Gittin 70b (ע:) — the Talmud in English

Rav Pappa said:

The bloodletting that we stated

“below”

on the body means

below the testicles,

such as bloodletting performed from his legs and thighs.

Whereas bloodletting

“above,”

means

above the testicles,

such as from the shoulders, the neck, and the kilbosa.

We learned in the Gemara above, concerning one of the things that diminish semen:

“and hops out of season.”

The tanna

taught

that just as hops

are harmful to the body

out of season,

as they diminish semen,

so they are beneficial

to the body

in season.

Rav Pappa said: “Its season”

for hops is during the period of

Tammuz.

And

“out of season”

is during the period of

Tevet.

Whereas

the days of Nisan and the days of Tishrei

are times when they

are neither beneficial

[i.e., beneficial] to the body

nor harmful

[i.e., harmful] to the body.

We learned in the Mishna:

If he said: “Write a get for my wife,” and he was then seized

afterward

by kordeyakos, and he then said

while ill,

“Do not write,”

his later words

which he uttered while ill

have no effect.

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: They write and give

his wife

a get immediately,

even though he is still presently ill, since earlier, when he was healthy, he said that they should give her the get; and we do not say that he is considered a shoteh, who is not competent to effect a divorce.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

Even if we say that his later words have no effect, and it is possible to rely on what he said when he was healthy, that they should write and give his wife a get, nevertheless, now, while he is ill,

they do not write

a get for his wife

unless

they write it only

when he regains his sanity

and returns to his normal state, because when he is seized by kordeyakos he is a shoteh and is not competent to effect a divorce.

And we clarify:

What is the reason of Reish Lakish?

Why did he understand from the Mishna that they may give her the get even while he is ill?

Because

it teaches

in the Mishna

“his later words have no effect.”

One may infer from this that his earlier words remain valid, and the witnesses act in accordance with his words to divorce his wife.

Whereas

Rabbi Yoḥanan can say to you

that the tanna’s intention in the Mishna is to say that

“his later words have no effect, for when he regains clarity, there is no need to consult him again,”

[i.e., when his mind becomes clear, there is no need to consult the husband again],

but the witnesses act on the basis of his earlier words. The tanna does not intend to say that they divorce her immediately, even while he is ill;

rather, they never write it except when he regains his sanity .

And we raise the issue:

With regard to what do

[i.e., in what matter do] Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish disagree?

And we explain:

Reish Lakish compares

[i.e., he equates one] who is seized by kordeyakos

to one who is sleeping,

who is competent to effect a divorce, and the witnesses may divorce his wife on the basis of his instruction even while he himself is asleep.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan compares

[i.e., he equates one] who is seized by kordeyakos

to a shoteh,

who is not competent to effect a divorce, and the witnesses cannot effect a divorce by his authority as long as he is a shoteh .

And we raise an objection:

But Rabbi Yoḥanan too should compare it

[i.e., he should likewise compare] kordeyakos

to one who is sleeping,

and why did he compare it to a shoteh rather than to one who is sleeping? And we answer: Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that kordeyakos should not be compared to one who is sleeping because

a sleeping person does not lack an action,

as he does not require any action in order for his mental awareness to return to him.

This is not so with regard to

this

[i.e., this person with] kordeyakos, who

lacks an action,

as he must take the remedy mentioned above: red meat roasted over coals and wine diluted with a great deal of water, in order to return to mental clarity. Therefore, Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that this person with kordeyakos more closely resembles a shoteh than one who is sleeping.

And we raise an objection:

But Reish Lakish too should compare it

[i.e., compare] kordeyakos

to a shoteh!

And why did he compare it to one who is sleeping rather than to a shoteh?

And we answer: Reish Lakish holds that kordeyakos should not be compared to a shoteh, because

the shoteh has no remedy

within our control

[i.e., his recovery is not within our control]. This is not so with regard to

this

[i.e., this person with] kordeyakos, whose

remedy is within our control

[i.e., his recovery is within our control], as his remedy is

red meat roasted over coals and diluted wine

[i.e., red meat roasted over coals and wine diluted with a great deal of water].

Therefore, Reish Lakish holds that this person with kordeyakos more closely resembles one who is sleeping, who is competent to effect a divorce, than a shoteh, who is not competent to effect a divorce .

And we raise an objection:

Did Rabbi Yoḥanan really say this

—that the agents of one with kordeyakos cannot divorce his wife by his authority until he regains his sanity?

But Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said:

A person who was

slaughtered

in

two

of the signs in his neck [the trachea and the esophagus],

or

who was slaughtered through

the majority of two,

and he is consequently about to die,

and he motioned and said: “Write a get for my wife,”

even though he did not say, “Give it” —

they shall write and give it.

And

so

it was taught

in a beraita:

If they saw

someone who was

dismembered

[i.e., cut into pieces]

or crucified on the crucifix,

but he had not yet died,

and he motioned and said: “Write

a get for my wife,”

even though he did not say, “Give it” —

they shall write and give it!

It follows from there that even a person who is about to die and has no remedy is competent to effect a divorce, and it is possible to write a get on his behalf !

If so, in the case of one suffering from kordaykos, for which there is a cure, all the more so he is fit to effect a divorce, and they may write a bill of divorce on his behalf.

