Gittin 70b — the Talmud in English

Rav Pappa said:

the bloodletting that we said [image: exact column location]

“below”

in the body means

below the testicles,

such as bloodletting performed from his legs and thighs.

Whereas bloodletting

“above,”

means

above the testicles,

such as from the shoulders, the neck, and the nape.

We learned in the Gemara above, concerning one of the things that reduce the semen:

and hops out of season.

The tanna

taught in a beraita:

Just as it is harmful

to the body, hops

out of season,

which reduces the semen,

so it is beneficial

to the body, hops

in season.

Rav Pappa said: “Its season”

of hops is during the period of

Tammuz.

And

“out of season”

is during the period of

Tevet.

Whereas

the days of Nisan and the days of Tishrei

—during these times they

were neither beneficial

[not beneficial] to the body

nor harmful

[harmful] to the body.

We learned in the Mishna:

He said, “Write a bill of divorce for my wife,” and he was seized

afterward

by kordakos, and he again said

during the illness

“Do not write”—

his latter words

that he said during the illness

have no substance.

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: They write and give

to his wife

a bill of divorce immediately,

even though he is still now standing in his illness, since he said earlier, when he was healthy, that they should give her the bill of divorce; and we do not say that he is called an imbecile, who is not capable of divorce.

And Rabbi Yohanan said:

Even if we say that his latter words have no substance, and it is possible to rely on what he said when he was healthy, that they should write and give a bill of divorce to his wife, nevertheless now, at the time of his illness,

they do not write

a bill of divorce for his wife

but

they write it only

when he becomes lucid

and regains his judgment, for while he is seized by kordakos, he is an imbecile and is not capable of divorce.

And we explain:

What is the reason of Reish Lakish?

Why did he understand from the words of the Mishna that they may give her the bill of divorce even while he is ill?

Because

it teaches

in the Mishna

“his latter words have no substance.”

And one should infer from this that his earlier words stand, and the witnesses act according to his words to divorce his wife.

Whereas

Rabbi Yohanan can say to you

that the intention of the tanna in the Mishna is to say that

“his latter words have no substance, for when he becomes lucid, there is no need to consult him again,”

to take his counsel

[when his mind becomes clear, there is no need to return and consult the husband], but the witnesses act according to his earlier words; and the intention of the tanna is not to say that they divorce immediately, even while he is ill,

but they never write except when he becomes lucid.

And we consider it:

In what do they differ

[in what do Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish disagree]?

And we explain:

Reish Lakish compares him

[he compares the one] who was seized by kordakos

to one who is sleeping,

who is capable of divorce, and the witnesses may divorce her according to his instruction even while he himself is sleeping.

And Rabbi Yohanan compares him

[he compares the one] who was seized by kordakos

to an imbecile,

who is not capable of divorce, and the witnesses cannot effect divorce by his authority as long as he is an imbecile.

And we raise a difficulty:

But Rabbi Yohanan too, let him compare him

[also, let him compare] kordakos

to one who is sleeping,

and why did he compare it to an imbecile and not to one who is sleeping? And we answer: Rabbi Yohanan holds that one should not compare kordakos to one who is sleeping, because

one who is sleeping does not require an act,

he does not need an act in order for his understanding to return to him.

But this is not so with

this

[this] kordakos,

which requires an act,

for one must take the remedy that we said above: red meat roasted over coals and wine diluted with much water, in order to return to clarity of mind. Therefore Rabbi Yohanan holds that this kordakos more closely resembles an imbecile than one who is sleeping.

And we raise a difficulty:

But Reish Lakish too, let him compare him

[let him compare] kordakos

to an imbecile!

And why did he compare it to one who is sleeping and not to an imbecile?

And we answer: Reish Lakish holds that one should not compare kordakos to an imbecile, because the

imbecile has no medicine

in our hands

[his cure is not in our hands]. But this

one

[this] kordakos,

has medicine in our hands

[his cure is in our hands], for his cure is

red meat on coals and diluted wine

[red meat roasted over coals and wine diluted with much water].

Therefore Reish Lakish holds that this kordakos more closely resembles one who is sleeping, who is capable of divorce, than an imbecile, who is not capable of divorce.

And we raise a difficulty:

But did Rabbi Yohanan say this

—that the agents of one seized by kordakos cannot divorce his wife through his authority until he becomes lucid?

But Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel:

A person who

had his

and

two

of the signs in his neck [the windpipe and the gullet] severed,

or

whose

majority of two

has been severed, and he is standing on the verge of death,

and he signaled and said, “Write a bill of divorce for my wife,”

even though he did not say, “Give it”—

these shall write and give it.

And

so

it was taught

in a beraita:

They saw him

who was

mutilated

[cut into pieces]

or crucified on the crucifix,

and he had not yet died,

and he signaled and said, “Write

a bill of divorce for my wife,”

even though he did not say, “Give it”—

these shall write and give it!

It is implied from there that even a person who is on the verge of death and has no remedy is capable of divorce, and it is possible to write a bill of divorce for him!

If so, a kordyākos who has a remedy—kal va-chomer, he is fit for divorce, and they can write a get for him.

