Gittin 77a — the Talmud in English

Abaye said: Everyone agrees, where

in the case

he says

to his wife at night: “This is your divorce document”

when the sun emerges from its sheath - ![](pamud.bmp "

exact page location")

when it emerges

the sun will emerge, the divorce document will take effect

he says to her,

and if he dies at night before the sun emerges, the divorce document does not take effect, because at the time when the divorce document needs to take effect,

it would be a divorce document after death,

And likewise in the Mishna, when he says, “This is your divorce document when I do not come after twelve months,” it is not a divorce document, and one cannot rely on the date written in the document to say that it proves that it takes effect from the time written in it, for he explicitly said that the divorce document should take effect only when I do not come, and not from now.

And if he said: “This is your divorce document”

on condition that the sun emerges from its sheath -

we interpret that

he says to her, ‘from now,’

and when the sun emerges, the divorce document will take effect retroactively from the time of delivery.

For Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: Anyone who says ‘on condition’ is considered as though he said ‘from now,’

They did not disagree

whether our Mishna and our Rabbis say that the date written in the document proves that he intended it to take effect from now,

but in the case where

he said to her in the language:

“If the sun emerges

from its sheath,”

and likewise in the Mishna, when he said to her in the language: “If I die,”

for the expression “if” has two meanings: it has a meaning of “from now,” and it has a meaning of “when it arrives,”

if he said “from today if,” its meaning is “from now,” and if he did not say “from today,” its meaning is “when it arrives,”

therefore,

the Master (

our Rabbis)

held

that

it follows the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says: The date of a document proves its meaning,

and therefore, in a divorce document in which he stipulated that it should take effect “if” he dies, its date proves its meaning,

and it becomes like

one who says:

“From today if I die,”

and

like

one who says:

“From now if I die.”

And

the Master (

our Mishna), who disagrees with our Rabbis,

did not hold

and

like Rabbi Yosei,

and the date in the divorce document does not prove that his intention is that it take effect from now,

and

therefore, in a divorce document in which he stipulated that it should take effect “if” he dies,

it becomes like

one who says:

“If I die alone”

only, whose meaning is after death.

We learned in the Mishna: He said to two men:

“Write and give a divorce document to my wife if I do not come from now until twelve months,”

and they went and

wrote

the divorce document within twelve months, even though they gave it after twelve months: according to the Sages, the divorce document is invalid, and according to Rabbi Yosei, the divorce document is valid.

Rav Yeimar said to Rav Ashi: Shall we say, he holds

that

Rabbi Yosei

says

that if he wrote a divorce document on a condition,

it is valid

even when the condition was not fulfilled,

for here in the Mishna, the husband commanded them to write the divorce document after twelve months, and they wrote it before then, and Rabbi Yosei declared this divorce document valid,

if so, let us say that also in the first case in the Mishna, where he preceded the condition to the statement of the act: “If I do not come from now until twelve months, write and give a divorce document to my wife,” Rabbi Yosei disagrees and holds that the divorce document takes effect, even if they wrote the divorce document within twelve months and gave it after twelve months.

No; in reality, I can say to you:

in the first case in the Mishna, where he said, “If I do not come, write and give a divorce document to my wife,” and they wrote it before then,

it is invalid

even according to Rabbi Yosei,

and here is different

and different is the case where he said, “Write and give it if I do not come,” for in this Rabbi Yosei disagrees and holds that the divorce document takes effect,

because

of the fact that

it would have been incumbent upon him

to precede and say the condition before the act, and thus it would have been incumbent upon him

to say: “If I do not come, write and give it,”

and since he preceded the act to the condition

and said: “Write and give it if I do not come,”

one may say that

this is what he means

and this was his intention:

“Write it from now and give it if I do not come.”

And the Rabbis

disagree and hold:

it makes no difference

whether he said

this

as in the first case, and preceded the condition to the act: “If I do not come, write and give it,”

and it makes no difference

whether he said

this,

as in the second case, and preceded the act to the condition: “Write and give it if I do not come,”

in both cases one must say that he intended that they write and give it only after the condition is fulfilled.

