Gittin 74a — the Talmud in English

and renders himself impure for her

when she dies, if he is a kohen.

The general principle is: she is like his wife in every respect —

except that she does not require from him a second get

when he dies, since the get that he gave her takes effect close to the time of death.

These are the words of Rabbi Judah.

Rabbi Meir says:

if she had relations with another man after the delivery of the get, the status of

her intercourse is contingent

on whether he eventually dies from the illness.

For Rabbi Meir holds that the expression “from the time that I am in the world” means from the time of delivery; and since, at the time of delivering the get, he said to her, “This is your get from the time that I am in the world, if I die,” therefore, when he dies, it becomes retroactively clear that the get took effect at the time of delivery and that she was divorced at the time of the intercourse. But if he does not die, the get did not take effect, and she is a married woman, and the one who has relations with her is liable for a sin-offering.

Rabbi Yose says:

if she had relations with another man after the delivery of the get,

her intercourse is

intercourse with a

doubtfully

married woman.

For Rabbi Yose holds that the expression “from the time that I am in the world” means from a time close to death. If so, there is a doubt whether the time of the intercourse can properly be joined to the husband’s death, in which case she is divorced, or perhaps it is not a time that can properly be joined to death, and she is not divorced. Therefore, if the husband dies, the one who has relations with her brings an asham talui; and if he does not die, she is certainly a married woman, and he brings a definite sin-offering.

And the Sages say

in accordance with the words of Rabbi Yose: she is doubtfully

divorced and

doubtfully

not divorced,

and the one who has relations with her brings an asham talui.

Provided that he dies.

And if he does not die, she is a married woman, and he brings a sin-offering.

And we raise a difficulty:

what difference is there

[what is the difference]

between

the view of

Rabbi Meir and

the view of

Rabbi Yose?

Rabbi Yohanan said:

with regard to bringing an offering,

an asham talui

for the one who had relations with her on the days following the delivery of the get,

there is a difference between them

: [there is a difference between them]:

According to

the view of

Rabbi Meir, he does not bring

the one who had relations with her

an asham talui,

because there is no intercourse involving doubt here, for the matter is destined to become known with certainty. If the husband dies, it will become clear that she was unmarried from the time of delivery of the get, and the one who had relations with her is exempt . And if he recovers from his illness, it will become clear that she was a married woman, and then the one who had relations with her must bring a sin-offering and not an asham talui.

But according to

the view of

Rabbi Yose, he brings

the one who had relations with her

an asham talui,

if the husband eventually dies and the get takes effect, for according to Rabbi Yose there is a doubt concerning the time of the intercourse: is it considered a time close to death, at which the get took effect, or not?

But if the husband recovers from his illness and the get does not take effect, she is certainly a married woman, and the one who had relations with her brings a sin-offering.

We learned in a beraita:

And the Sages say: divorced and not divorced.

And we raise a difficulty: the view of

the Sages is identical to

the view of

Rabbi Yose!

And we answer:

there is a difference between them

: [there is a difference between them] with regard to sustenance.

And it is like

Rabbi Zeira’s,

as Rabbi Zeira said in the name of Rabbah bar Yirmeya in the name of Samuel: wherever the Sages said, “divorced and not divorced” —

her husband is liable for her sustenance.

And therefore Rabbi Yose did not call her by the expression “divorced and not divorced,” because he disagrees with the Sages and holds that she has no sustenance .

However, there is a dispute among the tannaim concerning the words of Rabbi Yose: the tanna in the Mishna holds that according to Rabbi Yose her husband is liable for her sustenance, and therefore in the Mishna Rabbi Yose’s view was brought with the expression “divorced and not divorced”; and this is the view of the Sages in the beraita.

Mishna:

The Mishna before us teaches anew that it is possible to stipulate a condition in a get, and the divorce will take effect only if the condition is fulfilled.

Explanation of the law of a condition:

The possibility of stipulating a condition concerning the taking effect of an act is an innovation; and had the Torah not taught anew that stipulating a condition for the taking effect of an act is effective, we would not have known this from reasoning, as explained by Tosafot in Ketubot [56a, s.v. “This is”]. And the later authorities explain that the foundation of a condition is that the condition prevents the act from taking effect. That is, when a person performs an act that effects the taking effect of a particular law, such as delivering a get into the woman’s hand [which effects the legal status of divorce], the legal status should take effect since the act that effects it has been performed; but when he stipulates a condition, the condition prevents the legal status from taking effect as long as the condition has not been fulfilled. And as explained in the wording of Ramban in Ketubot [19b], “for a condition is another matter” .

