Gittin 76a — the Talmud in English

And we raise an objection:

Granted according to

the view

of Rava,

who establishes the first clause of the Mishna as requiring her actually to nurse for two full years, even though he stipulated without specifying a time, the words of the Mishna are well explained: for the

first clause

of the Mishna, which says that if the son dies within two years this is a bill of divorce, we establish it

where he did not specify

a time, and since she nursed him as much as he needed, that is sufficient.

But the

latter clause,

which says that if the son dies within two years it is not a bill of divorce, we establish it

where he specified

a time; and since he specified a time, he necessarily intended specifically that she actually nurse him until two years, for he had no need to specify it, and if nevertheless he specified it, this is a sign that he is particular about it.

But according to Rav Ashi,

who says that the first clause of the Mishna speaks of a case in which he stipulated that she nurse him for one day, necessarily, what is written, “the son or the father died before she completed the condition,” means that he died before she nursed him at all, this is difficult:

what is different about the first clause

in which the bill of divorce takes effect even though the condition was not fulfilled,

and what is different about the latter clause

in which the bill of divorce does not take effect when the condition was not fulfilled? And why in the first clause does the bill of divorce take effect, when nothing at all of the condition was fulfilled?

And the Gemara’s conclusion is: indeed,

it is difficult

for the Mishna according to Rav Ashi. 2 .

The Sages taught:

He said to his wife,

“This is your bill of divorce on condition that you serve my father for two years, and on condition that you nurse my son for two years.”

Even though the condition was not fulfilled—

this is a bill of divorce.

Because he did not say to her

a doubled condition, specifying what would be if she fulfilled the condition and what would be if she did not fulfill it.

And we learn from the condition of the sons of Gad and the sons of Reuben that a doubled condition is required.

And this is what he should have said to her:

“If you serve me

it shall be a bill of divorce, and

if you do not serve me

it shall not be a bill of divorce.

If you nurse him

it shall be a bill of divorce,

and if you do not nurse him

it shall not be a bill of divorce.”

And since he did not stipulate in this manner, the condition is void and the act itself remains valid. For the condition is effective only if he stipulated a doubled condition.

These are

the words of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say:

there is no need for a doubled condition in order for it to be considered a condition.

And therefore, if

the condition was fulfilled—

it is a bill of divorce, and if not—

it is not a bill of divorce.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “You have no condition in Scripture that is not doubled.”

The Gemara explains toward whom the words of Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel are directed:

Some say [

there are those who say]:

He said it to Rabbi Meir.

And some say: He said it to the Rabbis.

And the Gemara explains:

Some say he said it to Rabbi Meir, and this is what he said to him [

and thus he said to him]:

We do not have to learn from the condition of the sons of Gad that a doubled condition is required, since

you have no condition in

all of Scripture and the

Writings that is not doubled,

such as, “If he lay...

if he did not lie” [Numbers 5], “If you consent and obey... if you refuse and rebel” [Isaiah 1].

And they are [

and they are indeed]

two verses that come as one,

teaching one matter.

And any two verses that come as one do not teach

for other places.

That is, by the fact that the Torah repeated and wrote in additional places that a doubled condition is required, it is a sign that only in these places is a doubled condition required, and one does not learn from the condition of the sons of Gad and the sons of Reuben that a doubled condition is required for all conditions. For if the Torah wished to teach us that a doubled condition is required everywhere, it would have been sufficient to write this in one place, and from it we would have learned it for all the places by a bama matzinu inference.

And therefore one does not learn from the condition of the sons of Gad and the sons of Reuben that every condition must be so.

Some say,

Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel

said it to the Rabbis.

And this is what he said to them:

One cannot prove that we do not learn from the condition of the sons of Gad and the sons of Reuben that a doubled condition is required from the fact that the Torah repeated and wrote in other places that a doubled condition is required, because

you have no condition in Scripture that is not doubled.