The Sages taught:

He said to her: “This is your divorce document if I do not come”

after a week (

seven years, a Sabbatical cycle)—they wait for him to come throughout the

year

eighth, since the entire eighth year is called the time after the “week”; and if the eighth year ends and he has not come, the divorce document takes effect.

And if he said: “This is your divorce document if I do not come”

after a year—

they wait for him to come throughout the

month

first after the year, since the first month is called the time after the “year”; and if he has not come and a month after the year has passed, the divorce document takes effect.

And if he said that the divorce document should take effect if I do not come

after a month—

they wait for him to come throughout the

week,

and if he has not come and a week after the month has passed, the divorce document takes effect.

And we raised it: If he said that the divorce document should take effect if I do not come

after a week, what is the law?

Which days of the week are considered the days after the preceding week, and which days are considered the days before the following week?

And we say:

Rabbi Zeira was sitting before Rabbi Asi—and some say, Rabbi Asi before Rabbi Yohanan—and he said:

One on the week, and two, and three

the first day of the week, the second, and the third—are called the days

after the week

that passed,

but

four, and five, and the eve of the week

the fourth, the fifth, and the eve of the week—are called the days

before the week

that is coming.

Therefore, if the third day after the week passed and he did not come, the divorce document takes effect.

It was taught:

Rabbi says:

If he said: “This is your divorce document if I do not come”

after the festival—

one must wait for him

thirty days

after the festival, since thirty days after the festival are considered the days after the festival.

Rabbi Hiyya went out and taught this halakhic statement in the name of Rabbi

he brought forth this beraita in the name of Rabbi

and they praised him

saying that he had spoken well, for surely this matter is the opinion of an individual,

he stated it

in the name of the many—

but they did not praise him,

and they did not agree with him that it had been stated by the many,

therefore it follows that the halakha is not like him

it is proven that the halakha is not like him in this matter, and therefore the Sages did not agree with Rabbi Hiyya when he stated it as halakha in the name of the many.

We return to you, chapter, chapter “One who was seized”

Mishna:

If one throws a get to his wife, and she

is found

inside her house or inside her courtyard

[which belong to her, except that her husband is entitled to all the produce of the house and courtyard, and to all their uses, according to the law of nikhsei melog, whose principal belongs to her and whose produce the husband consumes], and the husband threw the get there onto the ground,

she is divorced

as though she had received the get into her hand.

If he threw it to her

the husband threw the get

inside his house or inside his courtyard, even if it is

the get

with her in the bed,

for she was lying in her bed, and he threw the get into it,

she is not divorced

since the get did not reach her hand.

He threw the get to her

into her bosom, or into her basket

[a basket in which the woman places sewing accessories]

she is divorced,

even if she is in his house, because the place of the woman’s bosom and basket is acquired by her even in his house, and the get has thus reached her domain.

Gemara:

And we inquire concerning it:

From where are these matters

that a woman is divorced through the get’s reaching her house or courtyard, without the need for the get to reach her hand, despite the fact that the Torah said, “And he placed it in her hand”?

And we answer:

For the Sages taught:

It is stated in the passage concerning the divorce of a woman: “And he shall write for her a scroll of severance

and he shall place it in her hand.”

He has

no basis to learn from here that she is divorced

except

when he placed the get

in her hand.

He placed it into

her roof, her courtyard, or her enclosure

[a woodshed],

from where

that she is divorced?

The verse says: “And he shall place it”—in any case!

For we expound the word “and he shall place” independently [from the fact that the verse did not say, “And in her hand he shall place it”], and the verse teaches that any placing into her domain, namely into her roof or courtyard, suffices with regard to a get.

And it was also taught likewise concerning a thief,

that the thief’s roof and courtyard are considered, with regard to liability for theft, as though the stolen item were found in the thief’s hand:

For the verse said in the passage of civil laws: “If the stolen item shall surely be found in his hand, from an ox to a donkey to a living sheep, he shall pay double.” And we expound:

“His hand.” He has no

basis for being liable for double unless he stole

with his hand.

