Gittin 71b — the Talmud in English

And did we not learn: Two deaf-mutes brothers

who married

are married

by signaling, to

two competent-minded sisters or

to

two deaf-mute sisters or

to

two sisters, one competent-minded and one deaf-mute,

for all their marriages are only rabbinic, since the husbands took them in marriage by signaling.

And likewise, two deaf-mute sisters

who were married by signaling, and were

married to two competent-minded brothers or to two deaf-mute brothers or to two brothers, one competent-minded and one deaf-mute,

for all of them married only by rabbinic law, since they married by signaling.

Their law:

These are exempt from halitza and from yibbum,

since the one who fell for yibbum is the sister of the wife of the yavam, and all forbidden relations are exempt from yibbum.

And if they were

the two women

unrelated

and there is no prohibition of a forbidden relation in marrying both of them, and one of the brothers died.

The second brother cannot perform halitza, because he is a deaf-mute and was excluded from halitza, or because she is a deaf-mute and cannot say, “My yavam has refused me.”

Rather,

they shall take

the yevama in marriage,

and if they wish

afterward

to release them—

they shall release them,

for a bill of divorce of a deaf-mute can dissolve the bond of the marriage of a deaf-mute.

It is demonstrated from this Mishna that a yevama from a deaf-mute brother who fell before a deaf-mute can be divorced by him, and we do not decree on account of a yevama from a competent-minded brother, whom he cannot divorce.

Rather, it is evident as we answered initially,

that we must return to the first answer: What we learned concerning one who was deaf-mute from the outset, that he cannot divorce by means of writing, refers to a yevama from a competent-minded brother.

And as for what we said above, to explain that Rav Kahana holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, that a deaf-mute who was competent-minded from the outset can effect a fully Torah-valid divorce, it cannot be said that everyone agrees with this and that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel came only to explain the words of the first tanna and not to dispute him.

For

Rabbi Yohanan said

explicitly:

His colleagues dispute him, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,

and hold that if a competent-minded man betrothed a woman with fully valid betrothal and then became a deaf-mute, he cannot divorce her even if he knows how to write.

Abaye said: We too have learned

that a deaf-mute cannot divorce even if he can communicate through writing, for we learned concerning the woman that only if she

became insane

after the marriage—

he shall not release her,

and it is forbidden for him to divorce her.

But if she had been competent-minded and became a deaf-mute, he can divorce her, since the woman’s consent is not required for divorce, and he can divorce her even against her will.

And only in the case of a woman who became insane did the Sages decree that he should not divorce her, because she does not know how to guard herself, and they were concerned that people would treat her permissively in licentiousness. In contrast, if she remains married, they will be careful with her since she is a married woman.

In contrast, the husband, whether

he became a deaf-mute or became insane—

he shall not release

his wife

ever.

And it is explained that if he married her when he was competent-minded and then became a deaf-mute, he cannot divorce her.

And we raised a difficulty concerning it:

What

is the emphasis that he shall not release his wife

ever?

Is it not

written to include that

even though he can communicate through writing,

nevertheless he does not divorce his wife with a Torah-valid divorce, and if he married her when he was competent-minded, so that her betrothal was valid by Torah law, he cannot divorce her?

Rav Pappa said: Had Rabbi Yohanan not taught us

that

Rabbi Yohanan

said that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel came to dispute the first tanna,

I would have said

that

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel came to explain the reason of the first tanna,

and everyone agrees that even a deaf-mute who had been competent-minded at the time of the betrothal, whose betrothal is valid by Torah law, can use writing for divorce.

And

according to this,

what

is the emphasis that we learned concerning one who was competent-minded and became a deaf-mute, that he shall not release his wife

ever?

And we explain: This does not come to teach us that even through writing he cannot command that a bill of divorce be written. Rather, it comes to teach us that

even though we see that he is sharp-minded

and understands, he is not capable of divorce by commanding others through signaling to divorce her; but through writing, he can divorce her.

