Gittin 78a (עח.) — the Talmud in English

and she is divorced,

unless it has no

additional name,

but is called merely “a slab.”

However,

if

it does have an additional name

for the slab, then

even though it is not ten handbreadths high, and even though it is not four cubits wide,

it has significance, constitutes a separate domain, and is not nullified with regard to the courtyard.

We learned in the Mishna: If he threw it to her inside his house or inside his courtyard,

even if he is with her in the bed,

she is not divorced.

Rava said: They taught

that she is not divorced

only

when the bill of divorce is with her

in his bed.

But

if the bill of divorce is with her

in her bed,

then she is

divorced,

even though the bed is located in the husband’s house.

It was taught likewise in a beraita: Rabbi Eliezer says: If it is in his bed, she is not divorced; if it is in her bed, she is divorced.

And we raise a difficulty:

And

if the bill of divorce was

in her bed,

why is she

divorced?

Is it not the case that

the vessel of a purchaser in the domain of the seller

does not effect acquisition? The bed is indeed hers, and she is the purchaser of the bill of divorce through it, but it is located in the husband’s domain, and he is the one transferring ownership of the bill of divorce.

Infer from this,

can one learn from here

that the vessel of a purchaser

located

in the domain of the seller effects acquisition for the purchaser

of an item that enters the vessel by means of the law of a courtyard? But the amoraim disputed this matter in tractate Bava Batra [85b]!

And we answer:

No, it is necessary

only

that it be ten handbreadths high.

The bed was more than ten handbreadths above the ground and thereby became a separate domain. Therefore, the woman can acquire the bill of divorce through it, since the bed is not considered nullified with regard to the seller’s domain.

And we raise a difficulty: How could you say that the bed constitutes a separate domain because it is ten handbreadths high,

and

yet

there is the space occupied by the legs,

that is, the space between the legs of the bed, which rest on the ground, is below ten handbreadths, and this space is not nullified with regard to the husband’s domain? It follows that the entire bed is located in the husband’s domain, and consequently the “domain of the vessel” of the bed is nullified?

And we answer:

People are not particular about the space occupied by the legs.

People are not particular about the space beneath the bed, between its legs, since the bed is ten handbreadths above the ground and they can comfortably use the space beneath it [despite the legs]; the owners are not particular about the space occupied by the legs, and therefore the domain of the vessel above is not nullified with regard to the owners’ domain below.

We learned in the Mishna:

into her lap or into her basket

she is

divorced.

And we inquire:

Why

is she divorced? Her basket is

the vessel of a purchaser in the domain of the seller!

And we answer:

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel:

The Mishna is speaking

of a case where her basket was hanging from her,

as it is actually equivalent to her hand.

And Rabbi Elazar likewise said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya: It is a case where her basket was hanging from her.

And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said:

It is a case where her basket was

tied

to her,

even though it was not hanging

from her but was being dragged along the ground; nevertheless, it is considered equivalent to her hand.

Rav Adda bar Ahava said: It is a case where her basket was placed between her thighs,

even if it was resting on the ground. A person is not particular about the place where his wife sits, and it remains designated for her use.

Rav Mesharsheya bar Demi said: It is a case where her husband was a seller of baskets,

and he had a special house for this purpose; therefore, he was not particular about the place occupied by her basket.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The place of his wife’s lap

belongs to her;

is acquired by her.

The place of her basket is acquired by her.

Rava said: What is the reason for Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling?

Because a person is not particular about either the place of his wife’s lap or the place of her basket

when she is his wife.

It was taught likewise,

that the reason is that he is not particular about the place of her lap and basket, as it was taught:

If he threw it into her lap, or into her basket, or into anything that is like her basket, she is divorced.

And we explain:

“Anything that is like her basket”—what does this serve to include?

It serves to include a taska,

a small vessel

in which she eats dates.

And likewise, anything designated for her regular use.

It is evident from here that the reason is the absence of particularity: When a person brings his wife into his house, he brings her in with the intention that her small utensils for personal use should be with her.

