Gittin 65a (סה.) — the Talmud in English

And we explain: Rav Ḥinnana could have answered:

Everything

that

the Sages instituted—

they instituted in accordance with the Torah

—the parameters of the rabbinic enactment. And if, according to Torah law, a minor could not acquire something on behalf of others, the Sages would not have said that his acquisition is effective even with regard to a matter of rabbinic law.

But the other one—

Rav Ḥinnana Vardan—why did he remain silent and not give this answer?

Because he holds that

when we say

—[when do we say]—

“Everything that the Sages instituted, they instituted in accordance with the Torah”—

only

in a matter

—[in an enactment]—

that has

—[that there is]—

a basis in the Torah,

where the fundamental law is from the Torah and the Sages merely added enactments to it.

But a matter

—[an enactment]—that the Sages instituted,

that does not have

—[that there is not]—

a basis in the Torah,

such as an eruv of courtyards and a shituf of alleyways—

they did not

institute their enactment in accordance with that of the Torah.

And if so, it is possible that the Sages instituted that a minor can acquire something on behalf of others, even though according to Torah law he cannot acquire something on behalf of others.

Rav Avya raises an objection

—another difficulty against Shmuel’s statement, as Rav Ḥisda explained it, that a minor cannot acquire anything at all on behalf of others.

From what we learned in tractate Ma'aser Sheni [4:4]:

One may employ artifice with regard to second tithe

so that the person redeeming it will not have to add a fifth of its value.

For if the owner of the tithe himself redeems it, he is obligated to add a fifth to the redemption payment, whereas for the redemption of another person’s second tithe, he does not add a fifth.

How

does he employ artifice so as not to add a fifth in redeeming second tithe?

A person says to his adult son or daughter,

or

to his

Hebrew slave or maidservant: “Here are these coins for you; redeem this second tithe with them.”

The father grants them ownership of the coins, and they redeem the second tithe with these coins, without adding a fifth, since with regard to him they are considered other people.

And after they redeem the second tithe, they return the produce to him, since they are dependent on his table, and whatever belongs to them belongs to him

as well.

as well. And he eats it without

adding to the redemption payment

a fifth.

And we raise a difficulty concerning this:

This maidservant

a Hebrew maidservant who redeems the second tithe,

what are the circumstances—

which maidservant is being discussed?

If

it is referring to a maidservant

who has

—[who has already brought]—

two hairs,

then she is already an adult, and

what is she doing with him

—[what is she doing in his possession?] For she is emancipated upon displaying the signs of maturity.

Rather, is it not

referring to a minor maidservant

who has not

—[who has not yet brought]—

two hairs!

It can be inferred from here that even a minor can acquire something on behalf of others, since she redeems the second tithe with the master’s money

. And we answer:

Here, with what are we dealing—

the Mishna in tractate Ma'aser Sheni is dealing

with second tithe

tithe

in the present era,

which is only

of rabbinic origin,

and with regard to a matter of rabbinic law the Sages were lenient and made a minor’s acquisition on behalf of others effective. One cannot prove from here with regard to Torah law.

And we ask:

And a Hebrew maidservant in the present era—

does such a thing exist?

And it is taught

in a beraita:

Hebrew slaves are in force only

when the Jubilee is in force.

And if so, the law of the Hebrew slave had already been nullified before the Second Temple period, when the Jubilee was discontinued, and certainly it does not apply in the present era!

And if the Mishna is speaking of a Canaanite maidservant, it must be referring to a time when the Jubilee is in force, in which case the law of second tithe is from the Torah.

Rather,

we must establish that it is speaking of second tithe from produce that grew

in an unperforated flowerpot,

so that the entire obligation of tithing is only

of rabbinic origin.

Therefore, the fact that the minor maidservant’s redemption on behalf of others is effective does not contradict what Rav Ḥisda explained in Shmuel’s statement: that a minor’s acquisition on behalf of others is not effective with regard to a matter governed by Torah law.

Rava said: There are three categories

of distinction

with regard to

acquisition by a

minor:

a. A minor such that when one gives him

a pebble and he throws it, a nut and he takes it,

acquires for himself, but does not acquire on behalf of others.

