Gittin 73b (עג:) — the Talmud in English

Like a married woman in every respect!

Because the divorce takes effect only immediately before his death, and until that time she is like his wife in every respect . One who has relations with her intentionally is liable to strangulation , and unintentionally, he is liable to a sin-offering.

Rabbi Yosei says:

Her status is that of a

divorced woman whose status is uncertain,

because he maintains that at every moment there is a possibility that this is the moment immediately preceding death . Thus, she is divorced as a matter of doubt, and one who has relations with her unintentionally must bring a provisional guilt-offering.

Their dispute applies even in a case where the husband ultimately dies from that illness, because Rabbi Yehuda maintains that he intended to divorce her only immediately before his death.

The Gemara establishes that the case concerns one who says to her when delivering the divorce document: “This is your divorce document, and be divorced by it from the time that I am still alive, if I die.” Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda maintains that the divorce takes effect only immediately before death, and beforehand she has the status of a married woman. Rabbi Yosei maintains that from the time the divorce document is delivered, her status is uncertain, as perhaps this is now the time immediately preceding death. Therefore, she is considered a married woman whose status is uncertain, and one who has relations with her is liable to a provisional guilt-offering.

Gemara:

The Sages taught

in a beraita:

If they saw her seclude herself with him

[with her husband]

in the darkness

after she had received this divorce document from him,

or if she slept with him at the foot of the bed, they do not suspect that they engaged in another matter

[sexual relations].

But they do suspect

that he had relations with her

for the sake of

[i.e., with the intention of]

promiscuity,

[as will be explained below].

But they do not suspect

that he had relations with her

for the sake of

[i.e., with the intention of]

betrothal,

which would require her to receive an additional divorce document on that account.

Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda says: They also suspect that it was for the sake of betrothal.

And we raise a difficulty:

What is he saying?

Initially, the beraita states that they do not suspect that they engaged in sexual relations, and afterward it states that they do suspect that he had relations with her for the sake of promiscuity.

Rav Naḥman said in the name of Rabba bar Avuha:

This is what it is saying,

and this is how the beraita should be read and explained:

If they saw her seclude herself with him, they do not suspect that they had relations.

But if

they saw

also

that she had relations

with him—

they suspect

that he had relations with her

for the sake of

[i.e., with the intention of]

betrothal,

and she requires an additional divorce document on account of this betrothal.

Indeed, the divorce document that he had delivered to her earlier takes effect if the condition is fulfilled, but it does not take effect with regard to this betrothal, which occurred afterward.

And the first divorce document is not considered an old divorce document on account of these relations, since an old divorce document applies only when he had relations with her after the divorce document was written and signed but before it was delivered, whereas here he had already delivered the divorce document to her, and only a condition necessary for it to take effect from the time he delivered it remained unfulfilled.

But if

he gave her money

after the relations—

they suspect

and presume that these relations were

for the sake of promiscuity.

For we say

[i.e., we say] that

with

the money of

the payment for relations he gave her

this money.

And they do not suspect that it was for the sake of betrothal

so as to require her to receive an additional divorce document on that account .

Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda says: Also in this case,

where he gave her money after the relations,

they suspect

that he had relations with her

for the sake of

[i.e., with the intention of]

betrothal.

And according to Rav Naḥman’s interpretation of the words of the beraita,

in accordance with whose opinion is this statement

[i.e., which of the opinions in the beraita accords with the statement]

that Rabba bar bar Ḥana said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan

in the following chapter: that

the dispute

between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel (below, 81a), concerning a divorced woman who secluded herself with her husband after the divorce—whether they suspect that they became betrothed and she requires a second divorce document—is only

when they saw that she had relations,

as, according to Beit Shammai, she does not require a second divorce document, whereas according to Beit Hillel, she does?

But

when

they did not see that she had relations—

everyone agrees that she does not require a second divorce document from him.

In accordance with whose opinion

[i.e., which opinion in the beraita] did Rabbi Yoḥanan speak?

In accordance with the opinion of everyone,

both the opinion of the first tanna and the opinion of Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda, since both maintain that when they did not see that she had relations, they do not suspect betrothal and she does not require a second divorce document, whereas when they saw that she had relations, they do suspect betrothal. They disagree only in a case where they saw that he gave her money.

Abaye raised an objection

to Rav Naḥman, who establishes that the dispute between the first tanna and Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda in the beraita concerns a case where he gave her money after having relations with her.

Is it

[i.e., does the beraita]

mention money

at all? Even if an error in the wording could be possible, such an error is not possible here, because if the tanna had taught the matter of giving money, the wording would not have been erroneously transmitted in such a way that it was omitted entirely.

Rather, Abaye said: This is what it is saying,

and this is how the beraita should be read and explained:

If

they saw that she had relations—

they suspect that it was for the sake of promiscuity, but they do not suspect that it was for the sake of betrothal.

Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda says: They also suspect that it was for the sake of betrothal.

And according to Abaye’s interpretation of the words of the beraita:

In accordance with whose opinion is this statement

[i.e., which of the opinions in the beraita accords with the statement]

that Rabba bar bar Ḥana said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: The dispute

between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel concerning a divorced woman who secluded herself with her husband after the divorce—whether they suspect betrothal and she requires a second divorce document, as according to Beit Shammai she does not require a second divorce document, whereas according to Beit Hillel she does—applies specifically

when they saw that she had relations.

