Gittin 54a (נד.) — the Talmud in English

And they do not count

Israel’s saplings

by Shabbatot.

That is, since the prohibition of orla for three years is dependent on the years, as it is stated: “Three years shall it be uncircumcised for you” [Leviticus 19:23], it is apparent in which year he planted the tree, because when the fruit becomes permitted in the fourth year, everyone will know that he planted the tree in the seventh year. However, after time has passed, it is not apparent on which day of the week it was planted, because the days from the planting are not counted; only years are counted.

Therefore, one who plants during the Sabbatical Year must uproot the tree, because it will be known to everyone that he planted it during the Sabbatical Year, and perhaps they will come to permit planting during the Sabbatical Year. But one who inadvertently plants on Shabbat need not uproot it, because after time has passed, they will not know that it was planted on Shabbat, and there is no concern that they might come to be lenient regarding the prohibition of Shabbat.

Another

reason

for

Rabbi Meir’s ruling:

Israel was suspected

of transgressing

the

prohibition of

the Sabbatical Year, but they were not suspected of

desecrating

Shabbatot,

and therefore one who plants during the Sabbatical Year must be penalized, whereas there is no need to penalize one who performs labor on Shabbat.

And we question this:

Why

did the tanna need to bring

another reason

rather than being satisfied with the first reason?

And we explain:

This is what he is saying:

And if you would say

that the first reason is insufficient to explain why one who plants on Shabbat need not uproot the tree,

because

there are also times when Shabbat

will be recognizable after time has passed as the day on which the tree was planted,

for example,

when the thirtieth day occurs

before Rosh HaShana,

on Shabbat.

The first year in the count of the years of orla need not be a complete year. Rather, whenever the tree has been planted thirty days before Rosh HaShana, when Rosh HaShana arrives, one year is counted for the tree, because thirty days of a year are considered a year, and the fruit of the tree is prohibited due to orla for only two additional years.

For if he planted that

same

day, it is that the year is counted

for him

as a year

in the count of the years of orla, because thirty days of a year are considered a year.

But if he did not

plant on that day,

the year is not counted for him,

and he will have to wait three complete years.

It follows that, when one plants on that Shabbat, the matter will be recognizable after time has passed. At the end of two years, when people eat from the fruit, because of those thirty days preceding Rosh HaShana, they will remember that he planted it on Shabbat.

If so, according to the first reason mentioned by Rabbi Meir, one should penalize even one who plants on Shabbat. Yet it is implied that anyone who plants on Shabbat need not uproot the tree! Therefore Rabbi Meir said:

Come and hear:

there is an additional reason to be lenient with one who planted on Shabbat.

Israel was suspected regarding the Sabbatical Year,

and there is concern, since the matter will be recognizable, that they might come to permit planting during the Sabbatical Year.

But they were not suspected regarding Shabbatot,

and even if the matter were remembered and became known, they would not come to be lenient regarding the prohibition of Shabbat and permit planting on Shabbat.

Thus, Rabbi Meir’s statements do not contradict one another.

And

Rabbi Yehuda,

who penalizes an inadvertent act because of an intentional act with regard to Shabbat, and

Rabbi Yehuda

with regard to the Sabbatical Year, who does not penalize an inadvertent act,

also do not contradict one another.

For

in the place

where

Rabbi Yehuda lived, the Sabbatical Year was treated stringently,

and people distanced themselves greatly from the prohibitions of the Sabbatical Year. There was therefore no concern that they might come to treat those prohibitions lightly, and consequently there was no need to penalize an inadvertent act because of an intentional one.

There is proof that the Sabbatical Year was treated stringently among the people of Rabbi Yehuda’s locality:

A certain man

[in Rabbi Yehuda’s locality]

said to his fellow,

in order to cause him distress: Is it not the case that

you are the son of a convert woman

[the son of a female convert] you?

His fellow said to him:

You are inferior to me, for

I do not eat the produce of the Sabbatical Year

in a prohibited manner

like you.