And corresponding to this, with regard to a minor girl,

at this level of understanding, she is considered capable of safeguarding her kiddushin documents—and she

is betrothed

by her mother or brothers through kiddushin by rabbinic enactment, with her consent; and to dissolve this kiddushin she must perform

mi'un,

as explained in Yevamot 107b: Any minor who cannot safeguard her kiddushin does not even need to perform mi'un, whereas this girl already knows how to safeguard her kiddushin, and she must perform mi'un in order to leave her husband.

Likewise, if she is an orphan, she can betroth herself through “kiddushei mi'un,” by rabbinic enactment

. b.

The pe'utot,

from the age of six to eight—

their purchases are purchases, and their sales are sales with regard to movable property,

as explained in chapter HaNizakin [above, 59a].

And corresponding to this, with regard to a minor girl,

when she reaches this age, she is in the category of “she can be sent away and does not return,” and she

is divorced

by receiving the bill of divorce, even if she had been betrothed

through her father’s kiddushin

and her father died, in which case her kiddushin is by Torah law.

c.

When they reach the “age of vows,”

that is, one year before reaching maturity, their vows are examined; and if they know in whose name they vowed and in whose name they consecrated the object, then

their vows are vows and their consecration is consecration,

as explained in tractate Nidda [45b].

And corresponding to this, with regard to a minor girl,

when she reaches this age and has grown two hairs, she

performs ḥalitza, and these signs may be relied upon; they are not merely hairs resulting from an abnormal growth,

but before this age she is a minor, and her signs are not legally significant, so she does not perform ḥalitza, because the passage concerning ḥalitza states “man,” and “woman” is derived by analogy from “man”; she must be an adult in order to perform ḥalitza.

but before this time she is a minor, and her signs are not signs, and she does not perform ḥalitza, because it is written in the section of ḥalitza “man,” and “woman” is juxtaposed to “man”: she must be an adult for ḥalitza.

d.

And

with regard

to selling

real estate

from his father’s property,

a minor is considered such

until he is twenty years old

.

Mishna:

A minor girl who said

to an agent:

“Receive my bill of divorce for me,”

thereby appointing him as her agent to receive it; this is a case, for example, where she is an orphan from her father and can safeguard her bill of divorce—

it is not

a bill of divorce until the bill of divorce reaches her hand

literally, because her appointment of him as an agent to receive it is ineffective

. Therefore, if the husband wished to retract

from the divorce after he delivered it to the agent and before it reached her hand,

he may retract.

And the reason is

that a minor cannot appoint an agent,

and therefore the agent is not considered an agent to receive the bill of divorce, such that the woman would be divorced immediately upon his receiving it; rather, he is only the husband’s agent to deliver it, and she is divorced by the bill of divorce only when it reaches her hand.

And if

the minor’s father is alive, and

her father said to him

the agent:

“Go

to the place where my daughter’s betrothed is

and receive her bill of divorce for her,”

the agent has the status of an agent to receive it, and after the husband gives the bill of divorce to the agent,

if he wished

the husband

to retract—

he may not retract,

for the agent’s hand is like the father’s hand, and the minor girl is divorced when the agent acquires the bill of divorce.

If one says

to his agent:

“Give this bill of divorce to my wife in a particular place,”

and the agent deviated from his instructions

and gave it to her in another place—

since he explicitly told the agent to give her the bill of divorce in a particular place, the bill of divorce is

invalid,

because the husband is particular about this and does not want him to give it to her elsewhere , so that people will not speak disparagingly of him there .

But if the husband said to the agent:

“She is in a particular place,”

and did not explicitly instruct the agent to give her the bill of divorce there,

and he gave it to her

the agent gave her the bill of divorce

in another place—the bill of divorce is

valid,

as he intended only to indicate the place where he would find her, and was not particular that he give her the bill of divorce specifically there.

Likewise,

a woman who said

to her agent:

“Receive my bill of divorce for me in a particular place,” and he received it for her in another place—the bill of divorce is

invalid,

for with regard to the woman as well, it can be said that she is particular that he receive the bill of divorce only in that particular place and not elsewhere.

Rabbi Elazar deems it valid.

In his opinion, it can be said specifically with regard to the husband that he makes the delivery of the bill of divorce contingent upon its being in a particular place, since he divorces her willingly and everything depends upon him. But the woman, who is divorced against her will, cannot be said to be particular about the place where the bill of divorce is received. When she said to the agent, “Receive my bill of divorce in a particular place,” she intended only to show him the location of her husband.

