Gittin 75a — the Talmud in English

By inference

you learn from these words,

that in general

[in the other matters in the world] that were not included within the scope of Hillel’s enactment,

giving against the recipient’s will is not

[not considered]

giving.

And if so, a bill of divorce, which is a matter of prohibition, is not included within Hillel’s enactment, and giving against her will is not considered giving.

Rav Pappa raised an objection to him, and some say Rav Shimi bar Ashi:

Perhaps

[and perhaps] giving against the recipient’s will is considered giving.

And

when it was necessary for him

for Hillel

to enact

that giving against his will be effective, this was because he gives the money

not in his presence,

such as one who comes to redeem his house while the purchaser is not in the chamber; only in this circumstance was Hillel’s enactment necessary, so that giving against his will would be effective and be considered giving.

But

when he gives the money

in his presence—

whether with his consent

or against his will, it is

[considered]

giving

according to the fundamental law.

And if so, with regard to a bill of divorce, when she gives it to him in his presence, the giving is effective even against his will.

And there are those who say

that the matter was stated in the reverse manner, and this is how it was stated:

Rava said: From Hillel’s enactment

there is proof:

That one who says to his wife:

“This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me two hundred zuz,” and she gave it to him—

whether with his consent or against his will, it is

[considered]

giving.

For,

did Hillel need to enact

a special enactment only for this act of giving

not in his presence,

such as in the case of one who sells a house in a walled city, where the purchaser hides and he cannot redeem it in his presence?

But

for giving in his presence he did not need to enact anything, since it is effective even against his will.

It follows that regarding giving

in his presence—

whether with his consent

or against his will, it is

[considered]

giving

according to the fundamental law.

And if so, the same law applies with regard to a bill of divorce.

Rav Pappa raised an objection to him, and some say Rav Shimi bar Ashi:

Perhaps

[and perhaps]

even

giving

in his presence also—

specifically,

with his consent is not

[so] effective, but

against his will it is not

effective.

And

the reason that

Hillel

enacted only regarding giving not in his presence, that it should be effective against his will, is because only

what was necessary for him

[what he needed]

he enacted,

and the case for which he needed to enact was giving not in his presence.

And indeed, giving against his will in his presence likewise requires an enactment so that it will be effective. If the purchaser of a house in a walled city had not hidden, but had said to the seller that he was unwilling to accept the money, Hillel would likewise have needed to enact that giving against the purchaser’s will be effective.

And if so, with regard to a bill of divorce, which is a matter of prohibition, Hillel’s enactment does not apply to it, and giving against his will is not effective.

Rabba bar bar Hana said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan:

Every place where Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel taught in our Mishna—

the halakha is like him

even though his is a minority opinion.

Except for

three places where the halakha is not like him, and these are they:

A. In the law of

a guarantor,

[brought at the end of the chapter “A Simple Bill of Divorce,”] if the creditor stipulated that he could collect his debt from whomever he wished, he may collect first from the guarantor’s property, even though the debtor has property; this is not according to the words of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

B.

And

regarding the incident that took place in

Sidon

mentioned in our Mishna, the halakha follows the Sages who dispute Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel: she cannot fulfill the condition by giving the value of the object.

C.

And the last proof,

[brought in Sanhedrin 31a:] if a person brings a proof to the court after he admitted that he had no proofs, this proof is not relied upon, although according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel it is relied upon.

The Sages taught:

One who says to his wife:

“This is your bill of divorce,”

but

the paper

will remain

mine—

she is not divorced,

since he did not give her anything tangible, and it is written in the Torah that it must be “and he shall place it in her hand”.

And if he said to her: “This is your bill of divorce”

on condition that you return the paper to me—

she is divorced.

The Gemara understood that the bill of divorce takes effect only when she returns the paper, and this is according to the opinion of the Rabbis who dispute Rabbi and hold that everyone who says “on condition” is not as one who says “from now”; this is as though he said: “This is your bill of divorce when you return the paper to me.”

And if so, it is difficult:

what is different in the first clause

that she is not divorced because he gave her nothing,

and what is different in the latter clause

that she is divorced even though she has nothing at the time of the divorce?

Rav Hisda said: This one, who is it?

[According to whose opinion is this beraita]?

It is according to the opinion of

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who says:

with regard to his cloak—that

she should give him its value,

and she does not need to give him the cloak itself in order to fulfill his condition.

Here too

[so likewise] it is possible to explain the beraita: the reason that when he stipulates with her on condition that she return the paper to him she is divorced is that

it is possible that she appeases him with money

[that she appeases him with money], and she does not need to return the paper; and if so, at the time of the divorce she has the paper for herself.

Abaye raised an objection to him:

Say

when

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said

that giving money in place of the object itself is effective—specifically

where it is not present as it is

[where the object is not extant], such as with regard to a cloak.

But

where it is present as it is

[where the object is extant], as in the beraita concerning a bill of divorce,

who said

that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that giving money will be effective?

If so, there is no proof from the Mishna to establish the beraita [as referring to a case in which the object stipulated is extant] according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

Rather, Abaye said: This one, who is it?

[According to whose opinion is this beraita]? It is according to

Rabbi Meir.

For he says that we require

[it is necessary] in every condition that he stipulate

a doubled condition,

and he must specify in his stipulation both what will happen if the condition is fulfilled and what will happen if the condition is not fulfilled [and this is learned from the condition of the children of Gad and the children of Reuben in the Torah]. If he did not stipulate in this manner, the condition is not binding, and the matter concerning which he stipulated takes effect even without fulfillment of the condition.

And here

in the beraita, where he stipulated with her on condition that she return the paper,

he did not double his condition.

And therefore the bill of divorce takes effect, since she does not need to fulfill the condition, to return the paper to him.

Rava raised an objection to him:

It follows from your words that

the reason

that the bill of divorce takes effect when he stipulates with her on condition that she return the paper is

that he did not double his condition.

But

if

he doubled his condition—

the condition that she must return the paper would take effect, and when she fulfilled the condition,

it would not be a bill of divorce

[the bill of divorce would not take effect].

It is impossible to say so, for

after all, every condition—from where do we learn them

[from where is it learned] that one may stipulate that a legal effect take effect only upon fulfillment of the condition?

From the condition of the children of Gad and the children of Reuben,

when Moses stipulated with them that if they crossed over and fought with the rest of Israel, they would receive the Transjordan as an inheritance, and if they did not send armed men ahead, they would not receive the Transjordan [Numbers 32].

And since the law of conditions is learned from there, the condition that one stipulates must be exactly as it was there.

Just as there

[there] in the condition of the children of Gad and the children of Reuben, the

condition

was stated regarding the act

before the act.

Moses first said the condition to them—“If the children of Gad and the children of Reuben will cross over, etc.” [there, 29]—and only afterward explained to them what the act would be when the condition was fulfilled—“and you shall give them the land of Gilead as a possession” [there].

So too, every condition

must have the condition stipulated

before the act.

To exclude here

[to exclude here], in the condition in the beraita, where he stated the

act

of giving the bill of divorce—“This is your bill of divorce”

—before the condition [“

on condition that you return the paper to me”] , and the condition has no force even if he had stated a doubled condition.

before the condition—“on the condition that you return the paper to me”.

The condition is therefore ineffective even if he had stated a double condition.

Rather, Rava said:

The reason that in the latter clause of the beraita the divorce takes effect even though he stipulated that she return the paper is

that the act preceded the condition,

and the condition is ineffective; she is therefore not required to return the paper.

Rav Adda bar Ahava raised an objection to him:

It follows from your words that

the reason

that the bill of divorce takes effect when he stipulated with her on condition that she return the paper is

that

the

act preceded the condition.

But

if he had stated the

condition before

stating the

act,

the condition that she must return the paper would take effect, and when she fulfilled the condition

it would not be a bill of divorce

[the bill of divorce would not take effect].

It is impossible to say so, for

after all, every condition—from where do we learn them

[from where is it learned] that one may stipulate?

From the condition of the children of Gad and the children of Reuben.

And since it is learned from there, the condition that one stipulates must be exactly as it was there.

Just as there

[there] the

condition

was

in one matter—

that they would cross the Jordan and fight in the Land of Israel,

and the

act

was

in

another matter—

that they would receive the inheritance of the land of Gilead, on the eastern side of the Jordan.

So too, all

conditions must be in this manner.