And if this disgrace was more significant in their eyes than being the son of converts and therefore lacking distinguished lineage, it is evidence that the Sabbatical Year was treated stringently among the people of that locality.

Come and hear,

from a beraita, that Rabbi Meir does not impose a rabbinic penalty on an inadvertent act because of an intentional one.

One who eats teruma inadvertently does not pay money like any other damager; rather, he pays produce.

And he pays not teruma but non-sacred produce that has been properly tithed [from which terumot and tithes have already been separated].

When he gives it to the kohen, it becomes teruma.

If he ate impure teruma

inadvertently,

he pays with pure non-sacred produce,

in place of what he ate, and it becomes teruma in the kohen’s possession [and the Gemara proceeds to explain that the law is not so, and that he may pay with impure non-sacred produce].

If he transgressed and

paid with impure non-sacred produce, what is the law?

Should he be penalized for this?

Sumakhos said in the name of Rabbi Meir: Inadvertently, his payment is valid.

Intentionally, his payment is not valid,

because he transgressed the words of the Sages.

And the Sages say: Both this and that

[an inadvertent act and an intentional act],

his payment

which he has already paid to the kohen

is payment,

and it becomes teruma and belongs to the kohen, in accordance with Torah law.

And

because of the rabbinic penalty, he

returns

and

pays

the kohen

with pure non-sacred produce,

but it does not become teruma.

And we examine this

[we analyze this beraita]:

If he ate impure teruma and paid with impure non-sacred produce, even if he did so

intentionally, why is his payment not

payment!?

He should not be penalized; on the contrary,

may blessing come upon him!

For

the case is one where he

fed him impure teruma, which is

something that is

not fit for him

[something unfit for him], and it is forbidden for him to eat it even

during his days of impurity.

And he pays him

impure non-sacred produce, which is

something fit for him,

at least

during his days of impurity.

And although the produce then becomes teruma, nevertheless he should not be penalized in every case, because perhaps he did not know that it would become teruma, and it turns out that his intention was to give him more than what he had eaten. Why, then, did the Sages penalize him?

And

[he answered]:

Rava said—and some say that Kady

[the name of a sage] answered:

The text is incomplete,

the wording of the beraita is lacking and must be supplemented.

And this is how it is taught

[this is how the beraita should be recited]:

If he ate impure teruma—

he pays

non-sacred produce

of any kind,

whether pure or impure.

If he ate pure teruma, he pays with pure non-sacred produce,

and although by Torah law he may pay with impure non-sacred produce, nevertheless the Sages instituted that he pay with pure produce.

If he transgressed and

paid with impure non-sacred produce, what is the law?

Sumakhos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: Inadvertently, his payment is valid,

and the Sages did not penalize him.

Although the kohen suffers a loss, since he ate pure teruma and receives impure teruma, nevertheless he has fulfilled his obligation of payment, since he paid the same quantity as the amount of teruma he ate.

Intentionally,

his payment is not valid,

because the Sages penalized him, since he intentionally violated their enactment and intended to cause the kohen a loss.

And the Sages say: Both this and that

[an inadvertent act and an intentional act],

his payment is valid,

and it becomes teruma,

but he returns and pays with pure non-sacred produce

which does not become teruma.

And Rav Aha, son of Rav Ika, said:

Even when Sumakhos said, “His payment is not valid,” he did not mean that the produce remains non-sacred and returns to the one who gave it. Since by Torah law it became teruma, the Sages did not come to uproot a matter of Torah law.

Rather, this is what Sumakhos meant: “His payment is not valid” for the purpose of fulfilling his obligation. Therefore, although what he gave became consecrated and belongs to the kohen, he must give him additional non-sacred produce, and this additional non-sacred produce does not become teruma.

And if you would say: If so, the Sages said the same thing; what, then, is the difference between the Sages and Rabbi Meir?

One can say:

Here, they differ with regard to whether one penalizes an inadvertent act because of an intentional one:

Rabbi Meir did not penalize the inadvertent act, whereas the Sages penalized it and said: “Both this and that”—he is not exempt through what he paid, and he must return and pay with other non-sacred produce.

