Gittin 71a — the Talmud in English

Rather,

the matters that are appropriate for the days of summer and the days of the rainy season, and they ask him whether he is interested in them—this is

with produce

that is not found in that season of the year; for if he answers the question by inclining “yes,” it is a sign that his mind is not clear.

A mentally competent man who betrothed a woman with a complete betrothal and afterward became deaf-mute or insane: the law is that he can never divorce his wife, because the divorce of a deaf-mute does not have the power to nullify the betrothal of a mentally competent man.

Rav Kahana said that Rav said:

But if he is

a deaf-mute who can speak through writing,

who knows how to write on parchment for the agents: “You, so-and-so and so-and-so, write and give a bill of divorce to my wife,”

then he is completely mentally competent, and if he conveyed his instruction to them in writing,

they write and give a bill of divorce to his wife.

Rav Yosef said: What is he teaching us

[what did Rav teach us]?

Did we not already

learn:

One who was mentally competent and

became mute, and they said to him, “Shall we write a bill of divorce for your wife?” and he inclined his head, they examine him three times; if he says “no” to no and “yes” to yes—

these people may write and give it!

It follows that even if he is able only to hint, he is fit to divorce, and all the more so in a case in which he can speak through writing.

Rabbi Zeira said to him:

Do you say that the Mishna which says that divorce is effective in the case of an

mute

who hears but does not speak

is what you are saying [you said] to prove Rav’s ruling, that divorce is effective in the case of a deaf-mute who neither hears nor speaks except through writing? But one cannot derive the case of a deaf-mute from the case of a mute.

Rav’s ruling that divorce is effective for a deaf-mute who can neither hear nor speak, except through writing? One cannot derive the law of a deaf-mute from the law of a mute.

For

different

[it is different with]

a mute:

since he hears, he is like a mentally competent person in every matter. This is not so with a deaf-mute, who neither hears nor speaks; if he cannot speak through writing, merely by hinting he is not fit to divorce.

And if Rav had not taught us that a deaf-mute who is able to speak through writing is fit to divorce, we would not have known this.

And the distinction between a mute and a deaf-mute, we learned in a beraita:

as it was taught:

A deaf-mute who

speaks but does not hear—

this is a deaf-mute;

one who hears but does not speak—

this is a mute;

and both this one and that one—

both the one who speaks but does not hear and the one who hears but does not speak—

they are

considered

like mentally competent persons in all their matters.

It is explained in the beraita that a mute is considered mentally competent in all their matters, and this deaf-mute brought here in the beraita is not the deaf-mute about whom the Sages spoke everywhere and whom they equated with an insane person. For this deaf-mute is mentally competent in every matter. Rather, the deaf-mute about whom they spoke everywhere, and about whom Rav spoke, is one who neither hears nor speaks.

It is evident from the beraita that a mute differs from the deaf-mute mentioned by Rav Kahana.

And we raise the question:

And from where

[and from where]

that one who speaks but does not hear is

called

a deaf-mute,

and

one who hears but does not speak is

called

a mute?

And we explain:

as it is written: “And I am like a deaf person; I do not hear, and like a mute, he does not open his mouth”

[Psalms 38:14]. If so, it is explained in the verse that a person who does not hear is called a deaf-mute, and a person who does not speak is called a mute.

And if you wish, say:

The expression “mute” is

as people say

[as people say]:

his speech was taken away

[his words were taken away], and “mute” is an abbreviation of “his speech was taken away,” by the initial letters.

Rabbi Zeira said: If I have a difficulty

with the words of Rav Kahana, who said that Rav said,

this is what I have a difficulty with,

as it was taught

in a beraita: Regarding the punishment of one who knows testimony concerning another and swears that he does not know it, the Torah writes:

“If he does not testify

and bears his iniquity” [Leviticus 5:1], and he must bring a sacrifice for the oath of testimony.

We learn from the wording of the verse to exclude:

excluding a mute who is unable to testify

the testimony with his mouth.

For if he knows testimony, and they administered an oath to him that he does not know testimony, and he inclined his head that he does not know, he is exempt from the sacrifice.

And according to Rav Kahana, this is difficult:

why

was he excluded from testimony if he cannot speak?

He can

still

testify through writing.

Rather, it follows from the beraita that testimony in writing is not considered testimony, contrary to the words of Rav Kahana who said that Rav ruled so.

Abaye said to him: Are you speaking of testimony

[did you say] to prove from testimony that testimony in writing is not considered testimony?

But one cannot prove from testimony with regard to a bill of divorce!

For

different

[it is different with]

testimony, since the Merciful One said

that the testimony must be conveyed

from their mouths.

As it is written, “By the mouth of two witnesses” [Deuteronomy 19:15]—

and

we learn from this to exclude that they

cannot

testify

from their written document

in court.

And therefore, in testimony, only what is spoken by mouth is considered testimony.

What is not so with a bill of divorce, for which there is no scriptural decree of “from their mouth—and not from the mouth of their writing”: written testimony is also considered testimony .

