Gittin 74b — the Talmud in English

And it was taught

[And thus a beraita is taught] in accordance with the words of Rabbi Yohanan, that Rabbi and the Sages did not disagree concerning the expression “on the condition that,” since it is like one who says “from now”; rather, they disagreed concerning one who stipulated: “from today and after death.”

As it was taught: One who says to a woman, “This is your bill of divorce”

“from today and after death”—

it is a bill of divorce and it is not a bill of divorce.

For it is uncertain whether, when he said “after death,” he intended to retract what he had said “from today” and intended that it take effect after death, or whether he intended a condition—that it take effect from today on the condition that he dies,

the words of the Sages.

Rabbi says: Like this

it is a bill of divorce.

That is, it is entirely a valid bill of divorce, since certainly he intended a condition.

And from the fact that they disagreed in the beraita in the case where he said in the language “from today and after death,” it follows that if he said in the language “on the condition that,” everyone agrees that he is considered to have explicitly said that it should take effect immediately, and the bill of divorce takes effect.

And we raise an objection:

But according to Rav Yehuda, who says

that Rabbi and the Sages

disagree concerning “on the condition that,”

if so, there is a difficulty from the beraita, for

rather than disagreeing

[before Rabbi and the Sages disagreed]

concerning “from today and after death,” let them disagree

[let them disagree]

concerning “on the condition that,”

and there would be a novelty in the matter: that the Rabbis invalidate the bill of divorce even when he said it in the language “on the condition that,” and not only when he said it in the language “from today and after death.”

And we answer: Indeed, the Rabbis invalidate the bill of divorce even when he said it in the language “on the condition that,” but the beraita preferred to establish their dispute in the case where he said it in the language “from today and after death” in order

to inform you of Rabbi’s power,

that he is not concerned at all that the bill of divorce is not a bill of divorce even with this language.

And we raise an objection:

Let them disagree

[and let them establish their dispute in the beraita]

concerning “on the condition that,” and inform you of the power of the Rabbis

that they invalidate the bill of divorce even in this case, and all the more so when he said “from today and after death.”

And we answer:

The power of the permissive ruling is preferable to him.

The beraita prefers to teach how far Rabbi permits, rather than to teach how far the Rabbis prohibit. For it is more difficult to permit a matter than to prohibit it, and therefore there is preference for the novelty of permission over the novelty of prohibition.

We learned in the Mishna: If he said to a woman, “This is your bill of divorce”

“on the condition that you give me, from now until thirty days,”

if she gave it within thirty days—it is a bill of divorce; and if not—it is not a bill of divorce.

And we raise an objection:

It is obvious

that this is so, since everything depends on whether, in the end, she fulfilled the condition or not! And we answer: The novelty in the words of the Mishna is that

lest you say

[I would say] that

his insistence

[the husband’s insistence] that she give it to him within a fixed period

is not insistence

[is not genuine insistence], and this is not an actual condition that binds her completely.

And

only

he comes to hurry her

[he comes] by setting thirty days for her to fulfill the condition, but he is not particular if she delays.

It teaches us

that it is a complete condition, and if she did not fulfill it within thirty days, this is not a bill of divorce.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: An incident

that occurred

in

the settlement

of Sidon

involving a man who stipulated that the bill of divorce should take effect when his wife gave him his cloak, and the cloak was lost, and the Sages said that she should give him its value in its place, and she would be divorced.

And we examine it:

What law did the tanna

teach,

that he taught

[that he taught] concerning this

“incident”?

For the tanna teaches an incident only as proof for a law that he brought, and if so, clarification is needed, since no law was brought in the Mishna for which this incident is proof.

And we answer:

Something is missing, and this is what it teaches

[something is missing from the words of the Mishna, and this is how it should be taught]:

If he said to her

the husband, “This is your bill of divorce,”

“on the condition that you give me my cloak, and his cloak was lost,”

she cannot fulfill the condition, since

“my cloak” is precisely what he said to her,

and not its value.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: She should give him its value,

for he is particular only that he should have the value of the cloak, and therefore she can fulfill the condition by giving him its value.

And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: An incident also occurred in Sidon involving one who said to his wife, “This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you give me my cloak,” and his cloak was lost, and the Sages said: She should give him its value.

Rabbi Asi asked Rabbi Yohanan

One who says to a woman,

“This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you give me two hundred zuz,” and he then said to her, “They are waived for you”—what is the law?

Does this waiver count as fulfillment of the condition, as though she had given him the money, or not?

It may be asked

[it is uncertain]

according to the Rabbis,

and likewise

it may be asked

[it is uncertain]

according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

It may be asked

[it is uncertain]

according to the Rabbis,

who say that money is not considered a substitute for the cloak.

Perhaps

the Rabbis said only there

that if he accepts its value, it is not considered that he received the cloak, and she is not divorced—

but

because

he did not waive it for her

[he did not waive the cloak for her].

But here, he has said

[he has said]

to her

that the money is

waived for you,

and since he waived the money for her, it is considered as though he actually received the money for the cloak, for waiver is like acceptance.

Or perhaps,

it is possible to say that

even Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said only

[did not say] that the condition is fulfilled even without giving the cloak itself,

but

in a manner

that she appeases him with money

[that she appeases him with money], so that the condition is considered fulfilled by his receiving its substitute.

But

to waive the condition

entirely

and waive it—perhaps

not

is possible.

And if so, what is the law?

He said to him

Rabbi Yohanan: The law is that

she is not divorced,

and the waiver is not considered fulfillment of the condition.

He challenged him

[they challenge Rabbi Yohanan] from what we learned in tractate Nedarim:

One who says to his fellow

“I prohibit upon you, with the prohibition of a

konam,

all benefit

that you

will

derive from me

[from me]

if

[if not]

you give my son one kor of wheat and two barrels of wine.”

Rabbi Meir says: He is prohibited

from benefiting from him, because of the konam,

until he gives

those things to his son.

And the Sages say: Even this one

who made the vow, if he wishes,

can release his vow without a sage’s authorization,

without asking a sage to release it,

and says

only,

“I am as though I have received from you,”

the things.

It follows that if, after the fact, he waives what he demanded, he is considered as though he received it; if so, here too, with regard to the bill of divorce, the husband’s waiver should be considered as though he received it, and she should be divorced?

And we answer:

Is that so?!

Can the two cases be compared?

There

[there] in the matter of divorce,

he intends to cause her distress

[he intends to cause her distress] through his condition that she bring him two hundred zuz.

And

when he waived the money for her,

he did not cause her distress

and his intention in the condition was not fulfilled.

That is not so

here

[here] in the matter of vows:

it was for benefit

that he stipulated, for he wished to benefit his son,

and

in the end

he did not need it

[he did not need] this benefit, and it is considered that the condition was fulfilled by his having obtained his satisfaction.

An incident:

A certain man

[there was a man]

who said to his tenant farmer:

Everyone draws three draws

[all the tenant farmers in that place customarily draw water and irrigate the field three times],

and eat a quarter,

[and receive a quarter] of the produce of the field as payment for their work of plowing, sowing, weeding, irrigating, and performing all the needs of the field.

But

you draw four and eat a third,

[but you shall draw water and irrigate the field four times, and receive a third of the produce of the field as your payment].

In the end, rain came

[in the end, rain fell], and it was necessary to irrigate only three times, as all the tenant farmers do.

And a question was asked before the Sages: Does the tenant farmer receive only a quarter of the produce, like all the other tenant farmers, since the condition was not fulfilled, for in practice he irrigated the field only three times, as the other tenant farmers do? Or does he receive a third of the produce, since he stipulated with the owner of the field that he would receive a third in return for irrigating the field four times, and in practice the land was irrigated four times and the condition was fulfilled?

Rav Yosef said:

He receives only a quarter of the produce, like all the other tenant farmers, for

this

[for]

he did not draw water

a fourth time, and he did not fulfill the condition.

Rabba said: He did not need it

[he did not need it]—the tenant farmer did not need to irrigate the field a fourth time, since it had already been irrigated by itself through the rain; he benefited from this, and he receives a third of the produce.

And we examine it:

Let us say

[let it be said] that

Rav Yosef, who said

here, concerning the tenant farmer, that it is not considered that the tenant farmer fulfilled the condition when rain fell and he did not need to irrigate, holds

in accordance with the Rabbis

in our Mishna concerning the cloak, who hold that the condition must be fulfilled according to its wording, and the condition is not fulfilled by giving the value of the cloak.

And Rabba, who said

here, concerning the tenant farmer, that the condition is fulfilled even if rain fell and the field was irrigated on its own, holds

in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel

in our Mishna, who holds that money is considered as though he received the cloak; likewise, rain is considered as though he received irrigation.

And we raise an objection:

Can you understand this?

[Do you think] that Rabba and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel hold the same thing?

But we have established

with regard to all the disputes between Rabba and Rav Yosef

that the halakha is in accordance with Rabba,

except for three disputes [concerning a field, an ענין, and half].

And in this

[and in this halakha], we have established:

the halakha is not in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel!

And if so, it is contradictory to say that Rabba, whose ruling is followed, holds in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, whose ruling is not followed.

Rather, in fact

it should be said that both Rabba and Rav Yosef hold

in accordance with

the opinion of

the Rabbis,

that the condition is not fulfilled when he did not do as the condition stated.

And concerning this, Rabba and Rav Yosef disagree:

Rav Yosef

simply holds

in accordance with the Rabbis,

that the condition must be fulfilled according to its meaning, and since the owner stipulated with him that he irrigate the field four times, and he did not irrigate it a fourth time, the condition was not fulfilled.

And Rabba can say to you: I who said

[I who said] my statement that when rain fell the tenant farmer fulfilled the condition,

even according to

the opinion of

the Rabbis

I said it.

For

the Rabbis said only

[did not say]

there

[there] in the matter of divorce, that for fulfillment of the condition he must give the cloak itself and not its value—

but

because

he intends to cause her distress,

since ordinarily a man who divorces his wife does so out of hostility, and he is particular that the condition be fulfilled exactly as he stipulated, he divorces her; therefore, as a matter of doubt, we say that his intention in the condition was to cause her distress, and we do not adopt the lenient assumption that his intention was merely to gain money.

But here

in the field, they say that

it is because of the benefit,

that he stipulated with the sharecropper to water it one additional time.

But he did not need it

[and after all, he did not require] an additional watering at the end; if so, the owner of the field had his need met by the rains, and the condition was thereby fulfilled.

We learned there in Arakhin, concerning the redemption of “houses of walled cities.”

in Arakhin, concerning the redemption of “houses of walled cities.”

By Torah law: a house that was sold within a walled city and was not redeemed by its owner within twelve months remains permanently with the purchaser:

And

at first,

before the enactment of the Sages,

the purchaser would hide

throughout the entire

day

of the last

ten

months, so that

the house

would become irrevocably his 17 ,

so that the seller would not find him and would be unable to redeem the house, and the house would remain permanently with the purchaser.

The elder Hillel enacted

so that the seller could redeem the house against the will of the purchaser:

That

the seller

would cast

[place]

his money

that he had set aside for the purpose of redeeming his house

into the chamber

that they had established for this purpose in the Temple,

and would break down the door

of the house

and enter.

And whenever the purchaser wishes,

he will come and take his money

from the chamber.

And Rava said: From Hillel’s enactment we may infer

to prove:

For one who says to his wife,

“This is your divorce document on condition that you give me two hundred zuz,”

and she gave it to him with his consent

[willingly]—she is

divorced.

And if she gave it to him

against his will—she

is not

divorced.

And this may be proved

from the fact that Hillel had to enact

a special enactment concerning

giving

of money

against his will

of the purchaser,

so that it would be

[be considered]

giving,