case that

a slave’s hand is like his master’s hand,

since the hand itself is acquired by his master, and it follows that the writ has not left his master’s domain?

Rather,

Rava necessarily proved that we must say:

“His writ and his hand come simultaneously.”

And if so,

here too,

with regard to a woman’s bill of divorce that her husband threw into her courtyard, we say:

“Her bill of divorce and her courtyard come simultaneously.”

The Gemara relates an incident involving

a certain dangerously ill man

who was gravely ill and near death,

who wrote a bill of divorce for his wife

for his wife,

on the eve of Shabbat,

on Friday late in the afternoon,

but did not manage to give it to

give

her

the bill of divorce before Shabbat.

On the following day,

on Shabbat,

his illness became more severe,

the illness overcame him, and he feared that he might die without divorcing his wife, leaving her subject to yibbum.

They came before Rava

to ask for advice as to how the ill man could divorce his wife on Shabbat, since the bill of divorce was muktzeh and forbidden to move on Shabbat.

He said to them

Rava gave them advice as to how the husband could give her the bill of divorce without moving it from its place:

Go,

go and

tell him

the husband,

let him acquire for her

that he should acquire for his wife

that place,

the location of the room

in which the bill of divorce is lying,

where the bill of divorce is located, through an act of possession [since land is acquired through an act of possession]

and let her go

let the woman go

and close

close the door of the room in which the bill of divorce is lying

and open

it again,

and take possession of it.

Through locking the door, she will acquire the room by an act of possession.

As we learned in a Mishna: If one locks

a door, or

fences

a breach, or

breaches

a fence

even to any extent, this constitutes possession

with which to acquire the property.

Through acquiring the room, she also acquires the bill of divorce. For this is the law: When a person acquires land from another together with movable property, the acquirer need not perform a separate act of acquisition with regard to the movable property; the act of acquisition performed with regard to the land is sufficient, and it is effective for the acquisition of the movable property as well. This is called acquisition through “

agav.” He said to him:

he challenged

Rav Ilish to Rava:

the law is

“Whatever a woman acquires, her husband acquires,”

and it follows that the room still remains in the husband’s possession. How, then, can the woman acquire the get by virtue of the room?

He was embarrassed.

Rava was embarrassed by Rav Ilish’s question.

Ultimately, the matter became clear,

it became known

that she was betrothed,

that the woman had merely been betrothed to the dangerously ill man and was not married to him.

Rava said: If they said in the case of a married woman

“Whatever a woman acquires, her husband acquires,” meaning that her husband acquires the usufruct of her property,

would they say

this

in the case of a betrothed woman!?

The betrothed man certainly has no rights whatsoever to the property of his betrothed; therefore, she acquires the room entirely, and by virtue of the room she acquires the get.

Rava then said,

Rava subsequently retracted this distinction and said:

There is no difference between a betrothed woman and a married woman!

Even if she had been married, she would have acquired the room entirely, because

her get and her courtyard come to her simultaneously,

and at the moment the get is given, she already acquires the courtyard.

And we raise a difficulty:

But

already

Rava said

earlier that the get and her courtyard come to her simultaneously. Why, then, was he initially embarrassed by Rav Ilish’s question, rather than answering him that her get and her hand come to her simultaneously?

And we answer:

Initially, when Rava said it, he said it with regard to this incident!

That is, when Rava said, “Her get and her hand come to her simultaneously,” he said this with regard to the incident involving the dangerously ill man, but he said it only after Rav Ilish’s question.

And what was stated earlier in the passage in Rava’s name—that her get and her courtyard come to her simultaneously—is derived from this incident.

We learned in the Mishna: If one throws a get to his wife

and she is inside her house

or inside her courtyard, she is divorced.

Ulla said: And this is the case when she is standing beside her house or beside her courtyard.

She is divorced only when she is standing next to the house or courtyard.

Rav Oshaya said: Even if she is

located

in Tiberias while her courtyard is in Tzippori,

or

she is in Tzippori while her courtyard is in Tiberias, she is divorced.

And we challenge Rav Oshaya:

But it teaches: “She is inside her house or inside her courtyard,”

in our Mishna, implying that she must be standing beside the house or courtyard!?

And we answer:

This is what

the tanna of the Mishna

is saying: “And she is like one who is inside her house, and she is like one who is inside her courtyard.”

