Gittin 55a (נה.) — the Talmud in English

And we raise an objection:

And what is different

about the case of Rabbi Abbahu

from

that

of Rabbi Ami

, who is not deemed credible to disqualify the Torah scroll, even though he is deemed credible to cause him to forfeit his wages?!

And we answer: It is not comparable, as

there it is possible to say

that he is lying, intending to aggravate the other, and

he erred regarding Rabbi Yirmeya

, for he thought that he would forfeit only the wages for writing the Divine Names, as in Rabbi Yirmeya’s question.

However,

here—

with regard to the parchment—

since

he knows

that he is forfeiting all his wages

[his entire wage],

and

nevertheless

came and said

that it is unfit,

say

[one may say]:

He is stating the truth

[the truth]

he is saying.

Mishna:

a. A father betroths his minor daughter, and her betrothal is a betrothal by Torah law.

b. In the case of a minor whose father died, the Sages instituted that her brothers or mother may betroth her, or that she may betroth herself; and her betrothal is a betrothal by rabbinic ordinance.

c. A deaf-mute lacks intellectual capacity and is like a minor, and the Sages instituted betrothal for him; likewise, a grown deaf-mute woman is betrothed by rabbinic ordinance.

d. A Jewish woman who married a priest may eat teruma, and she is not considered a zarah with regard to teruma.

e. Grain, wine, and oil

are obligated in terumot and tithes by Torah law, and their teruma is “teruma by Torah law.” But other produce is obligated only by rabbinic ordinance, and its teruma is “teruma by rabbinic ordinance.”

Four testimonies concerning halakha:

Rabbi Yohanan ben Gudgada testified

on the authority of his teachers: a. He testified

concerning a grown deaf-mute woman whom her father

had married off when she was a minor, and she is a married woman by Torah law,

that she is released with a bill of divorce

, meaning that her husband may divorce her even though she lacks the intellectual capacity required for divorce, since the woman’s consent is not required in order to divorce her.

b.

And

he testified

concerning

a

minor Jewish orphan who

was betrothed with a rabbinic betrothal and

married a priest, that she eats

—she—

teruma

by rabbinic ordinance, even though her betrothal is only rabbinic, and we are not concerned that she may eat “teruma by Torah law.”

And if she dies

, although by Torah law her relatives inherit her and not her husband, nevertheless, by rabbinic ordinance,

her husband inherits her.

c.

And

he testified

concerning the stolen beam

[a beam]

that the robber built

—the robber—

into a mansion

[a large house],

that

he need not return the stolen object itself as required by Torah law; rather,

the robbed party shall take

—the robbed party—

the value of the beam

from the robber immediately. And the reason is:

for the sake of the ordinance benefiting penitents

, so that if you require him to demolish his mansion and return the beam itself, he will refrain from repenting, because he is afraid of suffering such a great loss.

d.

And

he testified

concerning

a sacrificial animal,

a stolen sin-offering

, meaning a stolen animal that the robber consecrated as a sin-offering—

whose stolen status was not known to the public

that it was stolen,

that it effects atonement

and it is not necessary to bring another one,

for the sake of rectifying the altar;

this law will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

Rava said: From the testimony of Rabbi Yohanan ben Gudgada

we learn:

If he

said to the witnesses

in the woman’s absence:

“See this bill of divorce that I am giving her”

, to my wife—

and

afterward

went back and said to her: “Take this promissory note”

, as though he were not giving her a bill of divorce but a promissory note—

she is divorced

, even though she did not know that she was receiving a bill of divorce, since her awareness is not required in order to divorce her.

And proof of this is that

did

[did]

Rabbi Yohanan ben Gudgada not say

, with regard to a deaf-mute woman, that

her awareness is not required

? If so,

here—

when he says to her, “Take this promissory note”—

her awareness is likewise not required.

And we raise an objection:

Is this obvious?!

The cases are similar, so what did Rava teach?

And we answer: It was necessary for him to state this, because

it might have entered your mind that: since he said

to her,

“Take this promissory note,”

he nullified it

[he intended to nullify] the bill of divorce, and she is not divorced.

Rava teaches us

Rava, that he did not intend to nullify the bill of divorce, because

if indeed he had nullified it, he would have said so to

them

[if he truly wished to nullify it, he would have told the witnesses so].

