Gittin 55b — the Talmud in English

And for what reason did they say

the Sages: if

it became known, it does not effect atonement?

In order

that they should not say: “The altar consumes stolen property.”

With all offerings, only the sacrificial portions are burned upon the altar, while the rest of the meat is eaten by the priests or by the owners [and with the inner sin-offerings they burn the meat outside the camp]; but with a burnt-offering, all its meat is offered upon the altar.

And we object:

Granted, according to Ulla,

who says that it is because of the eating by the priests,

this is [

satisfactory]

for he teaches “sin-offering,”

which is an offering in which there is eating, and he does not teach “burnt-offering,” in which there is no eating.

But according to Rav Yehuda,

who says that it is because of the eating by the altar, if so,

why specifically

does he teach

“sin-offering”

specifically? Surely

even a burnt-offering as well

has this reason applicable to it!?

And we answer:

He is stating: “It is not necessary.”

That is, the fact that the tanna mentions “sin-offering,” he mentions it in order to teach a greater novelty.

It is not necessary to say a burnt-offering,

for there is concern lest they say, “The altar consumes stolen property,”

for

it

is entirely burned.

But even a sin-offering as well, for

it is not entirely burned, and only

the fat and blood ascend [

rise and are offered]

upon the altar, while the rest [

the remainder]

the priests eat it, and it might have entered your mind that we are not concerned lest they say, “The altar consumes stolen property,” and even when the theft became known, the sin-offering would effect atonement.

и можно было бы подумать, что мы не опасаемся, как бы не сказали: «Жертвенник поглощает украденное», и даже если о краже стало известно, хатат искупает.

This teaches us that

even so, they decreed

the Sages, in order

that they should not say: “The altar consumes stolen property.”

And we object to Rav Yehuda from the wording of our Mishna:

For

we learned: With regard to a stolen sin-offering whose theft did not become known to the public, it effects atonement because of the rectification of the altar;

and from this wording it is implied that because of the “rectification of the altar” it effects atonement when it did not become known to the public. And now there is a difficulty:

Granted, according to Ulla, it is satisfactory

that the wording of the Mishna means that indeed the Sages enacted that it should effect atonement when it did not become known to the public, unlike Torah law, according to which it does not effect atonement even when it did not become known to the public.

But according to Rav Yehuda,

who holds that by Torah law, even when the theft became known it effects atonement, and the enactment was that it should not effect atonement when the theft did not become known, if so:

It should have been the opposite [

for the tanna]

to teach: “With regard to a stolen sin-offering whose theft became known to the public, it does not effect atonement because of the rectification of the altar”!?

И отвечаем:

And we answer:

Indeed so,

as you say,

the tanna is stating:

таннай:

When it did not become known, it effects atonement,

and it is implied that if

it became known, it does not effect atonement,

and concerning this implication the tanna said:

because of the rectification of the altar.

Rava raised an objection [

he challenged]

to Ulla

from that which we learned:

a. One who steals pays double; one who steals an ox or a sheep and afterward slaughters or sells it pays fourfold or fivefold.

b. One who steals from consecrated property pays only the principal, even if he slaughters or sells it.

c. One who slaughters consecrated animals fit to be offered outside the courtyard is liable for karet.

He stole

an animal,

and consecrated

it as an offering,

and afterward slaughtered or sold it [

or sold it]:

This person

pays double payment

to the ordinary person from whom he stole it,

but he does not pay fourfold or fivefold payment

neither to the owners nor to consecrated property.

And the reason for this is: he does not pay the owners, since at the time of slaughter the animal no longer belonged to its owners, for he had consecrated it.

And he does not pay consecrated property, since there is neither double payment nor fourfold or fivefold payment for one who steals from consecrated property.

And

he teaches

concerning it

in a beraita

of the Mishna:

If he slaughtered

outside, in such a case, that is, if he slaughtered this animal outside the courtyard, the animal that he stole and consecrated,

he is liable for karet,

as is the law of one who slaughters consecrated animals outside.

