Gittin 63a — the Talmud in English

Granted, if it was stated in the opposite way:

the woman said

“Receive my bill of divorce for me,” and

the agent said

“Your wife said to me, ‘Bring me my bill of divorce,’ and

the husband

said

to the agent

“Here it is, as she said,”

in this manner it would have been possible to resolve the uncertainty: whether the husband relies on the agent’s words or whether he made it dependent on the woman’s דעת.

Since

said

about this

Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuha said that Rav: Once the bill of divorce has reached his hand

of the agent,

she is divorced.

Evidently,

it is proven from this that

it is on her statement that he relies.

Alternatively,

if Rav Naḥman had said: Once the bill of divorce has reached

her hand

of the woman, she is divorced, it would have been possible to resolve that

it is on his statement

of the agent

that he relies.

But here,

in the case in which the woman said to the agent, “Take it,” and the agent said to the husband that she had said to him, “Receive it,” there is no proof from Rav Naḥman’s words that she is not divorced that the husband relied on the agent’s words,

because

even if the husband made it dependent on the woman’s דעת, it may be said that Rav Naḥman innovated that the agency of the agent is not effective, since

the agent completely uprooted his agency,

for the agent did not agree to receive the bill of divorce as an agent of conveyance.

For

the agent

said: “I will be an agent of reception; for conveyance

I will not be,”

as I do not wish to trouble myself and bring it to her.

And if so, even afterward, when he reconsidered and conveyed the bill of divorce to the woman, it is not a bill of divorce, for initially, at the time of receiving the bill of divorce, he did not accept upon himself to be the husband’s agent for conveyance. And when the agent reconsidered and became an agent for conveyance, he was not appointed for this by the husband.

And one cannot resolve from Rav Naḥman whether the husband relies on the agent’s words or on the דעת of the sender.

And we raise a refutation against Rav Naḥman:

Rav Huna bar Ḥiyya said, ta shma

from what we learned in our Mishna:

One who says

to his agent,

“Receive this bill of divorce for my wife,” or

who says to his agent,

“Take this bill of divorce to my wife,”

if

the husband wishes

to

retract

from the bill of divorce,

he may retract.

And it is explained in the Mishna that

the reason

that the bill of divorce does not take effect when he says to the agent “Receive” is only because

he wished

to retract.

But

if

he did not wish

to retract,

it is a bill of divorce.

And we ask,

“But why? Does the husband not lack the capacity to appoint

[the capacity for appointment of]

an agent of reception?”

And why is the agency effective when he says “Receive”?

Rather,

it must be that the reason the agency is effective is because

we say: Since he set his eyes

and decided

to divorce her, he says

the husband in his heart,

“Let her be divorced in any manner

[in any manner] that is effective

in divorcing her.”

And therefore, although the husband gave the bill of divorce to the agent only as reception, nevertheless when the bill of divorce reaches the woman’s hand, she is divorced through it, because since he set his eyes on divorcing her, when he learns that he cannot make an agent of reception, he is content that the agent should at least be an agent of conveyance.

And if so, this is difficult against Rav Naḥman’s words, for

here too,

in the case spoken of by Rav Naḥman, where a woman said to the agent, “Take it,” and the agent said that she had said, “Receive,” even if at the time the agent receives the bill of divorce from the husband’s hand, it is not his דעת to be an agent of conveyance, nevertheless when the agent reconsiders and conveys the bill of divorce to the woman, the husband is content with this, and he is the husband’s agent of conveyance,

as we saw in the Mishna:

since he set

the husband

his eyes on divorcing her, he says

the husband in his heart that

“Let her be divorced in any manner in which she is divorced!”

And we reject this:

“How now?”

The law of Rav Naḥman is not comparable to the Mishna,

for

there,

in the case of the Mishna, where the husband said “Receive,”

a person knows that there is no agency for reception, and he fully resolves and gives it for conveyance,

and what the husband said, “Receive,” he intended to say, “Receive and convey”; therefore the agency is effective,

whereas

here,

when the agent told the husband that the woman had made him an agent of reception,

the husband errs

and believes the agent’s words, and gives him the bill of divorce only for reception.

And likewise, according to Rav Ashi’s explanation, who explained in Rav Naḥman’s words that the agent uprooted himself from being an agent of conveyance, there is also no difficulty from that Mishna, since the reason in the Mishna that he becomes an agent of conveyance when the husband says “Receive” is not the reason that we stated, but because the husband’s intention is “Receive and convey,” and from the outset he becomes his agent. Whereas in Rav Naḥman’s words, from the outset, at the time of receiving the bill of divorce, the agent did not agree to be an agent of conveyance. Therefore there is no difficulty with what Rav Naḥman said, that in such a case there is no divorce.

