Gittin 63b — the Talmud in English

Is it not

[does it not refer] to the Mishna,

in

a case in which the husband said to the woman's agent for receipt,

“Take it,” and

according to the method of

Rabbi Natan

is it? And it should be proved from here that even though he disagrees regarding “Go” and holds that this is not an expression of agency for receipt, he concedes that when the husband spoke with the expression “Take it,” and therefore the bill of divorce takes effect immediately upon the agent's receipt,

and resolve from our Mishna that for Rabbi Natan the expression “Take it” is equivalent to “Acquire it.”

And we reject this:

No!

Rather, it is possible to establish our Mishna even

in

a case in which the husband said to the woman's agent with the expression

“Go, and

according to the method of

Rabbi

who holds that with every expression that the husband used, the agent remains the woman's agent for receipt.

Come and hear

from what we learned later in our Mishna:

Therefore, if the husband said to him

to the agent, “

I do not want

[I do not desire]

that you receive

and acquire the bill of divorce on her behalf,

but go and give it to her,”

the law is that if

he desired

the husband

to retract

from the bill of divorce before it reaches the woman's hand—

he may retract.

And we infer:

The reason

that the husband may retract, and the bill of divorce does not take effect immediately upon the agent's receipt, is

because he said, “I do not want,”

but

if

he did not say, “I do not want,”

it implies that if

he desired

the husband

to retract

from it—

he may not retract.

Is it not

[does it not refer] to the Mishna

in

a case in which the husband said to the woman's agent

“Take it,”

and nevertheless, in a case in which he did not say “I do not want,” he is the woman's agent for receipt,

and

we shall establish the Mishna according to the method of

Rabbi Natan.

And we shall prove from here that for Rabbi Natan the expression “Take it” is equivalent to “Acquire it.”

And we reject this:

No!

Rather, it is possible to establish the Mishna even

in

a case in which the husband said to the woman's agent with the expression

“Go, and

according to the method of

Rabbi

who holds that with every expression that the husband used, the agent remains the woman's agent for receipt.

Come and hear

from what we learned in a beraita: A husband who said to his agent,

“Go with this bill of divorce to my wife,”

if

he desired

the husband

to retract

from the bill of divorce before it reached the woman's hand—

he may retract,

and if the husband said to his agent:

“Take this bill of divorce to my wife,”

if

he desired

the husband

to retract

from the bill of divorce—

he may not retract.

Whom do you hear saying

[who is the tanna who holds]

in

a case in which the husband said to his agent with the expression

“Go,”

the law is that if

he desired

the husband

to retract, he may retract?—

Rabbi Natan

is he!

And

that same tanna

says

in the beraita,

in

a case in which the husband said to his agent with the expression

“Take it,”

the law is that if

he desired to retract, he may not retract

and the bill of divorce takes effect immediately upon the agent's receipt,

Learn from it

[it is proven from the beraita] that according to Rabbi Natan the expression

“Take it” is equivalent to “Acquire it,”

and the Gemara concludes: Indeed,

learn from it.

It was stated:

The woman said to the agent:

“Receive my bill of divorce for me,” and

the agent came and said to the husband:

“Your wife said

‘Receive my bill of divorce for me,’ and he

the husband

says

to the agent:

‘Go and give it to her,’

Rabbi Abba said that Rav Huna said that Rav:

The husband's words are uncertain; therefore

the agent becomes

also

his agent

for delivery,

and

also

her agent

for receipt, because of the uncertainty.

And

if the husband dies without children after the bill of divorce was given to the agent and before the bill of divorce reached the woman's hand, the law is that she

performs halitza

because of the concern that perhaps the bill of divorce did not take effect, and she is therefore a yevama who requires halitza in order to be permitted to marry another, but she does not perform yibbum with his brother, because of the concern that perhaps the bill of divorce did take effect, and she is therefore forbidden to him.

