Gittin 75b — the Talmud in English

To exclude here

to exclude here] in the beraita

that the condition and the act

are

in one matter, in the get itself: the condition is to return the get, and the act is that it be a get, and the condition has no validity even if he had stated the condition before the act.

то есть в самом гете: условие состоит в том, чтобы вернуть гет, а действие — в том, что гет становится действительным. Поэтому условие недействительно, даже если бы он произнес условие прежде действия.

Rather, Rav Adda bar Ahava said:

the reason that in the latter clause of the beraita the divorce takes effect even though he stipulated with her that she return the paper is

because the condition and the act

are

in one matter , and the condition has no validity, and she need not return the paper.

и условие поэтому недействительно, а ей не нужно возвращать бумагу.

Rav Ashi said: Whose opinion is this?

[This beraita is according to whose opinion?] It is according to the opinion of

Rabbi.

For Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: Anyone who states a condition in the wording

“on condition that” is considered as though he said “from now.”

[it is considered so], and the divorce takes effect immediately, on condition that she fulfills the condition afterward.

If so, it follows that she receives the get at the time of the divorce, and the paper is hers on condition that she return it after some time. And a gift for a fixed period is a gift; therefore the divorce is effective, since she acquires the document until the time when she returns it.

Shmuel instituted in the get of a dangerously ill man

that if he wishes to stipulate that the get take effect only if he dies, he should stipulate in this wording:

“If I do not die, it shall not be a get, and if I die, it shall be a get.”

Since a doubled condition is required, and if he does not double the condition, the get takes effect immediately without fulfillment of the condition, and if he is a kohen, she becomes forbidden to him, and he cannot take her back.

And we raise an objection:

And let him say

[and let him say] in the reverse order:

“If I die, it shall be a get, and if I do not die, it shall not be a get!”

And we answer:

A person does not place misfortune before himself

[misfortune for himself], and one does not first say the side that he will die.

And we raise an objection:

And let him say

[and let him say] in this order:

“It shall not be a get if I do not die,

and it shall be a get if I die.”

And we answer:

We require

[it is necessary] that he state the

condition before

stating the

act,

whereas in this wording he explains the act—“it shall not be a get”—before he explains the condition—“if I do not die.”

Rava objected to him: Since,

after all,

from where do we derive every condition

[from where is it learned] that it is possible to stipulate?

From the condition of the sons of Gad and the sons of Reuben.

And since we learn from there, the condition that he stipulates must be exactly like the one there.

Just as there

[there], in the condition of the sons of Gad and the sons of Reuben, he stated in the condition the part of

“yes”

[the affirmative] [the positive]—what will be if the condition is fulfilled—

before

the part of

“no”

[the negative]—what will be if the condition is not fulfilled,

so too every

condition must be made in this manner.

To exclude here

[to exclude here], in the wording that Shmuel instituted, in which he explains the side of

“no” first

before he explains

“yes”!

Rather, Rava said:

this is how he must stipulate in the get of a dangerously ill man:

“If I do not die, it shall not be a get; if I die, it shall be a get; if I do not die, it shall not be a get.”

And why does he state the condition in such a complicated wording?

And we explain: At first he says

“If I do not die, it shall not be a get”—

because

a person does not place misfortune before himself,

and therefore he begins his condition with the possibility that he will not die.

And afterward he adds and says the possibility that the get will take effect, followed by the possibility that the get will not take effect:

“If I die, it shall be a get; if I do not die, it shall not be a get”—

because

we require

[it is necessary] that he state the side of

“yes” before “no.”

Mishna:

One who says to his wife:

“This is your get on condition that you serve my father,”

and he did not specify how long she is to serve him;

or he said to her:

“On condition that you nurse my son,”

and he did not specify how long she is to nurse him—

if she served his father or nursed his son during the nursing age, the condition has been fulfilled, and she is divorced;

and the time for fulfillment of the condition: for serving the father, the time is all his days of life, but with regard to nursing, the time for fulfillment of the condition is only within the nursing period.

And therefore the Mishna asks:

How long is she to nurse him,

that is, how long is the nursing period, such that if she nurses him within that period the condition is fulfilled?

Two years

from the day he was born.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

the nursing period is

eighteen months

only.

But since the husband did not set a time in his condition, therefore, if

the son dies

before she managed to nurse him,

or the father dies

and she did not serve him, even though she did not fulfill the condition—

it is a get,

for we say that the husband did not intend with his condition to cause her distress and delay her divorce, but rather for his own benefit , and once they died he no longer needs fulfillment of the condition; and had he known that the father or his son would die, he would not have stipulated with her.

The husband said to his wife:

“This is your get on condition that you serve my father for two years,”

or he said to her: this is your get

“on condition that you nurse my son for two years,”

for he set a time in his condition, and it follows that she is not divorced until she completes the time that he stipulated with her.

The son dies

or the father dies before the two years are completed,

or the father said, “I do not want you to serve me.”

Even if he said this

without insistence—

without her having angered him, and the insistence is not from her, and she did not cause his father not to want her service—

nevertheless

it is not a get,

since the condition that he stipulated with her was not fulfilled.

And certainly it is not a get in a case where the insistence is from her.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: In

a case

such as this,

where she did not insist and the impediment is not from her, it is a

get.

For

Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel stated a principle: Every impediment that is not from her—

every prevention in fulfilling the condition that was not caused by her, meaning that she did not prevent fulfillment of the condition, but the impediment came from another source—

it is a get

even though the condition was not fulfilled.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: If he stipulated with her that she nurse his son or serve his father, she must serve the father and nurse the son to the full extent of his need.

And we raise an objection:

Do we require all this,

and must she nurse the son and serve the father to the full extent of their needs in order to fulfill the condition?