The animal entered into

his roof, his courtyard, or his enclosure,

and he locked the door before it in order to steal it,

from where

that he becomes liable for double payment for his theft?

The verse says: “It shall surely be found.”

From the repetition of the wording we expound,

in any case,

that his roof and courtyard are also considered like his hand.

And it is necessary.

The Torah had to teach us that a person’s roof and courtyard are considered like his hand, both with regard to divorce by means of a get and with regard to theft.

For if it had taught us

concerning

a get,

we would have said that only there is a person’s courtyard like his hand

because he divorces her against her will.

Even when the husband gives her the get against her will into her hand, she is divorced; therefore, it is sufficient that he give it to her into her courtyard.

But a thief, who does not have [the aspect of] against his will,

for if another person were to throw the theft into his courtyard against his will, the owner of the courtyard would not become liable for double payment,

I would say

I would say that

he would not

become liable for his courtyard even when the theft entered there with his consent and he locked the door before it; therefore, the Torah must teach us this also with regard to a thief.

And if it had taught us

concerning

a thief,

we would have said that only in the case of a thief did the Torah make him liable for double payment as though the theft were in his hand,

because the Merciful One penalized him

the thief, so that he would become liable even through his courtyard.

But with a get, I would say, not

that she should be divorced unless the get actually reached her hand.

Therefore

it is necessary.

The Torah had to teach us this also with regard to a get.

And we inquire concerning it: “

Her courtyard”

of a woman—how is she divorced by placing the get there as though it had come to her hand!?

How can it be possible at all that the courtyard should be considered her domain and her hand? Is it not a law among the laws of marriage that everything

that a woman acquires

[such as the product of her hands and her found objects],

her husband acquires!

That is, the right of use in the courtyard is included in “consuming the produce,” which belongs to the husband , and it follows that when the get reaches the courtyard, it is still considered to be found in the husband’s domain, and not in the woman’s domain!? And we answer:

Rabbi Elazar said:

Our Mishna and the beraita speak only

in

a case in which the husband

writes for her,

after he married her, in a document:

“I have no claim or legal dealing with your property!”

For through this he relinquishes his rights in her property, and they are entirely hers.

And we object:

And if he wrote this for her, what has happened?

After all, a husband who writes to his married wife a document in such wording has not thereby lost his rights in her property!

And the Gemara brings proof for this matter:

And it was taught: One who says to his fellow

who is his partner in a field:

“I have no claim or legal dealing with this field,” and

likewise if he says to him:

“I have no business in it,” and

likewise if he says to him:

“My hand is removed from it”—

he has said nothing!

He has not lost his share in the partnership.

And the reason for the matter is that it is impossible for the owner of property to withdraw from it with complete withdrawal unless he sells it, gives it as a gift, or declares it ownerless; but not through language of “withdrawal,” which does not make it ownerless for every person, but is merely withdrawal from his ownership.

Therefore, here too, when the husband wrote to his wife, after he had already acquired rights in her property [the right to consume the produce], in the language of “I have no claim or legal dealing with your property,” it accomplishes nothing!

And we answer:

The scholars of the house of Rabbi Yannai said:

The case here is one in which he

writes for her “

I have no claim or legal dealing with your property”

while she is still betrothed,

for then language of withdrawal is effective, since he has not yet acquired the property before the marriage; therefore, he can withdraw and relinquish his future acquisition of it.

And as [stated] by Rav Kahana.

As we find elsewhere, where Rav Kahana stated this principle, that a person can withdraw from a future right.

For Rav Kahana said: An inheritance that comes to a person from another place,

which is not the inheritance of his ancestors, which is from the Torah, but which is destined to come to him through his actions, such as the inheritance of his wife, which results from his marriage,

a person may stipulate concerning it that he will not inherit it.

Since the husband’s inheritance of his wife is only a rabbinic right, he can withdraw from it and relinquish it before he acquires the inheritance.

And

as

Rava

said elsewhere.