Gittin 62b (סב:) — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

A

husband who appointed an agent to deliver a get to his wife, whether he

says

to the agent using the expression

“Receive”

and acquire

this get for my wife,

or

w

hether he says to him using the expression

“Take this get to my wife,”

he is merely an agent for delivery.

Therefore,

if he wishes

the husband

to retract

and cancel the get,

he may retract

as long as the get has not reached the wife.

Since the get is a liability for the wife, and it is impossible to acquire the get for her without her knowledge, therefore, as long as the get has not reached her hand, she is not yet divorced, and the husband may retract.

But

the wife who

appointed an agent to take the get from her husband and

said

to the agent using the expression

“Receive

and acquire

my get for me”

on my behalf, and the husband gave the get to the agent, the law is that

if he wishes

the husband

to retract

from the get,

he may not retract,

because once the wife made him an agent for receipt, his hand became like her hand. When the husband gave the get to the agent, it was as though the get had reached the wife’s hand.

And since, when the husband gives the get to an agent for receipt, he cannot retract, he has no recourse for retracting except to refuse this agency appointed by the wife and appoint the agent according to his own wishes.

Therefore, if the husband said to him

the agent for receipt:

“I

do not want

[I do not wish]

you to receive

and acquire

for her

the get,

but

only

take

the get

and give it to her,”

so that the wife acquires the get only when it reaches her hand, because through this he uprooted the agency for receipt and made him an agent for delivery,

if he wishes

the husband

to retract

before the get has reached the wife’s hand,

he may retract,

as we learned above concerning an agent for delivery.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:

Not only when she says “Receive,” but

also when she says

to the agent using the expression:

“Take my get for me,”

her intention is that he be an agent to receive the get on her behalf.

Therefore

if he wishes

the husband

to retract

after the get has reached the agent’s hand,

he may not retract,

because this expression also means that the woman made him an agent whose hand is like her hand.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: When a husband appoints an agent to deliver a get to his wife using the expressions “Receive” and “Take,” he may retract.

The Gemara now discusses whether the expression “Take” is equivalent to “Acquire,” or not; above [14a], the Gemara cited a dispute concerning this matter.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Avya, said to Rav Ashi:

It can be inferred from the Mishna that

the reason

the husband can retract is

that she did not appoint him

[the woman did not appoint the agent] to be

an agent for receipt

[whereas the husband cannot appoint an agent for receipt, since the get is a liability for the wife, and one cannot acquire for a person through another, without that person’s knowledge, something that is a liability for him; therefore the husband can retract].

But

if, before the husband’s appointment,

she had appointed him

[the woman had appointed him] to serve on her behalf as

an agent for receipt,

we should infer from the Mishna’s wording that even if the husband says to the agent “Take,” nevertheless, if

he wishes to retract —

he may not retract,

because this expression does not uproot the woman’s appointment.

We may conclude

[it follows from here] to resolve the dispute above [14a] that the expression

“Take” is equivalent to “Acquire.”

Therefore, when the woman appointed the agent for receipt and the husband said to him “Take” the get, the divorce takes effect immediately when the husband hands the get to the agent.

And we reject this:

No,

this does not prove that one who says “Take” is equivalent to one who says “Acquire.” For

I can say

[I can tell]

you

that the expression

“Take” is not equivalent to “Acquire.”

And one cannot infer from the Mishna that when the woman appointed the agent for receipt, the get takes effect immediately even if the husband said “Take.” Rather, our Mishna holds that when the husband says “Take” to the agent, he uproots the woman’s agency and makes him solely an agent for delivery.

The reason the Mishna did not state this case and did not teach that the expression “Take” uproots the agent’s status as an agent for receipt is that the Mishna preferred to teach another novel point, in a case where the woman had not appointed him as an agent.

And it was necessary for it to state, “Receive a get for my wife,”

in order to teach a novel point in a case where the woman had not appointed him as an agent.

For it might have entered your mind that, since

the woman had not appointed him as an agent,

and

the

husband

appointed him using the expression “Receive,”

he is not fit to appoint

[he is not capable of appointment]

as an agent for receipt,

but only fit to be appointed as an agent for delivery; and he did not appoint the agent using an expression of delivery. I might therefore have thought that

even though the get reaches

[comes to]

her hand,

the wife’s own hand,

it is not a get,

since the husband’s appointment of the agent is invalid, and this is not agency at all.

It teaches us that when he says, “Receive and take,” that is what he means.

A person knows that he cannot appoint an agent for receipt, and therefore intended to appoint him as an agent for delivery. Consequently, when the get reaches her hand, she is divorced.

