Gittin 73a — the Talmud in English

And this teaches us

by the fact that the tanna in the Mishna used the wording “he walked”.

“He walked,”

specifically if he walked

on his support, he

is the one for whom we require an assessment

[that is, an assessment is needed] whether he died because of the first illness or not, since there is concern that, because he walked, he was saved from that illness and died from another illness; and he had explicitly stipulated that the get should take effect only if he died from this illness.

But

the other one

[the other person], who did not walk in the marketplace, even though he moved on to another illness, it is clear that he still has something of the first illness, and

an assessment likewise is not required

[he does not need one for this], and the get takes effect.

And we challenge: Is it possible to learn

from this

[that it can be learned from our Mishna] that

a dangerously ill person who

gave his property as a gift and

moved from one illness to another—

his gift is a gift,

if he died from the second illness?

For it is explicit in the Mishna that if he moved from one illness to another, he is not considered to have recovered from his illness; and only with regard to a get did the Mishna require an assessment as to whether he died because of his first illness or because of his second illness, because, with regard to a get, the dangerously ill person specified in his stipulation that it should take effect specifically if he died from “this” illness.

And we answer:

Yes

[yes, it is so], and we find that this is indeed the law,

for Rabbi Elazar said in the name of Rav: A dangerously ill person who moved from one illness to another

and died—

his gift is a gift.

Rabba and Rava do not accept this statement of Rav Huna

who said that the get of a dangerously ill person has the status of his gift, and if he recovered from his illness and got well, he retracts his get, even if he did not stipulate concerning the get that it should take effect only if he died. Since there is an assessment of the mind that he gave it only because he thought he would die and wanted to exempt her from yibbum.

Rather, Rabba and Rava hold that when he did not stipulate concerning the get that it should take effect only on condition that he die, even if he recovered from his illness, he does not retract his get, even though his intention was to give the get only if he died.

And even though, according to the basic law, since he recovered from his illness he could retract his get, the Sages enacted that he does not retract his get and it takes effect,

because of

a decree,

since they are concerned

lest people say: There is a get after death,

because when they see that if the dangerously ill person recovered from his illness he can retract his get, they will come to say: Since the get does not take effect until he dies, whereas when he died the get takes effect, it follows that this proves that there is a get after death, and they will come to validate a case in which he said, “This is your get after my death”; and they will not know to distinguish between that case and the case in which he did not specify anything, where the get takes effect because he intended that the get should take effect immediately, on condition that he die.

And we challenge:

Is there such a thing

[is it possible]

that by Torah law it is not a get, but because of a rabbinic decree

the get takes effect, and

we permit

[and permit]

a married woman

who is not divorced by Torah law

to everyone

[forever]?

And we answer:

Yes

[yes, it is so]; divorce by rabbinic law applies even in a place where, by Torah law, it is ineffective, since

everyone who betroths

a woman

does so with the understanding of the Sages

and he

betroths

[that is, he makes the betrothal dependent on the judgment of the Sages], when he says, “According to the law of Moses and Israel.”

And the Sages annulled

[and removed]

the betrothal from him

retroactively, by means of this get, which the Sages enacted should take effect.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: It is understandable

[it is easy to understand] that the Sages retroactively annul the betrothal in a case

where he betrothed with money.

For in this manner they remove from him ownership of the betrothal money that he gave her, because the property of a court is ownerless property; it follows that he did not betroth her with his own money, and this was not a betrothal.

But in a case where

he betrothed with intercourse, what can be said

[what can be explained]? How can the Sages annul this act?

For, granted, if he divorces her by means of a valid get, even though the betrothal currently exists, it is a scriptural decree that the get severs it and releases its prohibition from this point onward.

But this get, which is not a get by Torah law and which the Sages validated because of the understanding of the one who betrothed her with the understanding of the Sages, and which they annulled according to the authority of the Sages, requires us to say that the betrothal was not a betrothal from the outset; and if he betrothed by intercourse and they retroactively uproot the betrothal, what is to become of his intercourse?

He said to him:

Since he made it dependent on the judgment of the Sages, the Sages said that when he gives this get, the status of the betrothal through intercourse will be annulled retroactively, and

the Sages made his intercourse licentious intercourse,

and the Sages have the power to do this, for he made his betrothal dependent on them.

The Sages taught:

If one says to his wife:

“This is your get from today if I die

[if I die]

from this illness,”

and the house fell upon him or a snake bit him

and he died—

it is not a get.

Since he died through an unusual accident, and he did not bring this to mind, he did not say in his stipulation that the get should take effect except if he died from the illness.

But if he said in his stipulation: “This is your get

if I do not recover from this illness,”

and a house fell upon him or a snake bit him

and he died—

this is a get.

And we challenge:

What is different in the first clause, and what is different in the latter clause?

If, in the latter clause, when the tanna stipulated that the get should take effect “if I do not recover from this illness,” we hold that he brings to mind and intends to stipulate even with regard to an unusual accident—for the get takes effect even if he did not recover from the illness because of an unusual accident—then likewise in the first clause, when he stipulated that the get should take effect “if I die from this illness” and he died because of an unusual accident, the get should have taken effect, since he died out of that illness; for the wording “from this illness” in the first clause means only that he dies “out of” this illness.

