Gittin 54a — the Talmud in English

and they do not count

the Israelites’ trees

by Shabbat days.

That is, since the prohibition of orla—the first three years during which the fruit of a tree is forbidden—is dependent on years, as it is stated: “For three years it shall be forbidden to you” [Leviticus 19:23], it is evident in which year the tree was planted. For when its fruit becomes permitted in the fourth year, everyone will know that the tree was planted during the Sabbatical year. But after time has passed, it is not evident on which day of the week it was planted, because the days from the planting are not counted; only years are counted.

Therefore, one who plants during the Sabbatical year must uproot the tree, because everyone will know that it was planted during the Sabbatical year, and perhaps people will come to permit planting during the Sabbatical year. But one who inadvertently plants on Shabbat need not uproot it, because after time has passed, people will not know that it was planted on Shabbat, and there is no concern that they might come to be lenient regarding the prohibition of Shabbat.

Another

reason

for

the ruling of Rabbi Meir:

The Israelites were suspected

of violating

the

prohibition of

the Sabbatical year, but they were not suspected of

desecrating

Shabbat,

and therefore one who plants during the Sabbatical year must be penalized, whereas there is no need to impose a penalty for performing work on Shabbat.

And we are surprised:

why

did the tanna—a sage of the Mishnaic period—need to bring

another reason,

rather than being satisfied with the first reason?!

And we explain:

This is what he is saying:

And if you would say

that the first reason is not sufficient to explain why one who plants on Shabbat need not uproot the tree:

For

with regard to Shabbat as well, sometimes

it will be evident after time has passed that the tree was planted on Shabbat.

For example,

if the thirtieth day falls

on Shabbat.

The first year in the count of the years of orla need not be a complete year. Rather, if the tree was planted thirty days before Rosh HaShana, when Rosh HaShana arrives, one year is counted for the tree, because thirty days of a year are considered a year; the tree’s fruit is then forbidden as orla for only two additional years.

For if he planted that

on that

day, it is that the year

will count

for him

But if he did not

plant on that day,

the year does not count for him,

and he will have to wait three complete years.

It follows that, in the case of one who planted on that Shabbat, the matter will become evident after time has passed. At the end of two years, when people eat from the fruit, because of those thirty days before Rosh HaShana, they will recall that he planted the tree on Shabbat.

consider a proof

from an additional reason for being lenient with one who planted on Shabbat.

The Israelites were suspected regarding the Sabbatical year,

and there is concern, since the matter will be evident, that they may come to permit planting during the Sabbatical year.

But they were not suspected regarding Shabbat,

and even if the matter were remembered and became known, they would not come to be lenient regarding the prohibition of Shabbat and permit planting on Shabbat.

It follows that Rabbi Meir’s statements do not contradict one another.

And the contradiction between

Rabbi Yehuda,

who penalizes one who acts inadvertently because of one who acts intentionally with regard to Shabbat, and

Rabbi Yehuda,

who does not impose a penalty for inadvertent action during the Sabbatical year,

is likewise not difficult.

For

in the place

where

Rabbi Yehuda lived, the Sabbatical year was considered especially severe,

and people kept very far from the prohibitions of the Sabbatical year. There was therefore no concern that they might come to treat those prohibitions lightly, and consequently there was no need to penalize inadvertent action because of intentional action.

There is proof that the Sabbatical year was considered severe among the people of Rabbi Yehuda’s place:

A certain man

in Rabbi Yehuda’s place

said to his fellow,

in order to distress him:

You are the son of a convert woman,

a son of a female convert, you!

His fellow said to him,

You are inferior to me, because

I do not eat Sabbatical-year produce

in violation of the prohibition

like you.

as you do. And if this disgrace was considered greater in their eyes than being the child of converts, without distinguished lineage, this indicates that the Sabbatical year was considered severe among the people of that place.

Consider a proof,

from a beraita, that Rabbi Meir does not impose a penalty for a rabbinic prohibition by treating inadvertent action like intentional action.

He pays teruma only with non-sacred produce that has been properly prepared, meaning that the tithes and other required portions have already been separated from it.

When he gives that produce to the kohen, it becomes teruma.

If he ate impure teruma

inadvertently,

he pays with pure non-sacred produce,

in place of what he ate, and it becomes teruma in the kohen’s possession. [The Gemara later explains that this is not the law, and that he is permitted to pay with impure non-sacred produce.]

If he nevertheless

paid with impure non-sacred produce, what is the law?

Should he be penalized for this?

Sumakhos said in the name of Rabbi Meir: If he acted inadvertently, his payment is valid.

If he acted intentionally, his payment is not valid,

because he violated the Sages’ instruction.

And the Sages say: Both this and that,

whether he acted inadvertently or intentionally,

his payment

which he already gave to the kohen

is payment

and becomes teruma; it belongs to the kohen according to Torah law.

But

as a rabbinic penalty,

he returns

and

pays

the kohen

with pure non-sacred produce,

which does not become teruma.

And we examine this

beraita carefully:

If one ate impure teruma and paid with impure non-sacred produce, even if he did so

intentionally, why is his payment not

valid payment?!

He should not be penalized; on the contrary,

may blessing come upon him!

For

he

fed him

impure teruma, which is

something unfit for him,

something that is not fit for him and that he is forbidden to eat even

during the days of his impurity.

And he pays him

with impure non-sacred produce, which is

something fit for him,

at least

Even though it will again become teruma, this is nevertheless not always a reason to penalize him, because perhaps he did not know that it would become teruma, and thus his intention was to give the kohen more than what he had eaten. Why, then, did the Sages penalize him?!

he replied:

Rava said—and some say it was Kadi,

a sage’s name, replied:

The text is incomplete,

meaning that the wording of the beraita is missing something and must be supplied.

