Gittin 54b (נד:) — the Talmud in English

A. A prohibition that became mixed with permitted matter is, by Torah law, nullified in a majority, as it is stated: “You shall follow the majority to decide.”

B. By rabbinic ordinance, neither orla nor the produce of a vineyard planted with diverse species is nullified except in a ratio of two hundred to one.

C. Items of importance are not nullified by rabbinic ordinance, even in a thousandfold mixture.

D. “Pirkha nuts” [nuts from a place called Pirkha] are among the items of importance that are never nullified. This applies specifically when they are whole; but if they “were split” [broken], their importance is nullified.

E. “One may not nullify a prohibition ab initio,” meaning that it is forbidden to mix a prohibited item with permitted matter in order to nullify it, and even if it became mixed in a manner in which it is not nullified by a majority, it is forbidden to perform an act that will cause it to be nullified by a majority.

Permitted Pirkha nuts, and

nuts fell

among them that were orla nuts—which are items of importance—and they are not nullified even in a thousandfold mixture; therefore, the entire mixture is forbidden.

They subsequently

were split [broken]

after they had fallen and become mixed.

Whether

he split them

unintentionally,

without intending to nullify their importance,

or

he split them

intentionally, [in order to nullify them thereby,]

in order to nullify them in this way,]

they do not count [they are not nullified]. For “one may not nullify a prohibition ab initio.” Since he violated the words of the Sages, the Rabbis imposed a penalty upon him when he acted intentionally, and also when he acted unintentionally, due to the possibility that he had acted intentionally.

they are not nullified]. This is because “one may not nullify a prohibition from the outset.” And since he violated the words of the Sages, the Sages penalized him when he acted intentionally, and also when he acted unintentionally, as a safeguard against intentional action.

These are

the words of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda.

Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon say: If he split them unintentionally, they count,

[they are nullified;]

if intentionally, they do not count.

The Sages penalized him when he acted intentionally, but did not penalize him when he acted unintentionally, due to the possibility that he had acted intentionally.

But here, since by Torah law

even

one among two

[one prohibited nut among two permitted nuts]

is nullified

by the majority, it follows that the nuts had already been nullified by Torah law from the moment they fell.

And

only

the Rabbis decreed

that whole Pirkha nuts should not be nullified; consequently, by splitting them he violated a rabbinic prohibition, and not a Torah prohibition.

Yet

even so,

Rabbi Yehuda imposed a penalty

if he split them unintentionally, due to the possibility that he had acted intentionally, even though this involves only a rabbinic prohibition.

But earlier we said that Rabbi Yehuda does not impose, in a matter prohibited only rabbinically, a penalty upon one who acted unintentionally due to the possibility that he acted intentionally!?

And we answer:

There

[in the case of nullifying the nuts],

this is the reason for Rabbi Yehuda’s

penalty:

because

we are concerned lest he

come to manipulate the matter,

and nullify them intentionally and deliberately, and say: “I acted unintentionally, and did not intend to nullify them.”

Therefore, with regard to nullification by a majority, Rabbi Yehuda penalized one who acted unintentionally, lest he had acted intentionally.

In the beraita cited above, we learned that Rabbi Yosei penalizes one who nullifies a prohibition intentionally.

And

accordingly, we ask:

How can one statement of Rabbi Yosei be reconciled with another statement of Rabbi Yosei?

As we learned:

Even though orla [the fruit of a tree during its first three years] and the produce of a vineyard planted with diverse species [a vine together with seeds that were sown beside it and grew with it] are nullified in a ratio of two hundred to one, nevertheless this applies specifically when they have been detached; if they are attached, they are considered important

and are not nullified.

A planting of orla and of produce from a vineyard planted with diverse species that became mixed with other plantings

in a field, and he does not recognize them.

He may not gather it,

because as long as they are attached, they are not nullified, and by gathering it he would nullify the prohibition.

And if

he transgressed and

gathered it, it counts in a ratio of one to two hundred.

Provided that he did not intend to gather it

in order to nullify them, for example, if he believed that they had already been nullified while attached.

But if he gathered them in order to nullify them, they are not nullified, because the Sages penalized him since he intentionally violated their words.

Rabbi Yosei says: Even the

one who acted

intentionally and deliberately gathered it

in order to nullify it was not penalized by the Sages, and

it counts in a ratio of one to two hundred.

It follows that Rabbi Yosei does not penalize even one who acted intentionally, whereas earlier, in the beraita concerning Pirkha nuts that fell and were split, Rabbi Yosei said: “If intentionally, they do not count”!?

And we answer:

It was already stated concerning it

[the following was already said concerning that beraita]:

Rava said:

It is an uncommon matter, since

there is no

person who

plants

an orla tree among other plantings without marking it

and renders his vineyard forbidden by

means of

a single planting.

Since it is uncommon, the Sages did not impose a stringent penalty.

But the falling of a prohibited item into permitted matter is common, and the Sages penalized one who acted intentionally.