Rava said, ta shma

from what we learned:

A minor who said

to an agent,

“Receive my bill of divorce for me,” it is not a bill of divorce until the bill of divorce reaches her hand,

because a minor does not have the power to appoint an agent.

And Rava infers from the Mishna: But

when the bill of divorce reaches her hand, at any rate, it divorces her!

And why? Did the husband not make him an agent of conveyance

the husband!

Rather,

it must be that the reason the bill of divorce is effective when it reaches the woman’s hand is that

we say: Since he set his eyes on divorcing her, he says

the husband in his heart,

“Let her be divorced in any manner

[in any manner] that is effective

in divorcing her.”

And therefore, although the husband gave the bill of divorce to the agent only as her agent, nevertheless when the bill of divorce reaches the woman’s hand, she is divorced through it, because since he set his eyes on divorcing her, when he learns that the minor does not have the power to appoint an agent of reception, he is content that the agent should at least be his agent of conveyance.

If so,

here too,

in Rav Naḥman’s law, where the agent misled the husband by saying that the woman had made him an agent of reception, let us say:

Since he set his eyes on divorcing her, he says

the husband in his heart that

“Let her be divorced in any manner in which she is divorced!”

And we reject this:

“How now!?”

Can Rav Naḥman’s law be compared to the Mishna there?

For

there,

in the case of a minor who sent an agent, the reason the agency is effective is not the reason we stated, but because

a person knows that there is no agency for a minor, and

therefore from the outset

he fully resolved

the husband in his heart

and gave it to her for his conveyance

[so that the agent would convey the bill of divorce on his behalf].

Whereas

here,

in Rav Naḥman’s law,

the husband errs

in the agent’s words, and appoints him for reception in accordance with the agent’s words.

Ta shma

from what we learned in a beraita:

The woman said to the agent,

“Bring me my bill of divorce,” and

the agent said to the husband,

“Your wife said, ‘Receive my bill of divorce.’”

Or the woman said,

“Receive my bill of divorce,” and

the agent said to the husband,

“Your wife said, ‘Bring me my bill of divorce.’”

And he

the husband

said

to the agent in one of these formulations:

“Take it and give it to her; acquire it for her; and receive it for her.”

The law is: if

the husband wishes

the husband

to retract

from it before the bill of divorce reaches the woman’s hand,

he may retract.

But

once the bill of divorce reaches her hand—

she is divorced.

Is this not

[the meaning] in the beraita:

reception for reception.

That is, the husband’s wording, “Acquire it for her and receive it for her,” applies to the case where the woman made the agent an agent of conveyance and the agent told the husband that he was an agent of reception.

And conveyance for conveyance.

The husband’s wording, “Take it and give it to her,” applies to the case where the woman made the agent an agent of reception and the agent told the husband that he was an agent of conveyance.

And concerning this the beraita rules that the bill of divorce takes effect once it reaches the woman’s hand.

And if so, this is a tiyuvta against Rav Naḥman. For it is explicitly explained in the beraita that if the woman said, “Bring me my bill of divorce,” and the agent said to the husband, “Your wife said, ‘Receive,’” and the husband said, “Receive,” whereby he explicitly gave it to the agent for reception [and the husband cannot appoint him as an agent of reception, and the woman likewise did not make him an agent of reception]—the agent becomes [at least] an agent of conveyance. And it implies that we say: Since the husband set his eyes on divorcing her, the husband intends to divorce her in any manner that is effective.

All the more so in Rav Naḥman’s case, where the husband said to the agent, “Here it is, as she said,” for it may be said that he did not rely on the agent’s words, but made it dependent on the woman’s דעת, and also appointed him an agent of conveyance; in that case, certainly it should be said that the agent became an agent of conveyance.

And we reject this:

No,

the beraita is not speaking of such a case. Rather,

reception for conveyance!

That is, the husband said wording of reception, “Acquire it for her and receive it for her,” in response to the wording of conveyance that the agent said, “Your wife said, ‘Bring me my bill of divorce.’” In such a case the woman too appointed him an agent of reception, for she said to the agent, “Receive.”

And

the wording of

conveyance

that the husband said, “Take it and give it to her,” applies

to reception

that the agent said, “Your wife said, ‘Receive,’” and therefore the bill of divorce is effective when it comes into her hand.