That is, the condition applies to the act after it has already been performed. And the legal status should have taken effect absolutely, except that the condition prevents the legal status from taking effect except on the possibility that the condition will be fulfilled. [See the novellae of Rabbi Shimon in Ketubot, sections 2 and 5, and the Granat in Ketubot, section 20.]

The source of the law of a condition is learned from the condition of the sons of Gad and the sons of Reuben [Numbers 32:29–30]: Moses our teacher stipulated with them that they would receive the inheritance of the land of Gilead, on the eastern side of the Jordan, on the condition that they cross the Jordan as armed vanguard and help Israel conquer the land.

And since the law of a condition is learned from the Torah and not from reasoning, the rules of conditions that he stipulates must be like the condition in the Torah. And if he made the condition in another manner, it is ineffective; rather, the act that he performed takes effect without the condition, as explained by Tosafot in Ketubot [there].

And these are the “rules of conditions” required for every condition

A. According to Rabbi Meir, he must stipulate a doubled condition; that is, he must explain what will happen if the condition is fulfilled and what will happen if the condition is not fulfilled, similar to the condition of the sons of Gad and the sons of Reuben, where Moses our teacher doubled the condition for both possibilities: if they would cross and if they would not cross.

B. According to Rabbi Meir, he must stipulate the condition before stating the act. For example, he should stipulate, “If you give me two hundred zuz, it shall be a get,” and he should not precede the act to the condition, as in, “It shall be a get if you give me two hundred zuz.”

C. According to Rabbi Meir, the condition must concern a matter separate from the act, as in the condition of the sons of Gad and the sons of Reuben, where the condition was to cross the Jordan and the act was to inherit the land of Gilead.

D. In the condition, it is necessary to precede and state the positive side [the “yes”] before stating the negative side [the “no”], as we find in the condition of the sons of Gad and the sons of Reuben: Moses our teacher first stated what would be if they crossed as armed vanguard, and only afterward stated what would be if they did not cross as armed vanguard.

E. It is impossible to stipulate a condition contrary to what is written in the Torah. This is learned from the fact that all the conditions written in the Torah that were brought in Kiddushin [61a], such as, “If you walk in My statutes,” and, “If you consent and listen,” are in this manner. [As explained by Tosafot below, 75a, s.v. “To exclude.”]

F. It must be possible to perform the act through an agent; and if it is not possible to perform the act through an agent, it is impossible to make the taking effect of the act dependent on fulfillment of the condition. [See Tosafot below there, and Tosafot in Ketubot 74a, s.v. “A condition,” as to whether this matter is learned from reasoning or from the Torah.]

One who says to a woman:

This is your get on the condition that you give me two hundred zuz.

She is divorced

if she fulfills the condition that he stipulated with her,

and gives

him two hundred zuz.

And if he said to her:

On the condition that you give me

a sum of money

from now [from here]

[from here]

until thirty days,

making fulfillment of the condition dependent on a particular time,

If she gave him

the sum of money

within thirty days

then she is

divorced

from the time of the delivery of the get into her hand, for the condition has been fulfilled.

And if not,

if she did not fulfill the condition until all thirty days had passed,

she is not divorced.

And we do not say that when the husband said “from now until thirty days” he intended only to urge her, and was not particular that she give it to him specifically within thirty days. Rather, since he stipulated this with her at the time of the delivery of the get, she is not divorced unless she fulfills the condition as he said to her.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: An incident

that occurred

in

a place called

Sidon, involving one who said to his wife, “This is your get on the condition that you give me

the

cloak” [a long coat],

a long garment,

and his cloak was lost,

and she could not give it to her husband and fulfill the condition in the get.

And the Sages said: She shall give him

in place of the cloak

its value

of that cloak, and through this the condition will be fulfilled and she will be divorced.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: “She is divorced, and she shall give [him two hundred zuz].”

And we inquire concerning it:

What is the meaning of “and she shall give”?

Will she be divorced only after she gives, or is she divorced immediately, and only needs to fulfill the condition and give him the money?

Rav Huna said:

She is divorced immediately upon delivery of the get,

and she shall give

the money afterward so that the condition will be fulfilled, and it will become clear retroactively that the divorce took effect from the time of delivery.

For the expression “on the condition that” that he stipulated in the get means that the get should take effect from now, at the time of delivery, on the condition that the condition will be fulfilled afterward.

Rav Judah said: When she gives

the money, the get will take effect.