And because of this difficulty, the words of the beraita are rejected.

And there was likewise an incident involving one who said to his wife: “This is your get if I do not recover from this illness,” and a lion ate him, and they

sent

[him] to the Land of Israel to ask about the law, and they answered

from there

[from there]:

A lion ate him; we have no

[basis for saying] that it is a get, since this is an unusual accident, and when he stipulated, he did not bring this to mind as something to intend.

And the Gemara brings an incident involving

a certain man who sold

land to his fellow

[there was a man who sold land to his fellow].

He accepted upon himself

[he accepted upon himself]—the seller accepted responsibility to compensate the buyer for

every accident that would occur

[every accident that would arise] to the land.

In the end, they brought a river through it

[in the end, the king ordered that the river be diverted through that field].

The buyer came

[he came]

before

[before]

Ravina

to demand compensation from the seller on account of the responsibility he had given him.

He said to him—

Ravina said to the seller:

Go and pay him in full

[go and provide him with a field in full, and pay him his loss],

for

[since]

you accepted upon yourself every accident that would occur.

Rav Aḥa bar Taḥlifa said to Ravina:

But

it is an unusual accident,

and he did not intend to accept responsibility for such an accident.

The matter unfolded

[the matter became known]

and reached

[and this incident came]

before Rava.

He said to them: It is an unusual accident,

and the seller did not intend to accept responsibility for this accident.

Ravina raised an objection to him

[he challenged him]

to Rava:

We learned in a beraita [which was brought above]: If one said to his wife, “This is your get

if I do not recover from this illness, and a house fell upon him or a snake bit him

and he died”—

this is a get!

It follows from the beraita that he brings to mind and intends to stipulate also concerning an unusual accident, and therefore the get takes effect even when he did not recover from the illness because of an unusual event.

Rava said to him: Rather, infer from the first clause

of the beraita the opposite: It is written in the first clause that if he stipulated in his get that it should take effect from today if he died from this illness, and the house fell upon him or a snake bit him—

it is not a get.

And it follows that he does not bring to mind and intend to stipulate also concerning an unusual accident.

And if so, there is a contradiction in this beraita between its first clause and its latter clause, and no proof can be brought from it.

Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: And because the first clause is difficult

of the beraita

for the latter clause, we do not raise an objection from it

[we do not challenge him from it]?

But it is still a beraita, and an amora cannot disagree with a beraita.

He said to him: Yes

[yes, it is so]; we do not challenge an amora from it.

Because

since the first clause is difficult against the latter clause, it was not stated in the study hall

[in the place where Torah scholars sit and resolve it],

and it is corrupted

[and it is defective]

it

—the beraita.

And since you cannot rely on the version of the beraita,

go after

[follow] the

reasoning.

And the reasoning says that he did not intend to include an unusual accident in his stipulation.

And the Gemara brings an incident involving

Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, who bought sesame on the bank

[they bought sesame on the bank]

of the King’s River.

They hired sailors to transport it

[they hired sailors to transport it] and bring it to their homes.

The sellers accepted upon themselves

[they accepted upon themselves] responsibility to compensate them for

every accident that would occur

to them on the way.

In the end, they dammed

[they built a dam in]

the King’s River,

and the boats could not pass through it.

They said to them—

Rav Pappa and Rav Huna said to the sellers:

Hire donkeys and deliver it to us

[hire donkeys and hand it over to us], so that we will not lose the travel expenses, which increased because the river was dammed,

for you accepted it upon yourselves

[since you accepted upon yourselves] responsibility to compensate us for

every accident that occurs

[that comes into existence] on the way.

They came

[they came] for judgment

before Rava.

He said to them—

Rava said to Rav Pappa and Rav Huna:

White geese

[white geese] [he called them this because they were old and their hair was gray].

Those who strip people of their garments

[those who strip people of their clothes], meaning, you wrong others unlawfully, for you issue a ruling for your own benefit.

For

it is an unusual accident,

and the sellers did not bring to mind accepting responsibility for an unusual accident.

Mishna:

That woman to whom her husband gave a get and stipulated with her that it should take effect from today if he died

may not seclude herself with him

because of concern that he might have intercourse with her.

And according to one tanna, there is concern that he might have intercourse with her for the sake of betrothal, and then she requires another get. And according to the second tanna, who is not concerned that he has intercourse with her for the sake of betrothal, nevertheless, even according to his view it is forbidden for him to seclude himself with her, since she is an unmarried woman if her husband ultimately dies, and it is forbidden to seclude oneself with an unmarried woman.

But rather

only secludes himself with her

in the presence of witnesses,

for then there is no room for this concern.

And there is no need for valid witnesses for this; rather, even in the presence of one witness ,

even on the basis of a slave, even on the basis of a maidservant,

he may be with her.

Except for her maidservant

—the woman is forbidden to seclude herself with her husband in the presence of her maidservant,

because her heart

of the woman

is coarse toward her maidservant,

for she treats her dismissively and will not be embarrassed before her to have relations with her husband .

And that woman

what is she

considered

in those days

from the time she received the get until the time of fulfillment of the condition, namely, when her husband dies?

Rabbi Judah says: