Gittin 63a (סג.) — the Talmud in English

Granted, if it was stated in the opposite manner:

the woman said

“Receive my bill of divorce for me,” and

the agent said

“Your wife said: Bring my bill of divorce to me,” and

the husband

said

to the agent

“Here it is, as she said,”

in such a case it would have been possible to resolve the uncertainty whether the husband relies on the agent’s statement or whether he made the matter dependent on the woman’s intent.

Since

Rab Naḥman said

in this regard:

“Once the bill of divorce has reached his possession,”

that of the agent,

“she is divorced.”

Apparently,

this proves that

he relies on her statement.

Alternatively,

if Rab Naḥman had said: Once the bill of divorce reaches

her possession,

that of the woman, she is divorced, it would have been possible to resolve that

he relies on his statement,

that of the agent,

and not hers.

But here,

in the case where the woman said to the agent, “Take it,” and the agent told the husband that she had said to him, “Receive it,” there is no proof from Rab Naḥman’s ruling that she is not divorced that the husband relied on the agent’s statement,

because

even if the husband made the matter dependent on the woman’s intent, it can be said that Rab Naḥman innovated that the agency of the agent is ineffective, since

the agent completely uprooted his agency,

as the agent did not agree to receive the bill of divorce as an agent for delivery.

For

the agent

said: “I will be an agent for receipt; I will not be an agent for delivery,

”

as I do not wish to trouble myself to bring it to her.

And if so, even afterward, when he reconsidered and brought the bill of divorce to the woman, it is not a valid bill of divorce, since initially, at the time he received the bill of divorce, he had not accepted upon himself to be the husband’s agent for delivery. And when the agent reconsidered and became willing to be an agent for delivery, he had not been appointed for this purpose by the husband.

And therefore Rab Naḥman’s statement cannot resolve whether the husband relies on the agent’s words or on the intent of the principal.

And we raise a refutation against Rab Naḥman:

Rav Huna bar Ḥiyya said: Come and hear

from what we learned in our Mishna:

One who says

to his agent, “

Receive this bill of divorce for my wife,” or

he said to his agent, “

Take this bill of divorce to my wife,”

if

the husband wishes

to

retract

his authorization of the bill of divorce—

he may retract.

And it is evident from the Mishna that

the reason

the bill of divorce does not take effect when he tells the agent “Receive it” is only

because he wishes

to retract.

But

if

he does not wish

to retract,

it is a valid bill of divorce.

And we ask:

“But why? The husband is not capable of appointing

[an agent for receipt],

an agent for receipt!”

And why is the agency effective when he says “Receive it”?

Rather,

perforce, the reason the agency is effective is that

we say: Since he set his mind

and decided

to divorce her, he says

to himself,

“Let her be divorced in any manner

[in any manner] that is effective

for divorcing her.”

Therefore, although the husband gave the bill of divorce to the agent only as an agent for receipt, nevertheless, when the bill of divorce reaches the woman’s possession, she is divorced with it. Since he had set his mind on divorcing her, when he learns that he cannot appoint an agent for receipt, he is content for the agent to be at least an agent for delivery.

And if so, this is difficult for Rab Naḥman’s statement, for

here too,

in the case addressed by Rab Naḥman, where a woman told the agent “Take it,” and the agent told the husband that she had said “Receive it,” even if at the time the agent receives the bill of divorce from the husband he does not intend to be an agent for delivery, nevertheless, when the agent reconsiders and brings the bill of divorce to the woman, the husband is content with this, and the agent is the husband’s agent for delivery,

as we saw in the Mishna:

Since

the husband

set his mind on divorcing her, he says

to himself that

“she should be divorced in any manner in which she can be divorced!”

And we reject this:

Can this really be compared?

Rab Naḥman’s ruling is not comparable to the Mishna,

for

there,

in the case of the Mishna, where the husband said “Receive it,”

a person knows that there is no agency for receipt, and he completes the transaction and gives it for delivery,

and when the husband said “Receive it,” he intended to say, “Receive it and bring it”; therefore the agency is effective,

whereas

here,

when the agent told the husband that the woman had appointed him as an agent for receipt,

the husband errs

and accepts the agent’s statement, and he gave him the bill of divorce only for receipt.

And likewise, according to Rav Ashi’s explanation, which explained Rab Naḥman’s statement as meaning that the agent had removed himself from being an agent for delivery, there is also no difficulty from that Mishna. According to that view, the reason that in the Mishna he becomes an agent for delivery when the husband says “Receive it” is not the reason stated above, but because the husband’s intention is “Receive it and bring it,” and from the outset he made him his agent. This is not so in Rab Naḥman’s statement, where initially, at the time he received the bill of divorce, the agent did not agree to be an agent for delivery. Therefore, there is no difficulty with Rab Naḥman’s statement that in such a case there is no divorce.

Rava said: Come and hear

from what we learned:

A minor girl who said

to an agent, “

Receive my bill of divorce for me,” it is not a valid bill of divorce until the bill of divorce reaches her possession,

because a minor does not have the power to appoint an agent.

And Rava infers from the Mishna: But

when the bill of divorce reaches her possession, at least, it divorces her!

But why? The husband did not make him an agent for delivery,

the husband!

Rather,

perforce, the reason the bill of divorce is effective when it reaches the woman’s possession is that

we say: Since he set his mind on divorcing her, he says

to himself,

“Let her be divorced in any manner

[in any manner] that is effective

for divorcing her.”

Therefore, although the husband gave the bill of divorce to the agent only as her agent, nevertheless, when the bill of divorce reaches the woman’s possession, she is divorced with it. Since he had set his mind on divorcing her, when he learns that the minor does not have the power to appoint an agent for receipt, he is content for the agent to be at least his agent for delivery.

If so,

here too,

in Rab Naḥman’s ruling, where the agent misled the husband into thinking that the woman had appointed him as an agent for receipt, we should say:

Since he set his mind on divorcing her, he says

to himself that

“she should be divorced in any manner in which she can be divorced!”

And we reject this:

Can this really be compared!?

Can Rab Naḥman’s ruling be compared to that Mishna?

For

there,

in the case of the minor who sent an agent, the reason the agency is effective is not the reason stated above, but because

a person knows that there is no agency for a minor, and

therefore, from the outset,

the husband completed

his intention

and gave it to her for his delivery

[so that the agent would bring the bill of divorce on his behalf].

Whereas

here,

in Rab Naḥman’s ruling,

the husband errs

regarding the agent’s statement, and appoints him for receipt, as the agent stated.

Come and hear

from what we learned in a beraita:

The woman said to the agent, “

Bring my bill of divorce to me,” and

the agent said to the husband, “

Your wife said: Receive my bill of divorce for me.”

Or the woman said, “

Receive my bill of divorce for me,” and

the agent said to the husband, “

Your wife said: Bring my bill of divorce to me.”

And he

the husband

said

to the agent, using one of these formulations:

“Take it and give it to her; acquire it for her; or receive it for her.”

The law is that if

the husband wishes

to

retract

his authorization of the bill of divorce before it reaches the woman’s possession,

he may retract.

But

once the bill of divorce reaches her possession,

she is divorced.

Is it not

the meaning of the beraita:

receipt with regard to receipt,

i.e., the husband’s formulation “Acquire it for her and receive it for her” refers to the case where the woman made the agent an agent for delivery, while the agent told the husband that he was an agent for receipt.

And delivery with regard to delivery.

The husband’s formulation “Take it and give it to her” refers to the case where the woman made the agent an agent for receipt, while the agent told the husband that he was an agent for delivery.

And concerning this, the beraita rules that the bill of divorce takes effect once it reaches the woman’s possession.

If so, this is a refutation of Rab Naḥman. For the beraita explicitly states that if the woman said, “Bring my bill of divorce to me,” and the agent told the husband, “Your wife said: Receive it,” and the husband said, “Receive it”—thus explicitly giving it to the agent for receipt [although the husband cannot appoint him as an agent for receipt, and the woman likewise did not make him an agent for receipt]—the agent becomes [at least] an agent for delivery. This implies that we say: Since the husband set his mind on divorcing her, he intends to divorce her in any manner that is effective.

All the more so in Rab Naḥman’s case, where the husband said to the agent, “Here it is, as she said.” It is possible to say that he did not rely on the agent’s statement, but made the matter dependent on the woman’s intent and likewise appointed him as an agent for delivery. In that case, it certainly should be said that the agent became an agent for delivery.

And we reject this:

No,

the beraita is not speaking of such a case. Rather,

receipt with regard to delivery!

That is, the husband’s formulation of receipt, “Acquire it for her and receive it for her,” refers to the formulation of delivery stated by the agent, “Your wife said: Bring it to me.” In such a case, the woman also appointed him as an agent for receipt, since she said to the agent, “Receive it.”

And

the formulation of

delivery

stated by the husband, “Take it and give it to her,” refers to

receipt

stated by the agent, “Your wife said: Receive it.” Therefore, the bill of divorce is effective when it reaches her possession.