And likewise, when Ravin came

[when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia,]

he said

in the name of

Rabbi Yohanan: It is presumed that no person renders his vineyard forbidden on account of a single planting.

Mishna:

There are four “blood rites” in a sacrifice: slaughtering, receiving the blood, conveying it, and sprinkling it.

There is a designated time for burning the sacrifice—until dawn—and likewise there is a fixed time for eating each sacrifice. If, during one of the blood rites, he intended to burn its sacrificial portions or eat its meat after the allotted time, the sacrifice became piggul and was invalidated.

Priests who rendered

a sacrifice

in the Temple

and invalidated it, if they were

intentional, they are liable

to pay the owners the value of the sacrifice. Although this is “unrecognizable damage,” and unrecognizable damage is not legally considered damage, nevertheless the Sages obligated them to pay, for the sake of tikkun ha-olam, so that everyone would not go and damage another through “unrecognizable damage” [as explained in the Gemara above, 53a].

But if they acted unintentionally, they are not liable to pay, and we do not penalize one who acted unintentionally due to the possibility that he acted intentionally, because if we imposed such a penalty, the priests would refrain from performing the service.

Gemara:

The Sages taught:

One whose

colleague was

working with him in matters of ritual purity, and he said to him:

“The ritually pure items that I prepared with you

have become impure.”

And likewise, one whose

colleague was

working with him

in sacrificial matters

[performing the sacrificial service for his sacrifice,]

and said to him: “The sacrifices that I performed with you

have become piggul.”

That is, “I rendered the sacrifice piggul.”

In these two cases, he is

believed.

However, if he said to him: “The ritually pure items that I prepared with you on a certain day

have become impure,”

he is not believed.

And likewise, if he said to him:

“The sacrifices that I performed with you on a certain day

have become piggul,” he is not believed.

And we ask:

What is different in the first clause,

where he did not say to him “on a certain day” and he is believed,

and what is different in the latter clause,

where he did say to him “on a certain day” and he is not believed!?

Abaye said

[he answered]:

Anything that is in his power

to do at the time that he informs him,

he is believed

.

The first clause is referring, for example, to a case where he still has the power to render the ritually pure items impure. And likewise, with regard to sacrifices, for example, where the priest informed him between slaughtering and sprinkling, and said to him, “I rendered it piggul during the slaughter,” while he still had the power to render it piggul through the sprinkling.

And “on a certain day” in the latter clause means that they had already left his possession; therefore, he is not believed to invalidate them.

Rava said:

Even though it is not currently in his power, he is believed. And the latter clause, which teaches that “on a certain day he is not believed,”

is referring to a case where he encountered him

[found him] after the ritually pure items and the sacrifices had left his possession,

and he did not say anything to him

[at all].

And afterward

[later]

he encountered him and said to him

that they had become impure and piggul, and therefore he is not believed.

For if he had been telling the truth, he would have told him the first time he encountered him. Since he did not tell him this at the outset, we say that perhaps he says this in order to distress him, while in truth the ritually pure items had not become impure and the sacrifices had not become piggul.

A certain

man

said to his fellow:

“The ritually pure items that I prepared with you on a certain day have become impure,”

The owner came

and

before Rabbi Ami

to ask him whether he had to believe his fellow’s statement, since the latter now had no power to render them impure.

Rabbi Ami said to him:

According to

the strict law, he is not believed,

and you need not be concerned by his statement, in accordance with the view of Abaye.

Rabbi Asi said before him

[before Rabbi Ami]:

“Rabbi, you

are the one

who says this!”

But Rabbi Yohanan disagrees with you and holds in accordance with Rava, because

thus

[in this manner]

Rabbi Yohanan said in the name of Rabbi Yosei: What can I do to be lenient,

even after time has passed, since

the Torah deemed him credible.

And we explain:

And where did the Torah deem him credible,

the Torah?

Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Bisna said: The High Priest on Yom Kippur proves it!

For when he says

[when he says]:

“It is piggul,”

referring to the bull and the goat of Yom Kippur, he is

believed

[he is trusted].

For piggul applies to every sacrifice, including the bull and the goat of Yom Kippur.

A. With regard to the bull and the goat of Yom Kippur: The High Priest sprinkles their blood in the Holy of Holies, toward the cover over the Ark, and in the Sanctuary [the Hall], toward the curtain; he then places some of their blood on the golden altar.

B. While the High Priest sprinkles the blood of the bull and the goat, no other person may be with him, as it is stated: “And no person shall be in the Tent of Meeting when he enters to effect atonement in the Sanctuary until he leaves.”

The Sages received by tradition [Yoma 44] that both while he sprinkles the blood in the Holy of Holies and while he sprinkles the blood in the Sanctuary, no other person may be with him.

And from where do we know

[how do we know] that the sacrifice indeed became piggul, if he is not believed in his testimony?

Perhaps there were witnesses with him who saw him render it piggul.

But it is written:

“And no person shall be in the Tent of Meeting”

during the blood rite.