Mishna:

He said to her

her husband, when he gave her the bill of divorce:

“Take

it,

this promissory note.”

Or she found it behind him,

meaning that she found the bill of divorce behind her husband. And when she

reads

it, she realizes

that it is her bill of divorce—

it is not a bill of divorce until he says to her: “This is your bill of divorce!”

Even if he says this to her after the bill of divorce has already come into her possession, she is divorced [as Rabbi maintains in the Gemara].

He placed the bill of divorce

in her hand

while she was asleep,

she is not divorced through it.

If she was awake,

if she subsequently awoke

and read

it,

and it was her bill of divorce—

it is not a bill of divorce until he says to her: “This is your bill of divorce.”

Even if he says so after she awakens from her sleep.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna that if she found it behind him, it is not a bill of divorce until he says to her, “This is your bill of divorce.”

And we inquire:

And when he says to her, “This is your bill of divorce,” what of it?

Why should she be divorced?

For it is equivalent to

the husband saying to her:

“Take your bill of divorce from atop the ground!”

For here too, she took the bill of divorce from the ground,

and Rava said:

One who says:

“Take your bill of divorce from atop the ground” has said nothing.

Rather, she must receive the bill of divorce from the husband’s hand and not from the ground, as it is written: “And he places it in her hand”!

And we answer:

Say

that the Mishna means that the woman

pulled it out

—she pulled out the bill of divorce

from behind him,

as the bill of divorce had been stuck between his belt and his waist, and she pulled it out from there. Thus, she did not take it from the ground; rather, she took the bill of divorce from her husband’s hand.

And we raise a difficulty:

Even if she pulled it out,

it should not be effective!

For we require, “And he places it in her hand,”

meaning that the giving must be effected by the husband,

and that is absent!

For she took the bill of divorce herself.

And we answer:

No, it is necessary

that the Mishna is speaking of a case

where he shifted his hips toward her,

where the husband moved his waist toward her side in order to bring the bill of divorce closer to her,

and she pulled it out,

so that it is considered as though the husband gave her the bill of divorce.

It was taught likewise,

that the case concerns one in which she pulled the bill of divorce from behind him, and not one in which she found it lying on the ground:

As it was taught:

If he said to her, “Take this promissory note,” or if she pulled it out from behind him, read it, and it was her bill of divorce, it is not a bill of divorce until he says to her, “This is your bill of divorce”—the statement of Rabbi,

who holds that it is sufficient for him to say to her, “This is your bill of divorce,” and he need not take the bill of divorce back from her and give it to her again when he makes the statement.

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: It is never a bill of divorce until he takes it from her, gives it to her again, and says to her: “This is your bill of divorce.”

Since the initial giving was not valid, a new giving must be performed.

If he placed it in her hand while she was asleep,

and afterward she

awoke, read it, and it was her bill of divorce, it is not a bill of divorce until he says to her: “This is your bill of divorce”—the statement of Rabbi.

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says:

It is never a bill of divorce

until he takes it from her, gives it to her again, and says to her: “This is your bill of divorce.”

And it is necessary.

The beraita had to teach their dispute in both cases.

For if it had been stated only in the first case,

the case in which he gave her the bill of divorce while she was awake, I might have said that only

in that case Rabbi says

that he need not take the bill of divorce from her and give it to her again, because

she is fit to be divorced:

she is fit to receive a bill of divorce, since she is awake; she lacks only the statement “This is your bill of divorce.” Therefore, a subsequent statement is effective, since the receipt of the bill of divorce was valid.

But

in the second case, where

“he placed it in her hand while she was asleep,” and she is not fit to be divorced

while she is asleep,

say that Rabbi concedes

to

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar

that it must be given to her again.

And if it had been stated only in this case,

the case of the sleeping woman, I might have said that only

in this case Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says

that he must give it to her again, because she was not fit for divorce at the time of the initial giving.

But in that case,

the first case, in which she was fit for divorce,

say that

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar

concedes to Rabbi

that a new giving is not required.

