Gittin 53b — the Talmud in English

And

he

said Rava: The water of purification ![](pamud.bmp "

Exact page location")

with which he weighed weights is fit!?

And we answer:

It is not difficult; this [the

baraita that disqualifies] is when he weighed

with their substance,

and for example, the water was in a vessel that had gradations marking the quantity of the water, and by placing the meat into the water, he knows its quantity, because the water rises from one mark to another. And

this [Rava's words that render it fit] is

Rava’s statement that permits the water refers to a case in which he weighed

in

a case where he weighed

against them,

and since he did not perform an act with their substance, they do not become disqualified.

And we challenge: If the baraita that disqualifies speaks of a case where he weighed

with their substance,

then

he performs an act with them,

that is, the disqualification takes effect through an act that he performed with the water, and not through thought.

And if

according to Hezekiah, who holds:

damage that is not recognizable is called damage, he should also be liable according to human law

at least when he acted intentionally!?

And we conclude:

Rather,

the very fact that he weighed against the water does not disqualify it.

Both this and that [both the baraita that disqualifies and Rava's words]

in

a manner in which he weighed

against them.

Water of purification, before he sanctified it with the ashes of the purification offering, requires safeguarding, so that he not divert his attention from it, as it is stated [Numbers 19:9]: “For a safeguarding for the water of sprinkling”; and if he diverted his attention from safeguarding it, even though he did not perform labor with it, it became disqualified,

and it is not difficult!

This [the baraita], for example,

the beraita, for example, is a case in which he

he diverted his attention [he diverted his attention] from safeguarding it while engaged in the weighing.

from guarding the water while he was engaged in weighing it.

And

this [Rava's words],

Rava’s statement refers to a case

that

he weighed and

did not divert his attention.

Raised an objection [he challenged]

from

Rav Pappa against Hezekiah's words:

with regard to his statement: A. One who robs another is obligated to return the stolen object to him, and is not permitted to give him its monetary value, as it is stated [Leviticus 5]: “When a person sins … or commits robbery … and he shall return the robbery that he robbed.”

A. One who robs his fellow is liable to return the robbed object to him, and he may not give him its monetary value, as it is stated [Leviticus 5]: “When a person sins, etc., or robs, etc., and he shall restore the robbery that he robbed.”

B. If the object was lost, the robber pays the value of the object according to what it was worth at the time of the robbery.

C. If the value of the object decreased, the robber may say to the robbed person: “Here is what is yours before you,” and he is not obligated to return to him its value at the time of the robbery, provided that he gives him the very object that he robbed.

D. If the object changed from the way it was, I do not call it “and he shall restore the robbery that he robbed,” because we require that the object be “like that which he robbed.” Therefore, he is liable to give him the monetary value of the robbed object as it was when he robbed it.

He robbed a coin and it was invalidated

through the king's order that it not be used, and through this the coin had no value.

Or he robbed

teruma and it became impure,

and it was unfit for human consumption.

Or he robbed

leavened bread and Passover passed over it

and it is now forbidden for benefit.

The robber

says to him [to the robbed person]:

the victim:

Here is

the object

that is yours before you,

and he need not pay him the value of the object that he robbed from him.

And if you say: Damage that is not recognizable is called damage,

the object has changed and is not “like that which he robbed,” and he does not fulfill his obligation of returning it through this.

But still,

this

man

is a robber,

and

he must pay full-fledged money [he is liable to pay full-fledged money]

in order to fulfill his obligation.

And we conclude: Indeed,

a refutation

of Hezekiah, for from this baraita it is proven in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan, that damage that is not recognizable is not called damage, and therefore he can say to him: “Here is what is yours before you.”

Shall we say: [it is a dispute] among tannaim

whether the dispute among the amoraim is a dispute among the tannaim:

One who renders [produce] impure, one who mixes [teruma with ordinary produce], and one who pours [wine as a libation to idolatry], whether unintentionally

whether he was unaware that his fellow would thereby be harmed,

or intentionally—

Rabbi Yehuda says: If he acted unwittingly, he is exempt; if intentionally, he is liable,

he is liable; these are the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Judah says: Unintentionally, he is exempt; intentionally, he is liable,

and our Mishna is in accordance with Rabbi Judah.

Is it not so,

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Judah

disagree in this:

For one [Rabbi Meir]

Rabbi Meir

holds: “Damage that is not recognizable is called damage,”

and therefore he is liable both intentionally and unintentionally [and we do not exempt him so that they will inform him].

And the other [Rabbi Judah]

Rabbi Yehuda

holds:

damage that is not recognizable

is not called damage.