And this is how it should be taught

as the beraita was formulated:

If he ate impure teruma—

he pays

non-sacred produce,

whatever it may be,

whether pure or impure.

If he ate pure teruma, he pays with pure non-sacred produce,

and although Torah law permits him to pay with impure non-sacred produce, nevertheless the Sages ordained that he pay with pure produce.

If he nevertheless

paid with impure non-sacred produce, what is the law?

Sumakhos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: If he acted inadvertently, his payment is valid,

Although the kohen suffers a loss, because the offender ate pure teruma and receives impure produce, he has nevertheless fulfilled his obligation to make payment, since he paid the same quantity as the amount of teruma he ate.

his payment is not valid,

because the Sages penalized him, since he intentionally violated their ordinance and intended to cause the kohen a loss.

whether inadvertently or intentionally,

his payment is valid

and has become teruma,

but he returns and pays with pure non-sacred produce,

which does not become teruma.

And Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said:

Even when Sumakhos said, “his payment is not valid,” he did not mean that it remains non-sacred and returns to the person who gave it. Since it became teruma according to Torah law, the Sages did not come to uproot a matter of Torah law.

Rather, this is what Sumakhos said: “His payment is not valid” for fulfilling his obligation. Therefore, even though what he gave became sacred and belongs to the kohen, he must give him additional non-sacred produce, and this additional non-sacred produce does not become teruma.

And if you say: If so, the Sages said the same thing. What is the difference between the Sages and Rabbi Meir?!

One can answer:

Here, the difference between them concerns whether one who acted inadvertently is penalized because of one who acted intentionally:

Rabbi Meir did not penalize one who acted inadvertently, whereas the Sages did penalize him and said: Both this and that do not exempt him through what he paid, and he must return and pay with other non-sacred produce.

But one who pays with impure non-sacred produce has violated a rabbinic prohibition, so it follows that Rabbi Meir does not impose a penalty for a rabbinic prohibition by treating inadvertent action like intentional action. This contradicts what we said above, that with regard to a rabbinic prohibition Rabbi Meir does impose such a penalty?!

And we answer:

Is that really comparable?

Is this a difficulty?

There,

in the case of payment for teruma,

the person intends to make payment,

and he is engaged in doing a favor. He is a proper person;

should we stand up and penalize him

for this?!

Consider a proof,

from a beraita, that Rabbi Meir does not impose a penalty for a rabbinic prohibition by treating inadvertent action like intentional action.

In the case of an offering whose blood became impure, the law should be that its blood may not be sprinkled, and that the offering would not be rendered fit if the blood were sprinkled.

However, the tzitz, the gold plate worn on the forehead of the High kohen, “effects acceptance” and renders the offering fit, as it is stated: “It shall be on Aaron’s forehead, and Aaron shall bear the iniquity of the sacred things” [Exodus 28:38.

According to Torah law, it is not prohibited to sprinkle the blood when the tzitz effects acceptance for the offering. Nevertheless, the Sages prohibited sprinkling impure blood, even though the tzitz effects acceptance.

The blood

of an offering

that became impure,

and he nevertheless

sprinkled it,

if he sprinkled it

inadvertently,

he sprinkled it

and the offering was accepted,

and its meat is permitted to be eaten.

But if

intentionally

he sprinkled its blood, the Sages penalized him, and

the offering was not accepted,

and its meat is forbidden to be eaten.

And we answer:

Is that really comparable? There, the person

the kohen who sprinkled the blood

intends to atone

for the owners;

that is what he intends,

and he is engaged in doing a favor.

Should we stand up and penalize him?!

Therefore, in such a case Rabbi Meir agrees that he should not be penalized for his inadvertent action.

Consider a proof!

The Sages prohibited separating terumot and tithes on Shabbat. They likewise prohibited immersing impure utensils on Shabbat, because this appears to be repairing a utensil on Shabbat.

One who separates the tithe on Shabbat, if he acted inadvertently, may eat the produce,

even on Shabbat, and the Sages did not penalize him.

If he acted intentionally,

the Sages penalized him so that he

may not eat the produce.

This is an unattributed Mishna [Terumot, chapter 2, Mishna 3], and an unattributed Mishna is the view of Rabbi Meir. Nevertheless, here too the tanna did not impose a penalty for a rabbinic prohibition by treating inadvertent action like intentional action! And we answer:

Is that really comparable? There, the person intends to repair

the produce;

that is what he intends,

and he is engaged in doing a favor.

Should we stand up and penalize him?!

Consider a proof!

One who immerses utensils on Shabbat, if he acted inadvertently, may use them,

even on Shabbat, and the Sages did not penalize him.

If he acted intentionally,

the Sages penalized him so that he

may not use them.

And this too is an unattributed Mishna, and in accordance with Rabbi Meir; and we do not penalize in the case of rabbinic enactments, the unwitting on account of the intentional[?]!

And we answer:

How can these cases be compared? There, the man is intending to purify vessels

[to purify his vessels]

and is intending,

and he is engaged in a benefit; and is it because of this that

we should arise and penalize him!?

It emerges: Rabbi Meir on the basis of Rabbi Meir—there is no difficulty!

And he raises

[a contradiction]

from Rabbi Judah on the basis of Rabbi Judah, concerning rabbinic enactments:

For above we said: Rabbi Judah does not penalize, in the case of rabbinic enactments, the unwitting on account of the intentional. But below, we found a beraita in which Rabbi Judah penalized the unwitting on account of the intentional—!?

As it was taught