And we answer:

hachi hashta

how can you compare a kordyākos to one who is about to die? Surely one must distinguish between them.

For

there,

in the case of one who is about to die,

da'ata tzelita

his mind is lucid,

and

only

kakhishuta hu de'atchila bei

weakness has begun in him, so that he cannot bring a matter out of his mouth.

But this is not so

here,

in the case of a kordyākos,

da'ata shagishta

his mind is confused

,

and therefore Rabbi Yohanan holds that he is not fit for divorce.

And we raise an objection:

But did Shmuel say this

that for one who has been slaughtered and is about to die they write a get for his wife, and it is considered that the get was given during the husband’s lifetime?

But Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel:

A person whom

they slaughtered

and

[cut] through two

of the signs of the neck—the windpipe and the gullet—

or

whom they slaughtered through

the majority of the two,

and he fled,

and the witnesses did not see what became of him,

the witnesses testify concerning him

that he died, in order to permit his wife to marry.

And if it enters your mind

to say that

he is alive

is what that slaughtered person is called,

why do they testify concerning him

that he died?

They say

a resolution in the beit-midrash:

He is alive

at this moment, and the get that they give at this moment is considered to have been given during the husband’s lifetime, but

his end is to die,

and therefore the witnesses testify concerning him after the time when he certainly died, in order to permit his wife to marry—if the husband did not divorce her.

And we raise an objection:

But from now on,

since his end is to die, this person through whom they cut two signs or the majority of the two,

shall

the one who cut him

be exiled on his account

if he did this inadvertently, for he performed upon him an act that causes death!

Why then

and why

is it taught

in a beraita: If

he cut through two signs or the majority of the two

inadvertently—

he is not exiled!

And we answer:

This was stated concerning it:

it was said concerning this,

Rabbi Hoshaya said:

The reason that, if he cut through two signs or the majority of the two inadvertently, he is not exiled is that

we are concerned that perhaps the wind confused him,

and had it not been for the wind, he would not have died.

Alternatively,

we are concerned that perhaps

he

the murdered man himself

brought his death closer

by convulsing and moving.

But in any event, even without the convulsive movement, his end would have been to die; rather, the convulsive movement hastened his death, and therefore he is not exiled.

And we inquire concerning it:

What is the difference between them

what is the difference between the reasons, if we are concerned that he hastened his death because the wind confused him, or we are concerned that he hastened his death because he convulsed? And we explain:

There is a difference between them

there is a difference between these concerns in a case

where he slaughtered him in a marble house

where he slaughtered him in a house of marble

and he convulsed,

for there the wind does not harm him, and only because of the convulsive movement can one attribute that he did not die solely because of the slaughter.

Alternatively,

there is a practical difference in the opposite direction, in a case

where he slaughtered him outside

where he slaughtered him outdoors

and

they saw concerning him that he

did not convulse,

so that only because there is wind can one attribute that he did not die solely because of the slaughter.

We learned in the Mishna:

He became mute, and they said to him, “Shall we write a get for your wife?”

and he inclined his head as a sign of yes; they examine him three times to see whether his mind is lucid. If they saw that his mind was lucid—so that for no he inclined his head as a sign of no, and for yes he inclined his head as a sign of yes, three times for each one — they write a get for him, if he inclines his head over the get with an inclination of yes.

And we raise an objection:

And let us be concerned

and let us be concerned

that perhaps an illness of “no”

that perhaps an illness of inclining the head in the movement of “no” has seized him, or alternatively an illness of inclining the head in the movement of “yes” has seized him!

And he does not intend this.

Rabbi Yosef bar Manyumi said in the name of Rav Nahman:

One should say that the form of the examination with which they examine him is

that we say to him

that they ask him

at intervals

waiting an hour between the inclination and the additional question, and then asking him the very same question again.

And we raise an objection: still,

and let us be concerned that perhaps an illness of intervals has seized him!

Let us be concerned that perhaps an illness of inclining the head with waiting between intervals has seized him.

And we answer: one should say

that we say to him

that they ask him one question

one

of

no and two

and two of

yes, and two

and two of

no and one

of

yes,

for there is no fixed order in this, and if he answers all the questions correctly, it is a sign that he does this intentionally and understands.

The school of Rabbi Ishmael taught:

With these matters they examine him to see whether his mind is lucid, for if he answers them with an inclination of “yes,” it is a sign that his mind is not lucid.

They say

they ask

him

whether he wants

things

that are

of the days of the summer,

and now it is

the days of the rainy season.

And

if he wants things that are

of the days of the rainy season

and now it is

the days of the summer.

What are they

what are the things suitable for the days of the summer and for the days of the rainy season, concerning which they ask him whether he wants them?

If you say

that they ask him whether he wants

a gelufkari

a warm coat] in the days of the summer,

and

whether he wants them to cover him with

a sadinei

a thin linen sheet] in the days of the rainy season.

But if he answers these matters with an inclination of “yes,” there is no proof in this that his mind is not lucid or that he does not understand, for

perhaps the cold seized him

in the days of the summer, and he wants a warm coat.

Alternatively, the heat seized him

in the days of the rainy season, and he wants a linen sheet.