Gittin 64b (סד:) — the Talmud in English

And we reject this:

This applies

when we say that there is a presumption that an agent carries out his agency; that is only

in a stringent case,

as in the case of Rabbi Yitzḥak.

But in a lenient case,

to presume her divorced and unmarried,

we do not

say that there is a presumption that an agent carries out his agency.

And we raise a difficulty:

And let us rely on her [

that we should believe the woman] that she is divorced,

from

the case

of Rav Hamnuna,

as Rav Hamnuna said: If a woman says to her husband, “You divorced me”—

she is believed,

because there is a

presumption

that

a woman does not brazenly lie in her husband’s presence

about a matter such as this!

And we explain:

This applies

when she is believed specifically

where there is no one who [

in a place where there is no other person who]

supports her,

for then there is a presumption that she does not brazenly lie about this matter in her husband’s presence,

but where

there is another person

who supports her

in her claim—

she is brazen indeed.

Therefore, in our case, where both the husband and the agent support her claim, she is not believed on the basis of her statement alone; rather, she is believed only when her get is in her possession.

Mishna:

A betrothed young woman

who has not yet left her father’s authority,

if her betrothed divorces her,

she

may receive the get herself, even without her father’s knowledge, since she has reached majority , or

her father

may receive it without her knowledge;

they may receive her get.

Once one of them has received the get, she is divorced, for the Torah granted the father legal capacity over his young daughter, but the Torah did not remove her own legal capacity .

Rabbi Yehuda said: Two legal capacities cannot acquire simultaneously;

one person cannot have two authorities acquiring on his behalf.

Rather,

only

her father receives her get

since the Torah granted the father legal capacity over his young daughter.

But when she is an orphan without a father, she receives her get.

And

they stated another major principle:

Every

woman

who cannot safeguard her get

such as a minor who lacks the understanding to safeguard her get,

cannot be divorced,

even by her father’s receiving the get, as it is stated [Deuteronomy 24:1], “And he sends her away from his house”—one who can be sent away and does not return; this excludes one who can be sent away and returns .

Gemara:

With regard to what do they disagree

—the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda in our Mishna?

The Rabbis [

the Sages]

hold: The Merciful One granted her an additional legal capacity [

the Torah granted her an additional legal capacity], meaning that the Torah also granted her the right to receive her get, although she is still under her father’s authority and he is the one who legally owns her for purposes of acquiring on her behalf.

And Rabbi Yehuda holds: Where her father is present [

when the father is alive], she is entirely under his authority, and

her own legal capacity is of no consequence. [

Unless she has married, in which case she leaves her father’s authority.]

We learned in the Mishna:

And anyone who cannot safeguard her get cannot be divorced.

The Sages taught

in a beraita:

A minor who knows how to safeguard her get—

she may be divorced;

but one who does not know how to safeguard her get—

she may not be divorced;

And which minor

is considered

to know how to safeguard her get?

Any minor who safeguards her get and another object.

And we inquire:

What does this mean?

What is meant by saying that she safeguards her get and another object?

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This is what it means: Any minor who safeguards another object because of her get,

meaning that if her get is lost, she safeguards another object that does not resemble a get because she thinks that it is the get. She is considered to know how to safeguard her get.

Rav Huna bar Menoaḥ objected to this: She is simply a fool,

for she safeguards another object because of her get! And there is no one more clearly described as “one who can be sent away and returns” than she is!

Rather, Rav Huna bar Menoaḥ said in the name of Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika:

This is what it means:

Any minor who can distinguish between her get

and another object, and safeguards her get rather than another object.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rabbi Asi:

A child to whom one gives a

pebble [

a stone],

and he throws it away

because he understands that it is worthless, while when one gives him a

nut,

he recognizes that it is valuable

and takes it—

he is sufficiently mature that he can

acquire for himself,

but

he does not acquire

for

others,

meaning that if a person seeks to transfer an object to another person through that minor, handing him the object and saying to him, “Acquire this object for so-and-so,” the other person has not acquired it; and if the giver wishes to retract, he may retract.

But if he possesses sufficient understanding that when one gives him

an object and he returns it after some time

when it is demanded from him, because he understands that the object belongs to others,

the law is that he

acquires both for himself and for others,

by rabbinic ordinance .

Rav Yehuda said:

When I stated [

when I stated the words of Rabbi Asi]

before Shmuel,

he said to me: This one and that one are the same [

the laws of these two measures are equal] with regard to the minor’s acquisition.

And we inquire:

What does

“this one and that one are the same” mean?