Alternatively,

the emphasis of “ever” was written in order to infer

the matter of Rabbi Yitzhak,

for from the fact that in the first clause “ever” is not written, while in the latter clause “ever” is written, it is inferred that the law in the first clause—that he does not divorce his insane wife—is only rabbinic, whereas the law in the latter clause, that if the husband is insane he does not divorce, is by Torah law, in accordance with the words of Rabbi Yitzhak.

For Rabbi Yitzhak said: By Torah law, an insane woman

who knows how to guard her bill of divorce

is divorced, just as

the law is with

a competent-minded woman against her will,

since the woman’s consent is not required for divorce.

And for what reason did they say

that the Sages said that an insane woman, even one who knows how to guard her bill of divorce,

is not divorced?

So that

they should not treat her in a permissive manner,

since she does not know how to guard herself.

This is not so in the case where the husband is a deaf-mute, who cannot divorce even by Torah law, since his consent is required, for a man releases only willingly. Therefore the beraita emphasized in the latter clause that when the husband is a deaf-mute [who cannot communicate even through writing] or insane, who cannot divorce, it says “ever.”

Mishna:

They said to him

when he was healthy, or when he was dangerously ill [an ill person who is about to die], but his mind was still clear,

“Let us write a bill of divorce for your wife”

so that she will not require yibbum after your death.

And he said to them,

the husband,

“Write.”

They themselves must write and sign it.

And they may also give it to the woman, for the case here is one of an ill person or one departing by sea and the like, as was explained in the previous chapter: when he says, “Write,” his law is as though he said, “Write and give.”

And if those men did not write and sign the bill of divorce themselves, but

said to the scribe, and he wrote

the bill of divorce,

and

said

to the witnesses, and they signed

at their instruction,

even though the scribe wrote it

the scribe

and the witnesses signed it,

the witnesses,

and gave it to him,

to the husband,

and he returned

the husband

and gave it to her,

it turns out that he revealed his opinion that he was not particular that his agents themselves write and sign.

Nevertheless,

the bill of divorce is invalid until

the husband himself

says to the scribe, “Write,” and to the witnesses, “Sign,”

for the bill of divorce must be written and signed at the husband’s command.

Gemara:

The Gemara infers from the Mishna:

The reason

that the bill of divorce is invalid if the husband did not explicitly tell the scribe to write is that it is explained in the Mishna

that he did not say

to those men in the wording

“Give,”

but explicitly said to them, “Write.” This indicates that he is particular that they themselves write, and that they should not tell another to write, because he is embarrassed to reveal to others that he does not know how to write a bill of divorce himself. In this, even Rabbi Meir agrees above [page 66]: If he said, “Write a bill of divorce for my wife,” even if he said it to a court, he did not make them a court in order to authorize others to write the bill of divorce.

This

is so if

he said

to them, the husband, in the wording

“Give,”

and they told the scribe to write and the witnesses to sign—

they give

it even though the husband did not explicitly command them to do so.

Whose

view is it?

It is in accordance with the view of

Rabbi Meir.

For he said: Statements can be entrusted to an agent.

It is possible to appoint an agent for the transmission of words, and if so, they also become agents to appoint others in their place.

This is inferred from the first clause of the Mishna, and the Gemara raises a contradiction to it from the latter clause:

Say,

look at the

latter clause

of the Mishna, in which we learned:

The bill of divorce is invalid

until

the husband himself

says to the scribe, “Write,” and to the witnesses, “Sign.”

This indicates that there is no possible permission to tell others to write; rather, the one who hears it from the husband will write it, even if the husband said it to three [who are a court], and even if he did not say to them in the wording “Write,” but in the wording “Give,” indicating that he is not particular if others write.

If so, it is inferred from the latter clause that the Mishna

comes

and proceeds

according to Rabbi Yosei, who said: Statements cannot be entrusted to an agent—

it is not possible to appoint an agent for the transmission of words, and they do not become agents to appoint others. Therefore, as long as the husband did not explicitly appoint the scribe to write the bill of divorce, he does not write it, even though the husband was not particular that the agents appoint another and relied on them for this, for they do not become agents for this matter, to command others.

