Gittin 64b — the Talmud in English

And we reject this:

these words—

that we say the presumption is that an agent carries out his agency, applies only

as a stringency,

as in the case of Rabbi Isaac.

But as a leniency,

to presume her divorced and unmarried,

no,

we do not say that the presumption is that an agent carries out his agency.

And we challenge this:

and let us believe her

[let us believe the woman] that she is divorced,

from

that

of Rav Hamnuna,

for Rav Hamnuna said: A woman who says to her husband, “You divorced me”—

is believed,

because there is a

presumption

that

a woman does not brazenly lie before her husband

about such a matter!

And we explain:

these words,

that she is believed, apply specifically

where there is no one who

[where there is no other person who]

assists her,

for then there is a presumption that she does not brazenly lie about this matter before her husband,

but where

there is another person

who assists her

in her claim—

she is brazen and brazen,

and therefore in our case, where the husband and the trustee assist her, she is not believed on the basis of her words alone, but only when her bill of divorce is in her hand.

Mishna:

A betrothed maiden

who has not yet left her father’s authority,

if the betrothed husband divorces her,

she

herself, even without her father’s knowledge, since she is of age , or

her father

without her knowledge,

may receive her bill of divorce.

And from the moment that one of them receives the bill of divorce, she is divorced, for Scripture granted the father a legal hand in his maiden daughter, but Scripture did not remove her own hand .

Rabbi Judah said: Two hands cannot acquire simultaneously,

it is impossible for one person to have two owners who acquire on his behalf.

Rather,

only

her father receives her bill of divorce alone,

since the Torah granted the father a legal hand in his maiden daughter.

But when she is orphaned from her father, she receives her bill of divorce.

And

they stated another major principle:

every

woman

who cannot guard her bill of divorce,

such as a minor who lacks the understanding to guard her bill of divorce,

cannot be divorced

even through the receipt of the bill of divorce by her father, as it is stated [Deuteronomy 24:1], “And he sends her away from his house”—the one whom he sends away and she does not return; this one, whom he sends away and she returns, is excluded .

Gemara:

With regard to what do they disagree

the Sages and Rabbi Judah in our Mishna?

The Rabbis

[the Sages]

hold: The Merciful One granted her an additional hand

[the Torah granted her an additional hand], for the Torah gave her the right also to receive her bill of divorce, even though she is still under her father’s authority and he is her owner for the purpose of acquiring on her behalf.

And Rabbi Judah holds: Where her father is present

[when the father is alive], she is entirely under his authority, and

her hand is nothing.

[Unless she has married, in which case she leaves her father’s authority.]

We learned in the Mishna:

And anyone who cannot guard her bill of divorce cannot be divorced.

The Sages taught

in a beraita:

A minor who knows how to guard her bill of divorce—

is divorced,

but one who does not know how to guard her bill of divorce—

is not divorced,

and which is the minor

who is considered

to know how to guard her bill of divorce?

Any one who guards her bill of divorce and another object.

And we examined it:

what is he saying?

What is the meaning of “she guards her bill of divorce and another object”?

Rabbi Yohanan said, this is what he is saying: Any one who guards another object because of her bill of divorce,

for if her bill of divorce is lost, she guards another object that is not similar to a bill of divorce, thinking that it is the bill of divorce. She is considered to know how to guard her bill of divorce.

Rav Huna bar Manoah challenged him: She is merely a fool,

who guards another object because of her bill of divorce! And there is no one more “whom he sends away and she returns” than she!

Rather, Rav Huna bar Manoah said in the name of Rav Aha son of Rav Ika:

this is what he is saying:

Any one who distinguishes between her bill of divorce and another object

and guards her bill of divorce, and not another object.

Rav Judah said in the name of Rabbi Asi:

A child to whom one gives a

pebble

[a stone] and

he throws it away,

because he understands that it has no value, and when one gives him a

nut,

he recognizes that it is valuable

and takes it—

he is sufficiently grown that he can

acquire for himself,

but

does not acquire

for

others,

for if one acquires something for his fellow through that minor, handing him the object and telling him to acquire this object for so-and-so, he has not acquired it, and if the giver wishes to retract, he may retract.

And if he has understanding to such an extent that one gives him

an object and he returns it after a while

when it is demanded from him, because he understands that the object belongs to others,

the law is that he

acquires both for himself and for others

by rabbinic law.

Rav Judah said:

when I said it

[when I said Rabbi Asi’s statement]

before Samuel,

he said to me: This and that are one

[these two enactments have the same law] with regard to a minor’s acquisition.

