Gittin 77a (עז.) — the Talmud in English

Abaye said: Everyone agrees that, where [

in a case]

he says

to his wife at night, “This is your bill of divorce”

when the sun emerges from its sheath —

when it emerges [

when the sun emerges, the bill of divorce will take effect]

he is saying to her ,

and if he dies at night, before the sun emerges, the bill of divorce does not take effect, because at the time when the bill of divorce would have to take effect,

it would be a bill of divorce after death,

Similarly, in the Mishna, when he says, “This is your bill of divorce if I do not return after twelve months,” it is not a bill of divorce. One cannot rely on the date written in the document and say that it proves that it takes effect from the time written in it, since he explicitly said that the bill of divorce should take effect only when I do not return, and not from this moment.

And if he says: “This is your bill of divorce”

provided that the sun emerges from its sheath—

we explain that

he is saying to her, ‘from this moment,’

and when the sun emerges, the bill of divorce takes effect retroactively from the time of delivery.

As Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: Anyone who says ‘provided that’ is considered as though he said ‘from this moment,’

They did not disagree

whether, in our Mishna and according to our Sages, we say that the date written in the document proves that he intended it to take effect from this moment,

except where

he said to her in the language:

“If it emerges,”

the sun from its sheath.

And similarly, in the Mishna, when he says to her in the language: “If I die,”

because the expression “if” has two meanings: it can mean “from this moment,” and it can mean “when it occurs,”

if he says “from today, if,” its meaning is “from this moment”; but if he does not say “from today,” its meaning is “when it occurs.”

Therefore,

our master (

our Sages)

held

and

aligned themselves with Rabbi Yosei, who said: The date of a document proves its intention,

and therefore, in a bill of divorce made conditional on his dying “if” he dies, its date proves his intention,

and it is equivalent to

one who says:

“From today, if I die,”

and

equivalent to

one who says:

“From this moment, if I die.”

But

our master (

our Mishna), who disagrees with our Sages,

did not hold

and

align himself with Rabbi Yosei,

and the date in the bill of divorce does not prove that he intended it to take effect from this moment.

And

therefore, in a bill of divorce made conditional on his dying “if” he dies,

it is equivalent to

one who says:

“If I die alone” [

only], whose meaning is after death.

We learned in the Mishna: He said to two men:

“Write and give a bill of divorce to my wife if I do not return from now until twelve months,”

and they went and

wrote

the bill of divorce within twelve months, although they gave it after twelve months. According to the Sages, the bill of divorce is invalid, while according to Rabbi Yosei, the bill of divorce is valid.

Rav Yeimar said to Rav Ashi: Shall we say that [

let us say that]

Rabbi Yosei

holds

that when one writes a bill of divorce subject to a condition, it is

valid

even when the condition was not fulfilled,

for here, in the Mishna, the husband instructed them to write the bill of divorce after twelve months, but they wrote it beforehand, and Rabbi Yosei declared this bill of divorce valid.

If so, let us say that even in the first case in the Mishna, where he placed the condition before the act: “If I do not return from now until twelve months, write and give a bill of divorce to my wife,” Rabbi Yosei disagrees and holds that the bill of divorce takes effect even if they wrote it within twelve months and gave it after twelve months .

No; I can say to you that, forever,

in the first case in the Mishna, where he said, “If I do not return, write and give a bill of divorce to my wife,” and they wrote it beforehand, it is

invalid

even according to Rabbi Yosei.

But here is different [

and this case is different], where he said, “Write and give it if I do not return,” for in this case Rabbi Yosei disagrees and holds that the bill of divorce takes effect,

because

of the fact that

it was appropriate for him [

it was appropriate for him] to place the condition first and the act afterward. He should have

said: “If I do not return, write and give it,”

but since he placed the act before the condition

and said: “Write and give it if I do not return,”

one may say that

this is what he meant:

“Write it from this moment and give it if I do not return.”

“Write it from this moment and give it if I do not return.”

And the Rabbis

disagree and hold that

it makes no difference

whether he said

this

as in the first case, placing the condition before the act: “If I do not return, write and give it,”

and it makes no difference

whether he said

this,

as in the second case, placing the act before the condition: “Write and give it if I do not return”;

in both cases, we say that he intended them to write and give it only after the condition was fulfilled.

