Gittin 74a (עד.) — the Talmud in English

and becomes impure through contact with her

when she dies, if he is a kohen.

The general rule is: she is considered his wife in every respect —

except that she does not require a second bill of divorce from him

when he dies, since the get that he gave her takes effect immediately before his death.

These are the words of Rabbi Yehuda.

Rabbi Meir says:

if she had relations with another man after the get was delivered, the status of

her intercourse is contingent

on whether he ultimately dies from his illness.

Rabbi Meir holds that the meaning of the expression “from the time that I am in the world” is from the time of delivery. Therefore, when he said to her at the time he delivered the get, “This is your get from the time that I am in the world, if I die,” once he died, it became clear retroactively that the get took effect at the time of delivery, and she was divorced when she had relations with the other man. But if he did not die, the get never took effect, and she remained a married woman; consequently, the man who had relations with her is liable to bring a sin-offering.

Rabbi Yosei says:

if she had relations with another man after the get was delivered,

her intercourse

was intercourse with

a woman of uncertain status,

possibly a married woman.

Rabbi Yosei holds that the meaning of the expression “from the time that I am in the world” is from a time immediately preceding death. If so, there is uncertainty whether the time of intercourse can be considered adjacent to the husband’s death, in which case she is divorced, or perhaps it is not a time that can be considered adjacent to his death, in which case she is not divorced. Therefore, if the husband dies, the man who had relations with her brings an uncertain-guilt offering; but if he does not die, she is certainly a married woman, and he brings a definite sin-offering.

And the Sages say

in accordance with Rabbi Yosei’s statement: she is of uncertain status,

divorced and

possibly

not divorced,

and the man who had relations with her brings an uncertain-guilt offering.

But this is only provided that the husband dies.

If he does not die, she is a married woman, and he brings a sin-offering.

And we challenge this:

what difference is there

[what is the difference]

between

the view of

Rabbi Meir and

the view of

Rabbi Yosei?

Rabbi Yohanan said:

with regard to bringing an

uncertain-guilt offering

by the man who had relations with her during the days following delivery of the get,

this is the difference between them

[there is a difference between them]:

According to

the view of

Rabbi Meir, he does not bring

[he does not bring] the man who had relations with her

an uncertain-guilt offering,

because this is not intercourse involving uncertainty, as the matter will ultimately be clarified with certainty. If the husband dies, it will become clear that she was unmarried from the time of delivery of the get, and the man who had relations with her is exempt . If he recovers from his illness, it will become clear that she was a married woman, and then the man who had relations with her must bring a sin-offering, not an uncertain-guilt offering.

And according to

the view of

Rabbi Yosei, he brings

[he brings] the man who had relations with her

an uncertain-guilt offering,

if the husband ultimately dies and the get takes effect, because according to Rabbi Yosei there is uncertainty concerning the time of intercourse: Is it considered a time adjacent to death, when the get took effect, or not?

But if the husband recovers from his illness and the get does not take effect, she is certainly a married woman, and the man who had relations with her brings a sin-offering.

We learned in a beraita:

And the Sages say: She is divorced and not divorced.

And we challenge this: The view of

the Sages is identical to

the view of

Rabbi Yosei!

And we answer:

There is a difference between them

[there is a difference between them] with regard to sustenance.

And this is

in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Zeira,

as Rabbi Zeira said that Rabba bar Yirmeya said that Shmuel said: Everywhere that the Sages said, “She is divorced and not divorced,” —

her husband is obligated to provide her sustenance.

Therefore, Rabbi Yosei did not describe her with the expression “divorced and not divorced,” because he disagrees with the Sages and holds that she is not entitled to sustenance .

However, there is a dispute among the tannaim concerning Rabbi Yosei’s statement. The tanna of the Mishna holds that according to Rabbi Yosei her husband is obligated to provide her sustenance. Therefore, in the Mishna Rabbi Yosei’s view is presented with the expression “divorced and not divorced,” and this is the view of the Sages in the beraita.

Mishna:

The Mishna before us teaches that it is possible to stipulate a condition in a get, and that the divorce takes effect only if the condition is fulfilled.

