Gittin 65a — the Talmud in English

And we explain: Rav Ḥinnana could have answered:

every

matter

that the Sages instituted—

precise page location—

they instituted in the manner of Torah law

the parameters of the ordinance. And if, by Torah law, a minor could not acquire on behalf of others, the Sages would not have said that his acquisition is effective even with regard only to a matter of rabbinic law.

But the other one—

Rav Ḥinnana Wardana—why did he remain silent and not answer this?

Because he holds that

when we say [that is, when do we say] “

when do we say] “

every ordinance that the Sages instituted, they instituted in the manner of Torah law”—

only

in a matter [in an ordinance]

that has [that is,

that has [that there is]

a basis in Torah law,

a basis in the Torah,

whose fundamental law is from the Torah, and the Sages merely added ordinances to it.

But a matter [an ordinance]

that the Sages instituted,

that does not have [that there is no]

[that is,

a basis in the Torah,

such as the joining of courtyards and the joining of alleyways—

they did not

institute their ordinance in the manner of Torah law.

And if so, it is possible that the Sages instituted that a minor can acquire on behalf of others, even though by Torah law he cannot acquire on behalf of others.

Rav Avya raised an objection

a further difficulty against Shmuel’s words, as Rav Ḥisda explained them, that a minor does not acquire at all on behalf of others.

From what we learned in tractate Maaser Sheni [4:4]:

They employ a stratagem with regard to second tithe

so that the one who redeems it will not have to add a fifth of its value.

For if the owner of the tithe himself redeems it, he is obligated to add a fifth to its redemption price, whereas for the redemption of another person’s second tithe, he does not add a fifth.

How

does he employ a stratagem so as not to add a fifth in the redemption of second tithe?

A person says to his adult son or daughter,

or

to his

Hebrew male slave or female slave: Here are these coins for you; redeem with them this second tithe.

The father grants them the coins, and they redeem the second tithe with these coins, and they do not add a fifth, since with regard to him they are considered other people.

And after they redeem the second tithe, they return the produce to him, since they are dependent on his table, and what is theirs is his

own.

And they eat it without

adding to the redemption

a fifth

And we inquire about it:

This female slave,

a Hebrew female slave who redeems the second tithe,

what are the circumstances—

of which female slave is the matter speaking?

If

it is speaking of a female slave

who has brought [who has already brought]

already produced

two hairs,

then she is already an adult, and

what is she doing with him [what is she doing in his possession], since she goes free through the signs of maturity?

[that is, why does she remain in his possession?] For she goes free upon showing the signs of maturity.

Rather, is it not

speaking of a minor female slave

who has not brought [who has not yet brought]

[that is,

two hairs!

It follows from here that even a minor female can acquire on behalf of others, since she redeems with the money of the master’s second tithe.

And we answer:

Here, with what are we dealing—

the Mishna in tractate Maaser Sheni is speaking

of

second tithe

at the present time,

which is only

rabbinic,

and with regard to a matter of rabbinic law the Sages were lenient, so that a minor’s acquisition on behalf of others is effective; and one cannot prove from here with regard to Torah law.

And we object:

And a Hebrew maidservant at the present time—

is there such a thing?

But it was taught

in a beraita:

Hebrew male slavery is practiced only

when the Jubilee is practiced.

And if so, the law of the Hebrew slave had already been annulled before the days of the Second Temple, when the Jubilee was annulled, and all the more so at the present time!

And if the Mishna is speaking of a Canaanite maidservant, necessarily it is speaking of a time when the Jubilee is practiced, and then the law of second tithe is from the Torah.

Rather, it must be established that it is speaking of second tithe from produce that grew

we must establish that the case concerns second tithe from produce that grew

in an unperforated flowerpot,

where the entire obligation of the tithe is only

rabbinic.

Therefore, the fact that the redemption by the minor female slave is effective on behalf of others does not contradict what Rav Ḥisda explained in Shmuel’s words: that a minor’s acquisition on behalf of others is not effective in a matter that is from the Torah.

Rava said: There are three measures

that are distinct

with regard to the

acquisition of a

minor:

A. A minor such that if one gives him

a pebble and he throws it, a nut and he takes it,

he acquires for himself but does not acquire on behalf of others.