She need not actually be standing next to the house or courtyard; rather, the house or courtyard must be guarded for her benefit [that is, at her instruction], and it is therefore as though she were inside her house or courtyard,

for once the courtyard is guarded for her benefit, she is divorced.

And the Mishna comes to exclude a case where he placed the get in the hand of the woman’s slave. For although the hand of the slave is considered the woman’s hand and courtyard, nevertheless she is not divorced, since this courtyard is not guarded for her benefit; rather, the slave guards himself, on his own initiative.

And we analyze the matter:

Shall we say

that we should say that

this is the dispute

between Ulla and Rav Oshaya:

One Master,

Ulla,

holds: A courtyard was included because of the hand.

The reason that a woman can be divorced by having the get placed in her courtyard is that a person’s courtyard is considered like his hand. Therefore, she must stand close to her courtyard, just as a person’s hand is close to him.

And the other Master,

Rav Oshaya,

holds: A courtyard was included because of agency,

as the law of acquisition through a courtyard is derived from the law of agency, and the courtyard is like a person’s agent. Therefore, the owner of the courtyard need not stand beside the courtyard, just as he need not stand beside the agent. And we reject this:

No!

Rather,

everyone

holds:

A courtyard was included because of “her hand.”

And their dispute is as follows:

One Master,

Ulla,

holds

that a courtyard is

like her hand—

just as her hand is adjacent,

as the hand is always adjacent to her,

so too her courtyard

specifically

must be adjacent

to her.

And the other Master,

Rav Oshaya, holds that it is impossible to say that the verse’s intent is to compare the status of the courtyard in relation to a person to the status of the hand in relation to a person, for if so:

If,

shall we also say,

just as her hand is attached

to the person’s body,

so too her courtyard

is only

attached

to the person’s body? But it is necessarily impossible for the courtyard to be exactly like the hand, since the hand is attached to the person, whereas the courtyard is not attached to him.

If so, it need not even be adjacent to the person’s body.

Rather,

what the verse said,

“like her hand,”

comes to teach:

Just as “her hand” is guarded for her benefit, so too her courtyard must be guarded for her benefit.

To exclude

the case where the verse comes to exclude

a courtyard that is guarded not for her benefit,

for it does not acquire the get for her.

And the Gemara cites an incident involving

a certain man who threw a get to his wife,

his wife.

She was standing

there

in the courtyard; the get went and fell on a pisla,

on a large piece of wood standing in the courtyard.

Rav Yosef said: We see that,

if

it is

the area of the pisla

four cubits by four cubits, it establishes a domain for itself.

It is considered as though it divides off a domain of its own and is not subordinate to the courtyard, and she is not divorced, because the get did not reach the domain of the courtyard but rather the domain of the pisla, which is considered the husband’s domain, since he is entitled to all use of it, like usufruct property.

But if not,

if the area of the pisla is less than four cubits by four cubits, it does not establish a domain of its own; rather,

it is one domain

with the courtyard, and the get is valid.

And we analyze the matter:

What are we dealing with?

If you say it is her courtyard,

the woman’s, then

when

it is

the pisla

also four cubits, what difference does it make?

Why is she not divorced? The pisla is hers as well, so what concern is it that it constitutes a separate domain?

Rather,

should you say that it is speaking

of his courtyard,

the husband’s, then

when it is not

the area of the pisla

four cubits, what difference does it make?

It is all his, so how can she be divorced with a get located in the husband’s domain?

And we answer:

No, it is necessary to state this with regard to a case where he lent her

the husband lent her

a place

in his courtyard so that she could acquire the get there.

For people lend one place, but people do not lend two places.

People lend only one place, not two places.

Therefore, if the pisla is not four cubits, it is not considered a separate place, and the woman is divorced even when the husband placed the get on it, because the place occupied by the pisla is subordinate to the place in the courtyard. And the husband intended to lend her that place.

And we said this

that she is divorced even when the get is placed on the pisla

only when it is not

the pisla

ten

handbreadths above the ground.

But

if it is

ten handbreadths high,

handbreadths,

even though it is not four cubits,

it is considered a separate place, and she is not divorced.

And we said this

that if the pisla is not four cubits and is not ten handbreadths high, it is not a separate place,