Gittin 74b (עד:) — the Talmud in English

And it was taught [

And a beraita is likewise taught: in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yohanan, that Rabbi and the Sages did not disagree concerning the wording “on condition that,” as one who says this is considered to have said that it takes effect from now; rather, they disagreed when he stipulated: “from today and after death”.]

As it was taught: One who says to a woman, “This is your bill of divorce”

“from today and after death”—

it is a bill of divorce, but it is not a bill of divorce.

For it is uncertain whether, by saying “after death,” he intended to retract what he had said by “from today,” and intended that it take effect only after death; or whether he intended it as a condition—that it should take effect from now on the condition that he dies,

the statement of the Sages.

Rabbi says: Like this

it is a bill of divorce.

That is, it is entirely a valid bill of divorce, since he certainly intended it as a condition.

And from the fact that they disagree in the beraita when he used the wording “from today and after death,” it follows that if he used the wording “on condition that,” everyone agrees that he is considered to have explicitly said that it should take effect immediately, and the bill of divorce takes effect.

And we raise an objection:

But according to Rav Yehuda, who said that

Rabbi and the Sages

disagree concerning “on condition that,”

if so, the beraita presents a difficulty, because

rather than disagreeing [

before Rabbi and the Sages disagreed]

concerning “from today and after death,” let them disagree [

let them disagree]

concerning “on condition that,” and

there would be a novel point in the matter: that the Sages invalidate the bill of divorce even when he used the wording “on condition that,” and not only when he used the wording “from today and after death”.

And we answer: Indeed, the Sages invalidate the bill of divorce even when he used the wording “on condition that,” but the beraita preferred to present their disagreement when he used the wording “from today and after death” in order

to inform you of Rabbi’s power,

that he is not at all concerned that the bill of divorce might not be a bill of divorce even with this wording.

And we raise an objection:

Let them disagree [

and let the beraita present their disagreement]

concerning “on condition that,” and inform you of the power of the Sages

that they invalidate the bill of divorce even in this case, and all the more so when he says “from today and after death”.

And we answer:

The power of a lenient ruling is preferable to him.

The beraita prefers to teach the extent of Rabbi’s leniency rather than the extent of the Sages’ stringency. For it is more difficult to permit something than to prohibit it, and therefore a novel leniency is preferable to a novel stringency.

We learned in the Mishna: If he said to a woman, “This is your bill of divorce”

“on condition that you give me [the item] from now until thirty days,”

if she gave it within thirty days, it is a bill of divorce; and if not, it is not a bill of divorce.

And we raise an objection:

Obviously

this is so, since everything depends on whether she ultimately fulfilled the condition or not! And we answer: The novel point in the Mishna is that

lest you say [

I might have said] that

his insistence [

the husband’s insistence] that she give it to him within a fixed period

is not insistence [

is not genuine insistence], and this is not a true condition that fully binds her.

And

only

he came to hasten her [

he set thirty days for her to fulfill the condition in order to hasten her, but he is not particular if she delays].

It teaches us

that it is a complete condition, and if she does not fulfill it within thirty days, it is not a bill of divorce.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: There was an incident

that took place

in

the settlement of

Tzidon

involving a man who stipulated that the bill of divorce should take effect when his wife gave him his cloak. The cloak was lost, and the Sages said that she should give him its value in its place, and she would thereby be divorced.

And we consider the matter:

What ruling did the tanna teach

what law did the tanna teach

that he taught [

that he taught] about this

“incident”?

For a tanna teaches an incident only as proof of a law that he has cited. If so, this requires explanation, since no law was brought in the Mishna for which this incident could serve as proof.

And we answer:

A portion is missing, and this is what it teaches [

something is missing from the Mishna, and this is how it should be taught]:

If he said to her

the husband, “This is your bill of divorce,”

“on condition that you give me my cloak,” and his cloak was lost,

she cannot fulfill the condition, since

“my cloak” is precisely what he said to her,

and not its value.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: She should give him its value,

for he is particular only that he should have the value of the cloak, and therefore she can fulfill the condition by giving him its value.