Explanation of the law of conditions:

The possibility of stipulating a condition concerning the efficacy of an act is itself novel. Were the Torah not to teach that it is effective to stipulate a condition for an act to take effect, we would not know this from reasoning alone, as Tosafot explain in tractate Ketubot [56a, s.v. harei zo]. Later authorities explain that the fundamental nature of a condition is that it prevents the legal effect of the act from taking effect. That is, when a person performs an act that effects a particular legal status, such as delivering a get into the woman’s hand [which effects the legal status of divorce], the legal status should take effect because the act that effects it has been performed. When he stipulates a condition, however, the condition prevents the legal status from taking effect as long as the condition has not been fulfilled. As expressed by Ramban in tractate Ketubot [19b]: “For a condition is a separate matter

” . That is, the condition takes effect upon the act after the act has already been performed. The legal status should have taken effect absolutely, but the condition prevents it from taking effect except insofar as the condition is fulfilled. [See the novellae of Rabbi Shimon in Ketubot, sections 2 and 5, and the novellae of Rabbi Naftali Tzvi Yehuda Berlin in Ketubot, section 20].

The source of the law of conditions is learned from the condition made with the descendants of Gad and Reuben [Numbers 32:29–30]. Moses our teacher stipulated with them that they would receive the inheritance of the land of Gilead on the eastern side of the Jordan, on condition that they cross the Jordan armed at the forefront and help Israel conquer the land.

Since the law of conditions is learned from the Torah and not from reasoning, the formal requirements of the conditions one stipulates must be like the condition in the Torah. If he made the condition in another manner, it is ineffective; rather, the act he performed takes effect without the condition, as Tosafot explain in tractate Ketubot [ibid

And these are the “formal requirements of conditions” that are necessary for every condition

A. According to Rabbi Meir, one must formulate a double condition. That is, he must specify what will happen if the condition is fulfilled and what will happen if the condition is not fulfilled, analogous to the condition made with the descendants of Gad and Reuben, for Moses our teacher stated the condition for both possibilities: if they would cross and if they would not cross.

B. According to Rabbi Meir, one must stipulate the condition before specifying the act. For example, he must stipulate, “If you give me two hundred zuz, the get shall take effect,” and he may not state the act before the condition, as in: “The get shall take effect if you give me two hundred zuz.”

C. According to Rabbi Meir, the condition must concern a matter separate from the act, as in the condition made with the descendants of Gad and Reuben: the condition concerned crossing the Jordan, while the act was inheriting the land of Gilead.

D. In the condition, one must state and specify the positive side [the “yes”] before specifying the negative side [the “no”], as we find in the condition made with the descendants of Gad and Reuben: Moses our teacher first specified what would happen if they crossed armed at the forefront, and only afterward specified what would happen if they did not cross armed at the forefront.

E. One cannot stipulate a condition contrary to what is written in the Torah. This is learned from the fact that all the conditions written in the Torah that are cited in tractate Kiddushin [61a], such as “If you follow My statutes” and “If you are willing and obey,” are formulated in this manner. [As Tosafot explain below, 75a, s.v. la’apukei].

F. It must be possible to carry out the act through an agent. If it is impossible to carry out the act through an agent, one cannot make the efficacy of the act conditional upon fulfillment of the condition. [See Tosafot below, ibid., and Tosafot in tractate Ketubot 74a, s.v. תנאי, concerning whether this principle is learned from reasoning or from the Torah].

One who says to a woman:

“This is your get on condition that you give me two hundred zuz.”

She is divorced

if she fulfills the condition that he stipulated with her

and gives

him two hundred zuz.

And if he said to her:

“On condition that you give me

a sum of money

from here

[from now]

until thirty days,”

thereby making fulfillment of the condition dependent upon a specific time,

if she gives him

the sum of money

within thirty days,

she is

divorced

from the time he delivered the get into her hand, since the condition has been fulfilled.

And if not,

if she did not fulfill the condition before all thirty days had elapsed,

she is not divorced.

We do not say that when the husband said, “from now until thirty days,” he intended only to urge her to act, and was not particular that she give him the money specifically within thirty days. Rather, since he stipulated this with her at the time he delivered the get, she is not divorced unless she fulfilled the condition exactly as he told her.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: There was an incident

that took place

in

a place called

Sidon, involving a man who said to his wife, “This is your get on condition that you give me

your

cloak,”

[a long coat],

and his cloak was lost,

so she could not give it to her husband and fulfill the condition in the get.

And the Sages said: She shall give him

in place of the cloak

its value,

the value of that cloak, and by doing so the condition will be fulfilled and she will be divorced.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: “She is divorced, and she shall give [him two hundred zuz].”

And we considered this:

What is the meaning of “and she shall give”?

Does she become divorced only after she gives the money, or is she divorced immediately, and is merely required to fulfill the condition and give him the money?

Rav Huna said:

She is divorced immediately upon delivery of the get,

and she shall give

the money afterward so that the condition will be fulfilled, and it will become clear retroactively that the divorce took effect from the time of delivery.

For the expression “on condition that,” when used in a get, means that the get takes effect immediately, at the time of delivery, on condition that the condition will be fulfilled afterward.