And in connection with this novel point, the Mishna also presents the case in which the husband appointed the agent using the wording “go.” Thus, the intent of the Mishna is to say: Whether the husband said “receive,” or whether he said “go,” he becomes an agent for delivery.

The Gemara attempts to bring proof to the law that “go” is equivalent to “acquire” from the continuation of the Mishna.

It was taught

in our Mishna:

“If the woman said, ‘Receive my bill of divorce for me,’ and [the husband] wishes to retract”—

he may not retract.

Is that not

does this law apply to both formulations that the husband used in the first clause of the Mishna—

it is no different if he said “receive,”

if the husband said to him using the wording

“receive,” it is no different if he said “go,”

if the husband said to him using the wording

“go,”

once the woman appointed him as an agent for receipt, the law is that he may not retract.

And infer from here that “go” is equivalent to “acquire,” and the husband does not, by using the wording “go,” uproot the agent from receiving the bill of divorce as the woman’s agent for receipt.

And we reject this:

No,

the law in the latter clause—that if the woman appointed the agent for receipt, she is divorced immediately when the bill of divorce is handed to the agent—is referring only to

“receive,”

to a case in which the husband also used the wording “receive.”

Come and hear

from what we learned in the continuation of the Mishna:

“Therefore, if the husband said to him

the woman’s agent,

‘I do not wish

[I have no desire]

that you receive

and acquire it

for her; rather, go and give it to her,’ if he wishes”

the husband

“to retract”—

he may retract.

And it is demonstrated from the Mishna that

the reason

that the husband may retract, and she is not divorced immediately upon the agent’s receipt, is specifically because

he said, “I do not wish

that you receive it for her.”

But

if

he did not say, “I do not wish,”

it follows that even if he said “go,” he does not uproot the woman’s agency, and the agent remains an agent for receipt; and

if he wishes to retract—

he may not retract.

Infer from here: “Go” is equivalent to “acquire”!

And we reject this: There is no proof from here. For

perhaps

the latter clause should not be understood as saying “go and give it to her”; rather, the Mishna is speaking of a husband who said

in

the wording

“Here, take it,”

whose intention was certainly to say, “Here is what the woman requested.” Therefore, if the husband did not say, “I do not wish,” the agent is an agent for receipt.

The Gemara now proceeds to discuss the very law of agency with regard to a bill of divorce:

The law of agency with regard to a bill of divorce is derived from the verse: “And he shall write for her a document of severance, and give it into her hand, and send her from his house” [Deuteronomy 24:1].

If so,

it is obvious,

that

a man

can be

able to be

an agent

of the husband

for delivery—

since the husband

is the one who

delivers

the

bill of divorce to his wife,

and with regard to an act for which he himself is fit, his agent is likewise fit.

And

it is likewise obvious to us that

a woman can be

able to be

an agent for receipt—

since a woman

herself

receives

her

bill of divorce directly from her husband.

But there is room for doubt:

Whether

a man

can be an agent

for receipt,

to acquire a bill of divorce on behalf of the woman.

And

whether

a woman

can be an agent

for delivery,

to deliver the bill of divorce on behalf of the husband into the woman’s hand.

What

[what is the law? Does one say that since the husband is not capable of receiving, other males are likewise not capable of receiving in order to acquire the bill of divorce on behalf of the woman, or not? And similarly, there is a doubt concerning agency for delivery by a woman.

The Gemara attempts to resolve the doubt from our Mishna:

Come and hear

from what we learned in our Mishna:

“One who says

to his agent,

‘Receive this bill of divorce for my wife,’ or

who said

‘Take this bill of divorce to my wife,’

the law is:

if he wishes

the husband

to retract

from the bill of divorce—

he may retract,

because the agent became only an agent for delivery.

And if

the woman said

to the agent

“Receive my bill of divorce for me,”

the law is that

if he wishes

the husband

to retract

from the bill of divorce—

he may not retract,

because the agent became an agent for receipt, and the woman is divorced immediately upon his receipt.

Is it not

[the case]

with one agent

[the same agent] in both cases,

and infer from here

that the same agent who is

fit for receipt is fit

also

for delivery.

And we reject this:

No.

It is possible to interpret our Mishna as referring to

two agents,

different agents: the agent for delivery was a male, and the agent for receipt was a woman.

Come and hear

from what we learned in the latter clause:

“Therefore, if the husband said to him

the agent whom the woman sent to receive her bill of divorce on her behalf:

‘I do not wish

[I have no desire]

that you receive

and acquire it

for her; rather, go and give it to her, if he wishes”

the husband

“to retract”

from the bill of divorce,

he may retract,

for he transformed the agent into an agent for delivery,

and here, it is one agent,

for the husband said to the same agent to whom the woman had said, “Receive,” “I do not wish you to be an agent for receipt; rather, be an agent for delivery.”