The Sages taught:

He said to her: “This is your bill of divorce if I do not return”

after a seven-year period (

seven years, a Sabbatical cycle) this one—the court waits for him to return throughout the

year

of the eighth year, since the entire eighth year is called the time after the “seven-year period”; and if the eighth year ends and he has not returned, the bill of divorce takes effect.

And if he said: “This is your bill of divorce if I do not return”

after a year—

the court waits for him to return throughout the

month

immediately following the year, since the first month is called the time after the “year”; and if he does not return and a month after the year has passed, the bill of divorce takes effect.

And if he said that the bill of divorce should take effect if I do not return

after a month—

the court waits for him to return throughout the

week,

and if he does not return and a week after the month has passed, the bill of divorce takes effect .

And we raised a question concerning this: If he said that the bill of divorce should take effect if I do not return

after a week, what is the law?

Which days of the week are considered days after the preceding week, and which days are considered days before the following week?

And we say:

Rabbi Zeira was sitting before Rabbi Asi—and some say Rabbi Asi was sitting before Rabbi Yohanan—and he said:

The first day of the week, the second, and the third [

Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday] are called the days

after the week [

that passed],

but

the fourth, the fifth, and the eve of Shabbat [

Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday] are called the days

before the week [

that is coming].

Therefore, if Tuesday after the preceding week passed and he did not return, the bill of divorce takes effect.

It was taught:

Rabbi says: If he said, “This is your bill of divorce if I do not come

If he said: “This is your divorce document if I do not come”

after the Festival”—

one must wait for him

thirty days

after the Festival, since thirty days after the Festival are considered days after the Festival.

Rabbi Hiyya disseminated a teaching in the name of Rabbi [

he publicized this beraita in the name of Rabbi]

and they praised him

for having stated it well, since it was certainly the view of an individual sage.

He stated it

in the name of the many—

but they did not praise him,

and they did not agree with him that it had been stated in the name of the many.

Apparently, the halakha is not in accordance with him [

it is evident that the halakha is not like him] in this matter; therefore, the Sages did not agree with Rabbi Hiyya when he stated it as a halakhic ruling in the name of the many .

We shall return to you, chapter: One Who Was Seized

Mishna:

If one throws a get to his wife, and she

is found

inside her house or inside her courtyard

that belong to her, except that her husband is entitled to all the produce of the house and courtyard, and to all their uses, under the law of nikhsei melog, in which the principal belongs to her while the husband enjoys the produce—and the husband throws the get there onto the ground,

she is divorced

as though she had received the get into her hand.

If he threw it to her

the husband threw the get

inside his house or inside his courtyard, even if it is

the get

with her in bed,

where she was lying in her bed and he threw the get onto it,

she is not divorced

since the get did not reach her hand.

If he threw the get to her

into her bosom or into her basket

a basket in which a woman places her sewing accessories,

she is divorced,

even if she is in his house, because a woman's bosom and basket are acquired to her even when they are in his house; therefore, the get has reached her domain.

Gemara:

We raise the question:

From where are these matters

that a woman becomes divorced through the get reaching her house or courtyard, without requiring that the get reach her hand, despite the Torah's statement, “And he places it in her hand”?

And we answer:

As the Sages taught:

It is stated in the passage concerning the divorce of a woman: “And he writes for her a document of severance

and places it in her hand.”

He has no

basis for learning from here that she becomes divorced

except

when he gives her the get

into her hand.

If he gave it into

her roof, her courtyard, or her enclosure

a woodshed,

from where

do we know that she is divorced?

The verse states: “And he gives it,” in any manner!

For we expound the word “and he gives” independently [since the verse could have stated, “And he shall give it into her hand”], teaching that any giving into her domain—that is, into her roof or courtyard—is sufficient with regard to a get.

And likewise it was taught in a beraita concerning a thief,

that the thief's roof and courtyard are considered, with regard to liability for theft, as though the stolen object were in the thief's hand:

For the verse states in the passage of civil laws: “If the theft is surely found in his hand, from an ox to a donkey to a sheep alive, he shall pay double.” And we expound:

“His hand.” He has no

liability for double payment unless he stole

with his hand.