And we juxtapose:

but we learned in another beraita a contradiction to this: that if she

served him

the father

one day,

or

nursed him

the son

one day—

it is a get,

for he did not specify how long she should serve the father and nurse the son; if so, by one day she has already fulfilled his words.

Rav Hisda said: It is not difficult

to reconcile the words of the beraita with our Mishna:

This

[this beraita] is according to the opinion of

the Rabbis, and this

[and this] our Mishna is according to the opinion of

Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel.

For they disagreed in the Mishna above [74a] concerning one who stipulated in a get, “on condition that you return my garment,” and the garment was lost. According to the Rabbis, there is no way for her to fulfill the condition, and therefore she cannot be divorced with this get. And according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel, in such a case she can fulfill the condition by giving its value.

And one may say that

the Mishna is according to the opinion of

Rabban

Shimon ben Gamaliel, who holds that his words are interpreted according to his intention. And since his intention is to gain the garment, we interpret his words as meaning that he did not intend specifically the garment but also its value. If so, the same applies when he stipulated that she serve the father or nurse the infant: he intended the benefit of the father or the child, and we interpret his words as meaning that he intended that she serve the father for as long as he needs it, and nurse his son for as long as he needs to nurse.

который считает, что слова следует истолковывать согласно намерению говорящего. Поскольку его намерение состояло в том, чтобы получить выгоду от плаща, его слова истолковываются так, что он имел в виду не именно плащ, но и его стоимость. Так же и здесь: если он поставил условие прислуживать отцу или кормить ребенка, он имел в виду пользу отца или ребенка, и его слова истолковываются так, что она должна прислуживать отцу все время, пока он нуждается в этом, и кормить сына все время, пока сын нуждается в кормлении.

And the beraita

holds according to the opinion of

the Rabbis,

who hold that his words are interpreted according to their plain meaning. And since he specified a garment, she must specifically bring him a garment. If so, the same applies when he stipulated that she nurse the infant or serve his father: since he did not specify how long, the condition is fulfilled even if she fulfilled it for only one day.

And we raise an objection: How is it possible to interpret that our Mishna, which requires fulfillment of the condition to the full extent, is the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel?

For

from the fact that in the latter clause

of the Mishna it is explicitly stated that it is the opinion of

Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel.

It follows

[it is proven]

that the Tanna Kamma in

the first clause is

not Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel!

Since if the first clause too were the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel, they would not have specified his name in the latter clause of the Mishna; and if they wished to specify his name in the Mishna, they would have brought him in the first clause. From the fact that they specified his name only in the latter clause, it is proven that only the law in the latter clause is according to his opinion.

If so, it is impossible to establish the first law in our Mishna—that if he did not specify a time in his condition, she must fulfill the condition for the entire time—according to the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel.

Rather,

the contradiction between the beraita and the Mishna must be resolved in the opposite manner:

The

beraita that is lenient concerning fulfillment of the condition and holds that if he did not specify a time in his condition, one day is sufficient to fulfill the condition, is the opinion of

Rabban

Shimon ben Gamaliel—

who is lenient with regard to a condition,

for he said that she can fulfill the condition even by giving the value of the garment, and he also said that every impediment to the condition that is not because of her does not prevent the divorce from taking effect.

Whereas

the Mishna that is stringent concerning fulfillment of the condition and holds that if he did not specify a time in his condition, the condition must be fulfilled for the entire time

is

according to the opinion of

the Rabbis—who are stringent concerning fulfillment of the condition, and they are the ones who hold in the Mishna that if the condition was not fulfilled in its entirety, it prevents the get from taking effect.

которые ужесточают требования к выполнению условия и считают в Мишне, что если условие не выполнено полностью, это препятствует вступлению гета в силу.

Rava said

to resolve the contradiction between the beraita and the Mishna in another manner:

It is not difficult: Here

our Mishna is speaking

of

one who stipulated

without specification,

who did not set a time; and when a person does not set a time, its ordinary meaning is for the entire time that is needed.

Here

the beraita is speaking

of one who specifies

that she should do it for one day.

Rav Ashi

disagrees with Rava and

said:

the beraita is speaking of one who stipulated without specification and did not set a time, and

every

one who stipulated

without specification

and did not set a time

is also like one who specifies

that she should fulfill the condition for only

one day.

And we raise an objection to Rav Ashi: After all, our Mishna is speaking of one who stipulated without specification and did not set a time.

And

we learned

in our Mishna:

How long is she to nurse him?

Until he is

two years old.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

until he is

eighteen months old.

If so,

according to

the opinion of

Rava, it is understandable,

that she must nurse the infant to the full extent of his need.

But according to

the opinion of

Rav Ashi,

who says that when he stipulated without specification and did not specify a time, it is considered as though he specified that she fulfill the condition for only one day,

why do I need two years, why do I need eighteen months?

After all,

one day is sufficient

[enough] for her to fulfill the condition!

And we answer: According to Rav Ashi,

this is what the Mishna says:

Мишна:

How long is she to nurse him?

One day within

the period of

two years

—these being the nursing period—

to exclude

[to exclude] if she nursed him

after

the infant had reached the age of

two years, for it does not

fulfill the condition thereby, since this is not nursing.

And Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with the Tanna Kamma and holds that she nurses him

one day within

the period of

eighteen months

of nursing,

to exclude

[to exclude] if she nursed him

after

the infant had reached the age of

eighteen months, for it does not

fulfill the condition thereby, since this is not nursing.

We challenge

[they raise an objection] to Rav Ashi from what we learned:

He said to her

“This is your get on condition that you serve my father for two years,”

or

“on condition that you nurse my son for two years.”

And

the son dies, or the father says, “I do not want you to serve me,”

even

without insistence,

so that she did not cause him to insist upon her; nevertheless

it is not a get.