And we inquire:

What difference is there between them

what is the practical difference between them if the get takes effect from the time of delivery or from the time of fulfillment of the condition, when according to both of them she must fulfill the condition for the get to take effect?

And we explain:

there is a practical difference between them

[there is a practical difference between them, in a case]

where the get was torn or lost

before fulfillment of the condition.

According to

Rav Huna,

who

said

that the get takes effect immediately,

and she shall give

the money only in order to fulfill the condition —

she does not require from him a second get,

since the get has taken effect, and what is lacking is only clarification that the condition was fulfilled .

But according to

Rav Judah,

who

said

that the get takes effect only

when she gives

the money —

she requires from him a second get,

for as long as she has not fulfilled the condition, the get has not taken effect at all; and now that the get has been torn or lost , it cannot take effect even if she fulfills the condition.

And we also learned with regard to betrothal

that Rav Huna and Rav Judah disputed

in a case such as this [in such a case]:

[in such a case]:

For we learned: One who says to a woman, “You are betrothed to me on the condition that I give you two hundred zuz” —

she is betrothed, and he shall give.

And it was stated:

Rav Huna and Rav Judah disputed this —

what

[what is meant by] “

and he shall give?”

Rav Huna said:

she is betrothed immediately,

and he shall give

in order to fulfill the condition.

Rav Judah said: When he gives

then the betrothal will take effect.

And we inquire concerning it:

What difference is there between them

[what is the practical difference between them]?

And we explain:

there is a difference between them,

the practical difference is in a case

where she extended her hand and accepted betrothal from

a

different man ,

before fulfillment of the condition.

Rav Huna said, “and he shall give,”

because the giving of the money

is merely a condition,

and he

fulfills

the

condition and goes on his way [and goes on his way],

for the betrothal takes effect retroactively, and it is only necessary that it subsequently become clear that the condition was fulfilled. And the second betrothal is null and void, since it was performed with a woman already betrothed to the first man.

Rav Judah said, “when he gives,”

and only

when he gives it to her [when he gives it to her]

—

then they take effect [then they take effect], the

the

betrothal.

But

now,

at the time she accepts betrothal from another, before fulfillment of the condition, still

the betrothal

of the first man has not taken effect, and therefore the second man’s betrothal takes hold of her.

And it is necessary

to state the words of Rav Huna and the words of Rav Judah both with regard to betrothal and with regard to divorce.

For if he had taught us [if they had taught us]

the view of Rav Huna only

with regard to betrothal,

we would say that only

in this case [in this] with regard to betrothal

of betrothal

did Rav Huna say

that the betrothal takes effect immediately at the time of the giving,

and he shall give, because

betrothal

comes to bring her close [comes to bring her close to him],

therefore it is more reasonable that the husband intended that the betrothal take effect immediately, and that the condition be fulfilled afterward, since he desires her.

But with regard to divorce, since it comes to distance her [he comes to distance her from him],

and presumably he divorces her reluctantly, it is more reasonable that he intended that the divorce take effect only when she fulfills the condition and gives, and the husband thinks in his heart that perhaps in the meantime they will make peace between themselves,

I would say, that

that

Rav Huna concedes to

Rav Huna

Rav Judah

that the get takes effect only when she gives.

And if he had taught us [and if they had taught us]

the view of Rav Huna only

with regard to divorce,

we would say that only

in this case [in this] with regard to divorce

of divorce

did Rav Huna say

that the get takes effect immediately at the time of delivery,

and she shall give. Because

with regard to divorce

he is not embarrassed to demand it from her [the husband is not embarrassed to demand from the woman]

the money that he stipulated for the divorce; therefore he need not make the taking effect of the get dependent on the giving of the money, and he intended that the get take effect immediately at the time of delivery.

But with regard to betrothal, since she is embarrassed to demand it from him [since the woman is embarrassed to demand her money from the husband]

that the woman is embarrassed to demand from the husband her money —

I would say, that

that

Rav Huna concedes to

Rav Huna

Rav Judah

that the woman intends to make the taking effect of the betrothal dependent on the giving of the money, and does not agree that the betrothal take effect except when he gives it.

And if it had taught us

[And if they had taught us] the view of Rav Yehuda only regarding

betrothals.

We would have said that only

in this case

[in this] in betrothals

does Rav Yehuda say

that the betrothals take effect only

when he gives

the money,

because

in betrothals

she is embarrassed to demand it

[the woman is embarrassed to demand her money from the husband], and therefore he makes the taking effect of the betrothals dependent upon the giving of the money, so that the betrothals take effect only when he gives it.