Rav Yehuda said: Once she gives

the money, the get takes effect.

And we considered this:

What difference is there between them

[what is the practical difference between them] if the get takes effect from the time of delivery or from the time the condition is fulfilled, since according to both views she must fulfill the condition for the get to take effect?

And we explain:

There is a practical difference between them

[there is a difference between them] in a case

where the get was torn or lost

before fulfillment of the condition.

According to

Rav Huna,

who

said

that the get takes effect immediately,

and she shall give

the money only in order to fulfill the condition —

she does not require a second bill of divorce from him,

since the get has taken effect, and all that is lacking is clarification that the condition was fulfilled .

But according to

Rav Yehuda,

who

said

that the get takes effect only

once she gives

the money —

she requires a second bill of divorce from him,

because as long as she has not fulfilled the condition, the get has not taken effect at all; and now that the get has been torn or lost , it cannot take effect even if she fulfills the condition.

And we also learned with regard to betrothal

that Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda disagreed

in a similar case

[in such a case]:

As we learned: One who says to a woman, “You are betrothed to me on condition that I give you two hundred zuz,” —

she is betrothed, and he shall give.

And it was stated:

Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda disagreed in this matter —

what

[what is the meaning of]

“and he shall give”?

Rav Huna said:

She is betrothed immediately,

and he shall give

in order to fulfill the condition.

Rav Yehuda said: Once he gives,

the betrothal takes effect.

And we considered this:

What difference is there between them

[what is the practical difference between them]?

And we explain:

There is a practical difference between them,

the practical difference being in a case

where she extended her hand and accepted betrothal from

another

man ,

before fulfillment of the condition.

Rav Huna said, “and he shall give,”

because the giving of the money

is merely a condition,

and he

fulfills

the

condition as he proceeds

[and goes on his way], since the betrothal takes effect retroactively, and it is only necessary that it subsequently become clear that the condition was fulfilled. The second betrothal is therefore null and void, since it was performed with a woman who was already betrothed to the first man.

Rav Yehuda said, “Once he gives,”

and only

when he gives it to her

[when he gives it to her]

do

[then take effect]

the betrothal.

But

now,

at the time she accepted betrothal from another man, before fulfillment of the condition,

the betrothal

of the first man has not yet taken effect; therefore, the betrothal of the second man does take effect with her.

It is necessary

to state both Rav Huna’s and Rav Yehuda’s statements with regard to both betrothal and divorce.

For had it been taught

[if they had taught us] Rav Huna’s view only

with regard to betrothal,

we would have said that only

in this case

[in this matter], betrothal,

Rav Huna says

that the betrothal takes effect immediately at the time of the giving,

and he shall give, because

betrothal

comes to bring her closer

[it comes to bring her close to him]. Therefore, it is more reasonable that the husband intended the betrothal to take effect immediately, on condition that he fulfill the condition afterward, since he desires her.

But with regard to divorce, since he comes to distance her

[he comes to distance her from him], and presumably he divorces her only with difficulty, it would be more reasonable that he intended the divorce to take effect only once she fulfills the condition and gives him the money, while the husband thinks to himself that perhaps in the meantime they will reconcile,

I would say

[I would have said] that

Rav Huna concedes

to

Rav Yehuda

that the get takes effect only once she gives the money.

And had it been taught

[if they had taught us] Rav Huna’s view only

with regard to divorce,

we would have said that only

in this case

[in this matter], divorce,

Rav Huna says

that the get takes effect immediately at the time of delivery,

and she shall give, because

with regard to divorce,

he is not embarrassed to demand it from her

[the husband is not embarrassed to demand from the woman] the money that he stipulated as a condition for the divorce. Therefore, he need not make the efficacy of the get dependent upon the giving of the money; rather, he intended that the get take effect immediately at the time of delivery.

But with regard to betrothal, since she is embarrassed to demand it from him

[since the woman is embarrassed to demand her money from the husband] —

I would say

[I would have said] that

Rav Huna concedes

to

Rav Yehuda

that the woman intends to make the efficacy of the betrothal dependent upon the giving of the money, and does not agree that the betrothal should take effect until he gives it.

And if he had taught us

the opinion of Rav Yehuda only with regard to

betrothal.

we would have said that only

in this case

in betrothal

did Rav Yehuda say

that the betrothal takes effect only

when he gives

the money,

because

in betrothal

she is embarrassed to demand it

the money from the husband; therefore, she makes the betrothal’s taking effect contingent upon the giving of the money, so that the betrothal takes effect only when he gives it.