And since he did not nullify it before the witnesses, his intention is to divorce her;

and this that he says this

to his wife

is due to embarrassment

[shame], because he is embarrassed before her.

We learned in the Mishna:

And concerning a minor Jewish girl

who married a priest, who eats teruma:

And we infer: Since it teaches “minor” and not “deaf-mute woman,” as in the first clause, it follows that specifically a minor eats;

whereas a deaf-mute woman

who is grown and married a priest on her own

does not eat

, even teruma by rabbinic ordinance.

And we explain:

What is the reason?

It is because of

a decree lest he feed

even a priest who is himself

a deaf-mute to

his

deaf-mute wife;

and the Gemara proceeds to explain this.

And we raise an objection:

Then let her eat

, let this woman eat as well, even teruma by Torah law—what difference does it make?! For this deaf-mute woman is like a

minor

who

eats unslaughtered carcasses

[she does], since she lacks understanding, and we are not commanded to prevent her from doing so?!

And we explain: A deaf-mute woman who married a competent priest does not eat,

lest one feed a deaf-mute man married to a competent woman

who is grown; and since her betrothal is only rabbinic, she is forbidden to eat “teruma by Torah law.”

And we challenge this:

Then let them eat

all these women

teruma

by rabbinic ordinance?!

And we answer:

A decree lest he come to feed her

[lest he come to feed her]

teruma by Torah law,

and since her betrothal is only rabbinic, it follows that by Torah law she is a zarah and is forbidden to eat teruma of Torah status.

However, a minor Jewish girl who married a priest eats teruma by rabbinic ordinance, because there is no concern lest one feed a minor boy married to a grown woman, since a minor boy’s betrothal has no validity whatsoever.

We learned in the Mishna:

And concerning the stolen beam that he built

into a mansion, that he takes its value, for the sake of the ordinance benefiting penitents.

The Sages taught: If one stole a beam and built it into a mansion:

Beit Shammai say: He demolishes

[cuts and breaks] even

the entire mansion, and returns the beam to its owner

, as required by Torah law, as it is stated [Leviticus 5:23]: “And he shall return the stolen object that he stole.”

And Beit Hillel say: The robbed party has

[the robbed party]

only the value of the beam, for the sake of the ordinance benefiting penitents.

We learned in the Mishna:

And concerning a stolen sin-offering

whose stolen status was not known to the public, that it effects atonement, for the sake of rectifying the altar:

Ulla said: By Torah law

[by Torah law],

whether

if

the theft became known

to the public,

or whether it did not become known, it does not effect atonement

, even if the owners despaired of recovering it.

What is the reason?

For

despair alone

[alone], without a “change of possession” [ownership] or a “change of designation” after the despair,

does not effect acquisition

[is not effective for acquiring it].

And although through consecration the designation of the stolen object changed—for initially it was unconsecrated property, and now it is consecrated property—nevertheless, it does not effect atonement, because it did not belong to him before consecration, and the verse does not apply to it: “If his offering is a burnt-offering” [Leviticus 1:3], implying: his offering, but not a stolen offering.

And for what reason did

the Sages say: A sin-offering whose stolen status

was not known effects atonement?

It is a rabbinic ordinance, in order

that the priests not be distressed

over having eaten unconsecrated meat slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, which is forbidden to eat.

The Sages said to Ulla: But

we

“for the sake of rectifying the altar”

learned

, whereas according to your explanation, it is an ordinance for the priests and not an ordinance for the altar?!

He said to them: Since the priests are distressed

over having eaten unconsecrated property in the Temple courtyard, the priests will refrain from offering sacrifices, and

the altar will consequently remain idle.

And this is what we learned: It effects atonement “for the sake of rectifying the altar.”

And although by Torah law he has not achieved atonement and is obligated to bring another offering, the Sages exempted him from offering another sacrifice, for the sake of rectifying the altar.

And Rav Yehuda said: By Torah law, whether

if

the theft became known

to the public,

or whether

if

it did not become known, it effects atonement

, provided that the owners despaired of recovering it.

What is the reason?

For

despair alone effects acquisition

, and it follows that it belonged to him at the time of consecration; therefore, it is fit to be offered by Torah law.