Gittin 72a (עב.) — the Talmud in English

It is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says: A matter cannot be entrusted to an agent to relay to another agent.

Therefore, there is no concern that perhaps the husband did not instruct the scribe to sign, but instructed his agents to tell this scribe to write the bill of divorce and others to sign it, and the agent was concerned that the scribe would be embarrassed to say that he is not accepted as a witness. Because of this concern, the agent instructed the scribe to sign. For according to Rabbi Yosei, there is no agency to appoint others as agents; therefore, the scribe will not accept the appointment as an agent to write the bill of divorce, but only if he hears it directly from the husband.

From here we learn that Rabbi Yosei also disagrees in the case where the husband tells the agents using the expression “say,” that they can become agents.

For

if it enters your mind

to say that

Rabbi Yosei concedes in the case where he says

to them using the expression

“say”

that they become agents to relay the instruction to appoint others,

then

a harmful outcome would emerge

if they permitted a bill of divorce bearing the scribe’s signature and the signature of only one additional witness.

This is because

sometimes

he tells two agents:

“Tell the scribe, and he will write, and tell So-and-so and So-and-so, and they will sign; and because of the embarrassment

of the scribe,

of the scribe,

they will be concerned and have him sign,

because he will say that they do not accept him as a witness,

but the husband did not say

and

the husband did not say

that they should do

so

—and therefore the bill of divorce is invalid, yet they will validate it improperly!

Rather,

the Gemara retracts its previous explanation:

It is clear

that one must say as we initially said:

the first clause

of the Mishna follows the view of

Rabbi Meir, and

the

latter clause

follows the view of

Rabbi Yosei,

even though their approaches differ.

Rav Ashi said

to resolve the Mishna:

The entire Mishna is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei,

who maintains that there is no agency for merely relaying instructions. The first clause of the Mishna, which states that the husband said “write,” does not specifically refer to a case where the husband used this expression. Rather, even if he said “give,” the bill of divorce is likewise invalid if another person wrote it, as explained in the latter clause—unless the husband himself tells the scribe, “Write.”

And this is the manner of the tanna: To teach the straightforward ruling first, and afterward to add and introduce a further innovation based upon it.

And

in the manner of

“it is not necessary”

to say the more obvious case,

the tanna states:

It is not necessary

to say, in the straightforward case,

where

the husband did not say

to the agents

using the expression

“give,”

but explicitly told them

“write”—that the bill of divorce is invalid if another person wrote it.

Rather, even

if he

said

using the expression

“give,”—

they did not

become agents to appoint a scribe to write the bill of divorce, and the scribe may not write a bill of divorce until he hears the instruction directly from the husband himself.

Nor is it necessary

to say, in the straightforward case,

where

the husband did not say

to

the three

members of the court

that they should write, since they cannot instruct others to write, as they were not appointed for this purpose.

Rather, even

if he

said to the three members of the court

that they should write, thereby making them a court,

they cannot

instruct others to write, because there is no agency for mere words, to appoint others on behalf of the husband.

Nor is it necessary

to say, in the straightforward case,

where

the husband did not say

to them

using the expression

“say,”

so that they were not explicitly appointed as agents to tell others to write and sign.

Rather, even

if he

said

to them using the expression

“say,”—

also

when he says to the scribe:

they do not

become agents to tell others to write and sign, and others may not write and sign until the husband himself tells them to do so.

It was taught in a beraita in accordance with the opinion

of

Rav Ashi,

that even when the husband tells them using the expression “say,” Rabbi Yosei invalidates a bill of divorce written by another who did not hear the instruction directly from the husband himself.

As we learned:

A scribe wrote

the bill of divorce

for its sake, and witnesses signed

it

for its sake.

Even if he wrote it, signed it, and gave it to him

—the husband—

and

the husband

gave it to her,

the bill of divorce is void.

Until they hear

the

voice

of the husband

saying to the scribe, “Write,” and to the witnesses, “Sign.”

Apparently, the words “that they hear his voice” are superfluous, as is precisely indicated by the language of the beraita:

The word

“hear”

is written

to exclude

the view

of one who says:

“Rabbi Yosei concedes in the case where the husband says”

to them using the expression

“say”

that the agent may appoint the scribe and the witnesses, but the scribe and the witnesses must hear the husband himself.

And the word

“voice”

is written

to

exclude

the view

of Rav

—

Rav Kahana said in the name of Rav

that if he is deaf and able to communicate through writing, he is fully competent, and they write and give a bill of divorce to his wife. Rather, he can divorce only when they hear the husband’s voice.