But one who pays with impure non-sacred produce has violated a rabbinic prohibition, so it follows that Rabbi Meir does not impose a rabbinic penalty on an inadvertent act because of an intentional one. This contradicts what we said above, that with regard to rabbinic law Rabbi Meir does penalize an inadvertent act because of an intentional one!

And we answer:

Can this be compared?

[Is this a difficulty?]

There,

[with regard to payment for teruma],

the person intends to make payment,

and he is engaged in doing a favor; he is a proper person.

Are we to arise and penalize him

[are we to arise and impose a penalty upon him]!?

This is unlike one who renders produce impure, mixes it with teruma, or pours libations to idolatry, since even when he acts inadvertently, he is not engaged in doing a favor. Therefore, there is reason to penalize him because of the possibility that he acted intentionally.

Come and hear,

from a beraita, that Rabbi Meir does not impose a rabbinic penalty on an inadvertent act because of an intentional one.

With regard to an offering whose blood became impure, the law should be that its blood may not be sprinkled and that the offering is not rendered fit if the blood was sprinkled.

Rather, the tzitz, the frontplate worn on the forehead of the High Priest, “effects acceptance” and renders the offering fit, as it is stated: “It shall be on Aaron’s forehead, and Aaron shall bear the iniquity of the sacred things” [Exodus 28:38].

And by Torah law, it is not prohibited to sprinkle the blood when the tzitz effects acceptance for the offering. However, the Sages prohibited sprinkling impure blood, even though the tzitz effects acceptance.

The blood

of an offering

that became impure,

and he transgressed

and sprinkled it:

If he sprinkled it

inadvertently,

the sprinkling

effects acceptance,

and its flesh is permitted to be eaten.

But if

intentionally

he sprinkled its blood, the Sages penalized him and

it does not effect acceptance,

and its flesh is forbidden to be eaten.

This demonstrates that the tanna does not impose a rabbinic penalty on an inadvertent act because of an intentional one!

And we answer:

Can this be compared? There, the person

[the kohen who sprinkled the blood]

intends to effect atonement

for the owners;

he intends

to do a favor. Are we,

then, to arise and penalize him!?

Therefore, in such a case Rabbi Meir agrees that he should not be penalized for his inadvertence.

Come and hear!

The Sages prohibited separating terumot and tithes on Shabbat, and they likewise prohibited immersing impure vessels on Shabbat, because this appears like repairing a vessel on Shabbat.

One who tithes on Shabbat: if he did so inadvertently, the produce may be eaten,

even on Shabbat, and the Sages did not penalize him.

If intentionally,

the Sages penalized him so that

it may not be eaten.

But this is an unattributed Mishna [Terumot, chapter 2, Mishna 3], and an unattributed Mishna is Rabbi Meir; nevertheless, the tanna did not impose a rabbinic penalty on an inadvertent act because of an intentional one! And we answer:

Can this be compared? There, the person intends to repair

the produce

and intends,

to do a favor. Are we,

then, to arise and penalize him!?

Come and hear!

One who immerses vessels on Shabbat: if he did so inadvertently, he may use them

even on Shabbat, and the Sages did not penalize him.

If intentionally,

the Sages penalized him so that

he may not use them.

And this too is an unattributed Mishna, and it follows Rabbi Meir; and in a rabbinic matter, we do not impose a fine, treating an inadvertent act as deliberate?!

And we answer:

How can these cases be compared? There, the man intends to purify his vessels

to purify his vessels

he is directing his actions toward that,

and he is engaged in doing a favor; would we then

get up and impose a fine upon him?!

It emerges that the contradiction between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Meir is not difficult!

And he raises

a contradiction

between Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Judah, in a rabbinic matter:

For above we said: Rabbi Judah does not impose a fine, in a rabbinic matter, treating an inadvertent act as deliberate. Yet below we find a beraita in which Rabbi Judah imposed a fine for an inadvertent act as though it were deliberate?!

As it was taught: