Gittin 73a (עג.) — the Talmud in English

And this teaches us that in the Mishna’s wording, “he walked.”

through the wording “he walked” that the tanna used in the Mishna.

The phrase “he walked” means specifically that he walked

on his own feet,

and he

is the one for whom we require an assessment

[that is, it must be determined] whether he died because of the first illness or not. Since there is reason for concern that, because he walked, he was saved from that illness and died of another illness, and he explicitly stipulated that the get should take effect only if he died from this illness.

But

the other one

[the one] who did not walk in the marketplace—even though he progressed from one illness to another—it is clear that he still has the first illness, and

we likewise do not require an assessment

[he does not need one] in this regard, and the get takes effect.

And we raise an objection: Is it possible to

infer from this

[to learn from our Mishna] that

a dangerously ill person who

gave his property as a gift and

progressed from one illness to another—

his gift is a valid gift if he died from the second illness?

For it is evident from the Mishna that if he progressed from one illness to another, he is not considered to have recovered from his illness. It was only with regard to a get that the Mishna required an assessment as to whether he died because of his first illness or because of his second illness, because with regard to the get, the dangerously ill person specified in his stipulation that it should take effect specifically if he died from “this” illness.

And we answer:

There is

indeed

[yes], and we find that this is the law,

as Rabbi Elazar said in the name of Rav: A dangerously ill person who progressed from one illness to another

and died—

his gift is a valid gift.

Rabba and Rava do not accept this ruling of Rav Huna,

who said that the get of a dangerously ill person has the same status as his gift, and that if he recovered from his illness, he retracts his get, even if he did not stipulate that the get should take effect only if he died. This is because there is an assessment of intent that he gave it only because he thought he would die and wanted to exempt her from yibbum.

Rather, Rabba and Rava maintain that when he did not stipulate that the get should take effect only on condition that he die, even if he recovered from his illness, he does not retract his get, despite the fact that his intention had been to give the get only if he died.

And even though, according to the basic law, once he recovered from his illness he could retract his get, the Sages instituted that he does not retract the get and that it takes effect.

This was instituted because of

a decree:

there is concern

that people might say: There is a get after death.

For when they see that if the dangerously ill person recovers from his illness he can retract his get, they will say: Since the get does not take effect until he dies, whereas when he dies the get takes effect, this proves that there is a get after death. They will consequently validate a case in which he said, “This is your get after my death,” and they will not know to distinguish between that case and one in which he did not specify anything, in which case the get takes effect because he intended that it take effect immediately, on condition that he die.

And we raise an objection:

Is there such a thing

[can such a thing be]

that by Torah law it is not a get, and because of a rabbinic decree

the get takes effect, and

we permit

[allow]

a married woman

who is not divorced by Torah law

to everyone

[forever]?

And we answer:

Indeed

[yes], rabbinic divorce is applicable even where it is ineffective by Torah law, since

whoever betroths

a woman

does so with the understanding of the Sages;

he

betroths

her on the condition that the betrothal conforms to the will of the Sages, as he says, “in accordance with the law of Moses and Israel.”

And the Sages nullified

[and revoked]

the betrothal from him retroactively

through this get, which the Sages instituted should take effect.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: It is understandable

[it is easy to understand] that the Sages retroactively nullify the betrothal in a case

in which he betrothed her with money.

For in such a case, they revoke his ownership of the money of betrothal that he gave her, since the renunciation of property by a court is legally effective, and it turns out that he did not betroth her with his own money; therefore, it was not a valid betrothal.

But in a case in which

he betrothed her through intercourse, what can be said

[what explanation is possible]? How can the Sages nullify this act?

For granted, if he divorces her with a valid get, although the betrothal currently remains in force, it is a decree of the Torah that the get severs the bond and permits its prohibition from that point onward.

But this get, which is not a get by Torah law and which the Sages validated because the man who betrothed her had done so with the understanding of the Sages, and which they nullified by authority of the Sages, requires us to say that the betrothal was never a valid betrothal in the first place. And if he betrothed her through intercourse and they retroactively uproot the betrothal, what is the status of his intercourse?

He said to him:

Since he made the betrothal dependent on the will of the Sages, the Sages declared that when he gives this get, the legal effect of the betrothal through intercourse is retroactively nullified, and

the Sages rendered his intercourse intercourse for licentious purposes,

and the Sages have the power to do this, since he made his betrothal dependent on them.

The Sages taught:

One who says to his wife:

“This is your get from today, if I die”

[I die]

from this illness,

and the house fell upon him, or a snake bit him,

and he died—

it is not a get.

Since he died through an uncommon accident, which he had not contemplated, and he did not state in his stipulation that the get should take effect unless he died from the illness.

But if he said in his stipulation: “This is your get

if I do not recover from this illness,”

and a house fell upon him or a snake bit him,

and he died—

it is a get.

And we raise an objection:

What is the difference between the first clause and the latter clause?

If in the latter clause, where the tanna stipulated that the get should take effect “if I do not recover from this illness,” we maintain that he contemplated and intended to stipulate even with regard to an uncommon accident—for the get takes effect even when he did not recover from the illness because of an uncommon accident—then in the first clause too, where he stipulated that the get should take effect “if I die from this illness” and he died because of an uncommon accident, the get should take effect. For he died as a result of that illness, and the wording “from this illness” in the first clause means only that he should die “out of” or as a consequence of this illness.

And because of this difficulty, the ruling of the beraita is rejected.

And a similar incident occurred involving a man who said to his wife: “This is your get if I do not recover from this illness,” and a lion devoured him. They

sent

to Eretz Yisrael to ask about the law, and they replied

from there

[from there]:

“A lion devoured him—we have no

basis for saying that it is a get, since this is an uncommon accident, and when he stipulated, he did not contemplate intending this.”

And the Gemara relates an incident involving

a certain man who sold

land to his fellow

[there was a man who sold land to another man].

He accepted upon himself

[the seller accepted upon himself] responsibility to compensate the purchaser for

any accident that might occur

[any accident that would arise] concerning the land.

Ultimately, they diverted a river through it

[in the end, the king ordered that the river be transferred through that field].

The purchaser came

[came]

before

[before]

Ravina

to demand compensation from the seller on the basis of the responsibility he had accepted.

He said to him,

Ravina said to the seller:

“Go and provide him with a replacement in full”

[go and provide him with an entirely intact field and pay him the loss],

for

[since]

you accepted responsibility for any accident that might occur.

Rav Aha bar Tachlifa said to Ravina:

But this is

an uncommon accident,

and he did not intend to accept responsibility for such an accident.

The matter unfolded

[the matter developed]

and reached

[and this incident came]

before Rava.

He said to them: “It is an uncommon accident,”

and the seller did not intend to accept responsibility for this accident.

Ravina raised an objection to

This indicates that he does not take into consideration and intend to include an uncommon accident in his stipulation.

Rava:

We learned in a beraita [cited above]: If he said to his wife, “This is your get

if I do not recover from this illness, and a house fell upon him or a snake bit him,”

and he died—

it is a get!

It follows from the beraita that he contemplated and intended to stipulate even with regard to an uncommon accident, and therefore the get takes effect even when he did not recover from the illness because of an uncommon event.

Rava said to him: “But infer it from the first clause”

of the beraita, and reach the opposite conclusion: It is written in the first clause that if he stipulated in his get that it should take effect “from today if I die from this illness,” and a house fell upon him or a snake bit him—

it is not a get.

It follows that he does not contemplate stipulating even with regard to an uncommon accident.

If so, there is a contradiction in this beraita between the first clause and the latter clause, and no proof can be brought from it.

Rav Aha of Difti said to Ravina: “And merely because the first clause is difficult

of the beraita

in relation to the latter clause, we do not raise a tiyuvta from it

[we do not raise a difficulty from it]?

After all, it is still a beraita, and an amora cannot disagree with a beraita.

He said to him: “Indeed,”

[yes], we do not raise an objection from it against the statement of an amora.

For

since the first clause is difficult in relation to the latter clause, it was not taught in the beit-midrash

in a place where Torah scholars could resolve the contradiction,

and it is corrupt

[and problematic]

—it

the beraita.

And since you cannot rely on the wording of the beraita,

follow

[follow]

the reasoning.

And the reasoning indicates that he did not intend to include an uncommon accident in his condition.

The Gemara relates an incident involving

Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, who bought sesame on the bank

[they bought sesame on the shore]

of the King’s River.

They hired sailors to transport it

[they hired sailors to transport it] and bring it to their homes.

The sellers accepted upon themselves

[accepted upon themselves] responsibility to compensate them for

any accident that might occur

along the way.

Ultimately, they dammed

[they built a dam in]

the King’s River,

and the boats could not pass through it.

They said to them,

Rav Pappa and Rav Huna said to the sellers:

“Hire donkeys and release them to us”

[hire donkeys and hand the sesame over to us] so that we would not lose the increased transportation expenses caused by the damming of the river,

for you accepted upon yourselves

[since you accepted responsibility to compensate us for]

any accident that occurs

[that will arise] along the way.

They came

[they came] to a beit din

before Rava.

Rava said to them,

Rava said to Rav Pappa and Rav Huna:

“White geese,”

[white geese] [he called them this because they were elderly and their hair was gray].

“Those who strip people of their garments,”

[those who strip people of their clothing]—that is, you wrong others unlawfully, imposing a ruling upon yourselves for your own benefit.

For

it is an uncommon accident,

and the sellers did not contemplate accepting responsibility for an uncommon accident.

Mishna:

A woman to whom her husband gave a get and stipulated with her that it should take effect from today if he died

may not seclude herself with him,

because of the concern that he might have intercourse with her.

According to one man de’amar, there is concern that he might have intercourse with her for the purpose of betrothal, in which case she requires an additional get. According to a second man de’amar, who does not share the concern that he has intercourse with her for the purpose of betrothal, it is nevertheless prohibited for him to seclude himself with her, since if her husband ultimately dies, she is an unmarried woman, and it is prohibited to seclude oneself with an unmarried woman.

Rather,

he may be secluded with her only

in the presence of witnesses,

so that there is no room for this concern.

There is no need for valid witnesses for this purpose; even in the presence of one witness ,

even on the testimony of a male slave, or even on the testimony of a maidservant,

he may be together with her.

Except for her maidservant,

because when her maidservant is present, the woman is forbidden to be secluded with her husband,

because her heart

of the woman

is at ease with her maidservant,

as she treats her dismissively and would not be embarrassed before her to have relations with her husband .

And that woman

what

is she considered

during those days,

from the time she received the divorce document until the time the condition is fulfilled, namely, when her husband dies?

Rabbi Judah says: