Gittin 54b — the Talmud in English

a. A prohibition that became mixed with what is permitted is, according to Torah law, nullified in the majority, as it is stated [Exodus 23:2]: “After the majority to incline.”

b. By rabbinic enactment, neither orla nor the mixed species of the vineyard is nullified except in two hundred.

c. Significant items are not nullified by rabbinic enactment, even in a thousand.

d. “Pirka nuts” [nuts from a place called Pirka] are among the significant things that are not nullified at all. And this is specifically when they are whole; but if they “were split” [were broken], their significance is nullified.

e. “One does not nullify a prohibition ab initio,” meaning: it is forbidden to mix a prohibition with what is permitted in order to nullify it, and even if it became mixed in a manner in which it is not nullified by the majority, it is forbidden to perform an act that will cause its nullification by the majority.

Pirka nuts of what is permitted, and

nuts of orla fell

into them, which are significant and are not nullified even in a thousand, and the entire mixture is forbidden.

They returned

and were split [

were broken], after they had fallen and become mixed.

Whether

the one who split them did so

unintentionally,

without intending to nullify their significance,

or whether

he split them

intentionally, [

in order to nullify them through this,]

they do not rise [

they are not nullified]. For “one does not nullify a prohibition ab initio.” And since he violated the words of the Sages, the Sages penalized him when it was intentional, and even when it was unintentional, on account of the intentional.

And these are:

the words of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda.

Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon say: When unintentional, they rise,

[they are nullified],

when intentional, they do not rise.

For the Sages penalized him when it was intentional, but did not penalize him when it was unintentional, on account of the intentional.

But here, since by Torah law

even

one among two [

one item of prohibition among two items of what is permitted]

is nullified

by the majority, it is found that the nuts had already been nullified, by Torah law, from the moment they fell.

And

only by

rabbinic enactment did they decree,

that whole Pirka nuts should not be nullified; thus, through splitting them, he violated a rabbinic prohibition and not a Torah prohibition.

And

nevertheless,

Rabbi Yehuda penalizes

one who split them unintentionally, on account of the intentional, even though it is only a rabbinic prohibition.

And above we said that Rabbi Yehuda does not penalize, regarding a rabbinic matter, the unintentional on account of the intentional!?

And we answer:

There [

regarding the nullification of the nuts],

this is the reason of Rabbi Yehuda

that he penalized:

because

we are concerned that perhaps

he will come to act deceitfully,

and nullify them intentionally and deliberately, and say: “I was acting unintentionally, and I did not intend to nullify them.”

Therefore, in the matter of nullification by the majority, Rabbi Yehuda penalized the unintentional, lest it was intentional.

In the beraita above we learned that Rabbi Yosei penalizes one who intentionally nullifies a prohibition.

And

therefore we ask:

Rabbi Yosei contradicts Rabbi Yosei:

For we learned:

Even though orla [the fruit of a tree during its first three years] and the mixed species of the vineyard [a vine with seeds sown together with it, which grew together with them] are nullified in two hundred, nevertheless this is specifically when they are detached; if they are attached, they are significant

and are not nullified.

A planting of orla and of the mixed species of the vineyard that became mixed with other plantings

in the field, and he does not recognize them.

This one may not pick,

because as long as they are attached, they are not nullified, and through his picking he nullifies the prohibition.

And if

he transgressed and

picked, they rise in one hundred and one.

Provided that he did not intend to pick

in order to nullify them, for example, when he thinks that they had already been nullified while attached.

But if he picked in order to nullify them, they are not nullified, because the Sages penalized him, since he intentionally violated their words.

Rabbi Yosei says: Even the

intentional one who

intended to pick

in order to nullify them, the Sages did not penalize him, and

they rise in one hundred and one.

It follows that Rabbi Yosei does not penalize even the intentional one, while above, in the beraita concerning Pirka nuts that fell and were split, Rabbi Yosei said: “When intentional, they do not rise”!?

And we answer:

This was stated concerning it [

it was already said concerning that beraita]:

Rava said:

It is an uncommon matter, for

there is no

person

who plants orla among other plantings without a sign

and renders his vineyard forbidden

because of

one

planting.

And since it is uncommon, the Sages were not stringent.

But the falling of a prohibition into what is permitted is common, and the Sages penalized the intentional one.

And likewise, when Ravin came [

when Ravin came from the Land of Israel to Babylonia]

he said

in the name of

Rabbi Yohanan: It is presumed that no one renders his vineyard forbidden through one planting.

Mishna:

There are four “blood services” in a sacrifice: slaughtering, receiving the blood, conveying it, and casting it.

There is a time for burning the sacrifice — until daybreak; and likewise, there is a fixed time for eating it for each sacrifice. If, during one of the blood services, he intended to burn its sacrificial portions, or to eat its flesh, after their allotted time, the sacrifice becomes pigul and is invalid.

The priests who rendered

a sacrifice pigul

in the Temple,

and invalidated it, if they were

intentional, they are liable

to pay the owners the value of the sacrifice. And even though this is “damage that is not perceptible,” and it is not called damage, nevertheless the Sages obligated them to pay, for the sake of “the betterment of the world,” so that everyone should not go and damage his fellow with “damage that is not perceptible” [as was explained in the Gemara above, 53a].

And if they were unintentional, they are not liable to pay, and we do not penalize the unintentional on account of the intentional, because if we penalize them, the priests will refrain from serving.

Gemara:

The Sages taught:

Whoever

was

his fellow

working with him in matters of purity, and said to him: “The pure things that I prepared with you —

have become impure.”

And likewise, whoever

was

his fellow

working with him regarding sacrifices [

performing the sacrificial service on his sacrifice]

and said to him: “The sacrifices that I prepared with you —

have become pigul.”

That is, I rendered the sacrifice pigul.

In these two cases:

he is believed.

But if he said to him: “The pure things that I prepared with you on a certain day —

have become impure,”

he is not believed.

And likewise, if he said to him: “

The sacrifices that I prepared with you on a certain day —

have become pigul,” he is not believed.

And we ask:

What is different in the first clause,

where he did not say to him “on a certain day,” and he is believed,

and what is different in the latter clause,

where he said to him “on a certain day,” and he is not believed!?

He said [

he answered]

Abaye: Everything that is in his power

to do when he informs him,

he is believed

to be.

And the first clause deals with a case in which it is still in his power to render the pure things impure; and likewise regarding sacrifices, for example, when a priest informed him between slaughtering and casting, and said to him, “I rendered it pigul during slaughtering,” while it was still in his power to render it pigul during casting.

And “on a certain day” in the latter clause means that they had already left his possession, and therefore he is not believed to invalidate them.

Rava said:

Even though now it is not in his possession, he is believed. And the latter clause, which teaches, “On a certain day he is not believed,”

is, for example, when he encountered him [

he found him], after the pure things and the sacrifices had left his possession,

and he did not say anything to him [

anything].

And afterward [

afterwards]

he encountered him and said to him

that they had become impure and had become pigul, and therefore he is not believed.

For if he had been speaking the truth, he would have told him when he met him the first time; and since he did not tell him this at the outset, we say that perhaps he says this in order to distress him, while in truth the pure things did not become impure and the sacrifices did not become pigul.

That

man

who said to his fellow: “

The pure things that I prepared with you on a certain day have become impure,”

came

the owner

before Rabbi Ami,

to ask him whether he must believe his fellow’s words, since now it was not in his power to render them impure.

He said to him

Rabbi Ami: From the standpoint of

the strict law, he is not believed,

and you need not be concerned about his words, in accordance with Abaye’s opinion.

Rabbi Asi said before him [

before Rabbi Ami]:

Rabbi, you are

the one

who says this!

But Rabbi Yohanan disagrees with you and holds like Rava, for

thus [

in this way]

Rabbi Yohanan said in the name of Rabbi Yosei: What can I do

to be lenient, even after time has passed, since

the Torah made him trustworthy.

And we explain:

And where did the

Torah make him trustworthy?

Rabbi Yitzchak bar Bisna said: The High Priest on Yom Kippur proves it!

For when he says [

when he says]:

“It is pigul,”

the bull and goat of Yom Kippur,

he is believed [

he is trustworthy].

For pigul applies to every sacrifice, including the bull and goat of Yom Kippur.

a. The bull and goat of Yom Kippur: the High Priest sprinkles their blood in the Holy of Holies, opposite the cover over the Ark, and in the Sanctuary [the Hall], opposite the curtain, and places some of their blood on the golden altar.

b. While the High Priest sprinkles the blood of the bull and the goat, it is forbidden for any person to be with him, as it is stated [Leviticus 16:17]: “And no person shall be in the Tent of Meeting when he enters to make atonement in the Sanctuary until he comes out.”

And the Sages received [Yoma 44] that both while he sprinkles the blood in the Holy of Holies and while he sprinkles the blood in the Sanctuary, it is forbidden for any person to be with him.

And from where do we know [

from where do we know] that indeed the sacrifice became pigul, if he is not trustworthy in his testimony?

Lest you say: witnesses were with him and saw him render it pigul,

but it is written: “

And no person shall be in the Tent of Meeting”

at the time of the blood service.

Rather, is it not

necessarily

because he is trustworthy,

the High Priest himself, in his testimony, when he emerges from the Tent of Meeting and says, “I rendered it pigul,” even though he no longer has the power to render it pigul; and infer from this that it is not in accordance with Rabbi Ami and Abaye.