And we ask:

If

the beraita is speaking of a case where the husband’s formulation of

receipt

refers

to delivery

stated by the agent, and the reason the agency is effective is that the woman also appointed the agent for receipt, then the law should be that

once the bill of divorce reaches

the agent’s

possession, it should immediately be a valid bill of divorce.

Why, then, does the beraita state that she is divorced only once the bill of divorce reaches her possession?

You may infer from this

and resolve the uncertainty raised in tractate Bava Metzia,

that he relies on his statement,

that of the agent,

and not on her statement. And when the husband said to the agent, “Receive it,” he intended to say, “Receive it and bring it.”

And as Rav Ashi said above, if Rab Naḥman had said that in the case where the woman said “Receive it” and the agent said “Your wife said: Bring it,” the law is that she is divorced only when the bill of divorce reaches her possession, it would have been possible to resolve that the husband relies on the agent’s statement and made him an agent for delivery.

And we reject this:

Can this really be compared!?

How can the law of the beraita be compared to Rav Ashi’s statement?

For

there,

in the case discussed by Rav Ashi,

the husband

says

to him,

the agent, “

Here it is, as she said,”

and since she is not divorced through the agent’s receipt, one could resolve from there the uncertainty raised in Bava Metzia: The husband’s intention when he said “as she said” was that he believed what the agent told him in his wife’s name, and he gave it to him as an agent for delivery.

Whereas

here,

from the beraita, it is not possible to resolve the uncertainty raised in Bava Metzia, because

did he say to him,

the agent, “

Here it is, as she said”?

The husband said, “Receive it.”

And since the agent said that the woman had appointed him as an agent for delivery, and the husband knows that he cannot appoint an agent for receipt, it is clear that he intended to say that he should be an agent for delivery; he was saying, “Receive it and bring it.”

But in the case where the husband said, “Here it is, as she said,” it is still possible to remain uncertain whether he relies on her intent.

The Sages taught

in a beraita:

The woman said to the agent:

“Receive my bill of divorce for me,” and

the agent came and said to the husband:

“Your wife said: Receive my bill of divorce for me.” And he

the husband

says

to the agent:

“Take it and give it to her; acquire it for her and receive it for her,”

the law is that if

the husband wishes

to

retract

his authorization,

he may not retract,

because the bill of divorce takes effect immediately upon the agent’s receipt.

Rabbi Natan says:

if the husband said

“Take it and give it to her,”

the law is that if

the husband wished

the husband

to retract—

he may;

he may retract,

because the husband appointed the agent as an agent for delivery. But if the husband said to the agent:

“Acquire it for her and receive it for her,”

if

the husband wished

the husband

to retract—

he may not retract.

Rabbi says: In all cases—

whether he said, “Take it and give it to her,” or whether he said, “Acquire it for her and receive it for her,”

if

the husband

wished to retract—

he may not retract,

because the expression “Take it” is equivalent to “Acquire it,” and the husband appointed him an agent for receipt.

However, if

the husband

said to him

the agent

“I do not want you to receive it for her; rather, take it and give it to her,”

in this manner the husband revealed that his intention in saying “Take it” was not that the agent acquire it for her, and the husband appointed him an agent for delivery. If

the husband

the husband

wished to retract

before the get reached the woman’s possession—

he may retract.

And we raise an objection: Apparently, the view of

Rabbi is

the view of

the first tanna!

And we answer:

If you wish, say:

the expression

“I do not want” was stated by

Rabbi

to teach us

that if the husband explicitly refuses to make him an agent for receipt and makes him an agent for delivery, he thereby annuls the agent’s earlier agency, and the agent becomes an agent for delivery.

And if you wish, say: This is what

the beraita

teaches: Who is the first tanna—

it is Rabbi

he.

They raised a dilemma:

what is the law when a husband says to an agent

“Here you are”—

“

Here you have it”— according

to the view of

Rabbi Natan.

Is

it

equivalent to saying

“Acquire it,”

and the get takes effect immediately upon the agent’s receipt of it?

Or is it not equivalent to “Acquire it”?

The Gemara attempts to resolve this from our Mishna:

Come and hear

from what we learned in our Mishna:

One who says

to his agent

“Receive this get for my wife,” or

who said to him

“Take this get to my wife,”

if

the husband

the husband

wished to retract

from the get before it reached the woman’s possession—

he may retract.

And

the woman who said

to the agent initially

“Receive my get for me,”

and afterward the husband gave the get to him, the law is that if

the husband

the husband

wished to retract

from the get—

he may not retract.