Mishna:

We already learned above, at the end of the first chapter, that one who says, “Give this bill of divorce to my wife,” and dies—the agents may not give it after his death, because there is no bill of divorce after death.

On this basis, the Mishna before us teaches that if a man gave his wife a bill of divorce and said to her, “This is your bill of divorce after my death,” or said to her using any expression that indicates that the bill of divorce should take effect only after he dies, it is not a bill of divorce, because there is no bill of divorce after death.

But if he said to her using an expression that indicates that when he dies the bill of divorce will take effect retroactively, from the time he gave it to her, it is a bill of divorce.

One who says to his wife:

“This is your bill of divorce if I die”

[if I die].

Or he was ill and said to his wife:

“This is your bill of divorce

if I die

from this illness.”

This is equivalent to his saying to her:

“This is your bill of divorce after my death,”

as these expressions mean that the bill of divorce should take effect only after he dies.

Therefore, the ruling is that

he has said nothing,

because the bill of divorce does not take effect after death.

And if he said: “This is your bill of divorce

from today if I die

[if I die],” or he said: “This is your bill of divorce

from now if I die

[if I die],” whose meaning is that if he dies, the bill of divorce will take effect from today or from now,

the ruling is that this is

a bill of divorce,

because the words “if I die” constitute a condition: If he dies, the bill of divorce will take effect while he is alive, and his wife will not require levirate marriage if he has no offspring.

And if he said: “This is your bill of divorce

from today and after my death,”

it is

a bill of divorce, and it is not a bill of divorce.

For it is uncertain whether his primary intention was that the bill of divorce should take effect “from today,” and what he added, “after my death,” was stated as a condition—that the bill of divorce should take effect on condition that he die. Since he died, the condition was fulfilled, and it follows that it is a bill of divorce from the time it was given—or perhaps he intended to retract what he had said about “today,” and said that it should be a bill of divorce after his death, in which case the bill of divorce does not take effect after his death.

And

therefore,

if the husband dies

without sons and the woman falls before a yavam,

she performs halitza,

because of the concern that perhaps this was not a bill of divorce, and she is like any yevama, who may not marry another man until the yavam performs halitza with her.

But she does not enter into levirate marriage,

because of the concern that perhaps this was a valid bill of divorce, in which case she is the divorced wife of the brother, who is forbidden to the yavam.

A sick man who gave his wife a bill of divorce and said to her:

“This is your bill of divorce from today if I die”

[if I die]

from this illness.

And he recovered

from his illness

and walked in the marketplace, and

afterward

became ill

again

and died

after becoming ill with the second illness.

The ruling is that

we assess him: If he died because of the first illness,

meaning that his death was caused by his first illness, so that although he recovered enough to stand and walk in the marketplace, he had not completely recovered from that illness, and even if he died from his second illness, that illness too came to him as a result of his first illness,

it is a bill of divorce,

for the condition was fulfilled.

And if not,

if we assess that he recovered in the interim from this illness and died as a result of a new illness that subsequently afflicted him,

it is not a bill of divorce,

because the condition was not fulfilled.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: “This is your bill of divorce if I die”—it is not a bill of divorce.

And we infer:

Apparently,

the expression

“if I die” is

equivalent to saying

“after death,”

and therefore it is not a bill of divorce.

But

the tanna

then

returned and

taught

later in the Mishna:

If the husband stated the condition using the expression:

“From today if I die,”

or

“from now if I die,”

it is a bill of divorce.

Apparently,

the expression

“if I die” is not

equivalent to saying

“after death.”

For it is explained in the continuation of the Mishna that when he states the condition using the expression “from today and after my death,” it is uncertain whether the words “after my death” constitute a condition, so that the bill of divorce takes effect from today and is a bill of divorce, or whether this is a retraction of his initial statement, in which case it is not a bill of divorce, since a bill of divorce does not take effect after death. Yet when he says, “from today if I die,” it is obvious to the Mishna that the bill of divorce takes effect from today; this indicates that the expression “if I die” is not considered equivalent to saying “after death.”

If so, the inferences from the Mishna contradict one another.

Abaye said:

The expression

“if I die”

has two meanings;

in the Mishna means that his words did not accomplish anything for her benefit, since

it has a double significance.

It can mean

that he is stating a condition: If this condition is fulfilled, namely, that he dies, the bill of divorce will take effect

from now.

And it can also mean

that he is

saying that the bill of divorce will take effect

after death.

Therefore, when

he

says to her, “from today,”

it is

equivalent to one who says to her

explicitly,

“from now,”

and then the clear meaning of “if I die” is a condition: If he dies, the bill of divorce will take effect from now.

