Gittin 76a (עו.) — the Talmud in English

And we raise an objection:

Granted according to

the view of

Rava,

who establishes the first clause of the Mishna as referring to a case in which she must nurse for precisely two years, even though he stipulated without specifying a period of time, the words of the Mishna are well understood:

the first clause

of the Mishna, which states that if the son dies within two years, this is a bill of divorce, we establish

as referring to a case in which he did not specify

a period of time; and since she nursed him as much as he needed, that suffices.

But

the latter clause,

which states that if the son dies within two years, it is not a bill of divorce, we establish it as referring to a case in which he

specified

a period of time. Since he specified a period of time, he must have intended specifically that she nurse him until the end of two years, as there was no need for him to specify the period, and if he nevertheless specified it, this indicates that he is particular about it.

However, according to Rav Ashi,

who understands that the first clause of the Mishna refers to a case in which he stipulated that she nurse him for one day, necessarily, when it says, “the son or the father died before she fulfilled the condition,” it means that he died before she nursed him at all. This is difficult:

What is the difference between the first clause

in which the bill of divorce takes effect even though the condition was not fulfilled,

and what is the difference between the latter clause

in which the bill of divorce does not take effect when the condition was not fulfilled? Why does the bill of divorce take effect in the first clause, when nothing of the condition was fulfilled?

And the Gemara’s conclusion is: Indeed,

the Mishna is difficult

according to Rav Ashi. 2 .

The Sages taught:

If he said to his wife,

“This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you serve my father for two years, and on the condition that you nurse my son for two years.”

Even though the condition was not fulfilled—

this is a bill of divorce.

Because he did not say to her

a double condition, specifying what would be the case if she fulfilled the condition and what would be the case if she did not fulfill it.

And we learn from the condition of the descendants of Gad and Reuben that a double condition is required.

And this is what he should have said to her:

“If you serve”

—it will be a bill of divorce;

“and if you do not serve”—

it will not be a bill of divorce.

“If you nurse”

—it will be a bill of divorce;

“and if you do not nurse”

—it will not be a bill of divorce.

And since he did not stipulate in this manner, the condition is void, while the act itself stands. For the condition is effective only when he stipulated a double condition.

These are

the words of Rabbi Meir.

And the Rabbis say:

There is no need for a double condition in order for it to be considered a condition.

And therefore, if

the condition was fulfilled—

this is a bill of divorce, and if not—

it is not a bill of divorce.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: You have no condition in Scripture that is not doubled.

The Gemara explains to whom Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s statement is directed:

Some say [

there are those who say]:

He said it to Rabbi Meir.

And some say: He said it to the Rabbis.

The Gemara explains:

Some say that he said it to Rabbi Meir, and this is what he said to him [

and this is what he said to him]:

There is no basis for learning from the condition of the descendants of Gad and Reuben that a double condition is required, since

you have no condition in

all of the Torah and the

Scriptures that is not doubled,

such as, “If he lay...

if he did not lie” [Numbers 5], and “If you are willing and obey... if you refuse and rebel” [Isaiah 1].

And they are [

and behold, they are]

two verses that come as one,

teaching one matter.

And whenever two verses come as one, they do not teach

their rule to other cases.

That is, by repeating in additional places in the Torah that a double condition is required, it is indicated that a double condition is required only in those places, and one cannot learn from the condition of the descendants of Gad and Reuben that a double condition is required for all conditions. For had the Torah wished to teach us that a double condition is required everywhere, it would have sufficed to write this in one place, from which we would have learned it for all the other places by means of a comparison based on a common precedent.

Therefore, one cannot learn from the condition of the descendants of Gad and Reuben that every condition must be formulated in this manner.

Some say, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel

said it

to the Rabbis.

And this is what he said to them:

One cannot prove that we do not learn from the condition of the descendants of Gad and Reuben that a double condition is required, from the fact that the Torah repeated elsewhere that a double condition is required, because

you have no condition in Scripture that is not doubled.

That is, in each of those verses there is a particular rationale for not learning from the condition of the descendants of Gad and Reuben that a double condition is required. For this reason, the verse had to repeat and specify in each of those passages that a double condition is required, as they explained in Kiddushin [61b].