But regarding divorce, where he is not embarrassed to demand it

[where the husband is not embarrassed to demand from the woman] the money that he stipulated for the divorce—

let us say

[I would say] that

he agrees with him

Rav Yehuda

with Rav Huna

that he does not intend to make the taking effect of the divorce dependent upon the giving of the money, and the get takes effect immediately, on condition that he gives it afterward.

And if it had taught us

[And if they had taught us] the view of Rav Yehuda only regarding

divorce.

We would have said that only

in this case

[in this] in divorce

does Rav Yehuda say

that the get takes effect only

when she gives, because

in divorce

he comes to distance her

[he comes to distance her], and presumably he divorces her with difficulty; therefore it is more reasonable that he intended it to take effect only when the condition is fulfilled and she gives, and he thinks in his heart that perhaps in the meantime they will reconcile with one another.

But regarding betrothals, where he comes to draw her close

[he comes], it is more reasonable that he intended it to take effect immediately, and on condition that the condition be fulfilled afterward, since he desires her,

let us say, he agrees with him

Rav Yehuda

with Rav Huna

that the get takes effect immediately and on condition that he gives it.

Therefore

it is necessary

to state their dispute in both cases.

He raises an objection

[they raise an objection] against Rav Yehuda, who holds that the get takes effect at the time of fulfillment of the condition, from what we learned in a beraita:

One who says to a woman:

“This is your get on condition that you give me two hundred zuz,”

behold,

even though the get was torn or lost—

she is divorced.

But nevertheless—

“and she may not marry another until she gives” .

And it was also taught: one who says to a woman, “

This is your get on condition that you give me two hundred zuz,” and he dies.”

If

she gave

him the money before he died—

she does not require levirate marriage,

because she had already been divorced from her husband by the get that he gave her.

And if

she did not give

him—

she requires levirate marriage,

because the get did not take effect, and she cannot fulfill the condition by giving the money to the heirs.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:

After his death she

gives

the money

to his father, or to his brother, or to one

of the relatives

who inherit from him, and through this the condition is fulfilled, and the get takes effect retroactively, and she is exempt from levirate marriage.

And we raise an objection:

Until here only

have we heard that

they dispute

[that they disagreed]—

but one master

[the first tanna]

holds

that when he says, “on condition that you give

me

” he means, “to me alone

and not to my heirs.”

And the other

[Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel]

holds

that he means, “

to me

and even to my heirs.”

But

everyone, in any event

[according to all the views, at any rate]

it is a condition

[his statement is a condition], and he did not make the taking effect of the get dependent upon its taking effect at the time of fulfillment of the condition.

For if we say that the conditions in the beraita hold that he intended the get to take effect at the time of fulfillment of the condition, then even if we hold that he intended that they give the money “to me and even to my heirs,” nevertheless the get would not take effect when she gives it to the heirs, since this is after the husband’s death, and there is no get after death.

A refutation of Rav Yehuda!

who said that the get takes effect when she gives it.

Rav Yehuda could say to you: Whose view is this,

this beraita? It is according to the view of

Rabbi.

For Rav Huna said in the name of Rabbi: Anyone who says

a condition in the wording

“on condition” is considered as one who says “from now,”

[is considered so], and according to this, everything involving a condition in the wording “on condition” takes effect immediately, even though the condition is fulfilled only later.

However,

the Sages dispute him

[they dispute him], and hold that anyone who says “on condition” is not considered as one who says “from now,” and the matter about which he stipulated takes effect only at the time of fulfillment of the condition.

And I say

[and I state my words] according to

the

view of

the Sages.

And Rabbi Zeira said: When we were

[when we were]

in Babylonia, we would say: This

[this]

that Rav Huna said in the name of Rabbi: Anyone who says

a condition in the wording

“on condition” is considered as one who says “from now”—the Sages dispute him

[they dispute him].

When I went up

[when I went up] to the Land of Israel,

I found him

[I found]

Rabbi Asi sitting and saying in the name

[who was sitting and saying in his name]

of Rabbi Yohanan:

Everyone agrees concerning one who says

a condition in the wording

“on condition” that he is considered as one who says “from now”

[is considered so].

They did not dispute

the Sages with Rabbi

except regarding

a case where he said, “This is your get

from today and after death.”

For the Sages are uncertain whether, by saying “after death,” he retracted what he said—that the get should take effect from today—or whether it is a condition that the get takes effect only if he dies.

And Rabbi holds that he certainly intended a condition, and the get takes effect from today.