But with regard to divorce, where he is not embarrassed to demand it

the money that he stipulated for the divorce —

say

I would have said, that

Rav Yehuda concedes to

Rav Huna

with regard to

that he does not intend to make the divorce’s taking effect contingent upon the giving of the money; rather, the bill of divorce takes effect immediately, on the condition that he subsequently gives the money.

And if he had taught us

the opinion of Rav Yehuda only with regard to

divorce.

we would have said that only

in this case

with regard to divorce

did Rav Yehuda say

that the bill of divorce takes effect only

when she gives it, because

with regard to divorce,

he comes to distance her

he comes to distance her, and presumably he divorces her only with difficulty. Therefore, it is more reasonable that he intended it to take effect only when the condition is fulfilled and she gives the money, thinking that perhaps in the meantime they will reconcile.

But with regard to betrothal, where he comes to draw her close

he comes to draw her close, it is more reasonable that he intended it to take effect immediately, on the condition that the condition be fulfilled afterward, since he desires her,

say, he concedes to

Rav Yehuda

with regard to Rav Huna

that the bill of divorce takes effect immediately, on the condition that he gives the money.

Therefore,

it is necessary;

we must state their dispute with regard to both cases.

Meytivi

they raise an objection to Rav Yehuda, who holds that the bill of divorce takes effect when the condition is fulfilled, from what we learned in a beraita:

One who says to a woman:

“This is your bill of divorce, on the condition that you give me two hundred zuz,”

behold,

even though the bill of divorce was torn or lost —

she is divorced.

Nevertheless,

she may not marry another until she gives it .

And it was further taught in a beraita: One who says to a woman,

“This is your bill of divorce, on the condition that you give me two hundred zuz,” and he dies.

If

she gave

him the money before he died,

she does not require levirate marriage,

because she had already been divorced from her husband by the bill of divorce that he gave her.

But if

she did not give

it to him,

she requires levirate marriage,

because the bill of divorce did not take effect, and she cannot fulfill the condition by giving the money to the heirs.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:

After his death, she

gives

the money

to his father, or to his brother, or to one

of the relatives

who inherit from him. In this way the condition is fulfilled, the bill of divorce takes effect retroactively, and she is exempt from levirate marriage.

And we challenge this:

It is only here

that we have heard that

they disagree

that they are divided in their opinions—

Rather, one master

the first tanna

holds

that when he says, “on the condition that you give

me”

he means, “to me alone,

and not to my heirs.”

And the other

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel

holds

that he means:

“to me” —

“even to my heirs.”

But

in any event, according to all

according to all the views,

it is a condition

his statement is a condition, and he did not make the bill of divorce’s taking effect dependent upon the time when the condition would be fulfilled.

For if we say that the conditions in the beraita hold that he intended the bill of divorce to take effect at the time the condition was fulfilled, then even if we hold that he intended the money to be given “to me, even to my heirs,” nevertheless the bill of divorce would not take effect when she gives it to the heirs, since that occurs after the husband’s death, and there is no bill of divorce after death.

A refutation of Rav Yehuda!

who said that the bill of divorce takes effect when she gives the money.

Rav Yehuda could have said to you: Whose opinion is this?

Who holds this beraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of

Rabbi.

As Rav Huna said that Rabbi said: Anyone who says

a condition using the expression

“on the condition,” it is considered as though he said, “from now.”

Accordingly, anything involving a condition expressed with “on the condition” takes effect immediately, even though the condition will be fulfilled only later.

However,

the Rabbis disagree with him

they disagree with him and hold that one who says “on the condition” is not considered as though he said “from now”; rather, the matter concerning which he stipulated takes effect only when the condition is fulfilled.

And I state

I state my position

in accordance with

the view of

the Rabbis.

And Rabbi Zeira said: When we were

when we were

in Babylonia, we would say: This

this is the matter

that Rav Huna said that Rabbi said: Anyone who says

a condition using the expression

“on the condition,” it is considered as though he said, “from now”; the Rabbis disagree with him.

they disagree with him.

When I ascended

when I ascended to Eretz Yisrael,

I found

I found

Rabbi Asi sitting and saying in the name

he was sitting and saying in his name,

of Rabbi Yohanan:

Everyone agrees with regard to one who says

a condition using the expression

“on the condition,” that it is considered as though he said, “from now.”

it is considered so.

They disagree

the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi

only with regard to

the case where he said, “This is your bill of divorce

from today and after death.”

For the Rabbis are uncertain whether, by saying “after death,” he retracted what he had said—that the bill of divorce should take effect from today—or whether this is a condition, meaning that the bill of divorce should take effect only if he dies.

And Rabbi holds that he certainly intended it as a condition, and the bill of divorce takes effect from today.