And if you say: Despair alone does not acquire

with regard to offering, and the offering is not valid — if so,

what is karet doing here [

what relevance does it have here]!? For there is liability for slaughtering consecrated animals outside only when they are fit to be offered inside validly.

He said [

he answered]

Rav Shizevi: “Karet by rabbinic enactment,”

of the Sages.

They laughed [

they mocked]

at him: Is there karet by rabbinic enactment?

For karet applies only to one who transgresses a Torah prohibition, for which the Torah made him liable for karet.

Rava said to them,

to those who were laughing: If

a great man [

a distinguished person] like Rav Shizevi

says a matter, do not laugh at him [

do not mock him], for certainly he has said a proper matter, and certainly this was his intention:

“Karet that comes about through their words [

the enactment of the Sages]

has come upon him!”

For just as the Sages placed it in his possession, with regard to atonement, when the theft did not become known, so too

the Sages placed it in his possession, so that he would be liable for it [

so that he would become liable for it] for karet.

Rava said: “This is certainly what I am uncertain about” [

in this I am certainly in doubt]: Shall we say

that when the Sages placed it

in his possession,

of the thief,

from the time of the theft

they placed it, [did the Sages place it in the thief’s possession already from the time of the theft]? For the theft is the factor that effects acquisition.

Or

perhaps only

from the time of consecration

did they place it in his possession.

And the Gemara explains:

What practical difference is there,

for the law, from when they placed it in his possession?

For its wool,

which was sheared from it before the consecration,

and its offspring,

which were born before he consecrated it.

For if you say that the animal stands in his possession from the time of the theft, then the wool and the offspring are his, and he pays only the value of a cow that is about to give birth.

But if you say that they placed it in his possession from the time of consecration, it emerges that the animal gave birth when it belonged to the robbed person, and he pays him the value of the cow and its offspring.

And concerning this Rava was uncertain:

What

is the law in such a case?

Rava then said,

to resolve his uncertainty:

It is reasonable

that

from the time of consecration

the Sages placed it in his possession, so that

the sinner should not profit

from the wool and the offspring.

Mishna:

The Sages established laws and enactments concerning one upon whom a murderous gentile came and who was forced to give him land as ransom for his life [and he is called: sikarikon ], and the sikarikon went and sold the field to another Jew: when and how is the sale that the purchaser bought from the sikarikon valid? The details of the “law of sikarikon” are explained later in the Mishna.

And before the Mishna details the particulars of the “law of sikarikon,” the Mishna first states:

There was no sikarikon in

the

land of

Judea,

during the time of those slain in

the

war, that is, during the time of the war of Titus, which took place in Jerusalem and Judea,

and they decreed that the Jews be killed, as the Gemara explains.

From the slain of the war onward [

after the war]

there is sikarikon in it,

and in the Gemara the intention of the tanna in this introduction will be explained.

And here the Mishna returns to explain

how

the “law of sikarikon” operates: if

a Jew took

the land

from

the

sikarikon, and the purchaser returned

and

took

it

from the landowner [

who is the robbed person]:

Then

his purchase —

of the land by the purchaser —

is void.

And the reason is: the land belongs not to the sikarikon but to the Jew, for land cannot be stolen,

and although it appeared that he agreed to the sikarikon’s sale, we assess the landowner’s intention: he is merely pretending, either because he fears the sikarikon, or because he wants the purchaser indeed to take the field, so that he will be able to remove it from him, and it is better for him that the field be in the Jew’s possession than in the sikarikon’s possession, from whom he cannot remove it.

But if

he took from the landowner

first,

and returned

after his purchase from the landowner

and took

the land

from

the

sikarikon,

then

his purchase stands.

And the reason is: when the owner sold it to him, the fear of the sikarikon had not been imposed upon him, to agree to the sale, since the second person had not yet taken it from the sikarikon himself; and it is also not applicable to say: “It was preferable for me to litigate with the second person, and therefore I agreed to sell.”

