Gittin 77b — the Talmud in English

For Rava said:

Every

one who says ![](pamud.bmp "

Exact page location") “

I do not desire

I do not wish

the rabbinic enactment

that they made for my benefit,”

such as this

which is explained below,

we heed him.

Since the enactment was made only for his benefit, he can say that he does not desire this benefit, and the enactment does not apply to him.

The same law applies here: the husband can relinquish his right in his wife’s property, which is a rabbinic enactment made for his benefit; therefore, she can receive the get in her courtyard.

And we explain:

What is “such as this”?

To which rabbinic enactment was Rava referring?—

As Rav Huna said in the name of Rav.

For Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: A woman can say to her husband, “I will not be sustained,”

I do not wish you to sustain me,

“and I will not work”

for you!

Since it is a rabbinic enactment that the husband is obligated to sustain his wife, and they enacted this lest her work not suffice for the expenses of her sustenance. And afterward they enacted that the woman’s work should belong to her husband, so that there should not be enmity between them because he sustains her while she takes her work for herself.

And since the primary purpose of the enactment was for her benefit, she can say that she does not desire this benefit.

Rava said

another answer as to how the woman can receive her get in her courtyard, and there is no deficiency on account of “what a woman acquires her husband acquires,” and there is no need to say, as Rabbi Elazar did, that the case is one in which the husband relinquished his rights in the woman’s courtyard.

And Rava stated his answer in the form of a question on the Gemara’s question: How is it possible to say that the acquisition of the courtyard belonging to the husband can prevent her from receiving her get in her courtyard?

Is it so,

and is

her hand

the woman’s hand itself,

does he not acquire it, the husband?

After all, even the woman’s hand itself is acquired by the husband, for everything a woman acquires her husband acquires [as will be explained below, why Rava assumed that the woman’s hand itself is acquired by the husband]; so why do you not ask how she is divorced through receiving the get in her hand?

Rather,

you are forced to say that

“her get and her hand come simultaneously.”

That is, since through the get she acquires her “hand,” we judge, with regard to receiving the get, as though the hand were already hers at the time of receiving the get in her hand.

And if so,

here too,

you should answer that likewise, with regard to receiving the get in her courtyard, we say:

“Her get and her courtyard come simultaneously,”

that the courtyard is already considered her courtyard at the time of the giving of the get, for the purpose of receiving the get, since through the get the courtyard becomes hers.

Ravina was astonished at Rava’s answer:

Ravina said to Rav Ashi:

Is it possible to say that

Rava was troubled by “the hand of a woman”

[how is the woman divorced through receiving the get in her hand, since her hand is acquired by her husband?], and on the basis of this question he proved that her get and her hand come simultaneously for the purpose of receiving the get, and the same applies to her courtyard?

But this is not correct! For

granted,

although

he acquires it

the husband

for the product of her hands,

so that the woman’s work belongs to him,

but does he acquire her hand itself!?

After all, the hand itself belongs to the woman and not to her husband, and it is impossible to prove from here that her get and her hand come simultaneously. If so, what is the proof concerning a courtyard, which itself indeed belongs to the husband [because of the right of produce that he has in it], that she can be divorced by receiving the get in it, by virtue of “her get and her courtyard come simultaneously”?

He said to him,

Rav Ashi answered Ravina: Rava did not prove his words from the woman’s hand.

Rather,

Rava was troubled by the hand of a slave.

How does a Canaanite slave receive his bill of manumission from his master,

according to the one who says

in the Mishna in tractate Kiddushin [22b] that the manumission

by a document

of a Canaanite slave is performed

by himself,

that the slave himself receives the document from his master in his hand?

And concerning this Rava raised the difficulty: Is it not so that

the hand of a slave is like the hand of his master,

for the hand itself is acquired by his master, and it follows that the bill of divorce has not left his master’s authority?

Rather,

Rava necessarily proved that we must say,

“His bill of manumission and his hand come into being simultaneously.”

And if so,

here too,

with regard to a woman’s bill of divorce that her husband threw into her courtyard, we say,

“Her bill of divorce and her courtyard come into being simultaneously.”