And we ask:

If

the beraita is speaking of a wording of

reception

that the husband’s wording applies

to conveyance

that the agent said, and the reason the agency is effective is because the woman too appointed the agent for reception, then the law should be that

as soon as the bill of divorce reaches

the moment the agent receives the bill of divorce

into his hand, it should immediately be a bill of divorce for her. And why is it explained in the beraita that she is divorced only once the bill of divorce reaches her hand?!

Why, then, does the beraita state that she is divorced only once the bill of divorce reaches her possession?

You may learn from it

that the uncertainty in tractate Bava Metzia can be resolved,

that it is on his statement

of the agent

that he relies

the husband! And what the husband said to the agent, “Receive,” he intended to say, “Receive and convey.”

As Rav Ashi said above: If Rav Naḥman had said that in the case where the woman said, “Receive,” and the agent said, “Your wife said, ‘Bring it,’” the law is that she is divorced only when the bill of divorce reaches her hand, it would have been possible to resolve that the husband relies on the agent’s words and made him an agent of conveyance.

And we reject this:

“How now!?”

How is it possible to compare the law of the beraita to Rav Ashi’s words?

For

there,

in the case of which Rav Ashi spoke,

he says

to him

the husband to the agent,

“Here it is, as she said,”

and since she is not divorced through the agent’s reception, the uncertainty in tractate Bava Metzia can be resolved from there: the husband’s intention in saying “as she said” was that he believed the agent concerning what he told him in his wife’s name, and gave it to him as conveyance.

Whereas

here,

from the beraita, the uncertainty in tractate Bava Metzia cannot be resolved, because

did he say to him

the husband to the agent,

“Here it is, as she said”?

After all, the husband said, “Receive.”

And since the agent said that the woman had made him an agent of conveyance, and the husband knows that he does not make an agent of reception, it is clear that he intended to say that he should be an agent of conveyance; he said, “Receive and convey.”

But in the case where the husband said, “Here it is, as she said,” it is still possible to be uncertain: perhaps he relies on her דעת.

The Sages taught

in a beraita:

The woman said to the agent:

“Receive my bill of divorce for me, and

the agent came and said to the husband:

“Your wife said, ‘Receive my bill of divorce.’ And he

the husband

says

to the agent:

“Take it and give it to her; acquire it for her and receive it for her,”

the law is that if

the husband wishes

the husband

to retract

from it,

he may not retract,

because the bill of divorce takes effect immediately upon the agent’s reception.

Rabbi Natan says:

if the husband said

“Go and give it to her,”

the rule is that if

he wished

the husband

to retract

—he can

retract,

for the husband made the agent an agent of delivery. And if the husband said to the agent:

“Acquire it for her and receive it for her,”

if

he wished

the husband

to retract

—he may not retract,

Rabbi says: in all of them

—whether in “Go and give it to her,” or in “Acquire it and receive it for her”—

if he wished

the husband

to retract

—he may not retract,

for the expression “go” is like “acquire,” and the husband made him an agent of acceptance.

But if

the husband

said to him

the agent

“I do not want you to receive it for her, but go and give it to her,”

in this manner the husband revealed his view that the expression “go” that he said does not mean acquisition, and the husband made him an agent of delivery. And if

he wished

the husband

to retract

before the bill of divorce reached the woman’s hand—

he may retract.

And we raise an objection: for apparently the opinion of

Rabbi is

the opinion of

the first tanna!

And we answer:

Alternatively, I could say

the expression

“I do not want” came

Rabbi

to teach us

that if the husband explicitly refuses to make him an agent of acceptance, and makes him an agent of delivery, he thereby nullifies the agent’s previous agency, and he becomes an agent of delivery.

And alternatively, I could say: this is what it teaches us

the beraita:

Who is the first tanna

? Rabbi

is.

They raised a question before them:

what is the law regarding a husband who says to an agent

“Here, take it”

“

to

the opinion of

Rabbi Natan.

Does

it

mean

“acquire,”

and the divorce takes effect immediately upon the agent’s receiving it?

Or does it not mean “acquire”?

And the Gemara attempts to resolve this from our Mishna:

Come and hear

from what we learned in our Mishna:

One who says

to his agent

“Receive this bill of divorce for my wife,” or

says to him

“Take this bill of divorce to my wife,”

if

he wished

the husband

to retract

from the bill of divorce before it reached the woman’s hand—

he may retract.

And

the woman who said

to the agent first

“Receive my bill of divorce for me,”

and afterward the husband gave him the bill of divorce, the rule is that if

he wished

the husband

to retract

from the bill of divorce—

he may not retract.