Therefore, they are not considered two verses that come as one and do not teach their rule elsewhere.

And

therefore

we learn from them [

we derive from them] with regard to other conditions that no condition takes effect unless it is doubled.

These are the two ways of explaining Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s statement in the beraita.

And he juxtaposes

a contradiction to this beraita from another beraita, in which we learned:

If he said to her,

“This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you serve my father for two years,”

or

“on the condition that you nurse my son for two years.”

If

the father or the son dies—

it is not a bill of divorce.

The words of Rabbi Meir.

And the Rabbis say: Even though the condition was not fulfilled—

this is a bill of divorce.

Since

she can say to him, “Give me your father, and I will serve him,”

or

“Give me your son, and I will nurse him.”

And if so,

it is difficult

from that which

Rabbi Meir

said

in the preceding beraita

in relation to

Rabbi Meir

in this beraita.

For it was explained in the preceding beraita that he holds that if the condition is not doubled, the condition is void and the bill of divorce stands, whereas this beraita indicates that Rabbi Meir holds that the condition stands and invalidates the bill of divorce.

And likewise,

it is difficult

from

the Rabbis in relation to the Rabbis,

as it was explained in the preceding beraita that they hold that even a condition that is not doubled stands and invalidates the bill of divorce, whereas this beraita implies that they hold that the condition is void and the bill of divorce stands.

And we answer:

Rabbi Meir

in this beraita

in relation to Rabbi Meir

in the preceding beraita

is not difficult:

For

there,

in the preceding beraita, where he said that it is not a condition, the case is

one in which he did not double his condition.

But

here,

in this beraita, where it says that the condition stands, the case is

one in which he doubled his condition,

but the tanna abbreviated the wording and did not record the doubled condition.

And

likewise,

the Rabbis

in this beraita

in relation to the Rabbis

in the preceding beraita

is not difficult.

For it may be said that they indeed hold that the condition stands, since there is no need to double the condition.

And the reason that in this beraita the Rabbis hold that the bill of divorce takes effect despite the condition not having been fulfilled is that

who are the “Rabbis” here [

who are the Rabbis in this beraita]?—

It is Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

For he said: Any impediment that is not from her [

from her] and is not caused by the woman

is a bill of divorce.

And this beraita is referring to a case in which the impediment was not caused by her, and she is therefore considered to have fulfilled the condition; consequently, according to the Rabbis, the bill of divorce takes effect.

The Sages taught:

a.

He said to her in the presence of two witnesses: “This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you serve my father for two years.”

And he had not yet given her the bill of divorce,

and then he said to her in the presence of two witnesses

who were different:

“This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you give me two hundred dinars”—

The latter statement did not invalidate

the condition

of

the

earlier condition.

We say that he did not intend to add this condition to the first one, since he did not say to her, “On the condition that you give me two hundred dinars in addition to the first condition.” Likewise, he did not intend to uproot the first condition, since he did not revoke his first condition in the presence of these witnesses. Rather, we say that his intention was that she fulfill either the first condition or the second condition.

Therefore, if she

wished,

she could fulfill the first condition and

serve him,

and if she

wished,

she could fulfill the second condition and

give him two hundred dinars.

b.

But

if

he said to her in the presence of two witnesses,

“When I give you the bill of divorce, I will say to you”:

‘This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you give me two hundred dinars.’”

And he had not yet given her the bill of divorce,

and then he said to her in the presence of two witnesses: “This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you give me three hundred dinars.”

The latter statement invalidated

the condition

of

the

earlier condition,

and he certainly intended to uproot the first condition; she will not be divorced until she gives him three hundred dinars.

And none of the

witnesses

from the first

condition and

one of the

witnesses

from the latter

condition

join together

to testify that there was a condition attached to this bill of divorce.

And the bill of divorce is valid by virtue of the witnesses who signed it.

The witnesses present at the giving of the bill of divorce do not have the power to establish a condition in the bill of divorce unless two witnesses who were together for one of the conditions come and testify that there was a condition attached to the bill of divorce.