If so, it emerges that the

first clause

of the Mishna is in accordance with the view of

Rabbi Meir,

and the

latter clause

of the Mishna is in accordance with the view of

Rabbi Yosei

—and how can the Mishna state both of two opinions that dispute one another? And we answer:

Indeed, the Mishna truly states the

the Mishna really follows in its

first clause

in accordance with the view of

Rabbi Meir, and

in its

the

latter clause

in accordance with the view of

Rabbi Yosei, even though the opinions dispute one another.

Abaye said

to answer in another way:

The entire Mishna

is in accordance with the view of

Rabbi Meir.

And here, with what are we dealing,

in the latter clause, which says that the bill of divorce is not valid until he tells the scribe himself to write? It is—

that he did not say

in the wording

“Give,”

but said it in the wording “Write.”

And this is the intention of the latter clause: When the husband says it in the wording “Write,” the bill of divorce is not valid until he tells the scribe himself to write.

And we raise a difficulty: Since there is a possible permission to tell others to write when he said to them in the wording “Give,”

if so, “

“until he says

until he says

to the husband in the wording

‘Give,’ should have been stated”—the tanna should have said this, and I would know by a kal va-chomer that it is valid in the simpler case, where the husband himself told the scribe to write.

The tanna should have said this, and I would have known by an a-fortiori inference that the document is valid in the simpler case, when the husband himself told the scribe to write it.

Rather, certainly, the latter clause is speaking even when the husband said to them in the wording “Give.” The reason that the bill of divorce is valid only when the husband himself commanded the scribe to write is that

it is certain that the latter clause refers even to a case in which the husband said to them “Give.” The reason the divorce document is valid only when the husband himself instructed the scribe to write is that

here, with what are we dealing

[In the latter clause, what case is being discussed?]

with his not having said to three

but having said it to two. And with two, Rabbi Meir agrees that even if the husband said to them in the wording “Give,” they write it themselves, since he did not make them a court to appoint others to write and sign, and they are not agents for this.

And we raise a difficulty: Since there is a possible permission to tell others to write when the husband said to three in the wording “Give,”

if so, “

[if that is so], “

until he says

the husband

to three

‘Give’”

should have been stated by the tanna, and I would know by a kal va-chomer that it is valid in the simpler case, where the husband himself said to the scribe to write.

The tanna should have said this, and I would have known by an a-fortiori inference that the document is valid in the simpler case, when the husband himself told the scribe to write it.

Rather, it must be said that

the Mishna

entirely

follows the view of

Rabbi Yosei,

and what they stated in the first clause, that the husband said in the wording “Write,” was not stated to infer that if the husband had said in the wording “Give,” without “Write,” they tell others and they write.

Rather,

here, with what are we dealing

here, in the first clause? The reason that they cannot appoint others to write the bill of divorce is not that the husband did not say to them in the wording “Give,” but

that he did not say

to them in the wording

“Say.”

For if the husband had said to them in the wording, “Say to the scribe and let him write, and to so-and-so and so-and-so and let them sign,” they would become agents for conveying the statement to others. In this Rabbi Yosei agrees, since he made them agents for this.

And we raise a difficulty: Since there is a possible permission to tell others to write when he said to them in the wording “Say,”

if so, “

[if that is so], “

until he says

to them, the husband, in the wording

‘Say,’ should have been stated” by the tanna in the latter clause, and I would know by a kal va-chomer that it is valid in the simpler case, where the husband himself said to the scribe to write.

The tanna should have said this in the latter clause, and I would have known by an a-fortiori inference that the document is valid in the simpler case, when the husband himself told the scribe to write it.

And furthermore,

there is a difficulty:

Does Rabbi Yosei agree when one says

the husband in the wording

“Say”

that the agents can convey the husband’s command to others?

And did we not learn: A scribe wrote

the bill of divorce

and

another signed—

it is valid,

the bill of divorce, since it contains testimony of two: the handwriting of the scribe and the signature of the other.

And Rabbi Yirmeya said: We learned, “the scribe signed,”

and not “the scribe wrote”; only if the scribe signed together with the other witness is the bill of divorce valid.

And Rav Hisda said: The Mishna

that validates the signature of the scribe—

whose

view is it?