Gittin 72b (עב:) — the Talmud in English

Rather,

it must be said that

it was uncertain to Rav Huna

whether

if

what

Rabbi Yosei said,

that every document takes effect from the date written in it, applies even when an additional condition was stated

orally

at the time of delivery.

If he did not say

this, and only when the condition is recorded alongside the date in the document can it be said that the date demonstrates that he intended it to take effect from that day, but when he stated the condition orally at the time of delivery, it may be said that when he delivered the document to her, he retracted the date in the document and delivered it on the condition that it take effect only after his death, since he did not say, “from today.”

Therefore, with regard to a bill of divorce that was written in accordance with its requirements, and when he delivered it to her he said, “This is your bill of divorce if I die,” but did not say “from today,” it is uncertain whether Rabbi Yosei said that even in this case the date in the bill of divorce demonstrates when it takes effect or not. And it was with regard to this case that Rav Huna said that she performs halitza, because of the uncertainty.

And we raise an objection:

Was it uncertain to Rav Huna

whether, even when the condition was stated orally, Rabbi Yosei maintains that the date of the document demonstrates when it is to take effect?

But didn’t we learn:

If one says to a woman:

“This is your bill of divorce if I do not return from here until twelve months, and he dies within twelve months,”

it is not a bill of divorce.

Since according to the condition the bill of divorce takes effect only after twelve months, and a bill of divorce cannot take effect after death, if he dies without children she is obligated in yibbum.

And it was taught concerning it [

and we learned concerning this Mishna]:

Our Rabbis

disagree, and they

permitted her to marry

as a divorced woman, and she does not require yibbum.

And we say: Who are [

who are]

our Rabbis?

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said:

They are

the court that permitted the oil [

the court of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi that permitted the oil of gentiles for consumption], in tractate Avoda Zara [page 37].

And they

hold in accordance with the

opinion of

Rabbi Yosei, who said: The date of a document demonstrates its intent!

It is thus clear that according to Rabbi Yosei, the date of a document demonstrates its intent even when the condition is stated orally at the time of delivery , and it is impossible to say that Rav Huna was uncertain about this.

Rather,

it must be said that

it was uncertain

to Rav Huna

whether the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei

that the date of a document demonstrates when it takes effect even when he stated the condition

orally

at the time of delivery,

or the halakha is not

in accordance with him in this case.

And we raise an objection:

Was it uncertain

to Rav Huna in this matter?

But didn’t Rava say:

If one says to his wife,

“This is your bill of divorce if I die,” [

if I die],

and

similarly, if one says to his wife, “This is your bill of divorce”

“when I am dying,”

it is a bill of divorce.

But if he says to her, “This is your bill of divorce”

“when I die,” and

similarly, if he says to her, “This is your bill of divorce”

“after death,”

it is not a bill of divorce,

since the implication of his words is that the bill of divorce will take effect after death, and there is no bill of divorce after death.

And we inquire about it:

What are the circumstances [

how is the first clause to be understood, that if he says “if I die,” it is a bill of divorce]?

If you say [

if it is said] that it is speaking of a case

in which he said to her

explicitly

“from today”

if I die ,

and

it is speaking according to the view of

the Rabbis,

who maintain that the bill of divorce takes effect from today only when he explicitly says “from today”,

If so, this is difficult: Was it

necessary

for Rava

to state

this ruling?

But didn’t we learn

in an explicit Mishna: If he says

“from today if I die”—

it is a bill of divorce!

Rather, is it not

necessarily the case that Rava is speaking of one

who did not say to her “from today,”

but merely said to her, “If I die, it shall be a bill of divorce,”

and

the reason the bill of divorce takes effect is that the halakha is in accordance with

Rabbi Yosei,

that the date written in the document demonstrates that the bill of divorce takes effect from today.

Infer from this

Rava’s statement that

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei,

that the date of a document demonstrates that it takes effect from today even when the condition was stated orally at the time the document was delivered.

And we reject this: Although

it was obvious to Rava

that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei even when the condition was delivered orally,

to Rav Huna it was uncertain

whether the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei even in this case or not. Therefore Rav Huna maintains that she performs halitza because of the uncertainty.

