Gittin 72a — the Talmud in English

It is Rabbi Yosei, who says: Matters are not entrusted to an agent

and therefore there is no concern that perhaps the husband did not command the scribe to sign, but rather commanded his agent to tell this scribe to write the bill of divorce, and others to sign it; and the agent was concerned that perhaps the scribe would be embarrassed to say, “They do not accept him as a witness,” and because of this concern the agent commanded the scribe to sign. For according to Rabbi Yosei, there is no agency to appoint others as an agent, and if so, the scribe will not accept the appointment of agency to write the bill of divorce, but only from the husband himself.

And from here we learn that Rabbi Yosei also disagrees in the case where the husband says to the agents in the language “Tell,” that they cannot become agents.

For

if it enters your mind

to say that

Rabbi Yosei concedes when he says

to them, the husband, in the language

“Tell”

that they become agents to convey a statement to appoint others—

if so,

a ruinous consequence would emerge

[a ruin would result] if they permit a bill of divorce in which the scribe’s signature and the signature of one additional witness appear.

Because

sometimes

[at times]

he says to two of them:

“Tell the scribe, and he shall write, and tell so-and-so and so-and-so, and they shall sign,” and because of the embarrassment

[shame]

of the scribe,

that he would say that they do not accept him as a witness,

they are concerned and have him sign

[the agents are concerned for the scribe’s embarrassment and have him sign],

but the husband did not say

that they should do

so

[and if so, the bill of divorce is disqualified, yet they will deem it valid improperly]!

Rather

the Gemara retracts:

it is clarified

that one must say as we said initially, that the

beginning

of the Mishna is according to the view of

Rabbi Meir and

the

end

is according to the view of

Rabbi Yosei,

even though the views disagree.

Rav Ashi said

to explain the Mishna:

The entire Mishna is Rabbi Yosei,

who holds that there is no agency for mere statements; and the beginning of the Mishna, where the husband said “Write,” is not specifically when the husband said this language, but even if he said “Give,” the bill of divorce is also disqualified if another wrote it—as explained in the end—until the husband himself says to the scribe, “Write.”

And this is the way of the tanna: to teach the simple law, and afterward to add and innovate upon it.

And

by way of

it is not necessary

[it is not needed]

he says

the tanna:

It is not necessary

[it is not needed] to say, in the simple case,

where

[where]

he did not say

the husband to the agents in the language

“Give,”

but rather explicitly said to them in the language “Write”—that the bill of divorce is disqualified if another wrote it.

Rather, even

if he

said

in the language

“Give”—

not

did they become agents to appoint a scribe who would write the bill of divorce, and the scribe does not write a bill of divorce until he hears the command from the husband himself.

And it is not necessary

[it is not needed] to say, in the simple case,

where

[where]

he did not say

the husband

to three

[to three men], who cannot command others to write, since they were not appointed for this.

Rather, even

if he

said to three

[to three men] that they should write, making them a court—

not

can they command others to write, because there is no agency for mere statements, to appoint others on behalf of the husband.

And it is not necessary

[it is not needed] to say, in the simple case,

where

[where]

he did not say

to them, the husband, in the language

“Tell,”

that they were not explicitly made agents to tell others to write and sign.

Rather, even

if he

said

to them, the husband, in the language

“Tell”—

also

[also]

not

do they become agents to tell others to write and sign, and others do not write and sign until the husband himself tells them.

A beraita was taught in accordance with his view

[a beraita was taught according to his view]

of Rav Ashi

that even when the husband says to them in the language “Tell,” Rabbi Yosei disqualifies a bill of divorce written by another who did not hear from the husband himself.

As we learned:

A scribe wrote

the bill of divorce

for its sake and witnesses signed

on it

for its sake.

Even though he wrote it, signed it, and gave it to him

to the husband,

and

the husband

gave it to her—

the bill of divorce is void.

Until they hear

the

voice

of the husband,

who says to the scribe, “Write,” and to the witnesses, “Sign.”

And seemingly the words “that they hear his voice” are superfluous, as is precise from the words of the beraita:

That

“they hear”

is written—

to exclude

[to exclude]

the one who says

[from the words of the one who says]:

Rabbi Yosei concedes when he says

the husband in the language

“Tell”

that the agent can appoint the scribe and the witnesses, but the scribe and the witnesses must hear the husband himself.

And

“his voice”

is written—

to exclude

[to exclude]

from Rav

[from the words of Rav]

Kahana said in the name of Rav

who says that if he is deaf but able to speak through writing, he is entirely competent, and they write and give a bill of divorce to his wife . Rather, he can divorce only through hearing the husband’s voice .