If the animal entered

his roof, his courtyard, or his enclosure,

and he shut the door in front of it in order to steal it,

from where

do we know that he becomes liable for double payment for his theft?

The verse states: “If it is found, it shall surely be found.”

From the repetition of the wording we derive

in any manner,

that his roof and courtyard too are considered his hand.

This is necessary.

The Torah had to teach us that a person's roof and courtyard are considered his hand both with regard to divorce by means of a get and with regard to theft.

Had it taught us

with regard to

a get,

we would have said that only there is a person's courtyard like his hand

because he divorces her against her will.

Even when the husband gives her the get against her will into her hand, she is divorced; therefore, it is sufficient that he give it to her in her courtyard.

But in the case of a thief, who does not have the possibility of acting against another's will,

for if another person were to throw the stolen object into his courtyard against his will, the owner of the courtyard would not become liable for double payment,

one might say

that

he would not

become liable for the theft through his courtyard even when the stolen object entered there with his knowledge and he shut the door in front of it. Therefore, the Torah must teach us this law with regard to a thief as well.

And had it taught us

with regard to

a thief,

we would have said that it is specifically in the case of a thief that the Torah made him liable for double payment as though the stolen object were in his hand,

because the Merciful One penalized

the thief, making him liable even through his courtyard.

But with regard to a get, one might say that she would not

become divorced unless the get actually reached her hand.

Therefore,

this is necessary.

The Torah had to teach us this with regard to a get as well.

We raise a question:

“Her courtyard”

of a woman—how can she become divorced by the get being given there, as though it had reached her hand?

How can the courtyard be considered her domain and her hand at all? Is it not a halakha concerning marriage that

whatever a woman acquires

such as the products of her labor and her found objects,

her husband acquires!

That is to say, the right to use the courtyard is included in “enjoying the produce,” which belongs to the husband, so that when the get reaches the courtyard, it should still be considered to be in the husband's domain and not in the woman's domain!? And we answer:

Rabbi Elazar said:

Our Mishna and the beraita speak only

of

a case in which the husband

writes for her,

after marrying her, in a document:

“I have no legal claim or involvement in your property!”

By doing so, he relinquishes his rights to her property, and it belongs entirely to her.

And we challenge this:

And what does it accomplish if he wrote this for her?

When a husband writes such a document to his married wife, he has not thereby forfeited his rights to her property!

The Gemara brings proof of this:

And was it not taught in a beraita: One who says to his fellow

who is his partner in a field:

“I have no legal claim or involvement in this field,” and

likewise, if he said to him:

“I have no dealings with it,” and

likewise, if he said to him:

“My hand is removed from it”—

he has said nothing!

He has not forfeited his share in the partnership.

The reason is that an owner of property cannot completely remove himself from it unless he sells it, gives it as a gift, or declares it ownerless. Merely using language of “removal” is insufficient, since it does not render the property ownerless for everyone; it merely expresses withdrawal from ownership.

Therefore, here too, since the husband wrote to his wife, after he had already acquired rights to her property [the right to enjoy its produce], using the language, “I have no legal claim or involvement in your property,” it accomplishes nothing!

And we answer:

The scholars of the school of Rabbi Yannai said:

The case here is one in which he

writes for her

“I have no legal claim or involvement in your property”

while she is still betrothed,

for then language of withdrawal is effective, since he has not yet acquired the property until the marriage; therefore, he can withdraw and relinquish his future acquisition of it.

And this is in accordance with Rav Kahana.

As we find elsewhere, Rav Kahana stated this principle: a person can withdraw from a future right.

For Rav Kahana said: An inheritance that comes to a person from another source,

which is not the inheritance of his ancestors, which is from the Torah, but is destined to come to him through his own actions, such as a husband's inheritance of his wife, which results from their marriage,

a person may stipulate concerning it that he will not inherit it.

Since a husband's inheritance of his wife is only a rabbinic right, he can withdraw from it and relinquish it before acquiring the inheritance.

And

as

Rava

said elsewhere.