But

if

they did not see that she had relations—

everyone agrees that she does not require a second divorce document from him.

In accordance with whose opinion

[i.e., which opinion in the beraita] did Rabbi Yoḥanan speak?

In accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda,

and not that of the first tanna, since according to the first tanna, even when they saw that she had relations, they do not suspect betrothal. And if the first tanna maintained that Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai disputed this matter, he would not have adopted the position of Beit Shammai.

But Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda agreed with Rabbi Yoḥanan, who established that the position of Beit Hillel—that she requires an additional divorce document—applies when they saw that she had relations, and he adopted the position of Beit Hillel. He did not agree with the one who disputes Rabbi Yoḥanan and establishes that Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai also dispute the case where they did not see that she had relations.

For according to Abaye’s explanation of the beraita, in a case where they did not see that she had relations, everyone agrees that they do not suspect that relations took place.

Rava raised an objection

to Abaye:

If so,

if this is how you interpret the beraita,

what is the meaning of “also”

when Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda says, “They also suspect in this case that it was for the sake of betrothal,” implying that he is adding a case? According to Abaye, he is not adding a case; rather, he is saying that one may not presume leniently that the relations were merely promiscuous, but must suspect that they were for the sake of betrothal.

Rather, Rava said: This is what it is saying,

and this is how the beraita should be read and explained:

Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda says: Also

if

they did not see that she had relations—

they suspect that it was for the sake of betrothal.

He comes to include the case where they did not see that she had relations: it is not only when they saw that she had relations that they suspect that he had relations with her for the sake of betrothal; even when they did not see that she had relations, they suspect that she had relations with him for the sake of betrothal.

And according to this,

in accordance with whose opinion is this statement

[i.e., which of the opinions in the beraita accords with the statement]

that Rabba bar bar Ḥana said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan,

that

the dispute

between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel concerning a divorced woman who secluded herself with her husband after the divorce—whether they suspect betrothal and she requires a second divorce document—applies specifically

when they saw that she had relations.

But

if

they did not see that she had relations—

everyone agrees that she does not require a divorce document from him.

In accordance with whose opinion

[i.e., which opinion in the beraita] did Rabbi Yoḥanan speak?

Not in accordance with

even one

of them

[i.e., of the two opinions].

For according to the first tanna, even when they saw that she had relations, they presume that it was for the sake of promiscuity, and she does not require a divorce document. And if he maintained that Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai disputed this matter, he would not have adopted the position of Beit Shammai.

And according to Rabbi Yosei, even when they did not see that she had relations, they suspect that relations took place. This accords with the one who disputes Rabbi Yoḥanan and maintains that even when they did not see that she had relations, Beit Hillel required her to receive an additional divorce document.

We learned in the Mishna:

What is her status during those days,

between the delivery of the divorce document and the fulfillment of the condition?

Rabbi Yehuda says: Like a married woman in every respect; Rabbi Yosei says: A divorced woman whose status is uncertain,

and she has the status of a married woman whose status is uncertain, and one who has relations with her is liable to bring a provisional guilt-offering.

A tanna taught

in a beraita:

Provided that he dies,

only then is he liable to a provisional guilt-offering according to Rabbi Yosei.

But if he does not ultimately die, it becomes retroactively clear that there was no divorce and that she was a completely married woman, and he is liable to a sin-offering.

And we raise a difficulty: According to both Rabbi Yosei, who considers her after the delivery of the divorce document to be a married woman whose status is uncertain, and Rabbi Yehuda, who considers her a definitively married woman, in a case where the condition was fulfilled and the husband ultimately died, the divorce takes effect only at the time of death.

For it is impossible to say that the divorce takes effect retroactively from the time of delivery, since if so, the woman would be neither a married woman nor a married woman whose status is uncertain.

And this is difficult:

And does the divorce document take effect when he dies

[i.e., does the divorce take effect at the time of death]?

But we have established that there is no divorce document after death!

Rabba said

to resolve the difficulty: The Mishna is not speaking of a case where he says that the divorce should take effect “from today,” because in such a case, if the condition is fulfilled, the divorce takes effect from the time of delivery, and one who has relations with her is exempt.

Rather, it is speaking of one

who says

that the divorce should take effect

from the

last

moment that I am alive,

meaning that it should take effect a short time before death.

Therefore, according to Rabbi Yehuda, the divorce takes effect immediately before the time of death, and beforehand she is a completely married woman. Rabbi Yosei maintains that from the time of delivery we are uncertain whether this is now the moment immediately preceding death; at every moment there is uncertainty whether the divorce has taken effect. And although it ultimately became clear that he remained alive for a longer time, Rabbi Yosei maintains that there is no retroactive determination, and we do not say that it was retroactively established that she was not a divorced woman whose status was uncertain.

The Sages taught: During the intervening days,

during the days between the delivery of the divorce document and the fulfillment of the condition of the divorce document, when he dies—

Her husband is entitled,

with regard to his wife:

To her found objects

—the object she finds belongs to him.

And to the proceeds of her labor

—her wages belong to him.

And to the annulment of her vows

—he may still annul her vows.

And he inherits her

if she dies in the interim.