Gittin 64a — the Talmud in English

or

in such a manner that

one of

the group of witnesses

the first

before whom she said to the agent, “Receive [the get] for me,” testifies concerning the statement,

and one of

the group of witnesses

the latter

before whom the agent received the get, testifies concerning the receipt,

and

a

single

third witness, before whom she spoke and before whom he received [the get],

joins with them

with each one of them to testify concerning the statement and concerning the receipt.

Gemara:

It was stated:

A husband who deposited his get with another person.

The

husband says: “For safekeeping

alone did I give the get into his possession, and not for divorce.”

And the shlish

says: “For divorce you gave it to me, for I was the woman’s agent to receive it from you, and the woman was divorced through my acquisition of it.”

And the man and the woman are both present in the same city.

Who is trusted,

the shlish or the husband?

Rav Huna said: The husband is trusted.

And Rav Hisda said: The shlish is trusted.

And their reasoning is:

Rav Huna said: The husband is trusted,

because

if it is so that he gave it to him for divorce [if the husband truly intended to give the get for divorce], he would not have given it to the shlish, but

he would have given it to her herself [he would have given the get into the woman’s hand],

for she is present in the city.

Therefore, it is logical that the husband gave it to the shlish for safekeeping.

And Rav Hisda said: The shlish is trusted, for

[for] the husband himself

trusted him

when he gave the get into his possession.

Rabbi Abba raised an objection

to Rav Huna: We learned in the Tosefta [Bava Metzia, chapter 1, halakha 10] that

the admission of a litigant is like one hundred witnesses, and the shlish is trusted

more

than both of them

than the two parties litigating with one another.

How

is it that the shlish is trusted?

If

this

the creditor

says

a sum,

“Thus

much you owe,” and

this

the debtor

says

a sum less than

thus much

I owe,

the law is that the

shlish

who transferred the loan from the creditor to the debtor

is trusted

to say what the amount of the debt is.

And this is difficult for Rav Huna’s view, who said that the husband is trusted and not the shlish.

And we answer: One cannot prove from monetary matters to gittin that the shlish is trusted,

for

different

[that which is different] is

monetary property, which was given

[which was given]

to remission,

for once the creditor gave the loan to the agent, he trusted him and relied upon him, as though the creditor had remitted it from the outset if the agent were to change [the terms]; therefore the agent is trusted. For even if the agent changed from what was said, it is merely monetary property, and it can be remitted.

This is not so with gittin, which is a matter of prohibition, and it is not subject to remission, and one must act according to the truth.

And we raise a difficulty:

but it was taught

in a beraita:

and likewise

the law is that the shlish is trusted

with gittin!

And we answer: The beraita is not referring to women’s gittin, but to

monetary gittin,

that is, documents of monetary matters, for get is merely an expression for a document.

And we raise a difficulty:

but it was taught: “And likewise with documents,”

that the shlish is trusted! And since monetary documents were mentioned, then what is stated, “and likewise with gittin,” must necessarily refer to women’s gittin, for the same law would not have been taught twice.

And we reject this:

Were they taught adjacent to one another? [Are the two beraitot [“and likewise with gittin,” “and likewise with documents”] taught together],

for if “and likewise with gittin and likewise with documents” had been taught in a single beraita, it would be clear that “gittin” refers to women’s gittin, since monetary documents had already been taught;

but since the two beraitot are separate from one another, it is possible to say that one beraita calls monetary documents “gittin,” while the other beraita calls them “documents.”

The Gemara attempts to bring proof that the shlish is not trusted with gittin:

For

we learned: “A woman who said, ‘Receive my get for me,’

the law is that she

the law is that she

must

bring proof,

two groups of witnesses,

one group of

two

witnesses

who will say: “Before us she said

to the agent, ‘Receive my get for me.’

And

one group of

two

witnesses

who will say: “Before us he received

the get,

and tore

it afterward.

And why

must she bring witnesses that she appointed the shlish as an agent to receive [the get],

should we not trust him

[that we should trust]

the shlish

on his statement alone, without witnesses, for the husband trusted him by giving him the get?

And we reject this:

Does the get emerge from beneath his hand, that we should trust him? [Does the get emerge from beneath the shlish’s hand, that we should trust him]? He tore it, and although the torn pieces of the get are in his possession, he is not trusted,

for the shlish is trusted only when the matter under discussion is in his possession, in such a manner that he has the power to do with it as he wishes. Since only when the complete get is in his possession can he give it to the woman, and she will then have the status of a divorced woman, only in this manner is he trusted to say that he is the woman’s agent to receive [the get].

This is not so here, where he is unable to give the get into her hand; he no longer has the legal status of the trustworthiness of a shlish.