And we resolve the difficulty:

That is how it is now?

How can you compare one suffering from kordaykos to one who is dying? Surely a distinction must be drawn between them.

For

there,

in the case of one who is dying,

his mind is lucid

and

it is

only

weakness that has begun to affect him

so that he is unable to articulate what he wishes to say.

Whereas

here,

in the case of one suffering from kordaykos,

his mind is confused

and

it is,

and therefore Rabbi Yohanan maintains that he is not fit to effect a divorce.

And we raise a difficulty:

And did Shmuel really say this

—that in the case of one who has been slaughtered and is about to die, they write a bill of divorce for his wife, and it is considered as though the bill of divorce was given during the husband’s lifetime?

But didn’t Rav Yehuda say that Shmuel said:

A person who

slaughtered

him and severed

two

of the neck signs—the trachea and the esophagus—

or

who was slaughtered through

most of the two,

and fled,

and the witnesses did not see what ultimately became of him,

the witnesses testify about him

that he died, in order to permit his wife to remarry.

And if it enters your mind

to say that

he is alive

—that is what the slaughtered man is considered to be—

why do the witnesses testify about him

that he died?

They say

in the beit-midrash by way of resolution:

He is alive

at this moment, and the bill of divorce given at this moment is considered to have been given during the husband’s lifetime; but

he is destined to die,

and therefore, after sufficient time has passed for him certainly to have died, the witnesses testify about him in order to permit his wife to remarry—if the husband did not divorce her.

And we raise a difficulty:

But from now,

since he is destined to die, in the case of one whose two signs or most of his two signs were severed,

let

the one who severed them

be exiled because of him

if he did so unintentionally, since he performed an act that causes death!

Why, then,

is it

taught

in a beraita: If one

severed two signs or most of two signs

unintentionally—

he does not go into exile!

And we resolve the difficulty:

This was stated concerning it;

it was said concerning this,

Rabbi Hoshaya said:

The reason that one who unintentionally severed two signs or most of two signs does not go into exile is that

we are concerned that perhaps the wind confused him,

and had it not been for the wind, he would not have died.

Alternatively,

we are concerned that perhaps

he,

the victim himself,

hastened his death

by convulsing and moving.

In any event, even without the convulsive movement he was destined to die; the convulsive movement merely hastened his death, and therefore the one who killed him does not go into exile.

We inquire about this:

What is the difference between them

—between the explanations that we are concerned that he hastened his death because the wind confused him, and that he hastened his death because he convulsed? And we explain:

There is a difference between them

in a case

where he slaughtered him in a marble house

—he slaughtered him in a house of marble—

and he convulsed,

as there the wind does not harm him, and it is only on account of the convulsive movement that one can attribute his death to something other than the slaughter alone.

Alternatively,

there is a practical difference in the opposite case,

where

he slaughtered him outside

and

they observed that he

did not convulse,

so that only because there was wind can one attribute his death to something other than the slaughter alone.

We learned in the Mishna:

If he became mute, and they said to him, “Shall we write a bill of divorce for your wife?”

and he nodded his head affirmatively, they examine him three times to determine whether his mind is lucid. If they saw that his mind was lucid—when asked a question requiring a negative answer he nodded his head negatively, and when asked a question requiring an affirmative answer he nodded affirmatively, three times for each— they write a bill of divorce for him if he nods affirmatively regarding the bill of divorce.

And we raise a difficulty:

But let us be concerned

that

perhaps a seizure of “no”

has taken hold of him, or alternatively a seizure of “yes” has taken hold of him!

Perhaps a condition causing him to nod his head in a “no” motion has seized him, or a condition causing him to nod his head in a “yes” motion has seized him, and he is not doing so intentionally.

Rabbi Yosef bar Minyomi said that Rav Naḥman said:

One should say that the manner in which he is examined is

that we say to him

—that we ask him questions—

intermittently:

we wait an hour between the nod and the next question, and then ask him that very same question again.

And we raise a further difficulty:

But let us be concerned that perhaps a seizure of intermittence has taken hold of him!

Perhaps a condition causing him to nod his head only after an intermittent delay has seized him.

And we resolve the difficulty: One should say

that we say to him

—that we ask him—one question

of

“no”

and two

of

“yes,” and two

of

“no” and one

of

“yes,”

so that there is no fixed order to the questions. If he answers all the questions correctly, this demonstrates that he is doing so intentionally and understands.

The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: They examine him with the following questions to determine whether his mind is lucid: if he answers them by nodding affirmatively, this is a sign that his mind is not lucid.

They say

to him

—they ask

him

whether he wants

things

that are appropriate

for the summer,

although now it is

the rainy season.

And

whether he wants things that are

appropriate for the rainy season,

although now it is

the summer.

What are they

—what are the things appropriate for the summer and for the rainy season that they ask him whether he desires?

If you say

that they ask him whether he wants

a gelufkari

—a warm cloak—during the summer,

and

whether he wants to be covered with

a linen sheet

during the rainy season.

But if he answers these questions by nodding affirmatively, this does not prove that his mind is not lucid or that he does not understand, since

perhaps he has been seized by cold

during the summer and desires a warm cloak.

Alternatively, he has been seized by heat

during the rainy season and desires a linen sheet.