And corresponding to them, in the case of a minor female,

with such understanding she is considered capable of guarding her betrothal—and she

is betrothed

by her mother or brothers through betrothal by rabbinic enactment, with her consent, and to release these betrothals she requires

miun,

as explained in Yevamot 107b: every minor female who is unable to guard her betrothal does not even need to perform miun, whereas this one already knows how to guard her betrothal, and she must perform miun in order to leave her husband.

And likewise she is betrothed by herself through “betrothal of miun,” by rabbinic law, if she is an orphan.

B.

The young children,

at the age of six to eight—

their purchases are purchases, and their sales are sales with regard to movable property,

as explained in chapter HaNizakin [above, 59a].

And corresponding to them, in the case of a minor female,

when she reaches this age, she is in the category of “one can send her away, and she does not return,” and she

is divorced

through her receiving the bill of divorce, even if she was betrothed

through her father’s betrothal

and the father died, whose betrothal is from the Torah.

C.

When they have reached the “age of vows,”

that is, one year before their maturity, their vows are examined, and if they know in whose name they vowed and in whose name they consecrated—

their vows are vows and their consecration is consecration,

as explained in tractate Niddah [45b].

And corresponding to them, in the case of a minor female,

when she reaches this age and has brought two hairs—

she performs ḥalitza, and

it is possible to rely on these signs, and they are not merely hairs of a mole,

but before this time she is a minor, and her signs are not signs, and she does not perform ḥalitza, because it is written in the section of ḥalitza “man,” and “woman” is juxtaposed to “man”: she must be an adult for ḥalitza.

D. And

with

regard to

selling

land

of his father’s property,

he is considered a minor

until he is twenty years old.

.

Mishna:

A minor female who said

to an agent:

Receive my bill of divorce for me,

having appointed him as an agent for receiving it; and for example, she is an orphan from her father and is capable of guarding her bill of divorce—

it is not

a bill of divorce until the bill of divorce reaches her hand

literally, because the appointment she made of him as an agent for receiving it is not effective.

Therefore, if the husband wished to retract

from the divorce after he gave it to the agent and before it reached her hand—

he may retract.

And the reason is

that a minor does not appoint an agent,

and therefore the agent is not considered an agent for receiving it, so that the woman is divorced immediately upon receiving the bill of divorce; rather, he is only the husband’s agent for carrying it, and she is divorced through the bill of divorce only when it reaches her hand.

And if

the minor’s father is alive, and

her father said to him

the agent:

Go

to the place of my daughter’s betrothed

and receive her bill of divorce for my daughter,

the agent’s law is that of an agent for receiving it, and after the husband gives the bill of divorce to the agent,

if he wished

the husband

to retract—

he may not retract,

for the agent’s hand is like the father’s hand, and the minor female is divorced through the agent’s acquisition of the bill of divorce.

One who says

to his agent:

Give this bill of divorce to my wife in a certain place,

and the agent altered his agency

and gave it to her in another place—

Since he explicitly said to the agent that he should give her the bill of divorce in a certain place, the bill of divorce is

invalid,

because the husband is particular about this and does not want him to give it to her in another place, so that people will not speak ill of him there.

But if the husband said to the agent:

She is in a certain place,

and he did not explicitly instruct the agent to give her the bill of divorce there,

and he gave it to her

the agent gave her the bill of divorce

in another place—

valid

is the bill of divorce, since he intended only to show him the place where he would find her, and was not particular that he give her the bill of divorce specifically there.

And likewise,

the woman who said

to her agent:

Receive my bill of divorce for me in a certain place, and he received it for her in another place—

invalid

is the bill of divorce, since with regard to the woman as well it can be said that she is particular that he receive the bill of divorce only in a certain place and not in another place.

Rabbi Elazar declares it valid.

In his view, specifically with regard to the husband can one say that he conditions the giving of the bill of divorce specifically on a certain place, since he divorces of his own will and everything depends on him; but the woman, who is divorced against her will, cannot be said to be particular about the place where the bill of divorce is received, and when she said to the agent, “Receive my bill of divorce in a certain place,” she intended only to show him the place of her husband.

And if the woman said to the agent:

Bring

and carry

my bill of divorce for me from a certain place,

for she did not appoint him as an agent for receiving it, but merely said to him that he should bring her the bill of divorce from a certain place,

and he brought it to her

the agent brought her the bill of divorce

from another place,

since she is not divorced through his receiving the bill of divorce, but only when the bill of divorce reaches her hand,

valid

it is according to everyone, for in such a case she certainly is not particular when he brings her the bill of divorce from another place.

Gemara:

The Gemara discusses the matter of the agent’s changing the place of agency for the bill of divorce.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty:

And

according to

Rabbi Elazar

in the Mishna,

what is different [why is it different] about his ruling in

[that is, why is his ruling different] in

the first clause, where he does not dispute

the first Tanna, and agrees that if he changed the husband’s instruction and delivered the bill of divorce in another place, the bill of divorce is invalid,

and what is different in the latter clause,

in the case where the agent changed the woman’s instruction and received the bill of divorce in another place,

where he disputes

and Rabbi Elazar holds that it is valid?

And we answer: There is a distinction between when the agent changes the husband’s instruction and when he changes the woman’s instruction, since

he,

the husband,

divorces of his own will [since the divorce depends on his will]—

[that is, the divorce depends on his decision]—

he is particular [it is reasonable that he is particular] and precise when he mentions a specific place.

[it is reasonable to assume that he is particular] and precise when he specifies a place.

But

she,

the woman,

is divorced against her will,

and she is not certain that the husband will agree to deliver the bill of divorce in that same place; therefore it is reasonable that she is only

showing him the place

to the agent.

Mishna:

Our Mishna discusses an Israelite woman married to a priest, when she is divorced from him: from what time is she forbidden to eat teruma? And the Mishna teaches us that there is a difference in this matter between whether she appointed an agent to bring the bill of divorce and whether she appointed an agent to receive the bill of divorce.

A woman who was an Israelite woman married to a priest and has no son from him eats teruma only until she is divorced; but once she is divorced she no longer eats teruma, unless she has a son from the priest.

Therefore, if she said to the agent:

Bring my bill of divorce to me,

appointing him only as an agent to carry the bill of divorce to her,

she eats teruma until the bill of divorce reaches her hand,

since as long as the bill of divorce has not reached her hand, she is not divorced.

But if she said to the agent:

Receive my bill of divorce for me,

appointing him to acquire the bill of divorce on her behalf—

she is forbidden to eat teruma immediately

when the agent leaves, lest he receive the bill of divorce immediately, and she has already been divorced; and anyone who is possibly divorced is forbidden to eat teruma.

And if she said to the agent:

Receive my bill of divorce for me in a certain place—

she eats teruma until he reaches

the agent with the

bill of divorce at that place,

for he does not become her agent to acquire the bill of divorce on her behalf until he reaches that place, and only then is she divorced. And they estimate how much time the agent needs to walk until he reaches that place.

Rabbi Eliezer forbids immediately,

from when the agent took leave of her. For Rabbi Eliezer follows his own method: she merely indicates a place to him, and she does not mind if the agent acquires the get for her in another place. Therefore, once the agent took leave of her, she is forbidden, since perhaps he found the husband with the get in a nearby place, and the agent had already acquired it for her.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: If she said to the agent, “Receive my get for me in a certain place”—she may eat teruma until the agent arrives with the get at that place.

And we raise an objection:

and

when the agent arrives at that place with the get in his hand,

is it at least a get,

even though he received the get from the husband in another place?

But you said in the first clause,

in the previous Mishna, that if the agent changed from her instruction and received the get in another place,

it is not a get!

But here, after all, the agent received the get from the husband in another place!

And we answer:

It is necessary,

our Mishna is speaking of a case

where she said to him

to the agent:

“Receive my get in the city

[in the city]

of Mata Meḥasya, and sometimes you will find him

[and sometimes you will find my husband]

in Babylonia.”

And since this is what she said to him, it follows that she does not mind if the agent receives the get for her in another place,

and

what she specified to the agent—that he should receive the get in the city of Mata Meḥasya—

this is what she meant by her words

[this is the meaning of her words]:

“Take

[to take] the get,

wherever you find him—

take it from him

[wherever you find the husband, take the get from him].