And if you wish, say [

and if you wish, say another answer]:

Actually,

Rava, who said that the bill of divorce takes effect, is speaking of a case

in which he said to her

explicitly

“from today”

if I die,

and

in accordance with the opinion of

the Rabbis.

And although this ruling has already been explained in the Mishna, nevertheless

these expressions were necessary for him [

because of these expressions, Rava needed to clarify the ruling].

Rava innovated that the expression

“I am dying,”

which is not mentioned in the Mishna, is

like

the expression

“if I die,”

and likewise the expression

“when I die”

is

like

the expression

“after death.”

And there are those who teach it [

and there are those who teach Rav Huna’s statement]

with regard to the latter clause,

concerning what we learned: One who says

“This is your bill of divorce after death”—

he has said nothing.

Rav Huna said: And according to Rabbi Yosei, she performs halitza.

And we raise an objection:

It is obvious,

for

from the latter clause,

from what we learned later in the latter clause of the Mishna, that if he says “from today and after death,”

according to

the opinion of

the Rabbis, she performs halitza,

so

the first clause as well,

when he says “after death,” obviously

according to Rabbi Yosei she performs halitza.

For according to Rabbi Yosei, this case is the same as one who says “from today and after death,” since Rabbi Yosei and the Rabbis disagree only on this matter: According to Rabbi Yosei, when he does not say “from today,” it is as though he said “from today,” whereas according to the Rabbis there is a distinction between one who says “from today” and one who does not say it.

And concerning the case in which he says “from today and after death,” it has already been explained in the latter clause that it is uncertain whether he intended that the bill of divorce take effect from today on the condition that he die, or whether he intended to retract what he said, “from today,” and intended that the bill of divorce take effect after death. Therefore, the ruling is that she performs halitza because of the uncertainty.

If so, what did Rav Huna innovate by saying that according to Rabbi Yosei she performs halitza when he says, “This is your bill of divorce after death” ?

And we answer: It is not obvious that in the first clause, when he says, “This is your bill of divorce after death,” Rabbi Yosei maintains that she performs halitza.

For

it might have been said that Rabbi Yosei in this matter [

in this case]

holds in accordance with Rabbi.

For Rabbi said

below:

It is a fully valid bill of divorce, and she does not require halitza either,

as the bill of divorce is fully valid when he says “from today and after death,” and there is no concern that by saying “after death” he intended to retract what he said, “from today.”

And since we find that Rabbi disagrees with the Rabbis in the latter clause, concerning “from today and after death,” it could be said that Rabbi Yosei likewise disagrees with the Rabbis in this matter, since we have learned that he is lenient with regard to a condition; perhaps he is lenient in accordance with Rabbi.

Therefore,

Rav Huna teaches us

that Rabbi Yosei disagrees with Rabbi and holds in accordance with the Rabbis that in the case of “from today and after death” she performs halitza, because it is uncertain whether, by saying “after death,” he intended to retract what he had said, “today,” or whether he intended it as a condition.

Rabbi does not hold in accordance with Rabbi Yosei

with regard to the principle that the date of a document demonstrates its intent.

Nor does Rabbi Yosei hold in accordance with Rabbi

with regard to one who says “from today and after death.”

And the Gemara explains: The fact that

Rabbi does not hold in accordance with Rabbi Yosei

with regard to the principle that the date of a document demonstrates its intent is inferred from the fact that

he teaches

in Rabbi’s statement the wording:

“Such a

bill of divorce,”

indicating that he validates the bill of divorce only in this case, when he says “from today and after death”;

to exclude

the ruling

of Rabbi Yosei,

who says that even when he does not say “from today,” the date of the document demonstrates that he intended it to take effect from today.

And

the fact that

Rabbi Yosei does not hold in accordance with Rabbi

with regard to one who says “from today and after death” is inferred from the fact that

he teaches

in Rabbi Yosei’s statement below [76b] the wording:

“Such a bill of divorce,”

and necessarily this wording was written to exclude something; and we find nothing to exclude other than

to exclude

the ruling

of Rabbi,

who maintains that when he says “from today and after death,” he certainly intended it as a condition and not as a retraction.

Rabbi Yosei innovates that although with regard to a gift, when one uses this expression, “from today and after death,” the gift certainly takes effect, one may not compare it to a bill of divorce. With regard to a gift, it can be explained that he intended the recipient to acquire the principal from today, while the fruits would belong to him only after death. This is not so with regard to a bill of divorce: Since this is not an expression of a condition, it is uncertain whether it is a condition or a retraction.