Does it mean that the two measures of the minor’s understanding have the same law, namely, that he can acquire; or that they have the same law, namely, that he cannot acquire?

Rav Ḥisda said: Both this one and that one—

he acquires for himself but does not acquire for others.

Before continuing the sugya, we will first explain the laws of an “eruv of courtyards” and a “shituf of alleyways: By Torah law, it is permitted to carry from houses into a shared courtyard, and likewise from one person’s courtyard to another person’s courtyard; it is prohibited only to take objects from them into the public domain.

But the Sages decreed that it is permitted for the residents of courtyards to carry from their houses into the shared courtyard, or from their courtyard to another courtyard, only when they establish an “eruv of courtyards” among themselves.

Likewise, by Torah law it is permitted to carry from the courtyards into the shared alleyway used by the residents of the houses and courtyards and leading to the public domain [an alleyway is a lane enclosed by partitions on three sides and open at its head to the public domain], and by Torah law the alleyway is considered a private domain, so it is permitted to carry from it into the courtyards of the houses. However, the Sages decreed that the residents of the courtyards may not carry objects into the alleyway unless all the residents of the alleyway establish a “shituf of alleyways” among themselves.

But if the residents of the courtyards did not establish an eruv among themselves, or if they did not establish a shituf of alleyways, the Sages prohibited carrying from the houses into the shared courtyard, or from one courtyard to another, and likewise from the courtyards into the alleyway. This is because the house is designated for its owner, whereas the courtyard is shared by everyone; similarly, with regard to a shituf of alleyways, the courtyards belong to their owners, whereas the alleyway is shared by everyone, and it appears as though one is carrying from one domain to another. They decreed that one may not carry from one private domain to another private domain as a safeguard, in order to distance a person from transgression, lest people come to carry from a private domain into the public domain, in which case they would be liable by Torah law .

And how does one establish an “eruv of courtyards” and a “shituf of alleyways”?

One combines and joins all the residents of the courtyard by having each resident contribute bread, and placing the bread contributed by each and every one of them in one of the houses that opens onto the courtyard. Through this, we regard them all as though they live in the same house, and as though the entire courtyard is designated to that house; no individual possesses a separate domain, but they are all partners together. This is what is called an “eruv of courtyards.”

The same law applies to a “shituf of alleyways”: Each of the residents of the courtyards that open onto the alleyway contributes bread or some other food, and it is placed in one of the courtyards, so that all the courtyards become like a single courtyard.

Rav Ḥinnana Vardaan raised an objection [

from a place called Vardanya] to Rav Ḥisda, who said that in both measures of a minor’s understanding he does not acquire for others, from what we learned in tractate Eruvin [73b]:

How do

the residents of the courtyards

join together in the alleyway,

so that it will be possible to carry into it and from it into all the courtyards surrounding it on Shabbat, without having to trouble to collect food from each of the residents of the alleyway?

One resident

of the alleyway

places the barrel,

containing wine or oil that he designated for this purpose, and

says: “This is for all the residents of the alleyway.”

And he grants them

each and every resident of the alleyway a share in the wine or oil in the barrel

through his adult son or daughter,

who are considered a separate legal domain from the head of the household and can acquire from him on behalf of other people,

and

he likewise grants them

through his Hebrew slave or maidservant,

who are also considered another legal domain and can acquire from the master on behalf of other people.

And we inquire:

This

[

that]

Hebrew maidservant mentioned here, who acquires the barrel on behalf of others,

what are the circumstances?

What kind of maidservant is this?

If she has already reached

[

if it is referring to one who has already reached]

two pubic hairs, which are a sign that she has reached maturity,

what is she doing with him

[

what is she doing in his possession]? For a Hebrew maidservant is released from slavery immediately upon displaying these signs! Rather, is it not

necessarily referring to a Hebrew maidservant

who has not reached,

who has not yet reached

two pubic hairs,

and is still a minor, and

it teaches:

that she

acquires for others!

This proves that a minor can acquire for other people! Rav Ḥisda rejected this:

The case of a shituf of alleyways is different,

as it is only a matter

of rabbinic law.

By Torah law, the prohibition of carrying applies only when carrying from a private domain into the public domain; the Sages were lenient in this matter, so for purposes of the law of a shituf of alleyways, even a minor can acquire for others.

Rav Ḥisda said: Rav Ḥinnana fell silent [

he was silent]

Vardaan

when I presented him with this rejection, and he offered no response.

And we inquire:

What could he have said [

what could Rav Ḥinnana have replied] to this rejection?