And we challenge this :

We object

we learned in a beraita :

Just as they examine him

one who has become mute

for bills of divorce

by means of nodding the head,

so they examine him for purchases and gifts [

for buying and selling] with regard to his property,

and for testimonies and inheritances.

In any event, it teaches [

it was taught in the beraita, in any event]

testimonies,

which implies that he can also testify even though he does not speak; but it was said above that there is a scriptural decree that testimony is conveyed only orally ?

Rav Yosef bar Minyumi said in the name of Rav Sheshet:

what is written in the beraita, that a mute person is fit for testimonies, means

for the testimony of a woman,

where he testifies that her husband has died so that she may marry.

For the Sages were lenient with regard to it,

in various ways so that she might marry, and in this matter they were lenient to accept the testimony of a mute person from writing.

But with regard to the other testimonies, which are from the Torah, the testimony cannot be conveyed through writing.

And we refute this :

But it teaches inheritances!

This implies that a mute person can testify even with regard to inheritance, which is a monetary law and whose testimony is from the Torah.

And we answer :

Rabbi Abbahu said:

it is not speaking of testimony that he gives concerning the property of others; rather, it is speaking of his own property, and “inheritances” refers to

the inheritance of his firstborn son,

who testifies in writing, if he wishes to alter the law of inheritance and make his firstborn son equal to the other brothers .

And we refute this :

In any event, it teaches [

it was taught in the beraita, in any event], that he is fit

for purchases and gifts; is it not [

is this not the meaning] that he is fit for buying and selling

for everyone else [

for others], and this means to testify concerning them in writing?

And we reject this :

No,

it is speaking of buying and selling

for himself [

for himself], and it is not speaking of testimony.

And we challenge this :

We object

from what we learned:

With regard to a deaf-mute, they did not follow his gestures, his jumping, or his handwriting

to consider him like one of sound mind,

but

with regard to buying and selling

movable property,

but not

did they consider him like one of sound mind

with

regard to

bills of divorce,

in a case where he betrothed his wife with a complete betrothal when he was of sound mind.

And this is difficult for Rav Kahana’s statement that he is considered like one of sound mind to divorce through his handwriting.

And we answer: it is a dispute among

the tannaim.

For it was taught: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said:

When are these words said,

that they do not rely on the handwriting of a deaf-mute for bills of divorce —

with regard to one who was a deaf-mute from the outset,

who does not have handwriting expressing intelligence, since his mind was never clear .

But

if he was

of sound mind

who learned to write with a clear mind,

and then became a deaf-mute

afterward —

he writes

the bill of divorce

and they sign.

And Rav Kahana holds in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

And we challenge this :

But is one who was a deaf-mute from the outset not

able to write a bill of divorce?

But we learned in Yevamot :

Just as he takes her

the deaf-mute

through gestures,

without speech of the mouth,

so he sends her away through gestures!

And we answer :

If

it is speaking

of his wife,

whom he took when he was a deaf-mute,

so too

it is clear that he can send her away through gestures.

Rather,

here, with what are we dealing [

what is the case here]? —

with his yevama,

who fell before him for levirate marriage, whose betrothal was a complete betrothal and whose levirate bond was a complete bond; and he cannot perform halitza with her, since he is not included in “and he shall stand and say, I do not wish to take her” [Deuteronomy 25], but he takes her in levirate marriage and can never send her away, for the bill of divorce of a deaf-mute does not dissolve a levirate bond from the Torah .

And we inquire about it :

His yevama—from whom [

from whom] did she fall before him for levirate marriage?

If you say [

if it is said]

that she fell to him from his brother

who was also

a deaf-mute.

But

just as her taking [

that her betrothal] to the first brother was

through gestures, so

the law of

her departure is through gestures!

If so, why can the deaf-mute levir not send her away after he performs levirate marriage with her?

Rather,

it must be said

that she fell to him

for levirate marriage

from a brother of sound mind,

whose betrothal was a complete betrothal.

And if you wish, say:

Actually,

it is speaking

that she fell to him from a deaf-mute brother, and

the Sages decreed

a decree

concerning a yevama from

a deaf-mute brother

that he should not be able to send her away,

lest [

so that] they come to permit divorce for a deaf-mute levir to whom a yevama fell from

a brother of sound mind.

And we challenge this :

If so [

if so], that they decree upon a deaf-mute that he cannot send away a yevama from a deaf-mute brother on account of his inability to send away a yevama from a brother of sound mind,

then concerning

his wife

of the deaf-mute

also

let us decree that he cannot send her away, on account of his yevama from a brother of sound mind.

And we answer :

His yevama is confused with his yevama [

one is exchanged for the other], and he will come to compare and learn one from the other; and if they permit him to send away a yevama from a deaf-mute brother, he will come to liken it to and permit even a yevama from a brother of sound mind.

What is not so with

his wife is not confused with his yevama [

he does not exchange one for the other], and he will not come to compare them.

And we challenge this :

Do we decree [

do we really decree] concerning the divorce of a yevama from a

deaf-mute brother lest [

on account of] the divorce of a yevama from a

brother of sound mind?