Mishna:

We already learned above, at the end of the first chapter, that one who says, “Give this bill of divorce to my wife,” and dies—they may not give it after his death, because there is no bill of divorce after death.

On the basis of this, the Mishna before us comes to teach that if a man gave a bill of divorce to his wife and said to her, “This is your bill of divorce after death,” or said to her in any language whose meaning is that the bill of divorce should take effect only when he dies, it is not a bill of divorce, because there is no bill of divorce after death.

But if he said to her in language whose meaning is that when he dies the bill of divorce will take effect retroactively, from the time he gave the bill of divorce to her, it is a bill of divorce.

One who says to his wife: Behold,

this is your bill of divorce if I die

[I die].

Or he was ill and said to his wife: Behold,

this is your bill of divorce

if I die

from this illness.

This is as though he said to her

This is your bill of divorce after death,

for the meaning of these expressions is that the bill of divorce should take effect only after he dies .

Therefore, the law is that

he said nothing ,

for the bill of divorce does not take effect after death .

And if he said: Behold, this is your bill of divorce

from today if I die

[I die], or he said: Behold, this is your bill of divorce

from now if I die

[I die], whose meaning is that if I die, the bill of divorce will take effect from today or from now.

The law is that this is

a bill of divorce,

since what he said “if I die” is a condition: if he dies, the bill of divorce will take effect while he is alive, and she will not require yibbum when he has no offspring.

And if he said: Behold, this is your bill of divorce

from today and after death,

it is

a bill of divorce and it is not a bill of divorce.

For it is doubtful to us whether his primary intention was that the bill of divorce should take effect “from today,” and what he said “after death” was stated as a condition, that the bill of divorce should take effect on condition that he die; and since he died, the condition was fulfilled, and it is found that it is a bill of divorce from the time it was given; or perhaps his intention was to retract what he said “today,” and he said that it should be a bill of divorce after death, and the bill of divorce does not take effect after his death .

And

therefore

if he died

the husband without sons, and the woman fell before a yavam,

she performs halitza,

because of the concern lest this was not a bill of divorce, and she is like any woman subject to yibbum, who cannot marry another until the yavam performs halitza with her.

And she does not undergo yibbum,

because of the concern lest this was a valid bill of divorce, and she is the divorced wife of a brother, who is forbidden to the yavam.

A sick man who gave a bill of divorce to his wife and said to her:

This is your bill of divorce from today if I die

[I die]

from this illness.

And he stood

up from his illness,

and walked in the marketplace, and

afterward

became ill

again

and died

after becoming ill with his second illness.

The law is that

they assess him: If he died because of the first illness,

meaning that his death was caused by his first illness, so that although he stood and walked in the marketplace, he had not yet completely recovered from that illness, and even if he died from his second illness, this illness too came to him because of his first illness .

It is a bill of divorce,

for the condition was fulfilled.

And if not,

if they assess that in the meantime he recovered from this illness, and died because of a new illness that arose in him,

it is not a bill of divorce,

for the condition was not fulfilled.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: “This is your bill of divorce if I die”—it is not a bill of divorce.

And we deduce:

it follows

[it implies] that the expression

“if I die” is like one who says

that it is

considered ‘after death,’

[it is considered such], and therefore it is not a bill of divorce.

And

however,

the tanna returned

[repeated] and

taught

[repeated] later in the Mishna:

If the husband stated the condition in the language:

“From today if I die,”

or

“From now if I die,”

it is a bill of divorce.

It follows

[it implies] that the expression

“if I die” is not like one who says

that it is

considered ‘after death.’

[it is considered such].

For it is explained in the continuation of the Mishna that when one states a condition in the language “from today and after death,” it is uncertain whether what he said “after death” is a condition, so that the bill of divorce takes effect from today and it is a bill of divorce, or perhaps this is a retraction from his earlier words, and it is not a bill of divorce, since a bill of divorce does not take effect after death. Whereas when he says “from today if I die,” it is obvious to the Mishna that the bill of divorce takes effect from today; this implies that the expression “if I die” is not considered like one who says “after death.”

If so, the deductions from the Mishna contradict one another.

Abaye said:

The expression

“if I die”

has two meanings,

for it has a double meaning.

It means, like one who says

that if this condition is fulfilled, that I die, the bill of divorce will take effect

from now.

And it also means

that

like one who says

that the bill of divorce should take effect

after death.

Therefore, when he

said to her “from today”—it is

like one who said to her

explicitly

that it is

considered “from now”

[it is considered such], and then certainly the meaning of “if I die” is a condition: if he dies, the bill of divorce will take effect from now.