That is, in all those verses there is a special rationale for not learning from the condition of the sons of Gad and the sons of Reuben that a doubled condition is required, and because of this Scripture had to repeat in all those verses and explain that a doubled condition is required, as they explained in Kiddushin [61b].

And therefore they are not considered two verses that come as one and do not teach.

And

therefore

we learn from them [

we learn from them] for other conditions, that no condition is fulfilled unless he doubled it.

These are the two approaches to explaining the words of Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel in the beraita.

And we raise a contradiction

against this beraita from another beraita, in which we learned:

He said to her,

“This is your bill of divorce on condition that you serve my father for two years,”

or

“on condition that you nurse my son for two years.”

If

the father died or the son died—

it is not a bill of divorce.

The words of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say: Even though the condition was not fulfilled—

this is a bill of divorce.

For

she can say to him, “Give me your father, and I will serve him,”

or

“Give me your son, and I will nurse him.”

And if so,

it is difficult

from that which

Rabbi

said

Rabbi Meir

in the earlier beraita,

against Rabbi Meir

in this beraita.

For in the earlier beraita it was explained that he holds that if the condition is not doubled, the condition is void and the bill of divorce remains valid, whereas from this beraita it emerges that Rabbi Meir holds that the condition remains valid and invalidates the bill of divorce.

And likewise

it is difficult

from

the Rabbis against the Rabbis,

for in the earlier beraita it was explained that they hold that even a condition that is not doubled remains valid and invalidates the bill of divorce, whereas in this beraita it implies that they hold that the condition is void and the bill of divorce remains valid.

And we answer:

Rabbi Meir

in this beraita

against Rabbi Meir

in the earlier beraita

is not difficult:

For

there [

there], in the earlier beraita, where he said that it is not a condition, it speaks

of a case where he did not double his condition.

But

here,

in this beraita, where he said that the condition remains valid, it speaks

of a case where he doubled his condition,

and the tanna shortened the wording and did not write the doubled condition.

And

likewise

the Rabbis

in this beraita

against the Rabbis

in the earlier beraita

is not difficult.

For it may be said that in truth they hold that the condition remains valid, since it is not necessary to double the condition.

And the reason that in this beraita the Rabbis hold that the bill of divorce takes effect despite the condition not having been fulfilled is because

who are the “Sages” here [

who are the Rabbis in this beraita]?—

It is Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel.

For he says: Any impediment that is not from her [

from her] and not because of the woman—

this is a bill of divorce.

And this beraita speaks of a case in which the impediment was not because of her, and she is considered to have fulfilled the condition; therefore, according to the Rabbis, the bill of divorce takes effect.

The Sages taught:

a.

He said to her in the presence of two: “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you serve my father for two years.”

And he had still not given her the bill of divorce,

and he went back and said to her in the presence of two

others:

“This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me two hundred zuz”—

the last statement did not cancel

the

condition

of the

first.

And we say that he did not intend to add to the first condition, since he did not say to her, “on condition that you give me two hundred zuz” as an addition to the first condition; and likewise he did not intend to uproot it, since he did not cancel his first condition before these witnesses. Rather, we say that his intention was that she fulfill either the first condition or the second condition.

And therefore, if

she wished—

she fulfills the first condition and

serves him,

and if

she wished—

she fulfills the second condition and

gives him two hundred zuz.

b.

But

if

he said to her in the presence of two

“When I give you the bill of divorce, I will say to you”:

‘This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me two hundred zuz.’”

And he had still not given her the bill of divorce,

and he went back and said to her in the presence of two: “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me three hundred zuz.”

The last statement canceled

the

condition

of the

first,

and he certainly intended to uproot the first condition, and she will not be divorced until she gives him three hundred zuz.

And none of the

witnesses

first

from the first condition,

and one of the

witnesses

last

from the second condition

join

to testify that there was a condition in this bill of divorce.

And the bill of divorce is valid by means of the witnesses who signed it.

And the witnesses of delivery do not have the power to establish a condition in the bill of divorce unless two who were together at one of the conditions come and testify that there was a condition in the bill of divorce.