Rather, is it not

necessarily

because he is believed,

the High Priest himself, on the basis of his testimony, when he emerges from the Tent of Meeting and says, “I rendered it piggul”? This is so even though he no longer has the power to render it piggul, and learn from this that the halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Ami and Abaye.

And we reject this:

And

from where do you know

perhaps

it is a case

where we heard him

[we heard him] from outside

render it piggul

with his words, when he said: “I am sprinkling the blood with the intention of burning the sacrificial portions after their allotted time.”

If so, there is no issue here of the High Priest’s credibility, but rather clear knowledge based on witnesses.

And we explain: He must be believed, because

if he were not believed

by us,

even though we heard him

when he was inside, he would likewise not be believed,

as perhaps he said it afterward.

That is, even if we heard him say that he was rendering it piggul during the sprinkling, how do we know that he actually said it during the rite itself? Perhaps he said it after the rite, in which case it is not piggul.

If so, you are forced to say that the High Priest is deemed credible to tell us, after emerging, that he had rendered the offering pigul during the service.

There were two small openings (pishpeshin) that stood open to the Sanctuary, one in the north and one in the south, and through them it was possible to see what was being done in the Sanctuary.

And

we reject this: the proof is still lacking, for one can say:

Perhaps we saw him

while he was sprinkling the blood in the Sanctuary

through the opening,

and we heard him declare the offering pigul at that moment!? And we conclude: Indeed,

it is difficult

for us to understand how Rabbi Yosei proved his ruling.

A Torah scroll requires that the parchment sheets on which it is written be processed for its sake; likewise, it must be written, and especially its sacred Names (azkarot), for the sake of a Torah scroll.

A certain

man

came before Rabbi Ami.

He said to him: The Torah scroll that I wrote for so-and-so

for so-and-so, I did not write its sacred Names

for their sake

and it is disqualified.

Rabbi Ami said to him

asked him:

In whose possession is the Torah scroll

located?

He said to him: In the possession of the purchaser

it is.

He said to him:

if so,

you are deemed credible to cause the loss of

your

wages,

for the admission of a litigant is equivalent to the testimony of one hundred witnesses.

But you are not deemed credible to cause the loss of

the

scroll

of the

Torah

and disqualify it, since it is not in your possession.

Rabbi Ami’s wording, “You are deemed credible to cause the loss of your wages,” implies that he meant the wages for writing the entire Torah scroll.

Therefore,

Rabbi Yeramya said to him

asked

Rabbi Yeramya

Rabbi Ami:

Granted

even if we say that he caused the loss of

the wages

for the

sacred Names

that he did not write with the proper intention,

The wages for the entire Torah scroll—did he

really

cause to be lost,

when he wrote all of it, apart from its sacred Names, with the proper intention?!

Rabbi Ami said to him

Rabbi Ami:

Yes

that is indeed the case: he caused the loss of all his wages!

For

every

Torah scroll whose sacred Names are not written with the proper intention

has no way to be rectified and

is worth nothing.

And we ask:

And

why is there no way to rectify it?

Let him pass a quill over them and sanctify them,

that is, why should he not go over the sacred Names again and write over the first writing with the proper intention?!

In accordance with whom,

are you saying that there is no way to rectify it?!

Shall we say

that Rabbi Ami holds

not in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda,

who validates passing a quill over it for the proper intention?!

For we learned in a Mishna: If one needed to write the

Name of

the Name

in a Torah scroll,

and

by mistake

he intended to write Yehuda.

And he erred and did not insert a dalet into it

he did not write the letter dalet, as he thought he needed to write Yehuda, and it turned out that he wrote the Name in its proper place, but without the proper intention.

What should he do to rectify the matter?

He passes a quill over it,

with the proper intention,

and sanctifies it; these are the words of Rabbi Yehuda.

And the Sages say: There is no

writing of the Name of

the Name

in this manner

of the highest quality,

and this Torah scroll is disqualified.

And we conclude:

Even if you say

in accordance with

Rabbi Yehuda,

Rabbi Ami’s words are properly explained.

For

Rabbi Yehuda stated this only up to this point,

that one passes a quill over it and sanctifies it,

in the case of a single sacred Name.

But

with regard to the sacred Names

throughout the entire Torah scroll,

Rabbi Yehuda did not validate it,

because it appears

that the Torah scroll is

patchy

in different shades, since it is all written in a single form of writing, whereas the Names are written over existing writing.

A certain

man

came before Rabbi Abahu.

He said to him: The Torah scroll that I wrote for so-and-so—the parchment sheets

belonging to him

on which the scroll was written,

I did not process them for his sake,

and it is disqualified.

He said to him: This Torah scroll

this

in whose possession

is it located?

He said to him: In the possession of the purchaser.

He said to him: Since you are deemed credible to cause the loss of your wages,

for the admission of a litigant is equivalent to the testimony of one hundred witnesses,

you are deemed credible

as well

to cause the loss

and disqualify the

scroll

of the

Torah

through your testimony, for it is presumed that you would not speak falsely and cause yourself to lose your wages for nothing.