And we examined it:

what

does “this and that are one” mean?

Does it mean that the two levels of the minor’s understanding have the same law, that he can acquire, or that they have the same law, that he cannot acquire?

Rav Hisda said: Both this one and that one—

acquire for himself but do not acquire for others.

Before continuing the discussion, we will first explain the law of “eruv of courtyards” and “partnership of alleyways”: by Torah law, it is permitted to carry from houses into a shared courtyard, and likewise from one person’s courtyard to another person’s courtyard; it is only forbidden to take objects from them into the public domain.

But the Sages decreed that only when the residents of the courtyards make an “eruv of courtyards” among themselves is it permitted for them to take objects from their houses into the shared courtyard, or from their courtyard to another courtyard.

Likewise, by Torah law it is permitted to carry from the courtyards into the alleyway shared by the residents of the houses and courtyards and leading to the public domain [the alleyway is a lane enclosed by partitions on three sides and open at its head toward the public domain], and by Torah law the alleyway is considered a private domain, so it is permitted to carry from it into the courtyards of the houses. However, the Sages decreed that the residents of the courtyards may not carry objects into the alleyway unless all the residents of the alleyway make a “partnership of alleyways” among themselves.

But if the residents of the courtyards did not make an eruv among themselves, or if they did not make a partnership of alleyways, the Sages prohibited taking objects from the houses into the shared courtyard, or from one courtyard to another, and likewise from the courtyards into the alleyway. This is because the house is designated for its owner, whereas the courtyard is shared by everyone; similarly, in a partnership of alleyways, the courtyards belong to their owners, while the alleyway is shared by everyone, and the matter appears as though one is taking from one domain to another domain. They decreed that one may not take from one private domain to another private domain as a safeguard, in order to distance a person from transgression, lest people come to take from a private domain into the public domain, in which case they are liable by Torah law .

And how does one make an “eruv of courtyards” and a “partnership of alleyways”?

They join and combine all the residents of the courtyard by having each of the residents give bread, and placing the bread of each and every one in one of the houses that opens into the courtyard. Through this, we view it as though they all live in the same house, and as though the entire courtyard is designated for that house; each person does not have a domain of his own, but they are all partners together. This is what is called an “eruv of courtyards.”

The same law applies to a “partnership of alleyways”: each of the residents of the courtyards that open into the alleyway gives bread or a type of food, and they place it in one of the courtyards, and all the courtyards become like one courtyard.

Rav Hinena Vardan raised an objection

[from a place called Vardena] to Rav Hisda, who said that in both levels of a minor he does not acquire for others, from what we learned in tractate Eruvin [73b]:

How

do the residents of the courtyards

participate in the alleyway partnership,

so that it will be possible to take objects into it and to carry from it to all the courtyards around it on Shabbat, without having to trouble to collect food from each of the residents of the alleyway?

One of the residents of the alleyway places

the residents of the alleyway

the barrel,

containing wine or oil, which he designated for this purpose, and

says: “This is for all the residents of the alleyway.”

And he grants them

each and every one of the residents of the alleyway a share in the wine or oil in the barrel

through his adult son and daughter,

who are considered a separate domain from the master of the house and can acquire from him for other people,

and

he likewise grants them

through his Hebrew male and female slaves,

who are also considered another domain and can acquire from the master of the house for other people.

And we examined it:

this

[that]

female slave

the Hebrew one mentioned here, who acquires the barrel for others,

what are the circumstances?

What sort of female slave is being discussed?

If she has brought

[if the case is that she has already brought]

two hairs,

which are a sign that she is of age,

what is she doing with him

[what is she doing in his possession]? For a Hebrew maidservant is immediately freed from slavery upon these signs!

Rather, is it not so

that necessarily the case is a Hebrew maidservant

who has not brought,

who has not yet brought

two hairs,

and she is still a minor,

and it teaches:

that she

acquires for others!

And it is proven that a minor can acquire for other people! Rav Hisda rejected this:

the partnership of alleyways is different,

for it is only a law

of rabbinic authority,

since by Torah law the prohibition of bringing in and taking out applies only from a private domain to the public domain. The Sages were lenient in this matter, so for the law of “partnership of alleyways,” a minor can also acquire for others.

Rav Hisda said: Rav Hinena Vardan was silent

[he was silent]

Vardan

when I told him this rejection, and he did not answer.

And we examined it:

what could he have said

[what could Rav Hinena have answered] in response to this rejection?