Gittin 64a (סד.) — the Talmud in English

or

in such a manner that

one of

the first group of witnesses

who were present

when she said to the agent to accept the bill of divorce testifies concerning the statement,

and one of

the group of witnesses

who were present

when the agent accepted the bill of divorce testifies concerning the acceptance,

and

a

single

third witness, before whom she made the statement and before whom he accepted it,

joins them

with each one of them to testify concerning both the statement and the acceptance.

Gemara:

It was stated:

A husband entrusted his bill of divorce to another person.

The

husband says: It was only for safekeeping

that I gave him the bill of divorce, and not for the purpose of divorce.

And the trustee

says: You gave it to me for the purpose of divorce, as I was the woman’s agent to accept it from you, and the woman was divorced through my acquisition of it.

And the man and the woman are both in the same city.

Who is deemed credible,

the trustee or the husband?

Rav Huna said: The husband is deemed credible.

And Rav Ḥisda said: The trustee is deemed credible.

And their reasoning is as follows:

Rav Huna said that the husband is deemed credible,

because

if it is so that he gave it to him for the purpose of divorce [if the husband truly intended to give the bill of divorce for the purpose of divorce], he would not have given it to the trustee, but rather

he would have given it to her directly

[he would have handed the bill of divorce to the woman], since she is in the city.

Therefore, it is reasonable that the husband gave it to the trustee for safekeeping.

And Rav Ḥisda said that the trustee is deemed credible, for

[as] the husband himself

trusted him

when he gave him the bill of divorce.

Rabbi Abba raised an objection

to Rav Huna: We learned in the Tosefta [Bava Metzia, chapter 1, halakha 10] that

the admission of a litigant is equivalent to the testimony of one hundred witnesses, and a trustee is deemed credible

more

than both of them

—than the two parties litigating with each other.

How

is the trustee deemed credible?

If

this

lender

says

a sum:

“This

is what you owe,” and

this

borrower

says:

I owe a sum less than

this,

—

the law is that the

trustee,

who transferred the loan from the lender to the borrower, is

deemed credible

to state the amount of the debt.

This is difficult for Rav Huna’s position, who said that the husband, and not the trustee, is deemed credible.

And we answer: One cannot prove from monetary matters that the trustee is deemed credible in the case of bills of divorce,

for

monetary matters are different,

[which differ,]

as they can be

[given]

for release,

since once the lender gave the loan to the agent, he trusted him and relied upon him, as though the lender had waived in advance any claim if the agent were to alter the terms; therefore, the agent is deemed credible. For even if the agent deviated from what was said, it is merely a monetary matter, and monetary matters can be waived.

This is not so with bills of divorce, which involve a matter of prohibition, and one cannot waive such a matter; rather, one must act in accordance with the truth.

And we raise a difficulty:

But wasn’t it taught

in a beraita:

And likewise

the trustee is deemed credible

with regard to bills of divorce!

And we answer: The beraita is not referring to bills of divorce for women, but to

monetary bills of divorce,

i.e., monetary documents, since get is merely a term for a document.

And we raise a difficulty:

But wasn’t it taught: And likewise with regard to documents,

that the trustee is deemed credible? Since monetary documents were mentioned, the statement “and likewise with regard to bills of divorce” must necessarily refer to bills of divorce for women, as the same ruling would not have been taught twice.

And we reject this:

Are they taught together?

[Do the two beraitot—“and likewise with regard to bills of divorce” and “and likewise with regard to documents”—appear adjacent to one another?]

If “and likewise with regard to bills of divorce, and likewise with regard to documents” had been taught in a single beraita, it would be clear that “bills of divorce” refers to bills of divorce for women, since monetary documents had already been mentioned.

But since the two beraitot are separate from one another, it is possible to say that one beraita calls monetary documents “bills of divorce,” while the other beraita calls them “documents.”

The Gemara attempts to bring a proof that a trustee is not deemed credible with regard to bills of divorce:

For

we learned: If a woman said, “Accept my bill of divorce for me,”

the law is that she

must

bring proof,

two groups of witnesses,

one group of

two

witnesses

who say: “It was in our presence that she said

to the agent, ‘Accept my bill of divorce for me.’”

And

one group of

two

witnesses

who say: “It was in our presence that he accepted

the bill of divorce,”

and tore

it afterward.

And why

must she bring witnesses that she appointed the trustee as her agent to accept the bill of divorce?

Let him be deemed credible

[let us believe]

the trustee

based on his statement alone, without witnesses, since the husband trusted him by giving him the bill of divorce.

And we reject this:

Does the bill of divorce emerge from beneath his hand, that he should be deemed credible?

[Does the bill of divorce emerge from the trustee’s possession, that we should believe him?] He tore it, and although the torn pieces of the bill of divorce are in his possession, he is not deemed credible.

The trustee is deemed credible only when the matter under discussion is in his possession, in a manner that enables him to do with it as he wishes. Since he can give the woman the bill of divorce only when it is intact in his possession, at which point she will have the presumptive status of a divorced woman, he is deemed credible to say that he is the woman’s agent to accept it only in such a case.

This is not so here, since he cannot give the bill of divorce to her; he no longer has the status of a trustee whose testimony is accepted.