And we reject this:

And

from where is it known,

perhaps

it is a case

where we heard him [

we heard him], from outside,

render it pigul

with his mouth, and he said: “Behold, I am sprinkling the blood with the intention of burning the sacrificial portions after their allotted time.”

And if so, there is no “trustworthiness” of the High Priest here, but clear knowledge through witnesses.

And we explain: necessarily he is trustworthy, for

if he were not trustworthy

to us, the High Priest,

even though we heard him

when he was inside,

he would likewise not be trustworthy, for perhaps he said it afterward.

That is, even if we heard him say that he was rendering it pigul at the time of the sprinkling, from where do we know that he actually said his words at the very time of the service? Perhaps he said this after the service, and it is not pigul.

If so, necessarily the High Priest is trusted to tell us, after his departure, that he had rendered it pigul at the time of the service.

Two small openings were open into the Sanctuary, one in the north and one in the south, and through them it was possible to see what was being done in the Sanctuary.

And

we reject this: there is still no proof, for one can say:

perhaps we saw him

at the time of sprinkling the blood in the Sanctuary

through the small opening,

through the way of the small opening, and we heard him render it pigul at that time!? And we conclude: indeed,

it is difficult

for us how Rabbi Yosei proved his ruling.

A Torah scroll requires that the parchment sheets on which it is written be processed for its sake, and likewise it must be written, especially its sacred Names for the sake of a Torah scroll.

A certain

man

came before Rabbi Ami.

He said to him: The Torah scroll that I wrote for a certain man

for that man, I wrote the sacred Names

of his not for their sake

and it is disqualified.

He said to him,

Rabbi Ami

asked him: In whose hands is the Torah scroll

located?

He said to him: In the hands of the purchaser

it is.

He said to him:

if so,

you are trusted to cause the loss of

the

payment

you are owed, for the admission of a litigant is equivalent to a hundred witnesses.

But you are not trusted to cause the loss of

the

scroll

of the

Torah

and to disqualify it, since it is not in your possession.

Rabbi Ami’s wording, “You are trusted to cause the loss of your payment,” implies the payment for writing the entire Torah scroll.

And therefore,

he said to him

asked

Rabbi Yirmeya

Rabbi Ami:

Granted

even if we say that he lost

the payment

for the

sacred Names

that he did not write for their sake,

Did he lose the payment for the entire Torah scroll

—did he

lose it,

when he wrote all of it, apart from its sacred Names, for its sake!?

He said to him

Rabbi Ami:

Yes

that is the matter: he lost all his payment!

For

after all,

any Torah scroll whose sacred Names are not written for their sake

has no remedy by which to render it fit, and

it is worth nothing.

And we ask:

And

why does it have no remedy,

to pass a quill over them and sanctify them,

that is, why should he not go over the sacred Names again and write them, on top of the first writing, for their sake!?

According to whom

are you saying that it has no remedy?

Shall we say

that we learn from here that Rabbi Ami holds

not like Rabbi Yehuda,

who renders it fit when passing a quill over it for its sake!?

For we learned: If one needed to write the

name

of the Name

in a Torah scroll,

and

by mistake

he intended to write Yehuda.

And he erred and did not place a dalet in it

he did not write the letter dalet, as he thought that he had to write Yehuda, and it turns out that he wrote the Name in its proper place, but not for its sake.

What should he do to correct the matter?

He passes a quill over it

for its sake

and sanctifies it; these are the words of Rabbi Yehuda.

And the Sages say: There is no

writing of the Name

of the Name

this

of the choicest,

and this Torah scroll is disqualified.

And we conclude:

Even if you say

like

Rabbi Yehuda,

Rabbi Ami’s words are properly explained.

For

Rabbi Yehuda said this only

that he passes a quill over it and sanctifies it

in the case of a single sacred Name.

But

with the sacred Names

of the entire Torah scroll,

Rabbi Yehuda did not render it fit

because it appears

the Torah scroll

like a variegated object,

in different colors, for all of it is written in one kind of writing, while the Names are written by writing on top of writing.

A certain

man

came before Rabbi Abbahu.

He said to him: The Torah scroll that I wrote for a certain man, the parchment sheets

his

on which the scroll was written

I did not process them for their sake,

and it is disqualified.

He said to him: This Torah scroll

this

in whose hands

is it located?

He said to him: In the hands of the purchaser.

He said to him: Since you are trusted to cause the loss of your payment,

for the admission of a litigant is equivalent to a hundred witnesses,

you are trusted

as well

to cause the loss

and to disqualify the

scroll

of the

Torah

through your testimony, for it is presumed of you that you would not speak falsely and cause the loss of your payment for nothing.