Therefore,

it is necessary.

The beraita had to teach their dispute in both cases.

Rava said: If he wrote a bill of divorce for his wife and placed it in the hand of her slave,

if the slave was

asleep

and the woman

was guarding him, it is a valid bill of divorce.

The slave is equivalent to the woman’s courtyard, and this is a courtyard guarded according to the woman’s wishes: since he is asleep, he is guarded only through her.

But if he was

awake, it is not a bill of divorce, for it is a courtyard guarded not according to her wishes,

the woman’s, but rather he guards himself and only what he holds. Such a courtyard does not effect acquisition for a person, since it is not comparable to a hand, which is guarded according to the person’s wishes.

And we challenge Rava, who said:

“If he is asleep and she guards him, it is a valid bill of divorce.”

But why

should the giving to the slave be effective by means of the law of a courtyard? With regard to acquisition through a courtyard, a slave who walks is

like a moving courtyard, and a moving courtyard does not effect acquisition.

The Sages said that a person’s courtyard effects acquisition for him only in the case of a courtyard that does not move!

And if you would say

perhaps

an asleep person is different,

since he does not walk at that time—

that cannot be said, because

Rava said: In any case in which, if he were walking, he would not acquire, if he is standing or sitting

also

does not

acquire. Since he is capable of walking, he is not comparable to a courtyard, and the law of a courtyard does not apply to him. The same applies to one who is asleep, since he is liable to awaken and walk.

And we conclude:

And the halakha is: When he is shackled,

meaning that the slave was bound and incapable of walking, in which case the law of a courtyard applies to him.

And concerning such a slave, Rava said that if he is asleep, it is a valid bill of divorce.

Mishna:

She was standing in the public domain, and he threw the bill of divorce to her there.

If it fell

closer to her,

she is

divorced.

But if it fell

closer to him, she is not divorced.

If it was

exactly halfway between them,

she is

divorced and not divorced.

That is, she is doubtfully divorced.

And likewise with regard to betrothal,

if he threw the betrothal money to her in the public domain, and the money fell closer to her, she is betrothed; if it fell closer to him, she is not betrothed; and if it was exactly halfway between them, it is doubtful betrothal.

And likewise with regard to a debt.

What are the circumstances?

If his creditor said to him,

the lender said to the borrower:

Throw my debt to me,

the money that you owe me!

And he threw it to him

in the public domain, and the money was lost.

If the money fell

closer to the lender, the lender acquired it

at the moment it fell, and the borrower was released from the debt.

But if it fell

closer to the borrower,

and the money was lost,

the borrower remains liable.

For the lender did not acquire it.

If it was

exactly halfway between them, they divide it between them.

That is, the borrower pays half the debt.

Gemara:

We raise a difficulty:

What are the circumstances of “closer to her,” and what are the circumstances of “closer to him”?

In what situation is this said?

Rav said:

If the bill of divorce fell within

her four cubits, that is “closer to her,”

and she is divorced, because the Sages instituted that a person’s four cubits acquire an item for him. But if the bill of divorce fell within

his four cubits, that is “closer to him,”

and the woman did not acquire the bill of divorce.

We raise a difficulty:

What are the circumstances of “exactly halfway between them”?

Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzchak said: For example, when both of them were standing

within

four cubits

of the bill of divorce, he on one side and she on the other, so that the bill of divorce is in the domain of both of them. And we object:

Let us see which of them arrived first,

which of the two preceded the other in coming to the place where they are now standing, in which case that person acquired all four cubits around him, and the other would no longer have any right there!

And if you would say

perhaps you will say:

that both of them arrived simultaneously,

that they both entered the four cubits of the bill of divorce at the same moment. This cannot be said, because:

it is impossible to be so precise

that one of them did not enter the four cubits of the bill of divorce before the other.

And we answer:

Rather, said Rav Kahana: Here,

in eight

cubits

exactly is our case,

meaning that the distance between them was precisely eight cubits, neither less nor more.