And we raise a difficulty:

This is satisfactory

[these words explain] why witnesses are required that she

said

to the agent that he should be her agent to accept the bill of divorce.

But it is still difficult: Why must she bring witnesses that the agent

accepted

the bill of divorce?

What do I need this for?

The torn pieces of the bill of divorce are found in his possession, so there is no need for testimony concerning this.

Rabba said: This is

the tanna who maintains that witnesses are required concerning the delivery of the bill of divorce to the agent to accept it:

It is Rabbi Eliezer, who said: The witnesses of delivery establish the document,

and the divorce takes effect when the agent acquires the bill of divorce, and the divorce cannot take effect without witnesses; therefore, witnesses are required at the time the bill of divorce is delivered to the agent to accept it.

And we inquire concerning the tanna’s statement:

Why do I need

the tearing? Why must the trustee tear the bill of divorce after acquiring it?

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: They taught this Mishna in a time of persecution,

when the authorities prohibited the observance of mitzvot. Therefore, immediately after the divorce took effect, they would tear the bill of divorce, so that there would be no proof that they had observed the mitzva of divorce.

Rabba said: And Rav Huna concedes

—although he holds that the husband, and not the trustee, is deemed credible—

that if she said

[if the woman said]:

“The trustee told me that he gave it to him for the purpose of divorce”

[the trustee told me that the husband gave him the bill of divorce for the purpose of divorce]—

she is deemed credible

[she is believed].

And we raise a difficulty:

Is there such a thing

[can it be]

that the trustee himself

[himself]

is not deemed credible, while she

[the woman, who is reporting his statement]

is deemed credible?

Rather,

Rabba must be understood as saying that Rav Huna concedes

that if she said

the woman

“It was in my presence that he gave it to him for the purpose of divorce”

[the husband gave the bill of divorce to the agent for the purpose of divorce in my presence]—

she is deemed credible

[she is believed]. The reason she is believed is that she has a

migo

[on the basis of]

“if she had wanted

[if she had wished] to lie, she

could have said

[could have claimed]:

“The husband gave it to her directly”

[that the husband gave the bill of divorce directly to her] for the purpose of divorce, in which case she would have been deemed credible.

Therefore, she is also deemed credible when she says that she saw the husband give the bill of divorce to the agent to accept it for her, for the purpose of divorce.

The Gemara now discusses the law in a case where the

husband said

that he gave the bill of divorce to the agent

for

the purpose of

divorce, and

the

trustee also says

that he accepted the bill of divorce

for

the purpose of

divorce, while she

the woman

says, “He gave it to me”

the trustee gave her the bill of divorce,

and it was lost

by me.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

Divorce

is a matter involving sexual relations, and

testimony concerning a

matter involving sexual relations

is not accepted with

fewer than two

witnesses who testify concerning the matter. We do not rely on the statements of the husband, the trustee, or the woman. Rather, witnesses must testify concerning the matter.

And we inquire:

And why

are witnesses required?

Let us deem

[believe]

the trustee

based solely on his statement that he accepted the bill of divorce from the husband for the purpose of divorce, since the husband trusted him.

And we explain:

Does the bill of divorce emerge from beneath his hand, that he should be deemed credible?

[Does the bill of divorce emerge from beneath his possession, that we should believe him?] He tore the bill of divorce.

And although the torn pieces are in his possession, he does not have the credibility of a trustee unless the object entrusted to him for his agency is still in his possession. In that case, he has a migo: Had the agent wished, he could have acted with the object as he claimed, and therefore he is also deemed credible concerning his statement. But since he tore the bill of divorce, he is unable to give it to her.

And we raise a difficulty:

And let us deem the husband credible

that he gave the bill of divorce to the agent for the purpose of divorce,

for

for

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If a husband said, “I divorced my wife,”—

he is deemed credible!

And we explain:

Did he say

the husband

“I divorced her”?

He merely says that he gave the bill of divorce to the agent, and therefore we believe him only that the agent accepted the bill of divorce for delivery.

And we raise a difficulty: Since the husband is deemed credible to say that he gave the bill of divorce to the agent for delivery to the woman, and he indeed claims that he gave the bill of divorce to the agent for the purpose of divorce,

let us say

[let it be said]:

There is a presumption that an agent fulfills his agency!

And she should therefore have the presumptive status of a divorced woman.

As Rabbi Yitzḥak said: If one says to his agent, “Go and betroth a woman for me,” without qualification,

and he did not specify a particular woman,

and his agent dies,

and the principal does not know whether the agent betrothed a woman for him or whom he betrothed—

the principal is prohibited

from the

entire world’s women,

since there is reason to be concerned with regard to every woman that she might be a relative of the woman whom his agent betrothed for him—for example, her sister or daughter, and the like—and she would therefore be prohibited to him. This applies unless the agent returned and told him whom he had betrothed for him, or that he had not betrothed any woman for him.

The reason that, when the agent did not return, he must be concerned that the agent betrothed a woman for him and is consequently prohibited with regard to all the women in the world is that there is a

presumption that the

agent

fulfills his agency,

and he indeed betrothed a particular woman for him.

Accordingly, in our case as well, the husband should be deemed credible that the woman is divorced, by combining his statement that he gave the bill of divorce to the agent with the presumption that an agent fulfills his agency.