And in the course of explaining the “law of sikarikon,” the Mishna explains that a similar law applies to one who purchases from a husband a field encumbered by his wife’s marriage settlement, and the purchaser also went to the wife so that she would give her consent to this sale, so that she would not collect the field from him when the time for payment of her marriage settlement arrived:

If

he took

first

from the man, and returned and took —

after his purchase from the husband —

from the woman,

that is, he gave her a small amount, and she too transferred the land to him, so that she would not collect the debt of her marriage settlement from this land: then

his purchase is void,

and her right to the land has not lapsed.

And the reason is: the woman can say, “I did not sell it to him willingly; rather, I was afraid that my husband would become angry with me and say, ‘Are you waiting to separate from me through death or divorce?’ For if not, what concern is it to you to agree to my sale?”

But if he took first

from the woman, and returned

afterward

and took from the man, then

his

purchase stands.

Now the Mishna returns to the “law of sikarikon”:

This,

which we learned — that one who purchases from the sikarikon, his purchase is void, unless he took from the landowner before he took from the sikarikon —

is the first Mishna,

that is, this was Torah law, and this is how they ruled initially.

But

the court of those after them

enacted an enactment

and said: “One who purchases from a sikarikon —

even if he did not purchase from the landowner at all — his purchase is a valid purchase.

Except that he

gives

to

the owners a quarter,

for the Sages assessed that the sikarikon reduces the price by a quarter in his sale, since this land came to him for free. Therefore they said that the purchaser should give that quarter to the original owners. And in the Gemara it will be explained what this “quarter” is: whether it is a quarter of the money he paid, or a quarter of the land itself.

When

does the purchaser pay a quarter to the owners and not return the land to them?

When they do not have the means

of the owners

to purchase

the field.

But

if

they have the means to purchase, they take precedence over every person,

that is, if the owners have money with which to pay the purchaser what he gave to the sikarikon, they take precedence over him, and he must return the land to its owners, while the owners return his money to him.

Rabbi convened a court

to examine this law,

and they were counted

[they stood for a count] and enacted:

if it remained

the land

before

[with]

the sikrikon, twelve months,

and the original owners did not take it.

Whoever is first to buy

from the sikrikon, he has

acquired it!

And the owners cannot take the land from him,

but he gives

he

a quarter to the owners..

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: “There was no sikrikon in Judea among those killed in the war; from those killed in the war onward, there is sikrikon”:

And it was initially understood that this is what it says: During the time of the war, gentiles who murdered and took lands as ransom for a life were not present, whereas after the war they were; and therefore we are astonished:

Now

[but surely if]

among those killed in the war there was no sikrikon, from those killed in the war onward there is sikrikon—

this is astonishing! Surely the reverse is more plausible, for at the time of war there are more robbers and murderers present.

He said

[he explained]

Rav Judah:

Our Mishna is not dealing at all with the murders and robberies of the sikrikonim themselves; rather,

they did not establish “

the law of sikrikon”—“

in Judea among those killed in the war”—

the tanna is saying!

That is to say: They did not rule that the purchase of one who bought from the sikrikon is void, because at that time, whenever the sikrikon took land from a Jew as ransom for his life, it was completely his according to the fundamental law, and the robbed person was not the “owner” of the field, and he did not require his consent, nor did he need to pay him a quarter for the land; and the reason for all this will be explained shortly.

And when does the “law of sikrikon” mentioned in our Mishna apply? Only “from those killed in the war onward,” for from that time the robbed person’s right to the land did not lapse according to the fundamental law, and therefore the purchaser from the sikrikon must give the robbed person a quarter.

And because

I potomu chto

Rabbi Asi said: They enacted three decrees

the gentiles during the time of Titus:

The first decree

[the first decree]:

whoever does not kill

[whoever does not kill] a Jew wherever he finds him,

let them kill him

[they shall kill the gentile], as punishment for his leaving their enemies alive.