And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: There was also an incident in Tzidon involving one who said to his wife, “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me my cloak,” and his cloak was lost, and the Sages said: She should give him its value.

Rabbi Asi asked Rabbi Yohanan:

One who says to a woman

“This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me two hundred zuz,” and then said to her, “It is forgiven you”—what is the law?

Does this waiver count as fulfillment of the condition, as though she had given him the money, or not?

The question may be raised [

there is room for uncertainty]

according to the Sages,

and likewise

the question may be raised [

there is room for uncertainty]

according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

The question may be raised [

there is room for uncertainty]

according to the Sages,

who say that money is not considered a substitute for the cloak.

Perhaps

the Sages said only there

that if he accepts its value, this is not considered as though he received the cloak, and she is not divorced—

but

because

he did not waive it for her [

he did not waive the cloak for her].

But here, he said [

he said]

to her

that the money

is forgiven you,

and since he waived the money for her, it is considered as though he actually received the money in exchange for the cloak, for waiver is equivalent to acceptance.

Or perhaps,

it is possible to say that

even Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said [

did not say] that the condition is fulfilled even without giving the cloak itself

but

in a case

where she appeases him with money [

where she appeases him with money], so that the condition is considered fulfilled because he accepted compensation for it.

But

to waive the condition

entirely

and forgive it—perhaps this

does not

apply.

And if so, what is the law?

He said to him,

Rabbi Yohanan: The law is that

she is not divorced,

and the waiver is not considered fulfillment of the condition.

He raised an objection to him [

they objected to Rabbi Yohanan] from what we learned in tractate Nedarim:

One who says to his fellow:

I prohibit upon you, with the prohibition of a

konam,

any benefit

that you

may

derive from me [

from me]

if [

if not]

you give my son one kor of wheat and two barrels of wine.

Rabbi Meir says: He is prohibited

from benefiting from his fellow because of the konam,

until he gives

those items to his son.

And the Sages say: This one too

the one who made the vow, if he wishes

can release his vow without a Sage,

without asking a Sage to release it,

and he says

only:

“I am as though I had received”

the items from you.

It follows that if, after the fact, he waives what he demanded, he is considered as though he had received it. If so, here too, with regard to the bill of divorce, the husband’s waiver should be considered as though he had received the money, and she should be divorced?

And we answer:

Can it really be compared?!

Is it possible to compare the two cases?

There [

there, in the case of the bill of divorce],

his intention is to cause her distress [

his intention is to cause her distress] through the condition that he makes with her, that she bring him two hundred zuz.

And

when he waived the money for her,

he did not cause her distress

and his intention in making the condition was not fulfilled.

In contrast,

here [

here, in the case of vows],

he made the stipulation for the sake of benefit

because he wanted his son to profit.

And

in the end,

he did not need it [

he did not need] this benefit, and it is considered that the condition was fulfilled by his having obtained what he needed.

An incident:

There was a certain man [

there was a man]

who said to his sharecropper:

All the sharecroppers in this place draw water three times [

all the sharecroppers in this place customarily draw water and irrigate the field three times],

and they take one-quarter, [

and receive one-quarter] of the field’s produce as payment for their work of plowing, sowing, weeding, irrigating, and performing all the needs of the field.

But

you draw water four times and take one-third, [

but you shall draw water and irrigate the field four times, and you shall receive one-third of the field’s produce as your compensation].

In the end, rain came [

in the end, rain fell], and it was necessary to irrigate only three times, as all the other sharecroppers did.

The Sages were asked whether the sharecropper receives only one-quarter of the produce, like all the other sharecroppers, since the condition was not fulfilled and in practice he irrigated the field only three times, as the others did; or whether he receives one-third of the produce, since he had stipulated with the landowner that he would receive one-third in exchange for irrigating the field four times, and in practice the land was irrigated four times and the condition was fulfilled.

Rav Yosef said:

He receives only one-quarter of the produce, like all the other sharecroppers, because

this [

for]

he did not draw water

a fourth time, and he did not fulfill the condition.