And we inquire concerning it:

With regard to which [

with regard to which] condition in the beraita was this statement said, that the witnesses do not join to testify?

If you say [

if you say] that it was said

about the latter clause,

when he demanded an additional hundred zuz,

then

in this manner the first condition

is void,

and it is obvious that one of the witnesses from the first condition cannot join and testify with another witness from the latter condition; there is no need to state it.

Rather,

certainly it was said

about the first clause,

in the manner in which he intended that she fulfill either the first condition or the latter condition.

But it is difficult: even in this case it is

obvious

that they do not join, for they are not testifying about the same condition!

And we answer: there is a novelty in this matter—that witnesses from the two conditions do not join.

For we might have thought to say,

what might you have said?

Since the bill of divorce takes effect through one of the conditions, they are like one condition, and

all

the witnesses who testify that it is necessary

to fulfill a condition

of some kind in the bill of divorce

join

to testify that there was a condition.

It teaches us

that this is not so: when they are not testifying about that same condition itself, they do not join.

Mishna:

One who was in the land of Judea and said to his wife:

“This is your bill of divorce if I do not come [

I come]

from now [

from now]

until thirty days.”

And he was going from Judea to Galilee,

and if so, the condition was on the understanding that he would go to Galilee and would not return within thirty days.

Therefore, if

he reached Antipatris,

which is at the beginning of Galilee [thus it is held in the hava amina of the Gemara],

and returned

immediately, within those thirty days—

his condition was void

and she is not divorced, for he reached Galilee and returned to Judea within the time that he had stated to her.

But if he did not reach Antipatris and returned, and afterward went to Galilee and stayed there for more than thirty days, she is divorced, because the period of thirty days was established only from the time that he would go to Galilee; and he had not gone there until now, while now that he went, he remained there for more than thirty days.

And similarly, if he was in Galilee and said to his wife:

This is your get if I do not come from here until thirty days.

And he was going from Galilee to Judea,

and if so, the condition in the get was on the understanding that he would go to Judea and would not return within thirty days.

And

therefore, if

he reached Kefar Utnai

which is at the beginning of Judea [thus it is held in the hava amina of the Gemara],

and returned

within those thirty days—

his condition was void,

for he had already reached Judea and returned within the time.

And similarly, if he was in the Land of Israel and said to his wife:

This is your get if I do not come from here until thirty days.

And he was going to an overseas country.

And he reached Acre

which is at the beginning of outside the Land [thus it is held in the hava amina of the Gemara],

and returned

within thirty days—

his condition was void.

He said to his wife:

This is your get as long as I remain away from before your face for thirty days,

that is, this shall be a get if thirty days pass during which I do not appear before you.

The law is that, even though the husband

was going and coming, going and coming,

and there is concern lest he appeased her and voided the get,

since he did not seclude himself with her

during the time that he was going and coming, we do not have this concern.

And if he fulfilled the condition and did not appear before her for thirty days,

this is a get.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: If he gave a get and stipulated that if he left from Judea for Galilee, or from Galilee for Judea, and would not return within thirty days, the get would take effect, and the one who was in Judea reached Antipatris, and the one who was in Galilee reached Kefar Utnai, and returned within thirty days, his condition was void and she is not divorced.

And seemingly it follows from the Mishna that the reason that his condition was void is because when he left from Judea for Antipatris, it is considered that he left for Galilee, and when he left from Galilee for Kefar Utnai, it is considered that he left for Judea; and since he left and returned within thirty days, he did not fulfill the condition, and she is not divorced, and the condition was void.

And we raise an objection: Is it to say that

Antipatris stood in Galilee

[was situated], and Kefar Utnai in Judea?

And we raise a contradiction

to this from what we learned:

Antipatris

is

at

the border of

Judea, and Kefar Utnai

is

at

the border of

Galilee.

And the place that

is in between

[between them]—

they impose stringency upon it

to consider it both as Judea and as Galilee.