And we inquire about this:

Is it to say

[should it be said]

that Rav is uncertain whether

the expression

“Go” is equivalent to “Acquire it”

and the bill of divorce takes effect immediately upon the agent's receipt,

or “

Go”

is not equivalent to “Acquire it”

and the bill of divorce takes effect only upon the woman's receipt ,

but it was stated:

One who says to his agent:

“Go with a maneh to so-and-so, whom I owe,”

Rav said:

If the money was lost on the way,

the sender is liable

the sender

for it,

and he still owes a maneh.

And

nevertheless,

if the sender came

the sender

to retract

from it and return the maneh—

he may not retract!

Because the creditor already acquired it from the time of the delivery .

It implies that Rav holds that the expression “Go” is certainly equivalent to “Acquire it,” and he is not uncertain about this .

And we answer: In truth, Rav holds that the expression “Go” is uncertain as to whether it is equivalent to “Acquire it” or not,

but

there

regarding “Go with a maneh,” it is a monetary law, and regarding monetary matters the law is that

an uncertain monetary matter is treated leniently,

and one who comes to extract from another, the burden is upon him and he must bring proof that the law is as he claims ; therefore the sender cannot retract, since perhaps the expression “Go” is equivalent to “Acquire it,” and the agent already acquired it on behalf of the creditor.

In contrast,

here

regarding a bill of divorce, it is a matter of prohibition, and regarding prohibitions the law is that

an uncertain prohibition is treated stringently;

therefore, when he speaks to the agent with the expression “Go,” we rule stringently because of the uncertainty that the agent is both an agent for delivering the bill of divorce and an agent for acquiring it, and if her husband dies without children, she performs halitza because of the uncertainty.

Rav said: A woman does not appoint an agent to receive for her

the

bill of divorce from the hand of an agent

of

her husband,

and Rabbi Hanina said: A woman does appoint an agent to receive for her

the

bill of divorce from the hand of an agent

of

her husband.

What is Rav's reason

that the woman does not appoint an agent to receive from the husband's agent?

Two reasons may be stated for his words:

a.

If you wish, say

[if you wish, say]: The reason that the woman cannot send an agent to receive the bill of divorce from the husband's agent is

because of the husband's humiliation,

for perhaps the husband thinks that the woman is showing him disrespect by not coming herself, and he does not wish to divorce her in this manner. This is unlike a case in which the woman appoints an agent to receive the bill of divorce directly from the husband himself, for then the husband knows that the woman sent an agent, and by handing it to the agent he proves that he agrees to divorce her in this manner.

b. And

if you wish, say:

The reason that the woman cannot send an agent to receive the bill of divorce from the husband's agent is

because of a courtyard that comes afterward.

For if the husband placed the bill of divorce in a courtyard that did not belong to the woman, and afterward the woman acquired the courtyard, the woman is not divorced through this, because the husband must give the bill of divorce into the woman's hand or into her courtyard. At the time that the husband placed the bill of divorce in the courtyard, the courtyard still did not belong to the woman, and it is as though she found the bill of divorce lying there and picked it up.

Therefore, we decree that the woman's agent—who is considered like her hand or like her courtyard with regard to the bill of divorce—should not receive it from the husband's agent, because a courtyard that comes afterward resembles a case in which the husband preceded and gave it to an agent, and only afterward the woman appointed him to be an agent for receipt. People will come to compare this and permit a courtyard that she acquired after the husband gave a bill of divorce into it, saying that the courtyard was initially the husband's agent and now, when the woman acquires it, the courtyard has become her agent .

What difference is there between them

[what is the difference between the two reasons]?

There is a difference between them

[there is a difference between them] in a case

where she preceded and appointed an agent from the outset

[where the woman preceded and appointed an agent for receipt] before the husband appointed an agent for delivery,

for then there is no concern that people will come to compare this and permit a courtyard that she acquired after the bill of divorce had already been placed in it,

but there is still concern because of the husband's humiliation, since the agent does not receive the bill of divorce directly from the husband .

An incident involving

a certain man who sent a bill of divorce to his wife

[one man sent an agent with a bill of divorce to his wife],

the agent went and found her sitting and kneading

[the agent went and found the woman sitting and kneading] dough,

he said to her: “Take your bill of divorce,”

she said to him:

Since my hands are soiled with dough,

let it be in your hand

[let the bill of divorce be in your hand], and you shall be an agent for receipt and acquisition on my behalf.

Rav Naḥman said: If the words of

the

Rabbi Hanina

are established, and the halakha is like him, that a woman appoints an agent to receive the bill of divorce from the husband's agent, and we are not concerned that people will come to permit a courtyard that she acquired after the bill of divorce had already been placed in it,

I would perform an act

[I would perform an act concerning it], to permit the woman through this bill of divorce.

Rava said to him

to Rav Naḥman:

And if the teaching of Rabbi Hanina is established,

and the halakha is like him,

would you perform an act concerning it

[would you perform an act] to permit the woman through this bill of divorce?

And

but

[yet] in this case, in which she appointed the husband's agent for delivery to be her agent for receipt,

the agency did not return to the husband!

For the husband's agency was not completed to the point that the agent could return to his sender and say that he had carried out his agency.

For before the agent completed his agency for the husband, he had already detached himself from his agency and become the woman's agent,

and any agency that is not fit to return and report to the sender is not an agency, and the bill of divorce is invalid!

They sent it

[they sent this question]

before Rabbi Ami,

and he

sent back to them

[to them]: since

the agency did not return to the husband,

it is not a get.

And Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said: It has been settled

[let us examine it until our minds are settled]

concerning the matter

to answer the halakha.

After several days,

they sent again

[they returned and sent]

before Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba,

to ask him what he had decided in this question,

he said: All these have sent to me and gone

[they go and send to me so many times]?

Just as it is doubtful to them, so too it is doubtful to us

[just as the matter is doubtful to them, so too I am doubtful concerning the matter] .

And since a doubt arose in the beit-midrash concerning this matter, and it was not decided,

it is

[it is therefore] a doubt concerning

a matter of sexual status,

whether her marital status changed so that she is divorced or not,

and

everywhere that there is a doubt concerning

a matter of sexual status,

the law is that one is stringent because of the doubt ,

And therefore, in this case, if her husband dies without sons, she

performs halitza

because of the doubt, lest the get did not take effect and she is a yevama; but she does not undergo yibbum, because perhaps the get took effect, and she is forbidden to the yavam.

Like this incident,

there was another incident

[there was another incident] involving a woman who appointed the husband’s agent of conveyance to be her agent for receiving the get,

and he required

[and he required her]

Rav Yitzhak bar Shmuel bar Marta

to receive

a get

additional from her husband, because the agency did not return to the husband, and the get was nullified,

and

when the husband died, he required her to perform

halitza.

And we raise a difficulty: Did Rav Yitzhak require her

two things,

both a get and halitza? But if she received an additional get, she does not require halitza after the husband’s death!

And we explain: Rav Yitzhak did not intend that the woman requires both a get and halitza; rather, he required her

a get

additional if she came to marry another

while he was alive

when her husband was still alive,

and

he required her

halitza

if she came to marry

after his death

of her husband without his having given her an additional get before he died (without sons).

An incident: concerning

a certain woman whom they called

[a certain woman whom they called]

Nafata,

and her husband instructed two witnesses to write a get for her and give it to her,

the witnesses went and wrote

[the witnesses went and wrote] in the get, by mistake, her name

Tafata,

Rav Yitzhak bar Shmuel bar Marta said in the name of Rav:

this get itself is invalid, whereas to write another get correctly they cannot, since they had already

performed

the

witnesses

and completed their

agency,

and they cannot write a get for the woman without the husband’s agency .

Rabba raised an objection to him: Did he say to them, “Write a potsherd and give it to her”?

[Did the husband instruct the witnesses to write a potsherd, something without value, and give it to the woman]? He instructed them to write for the woman a valid get fit for her divorce, and as long as they have not written a valid get, they have still not fulfilled their agency, and they can still write a get as the husband’s agents!

Rather, Rabba said: Certainly, if the witnesses wrote a superior get

[if the witnesses wrote a get that is valid for divorce]

and it was lost,

in this manner we say that

the

witnesses

performed

and completed their

agency,

and they are no longer agents to write an additional get,

but if they wrote an invalid get, we do not say that the witnesses completed their agency, and they can write an additional get as the husband’s agents.

Rav Nahman raised an objection to him

[he raises a difficulty against this]

Did he say to them

[did the husband instruct them]

“Write

and put it in your pockets”

[write a get and put it in your pocket]?

He instructed them to write a get and divorce with it, and through the writing itself their agency was not yet fulfilled.

Rather, Rav Nahman said:

even if the witnesses had already written a valid get, they had still not completed their agency,

and if the get was lost,

they write

an additional get as the husband’s agents

and give it

to the woman,

even one hundred times

until she is divorced .

Rava asked Rav Nahman:

According to your position, that the witnesses do not complete their agency until she is divorced, if the husband said to the witnesses:

“Write and give

the get

to an agent; what is the law?”

Is it to be said that

he removed them

[that he removed the witnesses] from their agency after they gave the get to an agent, and if the get was lost by the agent, they can no longer write another get,

or perhaps

he made them agents until a get reaches her hand and she is divorced, and they can still return and write another get .

And the reason that he told them to deliver the get to an agent is that

he was concerned about their exertion

[perhaps he was concerned only about the witnesses’ exertion], so that they would not have to convey the get themselves to the woman,

but they were still agents to write a get until the woman was divorced?

Ravina said to Rav Ashi:

And what is the law if the husband added and said to the witnesses: Write a get and give it to an agent

“and he shall convey it to her; what is the law?”

Is it established from the fact that he added “and he shall convey it to her” that he intended to say that these witnesses must ensure that the agent indeed conveys it to her and that it reaches her hand, and therefore their agency remains until the get actually reaches her hand; or perhaps this is not the meaning of his words, and even in this case his intention was to make them agents only for the writing, and their agency was nullified with the writing?

And these questions were not resolved, and the Gemara remains at

teyku.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even one who says

to her agent:

“Take my get, if he wishes”

the husband

to retract

from the get after she delivered it to the agent—

he may not retract,

for the agent became an agent of receipt, and already through his receipt he acquired the get for the woman.

The Sages taught

in a beraita: If the woman appointed an agent with one of these expressions:

“Take for me,” “Carry for me,” or “Let it be for me in your possession”—

all of them are expressions of receipt,

for she intended that he be an agent of receipt, and that she be divorced through the agent’s acquisition of the get.

Mishna:

A woman who said

to an agent:

“Receive

[be an agent to receive]

for me

the

my get,

and the agent returned and said that he had received the get, but the get is not in his possession,

she requires

the woman to have

two sets of witnesses

who testify concerning the matter.

One set of

two

witnesses

who say: “In our presence she said

to the agent to receive the get on her behalf .

And

another set of

two

witnesses

who say: “In our presence he received

the get from the husband’s hand

and tore

it after he received it . ( The Gemara will explain why the agent must tear the get after acquiring it) Maimonides explains that the intention of our Mishna is that if the agent tore the get, witnesses must testify concerning this. And Meiri explains that the Mishna mentioned “and tore” only as a continuation of the matter and by way of a plausible explanation: if the get is not in his possession, presumably he tore it; but the witnesses need not testify about this, but only that he received the get in their presence.

And it is not necessary that the two sets of witnesses be separate from one another; rather,

even they

the same witnesses

are the first ones and they are the last ones,

for the witnesses before whom she appointed the agent of receipt are themselves those who saw when the agent received the get.