And if he

did not say to her “from today”—it is

like one who said to her

explicitly

that it is

considered “after death”

[it is considered such], and then certainly the meaning of “if I die” is that the bill of divorce should take effect when he dies.

We learned in the Mishna: One who says

“This is your bill of divorce if I die”—

he said nothing.

Rav Huna said:

Nevertheless, if the husband died without sons and his wife fell for yibbum,

and she performs halitza,

and she does not undergo yibbum, for Rav Huna is uncertain lest it is a bill of divorce.

And we object:

But

in the Mishna

it teaches, “He said nothing”!

This implies that it is not a bill of divorce at all.

And we answer:

“He said nothing”

in the Mishna means that his words did not benefit her for her remedy, since

she is forbidden to everyone else

[she is forbidden to marry others] through this bill of divorce, but

she is also forbidden to the yavam,

because there is a possibility that the bill of divorce takes effect.

And we object:

But from what

we learned in the

end

concerning one who said to her in the language “from today and after death,” whose law is that

she performs halitza.

By inference

you learn to deduce

that

in the

beginning

concerning one who says “This is your bill of divorce if I die,” where we did not teach that she performs halitza, this implies that it was specifically written in the end that she performs halitza, but in the beginning

she undergoes yibbum as well!

And this is difficult for Rav Huna, who said that she performs halitza.

And we answer: There is no difficulty from here against Rav Huna, since

the Mishna is like

the view of

the Rabbis,

who disagree with Rabbi Yosei in Bava Batra [page 136] concerning one who writes all his property to his son, that he must write in the document “from today and after death”; and if he did not write this, it is a gift after death. Likewise here, if he did not say “from today and after death,” it is a bill of divorce after death and it does not take effect; and if she fell for yibbum, she undergoes yibbum.

However,

and Rav Huna, who said

his statement, said it

according to

the view of

Rabbi Yosei, who says

there that he need not write “from today and after death,” since

the date of the document proves its meaning

that from today he gave him the substance of the land, and only the produce would be eaten by the father during his lifetime .

For Rabbi Yosei holds that if he did not intend to give him the body from now, why was the date written in the deed of gift.

And therefore, also in a bill of divorce, if the date of the bill of divorce is “from now,” it indicates that he intended the bill of divorce to take effect from now, even if he did not explicitly say “from today,” .

And we object:

If

Rav Huna holds like

Rabbi Yosei,

then

she should not require halitza either!

For the date in the bill of divorce demonstrates that he intended to divorce her from now.

And if you would say

but if you say], that

it is uncertain to Rav Huna whether the halakha is according to Rabbi Yosei or the halakha is not according to Rabbi Yosei,

and therefore he was stringent according to both positions: he says that she performs halitza, out of concern that perhaps the halakha is according to the Rabbis and the bill of divorce did not take effect, in which case she is obligated in levirate marriage; but she does not enter into levirate marriage, out of concern that perhaps the halakha is according to Rabbi Yosei and the bill of divorce took effect, in which case she is permitted to the world and forbidden to the levir.

And does

indeed]

he find it uncertain

to Rav Huna whether the halakha is according to Rabbi Yosei or according to the Rabbis?

But

for]

Rabba bar Avuha fell ill

became ill].

They entered to him

they entered to him]

Rav Huna and Rav Nahman.

Rav Huna said to Rav Nahman:

Ask

ask him]

Rabba bar Avuha:

whether

the halakha is according to Rabbi Yosei, or the halakha is not?

He said to him

Rav Nahman:

The reason

the reason] of

Rabbi Yosei I do not know

I did not know] why he holds that it is unnecessary to write in the deed that it shall take effect “from today and after death,”

the halakha I should ask him

I will ask him]?

He said to him: Yo

u

ask

ask him] what is the

halakha, and his reason

and his reason] of

Rabbi Yosei I shall say

I shall say]

to you

afterward.

He asked

ask him] Rav Nahman Rabba bar Avuha: what is the halakha?

He said to him: Thus

so]

Rav said: The halakha is according to Rabbi Yosei.

After he went out

when he left] Rabba bar Avuha’s house,

he said to him

Rav Huna to Rav Nahman:

This is the reason for Rabbi Yosei,

that it is unnecessary to write in the deed “from today and after death,” because

he holds: the date of the document demonstrates its meaning

from when he intended it to take effect.

If so, it follows from this incident that Rav Huna knew with certainty that the halakha is according to Rabbi Yosei, and was not uncertain about it.