And the Gemara brings an incident involving

a certain dangerously ill man

[a sick man whose death was imminent]

who wrote a bill of divorce for his wife

for his wife,

at the time of the approach of the eve of Shabbat,

on Friday toward evening,

but he did not manage to give it,

to give

her

the bill of divorce before Shabbat.

The next day,

on Shabbat,

the world overwhelmed him,

the illness grew stronger against him, and he feared that he might die without divorcing his wife, and she would require levirate marriage.

They came before Rava

to ask advice as to how the sick man could divorce his wife on Shabbat, for the bill of divorce is muktzeh, and it is forbidden to move it on Shabbat.

He said to them

Rava gave them advice as to how the husband could give her the bill of divorce without moving the bill of divorce from its place:

Go,

go and

tell him

the husband,

let him acquire it for her,

that he should acquire for his wife

that certain place,

the place of the room

in which the bill of divorce is sitting,

where the bill of divorce is located, through an acquisition of possession [for land is acquired through an acquisition of possession]

and let her go,

the woman should go

and close

the door of the room in which the bill of divorce is lying

and open

it again,

and take possession of it.

For through locking the door she will acquire the room through an acquisition of possession.

For we learned: If one locks

a door, or

fences

a breach, or

breaches

a fence

by any amount, this is possession

with which to acquire the properties.

And through acquiring the room she also acquires the bill of divorce. For this is the law: When a person acquires land from his fellow together with movable property, the purchaser does not need to perform a separate act of acquisition with regard to the movable property; rather, the act of acquisition with regard to the land is sufficient, and it is effective also for the acquisition of the movable property. And this is called an acquisition “agav.”

He said to him:

he raised the difficulty

Rav Ilish to Rava:

the law is

“Whatever a woman acquires, her husband acquires,”

and it follows that the room still remains in the husband’s possession; so how can the woman acquire the bill of divorce together with the room?

He was embarrassed.

Rava was embarrassed by Rav Ilish’s difficulty.

In the end, the matter became clear,

it became known

that she was betrothed,

that the woman had only been betrothed to the dangerously ill man and was not married to him.

Rava said: If they said with regard to a married woman

“Whatever a woman acquires, her husband acquires,” so that her husband acquires the produce of her property,

would they say

this

with regard to a betrothed woman!?

Surely the betrothed has no right whatsoever to the property of his betrothed; therefore she acquires the room completely, and together with the room she acquires the bill of divorce.

Rava then said,

afterward Rava retracted this distinction and said:

It makes no difference whether she is betrothed or whether she is married!

Even if she were married, she would acquire the room completely, because

her bill of divorce and her courtyard come to her simultaneously,

and at the time the bill of divorce is given, she already acquires the courtyard.

And we raise an objection:

But

already

Rava said

previously the principle that her bill of divorce and her courtyard come to her simultaneously; so why was he initially embarrassed by Rav Ilish’s difficulty, and did he not answer him that her bill of divorce and her hand come to her simultaneously?

And we answer:

Initially, when Rava said it, he said it with reference to this incident!

That is, when Rava said, “Her bill of divorce and her hand come simultaneously,” he said it with reference to the incident involving the dangerously ill man, but he said it only after Rav Ilish’s question.

And what was brought above in the sugya in Rava’s name, that her bill of divorce and her courtyard come to her simultaneously, follows from this incident.

We learned in the Mishna: If one throws a bill of divorce to his wife

and she is inside her house

or inside her courtyard, she is divorced.

Ulla said: And this is so when she is standing next to her house or next to her courtyard.

She is divorced only when she is standing beside the house or the courtyard.

Rav Oshaya said: Even if she is

located

in Tiberias while her courtyard is in Sepphoris,

or

she is in Sepphoris while her courtyard is in Tiberias, she is divorced.

And we raise an objection to Rav Oshaya:

But it teaches, “and she is inside her house and inside her courtyard,”

in our Mishna, which implies that she must be standing beside the house and the courtyard!?

And we answer:

This is what

the tanna in the Mishna

is saying: “And she is as one who is inside her house, and she is as one who is inside her courtyard.”

She need not actually stand beside the house and the courtyard; rather, the house and the courtyard must be guarded according to her דעת [that is, according to her instructions], and this is as though she were inside her house and courtyard,

for since the courtyard is guarded according to her דעת, she is divorced.

And the Mishna comes to exclude a case in which he placed the bill of divorce in the hand of the woman’s slave: although the slave’s hand is considered the woman’s hand and courtyard, nevertheless she is not divorced, since this courtyard is not guarded according to her דעת; rather, the slave guards himself according to his own דעת.

And we inquire about it:

Shall we say

that we should say that

this is the point of disagreement

between Ulla and Rav Oshaya:

For one master,

Ulla

holds: A courtyard was included because of her hand.

The reason that the woman is divorced through the placement of the bill of divorce in her courtyard is that a person’s courtyard is considered like his hand. Therefore she must stand close to her courtyard, just as a person’s hand is close to him.

And the other master,

Rav Oshaya

holds: A courtyard was included because of agency,

for the law of acquisition through a courtyard is learned from the law of agency, and the courtyard is like a person’s agent; therefore the owner of the courtyard need not stand beside the courtyard, just as he need not stand beside the agent. And we reject this:

No!

Rather,

everyone

holds:

A courtyard was included because of “her hand.”

And their disagreement is:

For one master,

Ulla

holds that a courtyard is

that a courtyard is

like her hand —

just as her hand is adjacent,

since the hand is always adjacent to her,

so too her courtyard

specifically

adjacent

to her.

And the other one,

Rav Oshaya holds that it is impossible to say that the intent of the verse is to compare the status of the courtyard in relation to a person to the status of the hand in relation to a person, for if so:

Would

we also say,

just as her hand is attached

to the person’s body,

so too her courtyard

is only

attached

to the person’s body? But necessarily it is impossible for the courtyard to be actually like the hand, since the hand is attached to the person, whereas the courtyard is not attached to him.

And if so, it need not even be adjacent to the person’s body.

Rather,

what the verse said

“like her hand”

comes to teach:

Just as her hand is guarded according to her דעת, so too her courtyard, which is guarded according to her דעת.

To exclude

and the verse comes to exclude

a courtyard guarded not according to her דעת,

which does not acquire [the bill of divorce] for her.

And the Gemara brings an incident involving

a certain man who threw a bill of divorce to his wife,

to his wife.

She was standing

she was standing

in the courtyard; the bill of divorce went and fell on a pisla,

on a large piece of wood standing in the courtyard.

Rav Yosef said: We see,

we see,

if it is

if the area of the pisla is

four cubits by four cubits, it divides off a domain for itself.

It is as though it divides off a domain for itself and is not subsumed within the courtyard, and she is not divorced, because the bill of divorce did not reach the domain of the courtyard but the domain of the pisla, which is considered the husband’s domain, since he is entitled to all its uses, according to the law of usufruct property.

And if not,

if the area of the pisla is less than four cubits by four cubits, it does not divide off a domain for itself, but

it is one domain

with the courtyard, and the bill of divorce is valid.

And we inquire about it:

With what are we dealing?

If you say [we are dealing] with her courtyard

of the woman, then

when

it is

also the pisla

four cubits, what of it?

Why is she not divorced? After all, the pisla too is hers, and what concern is it to us that it is a domain in its own right?

Rather,

perhaps you will say that we are dealing

with his courtyard,

of the husband, then

when it is not

the area of the pisla

four cubits, what of it?

For everything belongs to him; so how can she be divorced with a bill of divorce located in the husband’s domain?

And we answer:

It is necessary [to state this] only when he lent it to her,

when the husband lent her

a place

in his courtyard so that she could acquire the bill of divorce there.

For people lend one place; people do not lend two places.

People lend only one place, and not two places.

Therefore, if the pisla is not four cubits, it is not considered a place in its own right, and the woman is divorced even when the husband placed the bill of divorce upon it, because the place of the pisla is subsumed within the place in the courtyard. And the husband intended to lend her that place.

And we said this

that she is divorced even when the bill of divorce is placed on the pisla

only when the pisla is not higher than

the pisla

ten

handbreadths above the ground.

But

if it is

ten handbreadths high

handbreadths,

even though it is not four cubits,

it is considered a place in its own right, and she is not divorced.

And we said

that if the pisla is neither four cubits nor ten handbreadths high, it is not a place in its own right,