A decree

the middle

[the second]:

whoever kills,

they impose a monetary penalty upon him, that

he should bring

[that he should bring]

four zuzim.

A decree

the last:

They said that it is forbidden to kill a Jew, and

whoever kills,

a Jew,

let them kill him

for his murder.

Therefore,

at the time of the decree

the first and the middle: since they killed

the gentiles, it follows that

because of his coercion

[fear of death] of the Jew,

he resolved

in his mind

and transferred

the field to the gentile.

And in the decree

the last:

for the gentiles were already no longer permitted to kill Jews; for then, if a murderous gentile came against a Jew and he appeased him with land,

they say

the owners,

today

[this day]

let him take

[let him take] the land from me, and

tomorrow I will sue him in court,

and he does not resolve and transfer it to him, because he is not so greatly concerned about death.

And from that third decree onward, the “law of sikrikon” mentioned in our Mishna applies.

Rabbi Yohanan said: What is the meaning of that which is written

[Proverbs 28:14]: “

Fortunate is the person who is always afraid

[who is concerned to foresee what will be born, lest a mishap occur through this if he does it]

but one who hardens his heart will fall into evil.”

And Rabbi Yohanan brings in connection with this three incidents, concerning all of which

the aforementioned verse should be read.

a.

Because of Kamtza and Bar Kamtza, Jerusalem was destroyed.

Because of an incident involving two Jews who were called Kamtza and Bar Kamtza, Jerusalem was destroyed], as the Gemara immediately brings the incident.

b.

Because of a rooster and a hen, Tur Malka was destroyed.

Because of a rooster and a hen, a place in the Land of Israel whose name was “Mountain of the King” was destroyed].

c.

Because of the sideboard of a carriage, Beitar was destroyed.

Because of the side of a women’s carriage, the city of Beitar was destroyed]. And the Gemara explains: a. Because of Kamtza and Bar Kamtza, Jerusalem was destroyed:

I Gemara obyasnyaet:

A.

Iz-za Kamtsy i Bar Kamtsy byl razrushen Ierusalim:

U odnogo cheloveka ego drugom byl Kamtsa, a vragom — Bar Kamtsa.

[U odnogo iz zhiteley Ierusalima byl drug po imeni «Kamtsa» i vrag po imeni «Bar Kamtsa»].

Ustroil

That certain man whose friend was Kamtza and whose enemy was Bar Kamtza. [One of the men of Jerusalem had a friend whose name was “Kamtza,” and he had an enemy whose name was “Bar Kamtza”].

He made

that certain man

a banquet. [That man made a banquet].

That certain man said to him

his attendant:

Go, bring me Kamtza; he went and brought him Bar Kamtza. [That man said to his attendant: Go and bring me to the banquet “Kamtza,” who was his friend; and the messenger made a mistake and went and brought “Bar Kamtza” to the banquet].

He came and found him

that certain man found Bar Kamtza

who was sitting, he said to him

the master of the banquet:

Since this man is the enemy of that man, what are you doing here?! [The master of the banquet arrived and found Bar Kamtza sitting at the banquet, and said to him: You are in fact my enemy, so what are you doing here!?]

And the master of the banquet commanded him:

Get up, go out!

[Get up and leave the banquet!].

He said to him

Bar Kamtza:

Since I have come, leave me be! And I will give you the cost of whatever I eat and drink. [Bar Kamtza said to the master of the banquet: Since I have already come, leave me be, and I will give you the cost of whatever I eat and drink].

«Raz ya uzhe prishyol, ostav menya! Ya zaplachu tebe za vse, chto s'em i vypyu».

[Bar Kamtsa skazal khozya inu pira: «Raz ya uzhe prishyol, ostav menya, i ya zaplachu tebe za vse, chto s'em i vypyu»].