Gittin 63b (סג:) — the Talmud in English

What, is it not

referring to the Mishna,

in

a case where the husband said to the woman’s agent for acceptance:

“Here it is,” and

according to the view of

Rabbi Natan

it is? And one can prove from here that although Rabbi Natan disagrees with regard to “Take it” and maintains that this is not an expression indicating agency for acceptance, he concedes that when the husband says “Here it is,” the get takes effect immediately upon the agent’s acceptance,

and one can resolve from our Mishna that, according to Rabbi Natan, the expression “Here it is” is equivalent to “Acquire it.”

And we reject this:

No!

Rather, it is possible to establish our Mishna even

in

a case where the husband said to the woman’s agent using the expression

“Take it, and

according to the view of

Rabbi,

who maintains that regardless of which expression the husband uses, the agent remains the woman’s agent for acceptance.

Come and hear

from what we learned later in our Mishna:

“Therefore, if the husband said to him”

the agent: “

I do not wish

to

accept

and acquire the get on her behalf;

rather, take it and give it to her,”

the law is that if

the husband wishes

to

retract

the get before it reaches the woman’s hand—

he may retract.

And we infer:

The reason

that the husband may retract, and the get does not take effect immediately upon the agent’s acceptance, is

that he said, “I do not wish”;

but

if he

did not say, “I do not wish,”

it follows that if

the husband wishes

to

retract

from it—

he may not retract.

What, is it not

referring to the Mishna

in

a case where the husband said to the woman’s agent

“Here it is,”

and nevertheless, when he did not say “I do not wish,” he is her agent for acceptance,

and

we establish the Mishna according to the view of

Rabbi Natan.

And we prove from here that, according to Rabbi Natan, the expression “Here it is” is equivalent to “Acquire it.”

And we reject this:

No!

Rather, it is possible to establish the Mishna even

in

a case where the husband said to the woman’s agent using the expression

“Take it, and

according to the view of

Rabbi,

who maintains that regardless of which expression the husband uses, the agent remains the woman’s agent for acceptance.

Come and hear

from what we learned in a beraita: A husband who said to his agent,

“Take this get to my wife,”

if

the husband wishes

to

retract

the get before it reaches the woman’s hand—

he may retract;

but if the husband said to his agent:

“Here is this get for my wife,”

if

the husband wishes

to

retract

from the get—

he may not retract.

Who is the one who maintains

that when the husband says to his agent

using

the expression

“Take it,”

the law is that if

the husband wishes

to

retract, he may retract?

Rabbi Natan

is the one!

And

that same tanna

states

in the beraita,

in

the case where the husband said to his agent using the expression

“Here it is,”

the law is that if

he wishes to retract, he may not retract

and the get takes effect immediately upon the agent’s acceptance,

Conclude from this

that the beraita proves that, according to Rabbi Natan, the expression

“Here it is” is equivalent to “Acquire it,”

and the Gemara concludes: Indeed,

conclude from this.

It was stated:

The woman said to the agent:

“Accept my get,” and

the agent came and said to the husband:

“Your wife said

‘Accept my get,’” and he

the husband

says

to the agent:

“Take it and give it to her,”

Rabbi Abba said that Rav Huna said that Rav:

The husband’s words are uncertain. Therefore,

the agent becomes

also

his agent

for delivery,

and

also

her agent

for acceptance, because of the uncertainty.

And

if the husband dies childless after the get was given to the agent but before the get reached the woman’s hand, the law is that she

performs halitza

because of the concern that perhaps the get did not take effect, in which case she is a yevama who requires halitza in order to be permitted to marry another man; but she does not undergo levirate marriage with his brother, because of the concern that perhaps the get did take effect, in which case she is forbidden to him.

And we inquire about this:

Does this mean

that

Rav is uncertain whether

the expression

“Take it” is equivalent to “Acquire it”

and the get takes effect immediately upon the agent’s acceptance,

or “

Take it”

is not equivalent to “Acquire it”

and the get takes effect only upon the woman’s acceptance?

But it was stated:

One who says to his agent:

“Take a maneh to so-and-so, to whom I am indebted,”

Rav said:

If the money is lost on the way,

the sender is liable

for it

and remains responsible,

and he still owes the maneh.

And

nevertheless,

if the sender comes

to

retract

and return the maneh—

he may not retract!

Because the creditor has already acquired it from the moment of its delivery.

This implies that Rav maintains that the expression “Take it” is certainly equivalent to “Acquire it,” and he is not uncertain about this.

And we answer: In truth, Rav maintains that the expression “Take it” is uncertain as to whether it is equivalent to “Acquire it” or not,

but

there

in the case of “Take a maneh,” it is a monetary law, and with regard to monetary matters the law is that

in a case of uncertain monetary ownership, one is lenient,

and the one who seeks to extract property from another is at a disadvantage and must bring proof that the law is in his favor. Therefore, the sender cannot retract, since perhaps the expression “Take it” is equivalent to “Acquire it,” and the agent has already acquired it for the creditor.

