Gittin 62b — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

A

husband who made an agent in order to deliver a get to his wife, whether he

says

to the agent in the wording

“Receive”

and acquire

this get for my wife,

or

i

f he says to him in the wording

“Take” this get for my wife,

he is only an agent of delivery.

And therefore:

if he wishes

the husband

to retract

and annul the get—

he may retract,

as long as the get has not reached the woman's hand.

Since the get is a liability for the woman, and it is impossible to acquire the get for her without her knowledge, therefore, as long as the get has not reached her hand she is still not divorced, and the husband can retract.

But

the woman who

appointed an agent to take the get from the husband, and

said

to the agent in the wording

“Receive

and acquire

my get

for me,” and the husband gave the get to the agent, the law is that

if he wishes

the husband

to retract

from the get—

he may not retract,

for since the woman made him an agent of acceptance, his hand becomes like her hand, and when the husband handed the get to the agent's hand, it is as though the get reached the woman's hand.

And since, if the husband hands the get to an agent of acceptance, he cannot retract, he has no remedy for retracting unless the husband refuses—refuses this agency of the woman—and appoints the agent according to his own will.

Therefore, if the husband said to him

to the agent of acceptance:

I

do not wish [

I do not want]

that you receive

and acquire

for her

the get,

but

only

take

the get

and give it to her, so that the woman will acquire the get only when it reaches her hand, only then, since by this he uprooted the agency of acceptance and made him an agent of delivery,

if he wishes

the husband

to retract

before the get reached the woman's hand—

he may retract,

as we learned above concerning an agent of delivery.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: It is not only the woman who says “Receive,” but

even the one who says

to the agent in the wording:

“Take my get,

her intention is that he should be an agent to receive the get for her,

and therefore

if he wishes

the husband

to retract

after the get reached the agent's hand—

he may not retract,

for this wording too means that the woman made him an agent so that his hand would be like her hand.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: A husband who appoints an agent to deliver a get to his wife with the wording “Receive” and “Take” can retract.

And the Gemara now discusses the question of whether the wording “Take” is like “Acquire,” or not; and above [14a] the Gemara brought a dispute concerning this matter.

Rav Aha, son of Rav Avya, said to Rav Ashi: It may be precisely inferred from the Mishna that

the reason

he husband can retract is because

she did not make him [the woman did not appoint the agent] to be

an agent of acceptance [whereas the husband cannot appoint an agent of acceptance, since the get is a liability for the woman, and it is impossible to acquire for a person through another, without his knowledge, something that is a liability for him; therefore the husband can retract].

But if, before the husband's appointment,

she made him [the woman appointed him] to be for her

an agent of acceptance,

we should infer from the wording of the Mishna that even if the husband says to the agent in the wording “Take,” nevertheless, if

he wishes to retract—

he may not retract,

for this wording does not uproot the woman's words.

Infer from it [it follows from here] to resolve the dispute above [14a] that the wording

“Take” is considered like “Acquire.”

Therefore, when the woman appointed the agent for acceptance and the husband said to him in the wording “Take” the divorce, the divorce takes effect immediately when the husband hands the get to the agent.

We reject this:

No,

it is not possible to prove from here that one who says “Take” is considered as one who says to him “Acquire.” For

I can always say to you

that the wording

“Take” is not considered like “Acquire.”

And one should not infer from the Mishna that if the woman appointed the agent as an agent of acceptance, the get takes effect immediately, even if the husband said to him in the wording “Take.” Rather, our Mishna holds that if the husband says to the agent in the wording “Take,” he uproots the woman's agency and makes him an agent of delivery בלבד.

And the reason that the Mishna did not state this case, and did not teach the novelty that the wording “Take” uproots the agent from being an agent of acceptance, is that the Mishna preferred to teach us another novelty, in a case where the woman did not appoint him as an agent.

And “Receive a get for my wife” was necessary for it, to teach us a novelty in a case where the woman did not appoint him as an agent.

For it might enter your mind to say: Since the woman did not appoint him as an agent,

and

the

husband appointed him with the wording “Receive,”

he is not fit to appoint [he is not fit for appointment as]

an agent of acceptance,

but is fit only for appointment as an agent of delivery, and he did not appoint the agent with wording of delivery, I might have thought to say that

even though the get reaches

her hand, the woman's own hand,

it is not a get, for the husband's appointment of the agent is invalid, and this is no agency at all.

It informs us that he said, “Receive and take.” A person knows that he cannot appoint an agency of acceptance, and he intended to appoint him as an agent of delivery; therefore, when the get reached her hand, she is divorced.

For it might have entered your mind that, since

the woman had not appointed him as an agent, and

the

the

husband

appointed him using the wording “Receive,”

he is not fit to appoint

[he is not capable of appointment]

an agent for acceptance,

but only fit to appoint an agent for delivery—and he did not appoint the agent using wording of delivery—we might think that

even though the bill reaches

[comes to]

her hand

the woman’s own hand,

it would not be a bill of divorce,

because the husband’s appointment of the agent is invalid and this is not agency at all.

It teaches us that when he says “Receive and carry,” that is what he means.

A person knows that he cannot appoint an agent for acceptance, and therefore intended to appoint him as an agent for delivery. Consequently, when the bill of divorce reaches her hand, she is divorced.

And incidentally, this innovation the Mishna brought as well: the manner in which the husband made the agent, using the wording “go.” And this is the intention of the Mishna to say: whether the husband said in the wording “receive,” or whether he said in the wording “go,” he became an agent for delivery.

And the Gemara attempts to bring a proof for the law that “go” is like “acquire” from the continuation of the Mishna.

It was taught

in our Mishna:

“The woman who said, ‘Receive my get for me,’ if he wishes to retract”—

he may not retract.

Is it not

that this law applies to the two wordings that the husband said to him in the first clause of the Mishna,

whether it was “receive,”

if the husband said to him in the wording

“receive,” whether it was “delivery,”

if the husband said to him in the wording

“delivery,”

after the woman appointed him an agent for reception, the law is that he may not retract?

And learn from this that “go” is like “acquire,” and the husband does not, through the wording “go,” uproot the agent from receiving the get as the woman’s agent for reception.

And we reject this:

No,

the law of the latter clause, that if the woman made the agent an agent for reception, she is divorced immediately upon delivery of the get to the agent, is speaking only of

“receive,”

in a case where the husband also said it in the wording “receive.”

Come and hear

from what we learned in the continuation of the Mishna:

“Therefore, if the husband said to him

to the woman’s agent,

‘I do not wish

[I have no desire]

that you receive

and acquire

it for her, but go and give it to her,’ if he wishes”

the husband

“to retract”—

“he may retract.”

And it is proven from the Mishna:

the reason

that the husband can retract, and she is not divorced immediately through the agent’s reception, is specifically because

he said, “I do not wish

that you receive it for her.”

But

if

he did not say, “I do not wish,”

it follows that even if he said “go,” he does not uproot the woman’s agency, and he is an agent for reception, and

“if he wishes to retract”—

“he may not retract.”

Learn from this: “Go” is deemed like “acquire”!

And we reject this: There is no proof from here. For

perhaps

the Mishna should not be changed here in the latter clause to “go and give it to her”; rather, the Mishna is speaking of a husband who said

in

the wording

“Here it is,”

whose intention certainly was to say, “Here it is, as the woman said.” Therefore, if the husband did not say, “I do not wish,” he is an agent for reception.

And now the Gemara moves to discuss the very law of agency concerning a get:

The law of agency concerning a get is learned from the verse, “And he shall write for her a scroll of severance and place it in her hand, and he shall send her from his house” [Deuteronomy 24:1].

And if so,

it is obvious,

for

a man

is

able to be

an agent

of the husband

for delivery—

since a husband

is the one who

delivers

the

get to his wife,

and with regard to something for which he himself is fit, his agent is also fit.

And

it is likewise obvious to us that

a woman is

able to be

an agent for reception—

since a woman

herself

receives

her

get directly from her husband.

But there is a question:

Can

a man

be an agent

for reception,

to acquire a get on behalf of the woman?

And

can

the woman

be an agent

for delivery,

to deliver the get on behalf of the husband into the woman’s hand?

What

[what is the law]: Do we say that since the husband is not capable of reception, other males likewise are not capable of reception, to acquire a get on behalf of the woman, or not? And similarly, the question concerning agency for delivery in the case of a woman .

And the Gemara attempts to resolve the question from our Mishna:

Come and hear

from what we learned in our Mishna:

“One who says

to his agent,

‘Receive this get for my wife,’ or

who said

‘Deliver this get to my wife,’

the law is:

“if he wishes

the husband

“to retract”

from the get—

“he may retract,”

for the agent became only an agent for delivery.

And if

“the woman who said”

to the agent,

“Receive my get for me,”

the law is that

“if he wishes

the husband

“to retract”

from the get—

“he may not retract,”

for the agent became an agent for reception, and immediately upon his reception the woman is divorced.

Is it not

[speaking]

“of one agent”

[the same agent] in the two cases,

“and learn from this”

that the same agent who is

“fit for reception is fit”

also

“for delivery.”

And we reject this:

No.

It is possible to explain that our Mishna is speaking

“of two agents,”

different ones: the agent for delivery was a male, and the agent for reception was a woman.