And we raise a difficulty:

This is satisfactory

[it is understood] from these words that witnesses are needed for the fact that she

from these words, that witnesses are required for the fact that she

said

to the agent to be an agent to receive [the get],

but it is still difficult: Why does she need to bring witnesses that the agent

received

the get

—what do I need this for?

But the torn pieces of the get are found in his possession, and there is no need to testify concerning this.

Rabba said: Whose opinion is this

[who is] the tan­​nay who holds that witnesses are needed concerning the delivery of the get to the agent to receive it?

It is Rabbi Eliezer’s, who said: “The witnesses to delivery establish [the document],”

and the effect of the divorce takes place at the time when the agent to receive [the get] acquires it, and the effect of the divorce is not valid without witnesses; therefore witnesses are needed at the time the get is delivered to the agent to receive it.

And we considered it: In the words of the tan­​nay,

why do I need [him] to tear [it]?

Why must the shlish tear the get after acquiring it?

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: They taught this Mishna at the time of the decree

when the government prohibited observing mitzvot; therefore, immediately after the divorce took effect, they would tear the get, so that there would not be proof that they had observed the mitzva of divorce.

Rabba said: And Rav Huna admits

that he holds that the husband is trusted and not the shlish,

that if she said

[if the woman said]:

“The shlish himself said to me that he gave it to him for divorce”

[the shlish said to me that the husband gave him the get for divorce]—

she is trusted

[she is trusted].

And we raise a difficulty:

Is there such a thing

[is there such a matter]

that the shlish himself

[himself]

is not trusted, while she

[the woman, who says in his name]

is trusted?

Rather,

Rabba’s words must be explained as follows: Rav Huna admits that

if she said

the woman

“Before me he gave it to him for divorce”

[the husband gave the get to the agent before me for divorce]—

she is trusted

[she is trusted]. And the reason that she is trusted is that she has a

migo

[“by virtue of”]

that if she wished

[if she wanted] to lie,

she could say

[she could have said]:

“The husband gave it to her himself”

[that the husband gave the get into her hand] for divorce, and then she would have been trusted,

therefore she is also trusted when she says that she saw the husband give the get into the hand of the agent to receive it for divorce.

And now the Gemara discusses what the law is if

the husband said

that he gave the get to the agent

for

divorce,

and

the

shlish also says

that he received the get

for

divorce,

and she

the woman

says, “He gave it to me”

the agent gave her the get,

and it was lost

to me.

Rabbi Yohanan said:

Divorce

is a matter of sexual status, and there is no

testimony concerning

a matter of sexual status

with

fewer than two

witnesses who testify concerning the matter. And we do not rely upon the words of the husband, the shlish, and the woman. Rather, witnesses must testify concerning the matter.

And we considered it:

And why

are witnesses required?

And should we not trust

[trust]

the shlish

on his statement alone that he received the get from the husband for divorce, since the husband trusted him?

And we explain:

Does the get emerge from beneath his hand, that we should trust him?

[Does the get emerge from beneath his hand, that we should trust him]? He tore the get,

and although the torn pieces are in his possession, he does not have the trustworthiness of a shlish unless the object of the agency is still in his possession; then he has a migo, for if the agent wished, he could do with the object as he said, and therefore he is also trusted concerning his statement. But this one, who tore the get, cannot give it into her hand.

And we raise a difficulty:

And should we trust the husband

that he gave the get into the agent’s hand for divorce,

for

this

is what Rav Hiyya bar Avin said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: “A husband who said, ‘I divorced my wife’”—

is trusted!

And we explain:

Did he say

the husband

“I divorced her”?

But he says only that he gave [the get] to the agent, and if so, we trust him only that the agent received the get for delivery.

And we raise a difficulty: Since the husband is trusted to say that he gave the get into the agent’s possession to deliver it to the woman, and he indeed claims that he gave the get into the agent’s possession for divorce,

let us say

[let it be said]:

“There is a presumption that an agent performs his agency!”

And she should have the status of a divorced woman.

For Rabbi Yitzhak said: “One who says to his agent, ‘Go and betroth a woman for me,’ without specification,

and he did not tell him a particular woman,

and his agent died,

and the sender does not know whether the agent betrothed a woman for him, or whom he betrothed,

the sender is forbidden

the sender

to all the women in the world,

since concerning every woman there is room for concern that she might be a relative of the woman whom his agent betrothed for him [such as her sister or daughter and the like], and she is therefore forbidden to him. This is unless the agent returned and told him whom he had betrothed for him, or that he had not betrothed any woman for him.

And the reason that when the agent did not return he must be concerned that the agent betrothed a woman for him, and he is forbidden with all the women in the world, is that

there is a presumption

that the

agent performs his agency,

and he indeed betrothed a particular woman for him.

And if so, in our case as well, the husband should be trusted that the woman is divorced by virtue of his saying that he gave [the get] to the agent, together with the presumption that an agent performs his agency.