And we inquire about it: The opinion of

Rabbi—what is it,

where is it stated?

As it was taught:

One who says: “This is your bill of divorce”

“from today and after death”—

it is

a bill of divorce and it is not a bill of divorce; this is the statement of the Sages.

Rabbi says: It is such a bill of divorce,

and it is certainly valid; and if the husband dies without children, she does not require halitza because of the uncertainty.

And

Rabbi Yosei’s opinion—what is it,

where is the expression “such a bill of divorce” taught in his statements?

As we learned:

One who says:

“Write and give a bill of divorce to my wife if I do not return from here” [

from here, from now]

“until twelve months.”

If

they wrote it within twelve months and gave

it

after twelve months—

it is not a bill of divorce.

Rabbi Yosei says: It is such a bill of divorce.

Since he should have said: “If I do not return, write and give,” whereas he said: “Write and give if I do not return.”

Therefore Rabbi Yosei maintains that this was his intention: Write it now, and give it if I do not return; therefore, it is a bill of divorce.

We learned in the Mishna: One who says to a woman:

“This is your bill of divorce from today if I die from this illness, and he rose”

from his illness

“and walked in the marketplace,”

and afterward became ill again and died, we assess him: If he died as a result of the first illness, it is a bill of divorce; and if not, it is not a bill of divorce.

Rav Huna said: The bill of divorce

of a dangerously ill person has the same legal status

as his gift.

Just as

with regard to

his gift,

it was said in Bava Batra [151b] that

if he rose

from his illness and recovered, he

retracts

his gift, since he gave it only because he thought he would die,

so too

with regard to

his bill of divorce, if he rose

from his illness and recovered, he

retracts

his bill of divorce, even if he did not stipulate concerning the bill of divorce that it should take effect only if he died, but gave her the bill of divorce without stating this explicitly . Since there is an assessment of the mind that he gave it only because he thought he would die and wished to exempt her from yibbum.

And

similarly, the gift of a dangerously ill person has the same legal status as his bill of divorce:

Just as

with regard to

his bill of divorce,

it was explained above [page 65] that

even though he did not state explicitly

his complete intention, we interpret his words.

As was explained above with regard to a dangerously ill person who is approaching death: Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says that even when “the dangerously ill person”

once he said, “Write,”

we interpret his saying “Write” as meaning that they should give it, and they give the bill of divorce to the woman

even though he did not say, “Give,”

as we say that because of his fear he was preoccupied and forgot to state it explicitly.

So too with regard to

his gift,

the same law applies:

once he said, “Give,”—

even though they did not acquire it from him [

from him], the gift on behalf of the recipient—it is acquired by the recipient.

And we raise an objection to Rav Huna:

We learned

in our Mishna: He said to her:

“This is your bill of divorce from today if I die from this illness, and he rose and walked in the marketplace,”

and afterward

“became ill and died. We assess him: If he died as a result of the first illness”—

“it is a bill of divorce. If not”—

“it is not a bill of divorce.”

And if you say [

and if you maintain] that

if he rose

from his illness, he

retracts

his bill of divorce, as with regard to his gift,

then

why do I need the assessment

whether he died as a result of the first illness?

He

in the meantime

rose

from his illness, and the bill of divorce was automatically voided.

And we answer:

Mar, the son of Rav Yosef, said in the name of Rava:

Our Mishna is speaking of a case

in which he passed from one illness to another,

meaning that he did not recover completely, but emerged from one illness and contracted another; and this is not considered rising unless he attained a period of recovery.

And we raise an objection: How can it be explained that in the Mishna he remained ill the entire time, merely passing from one illness to another,

but it teaches: “He rose”!

This indicates that he recovered in the interim.

And we answer:

“He rose”

in the Mishna means that he rose

from this illness and fell into another illness.

And we raise an objection: How can it be explained that in the Mishna he rose from this illness and fell into another, without recovering in the interim,

but it teaches: “And he walked in the marketplace”!

This indicates that he was healthy in the interim.

And we answer: “He walked” in the Mishna means:

he walked with the support of his staff,

but he was still ill.