Rabba said: He did not need to [

he did not need] irrigate the field a fourth time, since it had already been irrigated on its own by the rain; this was to the sharecropper’s benefit, and he receives one-third of the produce.

And we consider the matter:

Let us say [

let it be said] that

Rav Yosef, who said

here, concerning the sharecropper, that it is not considered that the sharecropper fulfilled the condition by rain falling and making irrigation unnecessary, holds

in accordance with the Sages

in our Mishna concerning the cloak, who hold that the condition must be fulfilled according to its wording, and that the condition is not fulfilled by giving the value of the cloak.

And Rabba, who said

here, concerning the sharecropper, that the condition was fulfilled even when rain fell and the field was irrigated by itself, holds

in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel

in our Mishna, who holds that money is considered as though he received the cloak; likewise, rain is considered as though he received irrigation.

And we raise an objection:

Can you really say [

do you think] that Rabba and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel hold the same thing?

But we have established

that in all the disputes between Rabba and Rav Yosef,

the halakha is in accordance with Rabba,

except for three disputes [concerning a field, an issue, and half].

And in this case [

and with regard to this halakha], we have established:

the halakha is not in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel!

If so, it is contradictory to say that Rabba, whose ruling is the halakha, holds in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, whose ruling is not the halakha.

Rather, actually

we should say that both Rabba and Rav Yosef hold

in accordance with

the opinion of

the Sages,

that the condition is not fulfilled when he does not act in accordance with the terms of the condition.

And Rabba and Rav Yosef disagree with regard to this:

Rav Yosef

simply holds

in accordance with the Sages,

that the condition must be fulfilled according to its plain meaning. Since the owner stipulated with him that he irrigate the field four times, and he did not irrigate it a fourth time, the condition was not fulfilled.

And Rabba could say to you: I who said [

I who said] my statement—that when rain fell, the sharecropper fulfilled the condition—

even according to

the opinion of

the Sages

I said it.

For

the Sages said only [

they said]

there [

there, in the case of divorce], that in order to fulfill the condition she must give the cloak itself and not its value—

but

because

his intention is to cause her distress,

since ordinarily a man who divorces his wife does so out of animosity, and he is particular that the condition be fulfilled precisely as he stipulated. He divorces her; therefore, because of the uncertainty, we say that his intention in the condition was to cause her distress, and we do not assume leniently that his intention was merely to gain money.

But here,

in the field, it is said that

it was for the sake of benefit,

as he had stipulated with the sharecropper that he irrigate it one additional time.

But it was not necessary [(

for he did not need)] to irrigate it additionally at the end; if so, the owner of the field achieved his objective through the rain, and the stipulation was thereby fulfilled.

We learned there

in tract Arakhin, concerning the redemption of “houses in walled cities.”

By Torah law: If a house was sold within a walled city and its owner did not redeem it within twelve months, the house remains permanently with the purchaser:

And

originally,

before the Sages instituted their ordinance,

the purchaser would conceal himself

throughout the entire

day

of the final

year

of the twelve months, so that

the house

would become his permanently 17 ,

so that the seller would not find him and would be unable to redeem the house, and the house would remain permanently with the purchaser.

Hillel the Elder instituted

that the seller could redeem the house against the purchaser’s will:

so that

the seller

could deposit [(

place)]

his money

that he had set aside for redeeming his house

in the chamber

that they had designated for this purpose in the Temple,

and could break down the door

of the house

and enter.

And whenever the purchaser wishes,

he may come and take his money

from the chamber.

And Rava said: From Hillel’s ordinance it can be inferred

as proof:

For when one says to his wife,

“This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me two hundred zuz,”

and she gave it to him willingly [(

of his own accord)]—she is

divorced.

But if she gave it to him

against his will—she

is not

divorced.

And this can be proved

from the fact that Hillel had to institute

a special ordinance concerning

the giving

of money

against the will

of the purchaser,

so that it would be for her [(

so that it would be considered)]

a giving,