Come and hear

from what we learned in the latter clause:

“Therefore, if the husband said to him”

to the agent whom the woman sent to receive her get for her:

“I do not wish”

[I have no desire]

“that you receive”

and acquire it

“for her, but go and give it to her; if he wishes”

the husband

“to retract”

from the get,

“he may retract,”

for he transformed the agent into an agent for delivery,

“and here, it is one agent,”

for to that same agent to whom the woman said, “Receive,” he said, “I do not wish you to be an agent for reception; rather, be an agent for delivery.”

“And learn from this”

that the same agent who is

“fit for reception is fit”

also

“for delivery.”

And since above the Gemara raised two questions: a. whether a man can be an agent for reception; b. whether a woman can be an agent for delivery,

“resolve from it”

from this Mishna one of the questions.

For it is possible to say that the Mishna is speaking of a man, who is fit also for reception; and it is possible to say that the Mishna is speaking of a woman, who is fit also for delivery.

But it is more reasonable to resolve from the Mishna that

“a man is”

also

“an agent for reception,”

than to resolve from the Mishna that a woman is also fit for delivery,

“since”

we find a manner in which a man receives a get, for

“a father receives a get for his minor daughter”

in her place. And this is learned from the fact that the Torah granted the father the right to receive her betrothal through the verse, “And she shall go out for nothing, without money,” and it says, “And she shall go out and become,” to juxtapose betrothals to gittin. From this we learn that just as the betrothal of a minor belongs to her father, so the get of a minor belongs to her father. And since we find a manner in which a man receives a get, it is therefore reasonable that he is fit also with regard to agency.

And if so, the Mishna can resolve only the case of a man, who is fit also for reception.

But concerning

“a woman,”

whether she can also be an agent

“for delivery,”

it still

“remains a question for you: what is the law?”

“Rav Mari said: Come and hear”

from what we learned in the earlier Mishna [folio 23]:

“Even the women”

who hate the woman,

such as her mother-in-law, her mother-in-law’s daughter, her rival wife, her yevama, and her husband’s daughter,

“who are not trusted to say”

concerning a woman that

“her husband died,”

because they are suspected of harming her—

“are trusted ‘to bring’ her get”

from the husband.

“And there,”

the agency is certainly agency for

“delivery,”

for they are trusted “to bring her get.”

Learn from this that a woman can be an agent for delivery.

Rav Ashi said: From the latter clause

of that Mishna

“we also learn”

that a woman can be an agent for delivery.

“For it teaches in the latter clause: The woman herself brings her get, provided that she must say, ‘Before me it was written and before me it was signed.’”

“And we established”

[and we established] above, in the first chapter, that it is speaking

“of”

agency

“for delivery,”

from the fact that the woman must say, “Before me it was written and before me it was signed.” And we raised a difficulty concerning this: Since from the moment the get came into her hand she is divorced, why must she say, “Before me it was written and before me it was signed”? We answered that it is speaking of a case in which the husband said to her that she should be an agent for delivery until she arrives there; if so, she has not yet been divorced, and for this reason she must say, “Before me it was written and before me it was signed.”

“Learn from this”

that the woman also becomes an agent for delivery.

It was stated: If the woman said to the agent

and the meaning of her words is that the divorce will take effect only from the moment the get comes into her hand:

“Bring me my get,”

and the agent came and said to the husband:

“And

the agent said to the husband:

‘Your wife said, “Receive my get for me,”’

and the meaning of these words is that as soon as the agent acquires the get, she will be divorced.

“And he”

[the husband]

“said”

to the agent:

“Here it is,”

the get, so that it should take effect

“as she said.”

“Rav Nahman said that Rabbah bar Avuha said that Rav said: Even if the get came into her hand, she is not divorced.”

And the Gemara proves from the words of Rav Nahman in the name of Rav:

“Learn from this,”

that the husband

“relies on his own wording”

of the agent

“he relies,”

and the husband’s intention follows the agent’s words: that he should make him an agent for reception and for acquiring the get on behalf of the woman, and not an agent for delivering the get from the husband’s hand to the woman’s hand. And since the woman did not appoint him an agent for reception, she is not divorced when the agent receives the get from the husband’s hand, nor is she divorced when she receives the get from the agent’s hand, since he was not an agent for delivery, and there is a deficiency in the husband’s delivery into the woman’s hand.

For if

if we say that the husband

relies on her speech

of the woman

and relies, and the husband's intention follows the woman's words and not the agent's words, and this is the meaning of what he said to the agent: “I do not know what she told you; rather, I will deliver the get to you as the woman told you.

If so, the law should be that

as soon as

when it reaches

the get reaches her hand at least, she is divorced!

For the husband also made the agent an agent of delivery.

And let us resolve from Rav Nahman's words the inquiry about which they were uncertain in tractate Bava Metzia [chapter “One who hires artisans”]: whether the sender relies on the words of the agent or not.

Rav Ashi said: Is that so now!?

Can it be possible to resolve from Rav Nahman's words in the name of Rav that the husband relies on the words of the agent?