And infer from here

that the same agent who is

fit for receipt is fit

also

for delivery.

And since above the Gemara raised two doubts: a. Whether a man can be an agent for receipt; b. Whether a woman can be an agent for delivery,

resolve from it

one of the doubts from this Mishna.

For it is possible to say that the Mishna is speaking of a man, who is fit for receipt as well, or it is possible to say that the Mishna is speaking of a woman who is fit for delivery as well.

But it is more reasonable to resolve from the Mishna that

a man can be

also

an agent for receipt,

rather than to resolve from the Mishna that a woman is also fit for delivery,

since

we find a situation in which a man receives a bill of divorce, for

a father receives a bill of divorce for his minor daughter

in her place. This is derived from the fact that the Torah granted the father the right to receive her betrothal, in the verse “She shall go out for nothing, without payment,” and it says, “And she shall go out and become,” juxtaposing betrothal to divorce. From this we learn that just as the betrothal of a minor belongs to her father, so too the bill of divorce of a minor belongs to her father. Since we find a case in which a man receives a bill of divorce, it is therefore reasonable that he is fit to serve as an agent as well.

If so, the Mishna can resolve only the question concerning a man, who is fit for receipt as well.

But concerning

a woman,

whether she can also be an agent

for delivery,

the question

remains unresolved; what is the law?

Rav Mari said: Come and hear

from what we learned in the Mishna above [23b]:

“Even the women

who hate the woman,”

such as her mother-in-law, her mother-in-law’s daughter, her rival wife, her yevama, and her husband’s daughter,

who are not deemed credible to say

about a woman that

her husband died

because they are suspected of harming her—

are deemed credible ‘to bring’ her bill of divorce

from the husband.

And there,

it is certainly agency

for delivery,

as it says, “to bring her bill of divorce.”

Infer from here that a woman can be an agent for delivery.

Rav Ashi said: From the latter clause

of that Mishna

we can also infer

that a woman can be an agent for delivery.

For it teaches in the latter clause: “The woman herself brings her bill of divorce, provided that she must say, ‘It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence.’”

And we established

[and explained] above, in the first chapter, that this refers to

an

agency

for delivery,

as is evident from the fact that the woman must say, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence.” We raised the difficulty that once the bill of divorce has reached her hand, she is divorced; why, then, must she say, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence”? We answered that this refers to a case in which the husband told her to be an agent for delivery until she arrives there. If so, she has not yet been divorced, and therefore she must say, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence.”

Infer from here

that a woman can also be an agent for delivery.

It was stated:

If the woman said to the agent,

“Bring me my bill of divorce,”

the meaning is that the divorce takes effect only once the bill of divorce reaches her hand.

And

the agent came and said to the husband:

“Your wife said, ‘Receive my bill of divorce for me,’”

the meaning is that she becomes divorced as soon as the agent acquires the bill of divorce.

And he

[the husband]

said

to the agent:

“Here, take it,”

the bill of divorce, so that it should take effect

“as she said.”

Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuha said that Rav said: Even if the bill of divorce reached her hand, she is not divorced.

The Gemara proves from the words of Rav Naḥman in the name of Rav:

Infer from here

that the husband

relies on his statement

of the agent

concerning

the agent’s words: The husband’s intent accords with the agent’s statement—that he should be an agent for receipt and for acquiring the bill of divorce on behalf of the woman, and not an agent for delivering the bill of divorce from the husband to the woman. Since the woman did not appoint him as an agent for receipt , she is not divorced when the agent receives the bill of divorce from the husband, nor is she divorced when she receives the bill of divorce from the agent, because he was not an agent for delivery, and the husband’s delivery into the woman’s hand is lacking.

For if

we say that the husband

relies on

the woman's statement

and the husband's intention follows the woman's words and not those of the agent, and this is the meaning of what he said to the agent: “I do not know what she told you; rather, I will give you the get as the woman told you.

then the halakha should be that

as soon as

it reaches

her hand, at least, she is divorced!

for the husband too appointed the agent as an agent for delivery.

And we can resolve from Rav Nahman's statement the question raised in tractate Bava Metzia [the chapter “One Who Hires Artisans”], whether the sender relies on the agent's words or not.

Rav Ashi said: How can you say that?!

Can one resolve from Rav Nahman's statement in the name of Rav that the husband relies on the agent's words?