We inquire concerning this:

With regard to which [

which] condition in the beraita was this statement made, that the witnesses do not join together to testify?

If you say [

if you say] that it was stated

with regard to the latter clause,

when he demanded an additional hundred dinars,

then

in such a case the first condition

is void,

and it is obvious that one of the witnesses to the first condition cannot join with another witness to the latter condition to testify; it need not be stated.

Rather,

it certainly must have been stated

with regard to the first clause,

in a case in which he intended that she fulfill either the first condition or the latter condition.

But it is difficult: Even in this case,

it is obvious

that they do not join together, since they are not testifying about the same condition!

And we answer: There is a novel point here: Witnesses from the two conditions do not join together.

For we might have thought to say,

What might you have said?

Since the bill of divorce takes effect upon fulfillment of either one of the conditions, they are considered one condition, and

all

the witnesses who testify that it is necessary

to fulfill a condition

of some kind in the bill of divorce

join together

to testify that there was a condition.

It teaches us

that this is not so: When they are not testifying about that same condition itself, they do not join together.

Mishna:

One who was in the land of Judea and said to his wife:

“This is your bill of divorce if I do not come [

I come]

from now [

from this moment]

until thirty days.”

And he was traveling from Judea to Galilee,

and thus the condition was made on the understanding that he would travel to Galilee and not return within thirty days.

Therefore, if

he reached Antipatris,

which is at the beginning of Galilee [this is the assumption in the Gemara’s initial understanding],

and returned

immediately, within those thirty days—

his condition was nullified,

and she is not divorced, since he reached Galilee and returned to Judea within the time he had specified to her.

But if he did not reach Antipatris and returned, and only afterward traveled to Galilee and remained there for more than thirty days, she is divorced, because the thirty-day period was not established except from the time he would travel to Galilee; and until now he had not traveled there, whereas now that he traveled there, he remained there for more than thirty days.

Similarly, if he was in Galilee and said to his wife:

This is your get if I do not come here within thirty days.

And he was traveling from Galilee to Judea,

and thus the condition in the get was made on the understanding that he would travel to Judea and not return within thirty days.

And

therefore, if

he reached Kefar ʿUtnai,

which is at the beginning of Judea [this is the assumption in the Gemara’s initial understanding],

and returned

within those thirty days—

his condition was nullified,

since he had already reached Judea and returned within the specified time.

Similarly, if he was in Eretz Yisrael and said to his wife:

This is your get if I do not come here within thirty days.

And he was traveling to an overseas country.

And he reached Acre,

which is at the beginning of the Diaspora [this is the assumption in the Gemara’s initial understanding],

and returned

within thirty days—

his condition was nullified.

He said to his wife:

This is your get provided that I remain away from your presence for thirty days,

meaning, this get shall take effect if thirty days pass without my appearing before you.

The ruling is that even though the husband

was coming and going, coming and going,

and there is concern that perhaps he appeased her and revoked the get,

since he did not seclude himself with her

while he was coming and going, we have no such concern.

And if he fulfilled the condition and did not appear before her for thirty days,

this is a valid get.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: If he gave a get and stipulated that if he left Judea for Galilee, or Galilee for Judea, and did not return within thirty days, the get would take effect, and the one who was in Judea reached Antipatris, while the one who was in Galilee reached Kefar ʿUtnai, and he returned within thirty days, his condition was nullified and she is not divorced.

Seemingly, the Mishna indicates that the reason his condition was nullified is that when he left Judea for Antipatris, he was considered to have left for Galilee, and when he left Galilee for Kefar ʿUtnai, he was considered to have left for Judea. Since he left and returned within thirty days, he did not fulfill the condition, and she is not divorced; therefore, the condition was nullified.

And we raise an objection: Does this mean that

Antipatris was located in Galilee

[was situated there], and Kefar ʿUtnai in Judea?

And they raise a contradiction

to this from what we learned:

Antipatris

is

within

the border of

Judea, and Kefar ʿUtnai

is

within

the border of

Galilee.

And the place

in between

[between them]—

we treat it stringently

and consider it both Judea and Galilee.