In contrast,

here

in the case of a get, it is a matter of prohibition, and with regard to prohibitions the law is that

in a case of uncertain prohibition, one is stringent.

Therefore, when he says to the agent “Take it,” we rule stringently because of the uncertainty that the agent is both the agent for delivering the get and the agent for acquiring it; and if her husband dies childless, she performs halitza because of the uncertainty.

Rav said: A woman may not appoint an agent to accept

her

get from an agent

of

her husband,

and Rabbi Ḥanina said: A woman may appoint an agent to accept

her

get from an agent

of

her husband.

What is Rav’s reason

that a woman may not appoint an agent to accept the get from the husband’s agent?

Two reasons may be offered for his statement:

a.

Alternatively, if you wish, say:

the reason that the woman cannot appoint an agent to accept the get from the husband’s agent is

because of the husband’s humiliation,

as perhaps the husband thinks that the woman is slighting him by not coming herself, and he does not wish to divorce her in this manner. This is unlike a case where the woman appoints an agent to accept the get directly from the husband himself, in which case the husband knows that the woman sent an agent, and by handing it to the agent he demonstrates that he agrees to divorce her in this manner.

b.

Alternatively, if you wish, say:

the reason that the woman cannot appoint an agent to accept the get from the husband’s agent is

because of a courtyard that comes into her possession afterward.

For if the husband placed the get in a courtyard that did not belong to the woman, and afterward the woman acquired the courtyard, she is not divorced through this act, because the husband must give the get into the woman’s hand or into her courtyard. At the time the husband placed the get in the courtyard, it still did not belong to the woman, and this is as though she found the get lying there and picked it up.

Therefore, the Sages decreed that the woman’s agent—who is considered equivalent to her hand or her courtyard with regard to the get—may not accept it from the husband’s agent, because this courtyard that comes into her possession afterward resembles a case where the husband first gave the get to an agent and only afterward the woman appointed him as her agent for acceptance. People might come to compare the cases and permit a courtyard that she acquired after the husband placed the get into it, saying: The courtyard was initially the husband’s agent, and now, when the woman acquires it, the courtyard becomes her agent.

What difference is there between them

between the two reasons?

There is a difference between them

in a case

where she preceded him and appointed an agent from the outset

where the woman first appointed an agent for acceptance, before the husband appointed an agent for delivery,

for then there is no concern that people will come to compare the case and permit a courtyard that she acquired after the get had already been placed in it,

but there is still concern because of the husband’s humiliation, since the agent does not receive the get directly from the husband.

There was an incident involving

a certain man who sent a get to his wife

a man who sent an agent with a get to his wife,

the agent went and found her sitting and kneading

the woman while she was sitting and kneading dough,

he said to her: “Here is your get,”

she said to him:

Since my hands are dirty with dough,

“Let it be in your possession”

let the get be in your possession, and you shall be my agent for acceptance and acquisition on my behalf.

Rav Naḥman said: If the words of

Rabbi

Ḥanina are correct,

and the halakha follows him, that a woman may appoint an agent to accept the get from the husband’s agent, and we are not concerned that people will come to permit a courtyard that she acquired after the get had already been placed in it,

I would act on the basis of it

and permit the woman through this get.

Rava said to

Rav Naḥman:

And if the teaching of Rabbi Ḥanina is correct,

and the halakha follows him,

would you act on the basis of it

and permit the woman through this get?

But

in

this case, where she appointed the husband’s agent for delivery to be her agent for acceptance,

the agency did not return to the husband!

For the husband’s agency was not completed to the extent that the agent could return to his sender and say that he had fulfilled his agency.

After all, before the agent completed the husband’s agency, he had already detached himself from that agency and become the woman’s agent,

and any agency that cannot return and report to the sender is not an agency, and the get is invalid!

They sent it [

they sent this question ]

before Rabbi Ami,

and he

sent back to them [

to them ] : Since

the agency did not return to the husband,

it is not a valid get.

And Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said: It has been settled [

let us examine it until our minds are settled ]

regarding the matter

to issue a halakhic response.

After several days,

they sent it again [

they sent it again ]

before Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba,

to ask him what conclusion he had reached regarding this question.

He said: All these times you send to me and go [

you keep going and sending to me so many times ]?

Just as it is uncertain to them, so too is it uncertain to us [

just as the matter is uncertain to them, so too is it uncertain to me ] .

And since uncertainty arose in the beit-midrash regarding this matter and was not resolved,

it is [

it is therefore ] an uncertainty concerning

a matter of sexual status,

whether her marital status was altered so that she became divorced or not.

And

everywhere there is uncertainty concerning

a matter of sexual status,

the law is to be stringent due to the uncertainty ,

Therefore, in this case, if her husband dies without children, she

performs halitza

due to the uncertainty, lest the get did not take effect and she is therefore a yevama; but she does not perform yibbum, because perhaps the get did take effect, in which case she is forbidden to the yavam.