But if he

does not say to her, “from today,”

it is

equivalent to one who says to her

explicitly,

“it is considered after death,”

and then the clear meaning of “if I die” is that the bill of divorce will take effect when he dies.

We learned in the Mishna: One who says,

“This is your bill of divorce if I die”—

he has said nothing.

Rav Huna said:

Nevertheless, if the husband dies without sons and his wife falls before a yavam,

she performs halitza

and does not enter into levirate marriage, as Rav Huna is uncertain whether it is a bill of divorce.

And we raise an objection:

But

in the Mishna

it teaches, “He has said nothing”!

This indicates that it is not a bill of divorce at all.

And we answer:

“He has said nothing”

in the Mishna means that his words did not benefit her by permitting her, since

she is forbidden to everyone else

[to marry others] because of this bill of divorce. But

she is also forbidden to the yavam,

because there is a possibility that the bill of divorce took effect.

And we raise an objection:

But from what

we learned in the

latter clause

regarding one who said to her, “from today and after death,” where the ruling is that

she performs halitza—

by inference

you learn to infer

that in the

first clause,

regarding one who says, “This is your bill of divorce if I die,” where we did not teach that she performs halitza, this indicates that it was specifically in the latter clause that the Mishna stated that she performs halitza. But in the first clause, she may even

enter into levirate marriage!

This is difficult for Rav Huna, who said that she performs halitza.

And we answer: There is no difficulty from here against Rav Huna, since

the Mishna follows

the view of

the Rabbis,

who disagree with Rabbi Yosei in Bava Batra [136a] concerning one who writes all his property to his son. They maintain that he must write in the deed, “from today and after death”; if he did not write this, it is a gift after death. Likewise here, if he did not say “from today and after death,” it is a bill of divorce after death and does not take effect; and if she falls before a yavam, she enters into levirate marriage.

However,

Rav Huna, who said

this ruling, said it

in accordance

with the view of

Rabbi Yosei, who said

there that it is not necessary to write “from today and after death,” because

the date of the deed proves its intent:

the donor gave him the body of the land from today, and only the produce would be consumed by the father during his lifetime.

that from today he gave him the substance of the land, and only the produce would be eaten by the father during his lifetime .

For Rabbi Yosei holds that if he did not intend to give him ownership of the body of the property immediately, why was the date written in the deed of gift.

Therefore, also with regard to a get, if the date of the get is stated as being from now, this indicates that he intended the get to take effect immediately, even if he did not explicitly say, “from today.”

And we raise an objection:

If

Rav Huna holds like

Rabbi Yosei,

then

there should likewise be no need for halitza!

For the date in the get proves that he intended to divorce her immediately.

And if you would say

[and if you say] that

Rav Huna was uncertain whether the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei or whether the halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yosei,

and therefore he acted stringently in accordance with both opinions: He said that she must perform halitza, out of concern that the halakha is in accordance with the Rabbis and the get did not take effect, in which case she is obligated in yibbum; but she may not enter into yibbum, out of concern that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei and the get took effect, in which case she is permitted to marry anyone outside the levirate bond and forbidden to the yavam.

And does

[or rather]

he entertain uncertainty

as to whether the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei or in accordance with the Rabbis?

But

[after all]

Rabba bar Avuha fell ill.

[He became ill.]

Rav Huna and Rav Nahman entered to him.

[They entered to him.]

Rav Huna and Rav Nahman.

Rav Huna said to Rav Nahman:

Ask

[him]

Rabba bar Avuha

whether

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, or whether it is not in accordance with him.

He said to him,

Rav Nahman:

The reason

[the reason]

of Rabbi Yosei I do not know,

[I do not know] why he holds that it is unnecessary to write in the deed that it should take effect “from today and after death,”

while the halakha—I will ask him

[I shall ask him]?

He said to him: You

should

ask

[him] what the

halakha is, and his reasoning

[and his reasoning] of

Rabbi Yosei I will tell

[I will tell]

you

afterward.

Rav Nahman asked

[him] from Rabba bar Avuha: What is the halakha?

He said to him: Thus

[so]

Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei.

After he left

[he left] the house of Rabba bar Avuha,

he said to him

Rav Huna to Rav Nahman:

This is Rabbi Yosei’s reasoning,

that it is unnecessary to write in the deed “from today and after death,” because

he holds: The date of a document proves its intended effect

from when he intended it to take effect.

If so, it is evident from this incident that Rav Huna knew with certainty that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei and was not uncertain about the matter.