And if the woman said to the agent:

“Bring

and deliver

my bill of divorce to me from a particular place,”

where she did not appoint him as an agent to receive it, but merely told him to bring her the bill of divorce from a particular place,

and he brought it to her

the agent brought her the bill of divorce

from another place,

since she is not divorced through his receiving the bill of divorce, but only when the bill of divorce reaches her hand, it is

valid

according to everyone, for in such a case she certainly is not particular when he brings her the bill of divorce from another place

. Gemara:

The Gemara discusses the agent’s deviation concerning the place designated for the agency involving the bill of divorce.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty:

And

with regard to the opinion of

Rabbi Elazar

in the Mishna,

what is different

—[why is it different]—about his ruling in the

first clause, where he does not disagree

—[where he does not disagree]—with the first tanna, and agrees that if the agent deviated from the husband’s words and delivered the bill of divorce elsewhere, the bill of divorce is invalid,

and what is different about the latter clause,

where the agent deviated from the woman’s words and received the bill of divorce elsewhere,

where he disagrees,

and Rabbi Elazar holds that it is valid?

And we answer: There is a distinction between an agent’s deviation from the husband’s words and his deviation from the woman’s words, since

he,

the husband,

divorces willingly

—[since the divorce depends upon his will]—

is particular

—[it is reasonable that he is particular]—and precise when he designates a particular place.

By contrast,

she,

the woman,

is divorced against her will,

and she cannot be sure that the husband will agree to deliver the bill of divorce in that same place. Therefore, it is reasonable that she is merely

showing him the place

to the agent.

Mishna:

Our Mishna discusses an Israelite woman married to a kohen when she is divorced from him: from what point is she prohibited from eating teruma? The Mishna teaches that there is a difference in this regard between her appointing an agent to bring her the bill of divorce and her appointing an agent to receive the bill of divorce.

An Israelite woman who was married to a kohen and has no son from him may eat teruma only until she is divorced; once she is divorced, she may no longer eat teruma, unless she has a son from the kohen.

Therefore, if she said to an agent:

“Bring me my bill of divorce,”

appointing him only as an agent to deliver the bill of divorce to her,

she may eat teruma until the bill of divorce reaches her hand,

since as long as the bill of divorce has not reached her hand, she is not divorced.

But if she said to the agent:

“Receive my bill of divorce for me,”

appointing him to acquire the bill of divorce on her behalf—

she is prohibited from eating teruma immediately

when the agent departs, lest he received the bill of divorce immediately and she has already been divorced; and anyone who is possibly divorced is prohibited from eating teruma

. And if she said to the agent:

“Receive my bill of divorce for me in a particular place”—

she may eat teruma until he reaches

the agent, with

the bill of divorce to that place,

for he does not become her agent to acquire the bill of divorce on her behalf until he reaches that place, and only then is she divorced. The amount of time the agent needs to travel until he reaches that place is estimated.

Rabbi Eliezer prohibits her immediately,

once the agent has departed from her. This is because Rabbi Eliezer follows his own approach: she merely indicates a location to him and is not particular that the agent acquire the get for her in another place. Therefore, once the agent has departed from her, she is prohibited, since perhaps he found the husband with the get nearby, and the agent had already acquired it for her.

[Gemara:]

We learned in the Mishna: If she said to the agent, “Receive my get in such-and-such a place,” she may eat teruma until the agent arrives with the get at that place.

And we raise an objection:

But

when the agent arrives at that place with the get in his hand,

is it nevertheless a valid get,

even though he received the get from the husband in another place?

But you said in the first clause,

in the preceding Mishna, that if the agent deviated from her instructions and received the get in another place,

it is not a valid get!

Yet here, too, the agent received the get from the husband in another place!

And we answer:

It is necessary;

our Mishna is dealing with a case in which she

said to him

the agent:

“Receive my get in Mata Meḥasya

(the city)

and sometimes you may find him

(my husband)

in Babylonia.”

Since this is what she said to him, it is clear that she is not particular whether the agent receives the get on her behalf in another place,

and

what she specified to the agent—that he should receive the get in the city of Mata Meḥasya—

this is what she meant

(this is the meaning of her statement):

“Take

the get,

wherever you find him—

take it from him

(wherever you find the husband, take the get from him).