A case like this one:

there was another incident [

there was an incident involving a woman who appointed the husband's agent to deliver the get as her agent to receive the get ],

and Rav Yitzhak bar Shmuel bar Marta required her

to receive

Rav Yitzhak bar Shmuel bar Marta

to receive an additional

get

from her husband, because the agency had not returned to the husband and the get was invalid.

And

when the husband died, he required her to perform

halitza.

And we challenge this: Did Rav Yitzhak require her

two things,

both a get and halitza? If she had received an additional get, she would not need halitza after the husband's death!

And we explain: Rav Yitzhak did not mean that the woman required both a get and halitza. Rather, he required her to receive an additional

get

if she wished to marry someone else

during his lifetime,

while her husband was still alive,

and

he required her to perform

halitza

if she wished to marry

after the death

of her husband without his having given her an additional get before he died (without children).

An incident:

there was a certain woman who was called [

a certain woman whom they called ]

Nafata,

and her husband instructed two witnesses to write a get for her and give it to her.

The witnesses went and wrote [

the witnesses went and wrote ] her name in the get incorrectly as

Tafata.

Rav Yitzhak bar Shmuel bar Marta said in the name of Rav:

This get itself is invalid, and they cannot write another get correctly, since they had already

completed

the

witnesses

and completed their

agency,

and they cannot write a get for the woman without the husband's agency .

Rabba challenges this: Did he say to them, “Write a potsherd and give it to her”? [

Did the husband instruct the witnesses to write a potsherd, something without value, and give it to the woman? ] He instructed them to write for the woman a valid get with which she could be divorced. As long as they had not written a valid get, they had not yet fulfilled their agency, and they could still write a get as the husband's agents!

Rather, Rabba said: Certainly, if the witnesses wrote a proper get [

if the witnesses wrote a get that was valid for divorce ]

and it was lost,

in such a case we say that

the

witnesses

had completed

and completed their

agency,

and they are no longer agents to write another get.

But if they wrote an invalid get, we do not say that the witnesses had completed their agency; rather, they can write another get as the husband's agents.

Rav Naḥman challenges him [

he raises a difficulty against this ]

: Did he say to them [

did the husband instruct them ]

“Write”

“and place it in your pockets” [

write a get and place it in your pockets ]?

He instructed them to write a get and divorce the woman with it; by the writing alone, their agency had not yet been fulfilled.

Rather, Rav Naḥman said:

Even if the witnesses had already written a valid get, they had not yet completed their agency.

And if the get was lost, they

write

another get as the husband's agents

and give it

to the woman

even one hundred times

until she is divorced .

Rava asked Rav Naḥman:

According to your view, that the witnesses do not complete their agency until she is divorced, if the husband said to the witnesses:

“Write and give”

the get

“to an agent; what is the law?”

Is it to be said that

he withdrew them [

that he removed the witnesses ] from their agency after they gave the get to an agent, and if the get was lost by the agent, they could no longer write another get,

or perhaps he made them agents until the get reached her hand and she was divorced, and they could still return and write another get .

And the reason he told them to give the get to an agent is that

he was concerned about their exertion [

perhaps he was concerned only about the witnesses' exertion ], so that they would not have to deliver the get to the woman themselves.

But they would still be agents to write a get until the woman was divorced?

Ravina said to Rav Ashi:

What is the law if the husband added and said to the witnesses: “Write a get and give it to an agent”

“and he shall deliver it to her; what is the law?”

Does the addition, “and he shall deliver it to her,” prove that he intended these witnesses to ensure that the agent would indeed deliver it to her and that it would reach her hand, and therefore their agency remains in force until the get actually reaches her hand? Or perhaps this is not the meaning of his words, and even in this case his intention was to make them agents only for the writing, so that their agency ended with the writing?

These questions were not resolved, and the Gemara remains at

teiku.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even one who says

to her agent:

“Take my bill of divorce; if he wishes”

the husband

to retract

the get after she gave it to the agent—

he may not retract,

for the agent became an agent to receive it, and upon his receipt he had already acquired the get for the woman.

The Sages taught

in a beraita: If the woman appoints an agent using any of these expressions:

“Take it for me,” “carry it for me,” or “let it be in your possession for me”—

all of them are expressions of receipt,

meaning that she intended him to be an agent to receive the get, and that she would be divorced when the agent acquired the get.

Mishna:

A woman who said

to an agent:

“Receive” [

be an agent to receive ]

for me

the

get,

and the agent then stated that he had received the get, but the get is not in his possession,

requires

the woman to have

two sets of witnesses

testifying concerning the matter.

One set consisting of

two

witnesses

who say: “In our presence she said

to the agent to receive the get on her behalf .

And

another set consisting of

two

witnesses

who say: “In our presence he received

the get from the husband's hand

and tore it

after receiving it . ( The Gemara will explain why the agent must tear the get after acquiring it.)

It is not necessary that the two sets of witnesses be distinct from one another. Rather,

even they

may be the same witnesses—

the first and the last—

the witnesses before whom she appointed the agent to receive the get are themselves the ones who saw the agent receive the get.