Therefore, the one who acted unintentionally is exempt by law, while the one who acted intentionally is liable on account of a penalty, so that he will not go and damage his fellow.

And we reject this:

Rav Nahman bar Yitzhak said:

They did not disagree about this, for

everyone agrees: damage that is not recognizable is not called damage.

And one who causes damage intentionally is liable according to everyone on account of a penalty.

And here [in the baraita]

in the beraita, they

in the matter of penalizing

the Sages the one who causes damage

unintentionally because of [because of] one who causes damage

one who causes damage

intentionally—they disagree,

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Judah.

For one [Rabbi Meir]

Rabbi Meir

holds: They penalized the one who acted unintentionally because of the one who acted intentionally.

And

And the other [Rabbi Judah]

Rabbi Yehuda

holds: They did not penalize the one who acted unintentionally because of the one who acted intentionally.

And he raises [a contradiction] from the words

between

of Rabbi Meir

here, who holds: They penalized the one who acted unintentionally because of the one who acted intentionally,

against Rabbi Meir

elsewhere, who said: They did not penalize the one who acted unintentionally because of the one who acted intentionally.

And

likewise

he raises a contradiction from Rabbi Judah against Rabbi Judah,

for with regard to damage that is not recognizable, he did not penalize the one who acted unintentionally because of the one who acted intentionally, while elsewhere he did penalize him.

As it was taught: One who cooks on Shabbat unintentionally,

the cooked food is not prohibited at all, and therefore even the cook himself

may eat

if he wishes, even on Shabbat. But if he cooked

intentionally, he may not eat.

These are the words of Rabbi Meir,

and it follows that Rabbi Meir did not penalize the one who acted unintentionally because of the one who acted intentionally.

Rabbi Judah says:

The one who cooks

unintentionally may eat

himself

at the conclusion of Shabbat [at the conclusion of Shabbat]

after waiting the time in which it would have been possible to finish cooking lawfully at the conclusion of Shabbat. But on Shabbat itself he may not eat, for we penalize the one who acted unintentionally because of the one who acted intentionally.

And if he cooked

intentionally,

it is fitting to penalize him more, and therefore

he may not eat

himself

forever,

while others are permitted to eat it.

Rabbi Yohanan the sandal-maker says:

The one who cooks

unintentionally may eat

the cooked food

at the conclusion of Shabbat

for others

only,

but not for himself,

for they penalized the cook himself because of the one who acted intentionally.

And if he cooked

intentionally, he may not eat

the cooked food

forever, neither he nor others.

For Rabbi Yohanan the sandal-maker holds: “an act of Shabbat”—that is, something done on Shabbat through prohibited labor intentionally—is forbidden to eat, as it is stated [Exodus 31]: “You shall observe the Shabbat, for it is holy for you,” and we expound [Bava Kamma 71a]: Just as something holy is forbidden to eat, so an act of Shabbat is forbidden to eat.

But the Sages disagree and hold: “an act of Shabbat” is not forbidden to eat, for they expound: “It is holy for you”—it, [Shabbat itself,] is holy, but its products are not holy.

Now the Gemara returns to the matter above, in which Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Judah disagreed whether they penalized the one who acted unintentionally because of the one who acted intentionally, and it concludes:

Rabbi Meir against Rabbi Meir is difficult,

for with regard to damage that is not recognizable, Rabbi Meir penalized the one who acted unintentionally because of the one who acted intentionally, while with one who cooks on Shabbat he did not penalize him!?

And likewise,

Rabbi Judah against Rabbi Judah is difficult,

for with regard to damage that is not recognizable, Rabbi Judah did not penalize the one who acted unintentionally, while with one who cooks on Shabbat he did penalize him—he penalized the one who acted unintentionally because of the one who acted intentionally!?

And we answer:

Rabbi Meir against Rabbi Meir is not difficult!

For

when [where]

Rabbi Meir

Rabbi Meir penalized

the one who acted unintentionally because of the one who acted intentionally, it was

in

a case where he committed a

rabbinic prohibition,

such as one who renders [produce] impure or mixes [teruma with ordinary produce], who does not violate a prohibition from the Torah, since it is damage that is not recognizable.

And with regard to a rabbinic prohibition, Rabbi Meir holds that one should penalize more, because the words of the Scribes require strengthening, to give force to their words, so that people will not come to violate them.

But

in

a case where he committed a prohibition

from the Torah,

such as one who cooks on Shabbat,

Rabbi Meir did not penalize the one who acted unintentionally because of the one who acted intentionally, because it is uncommon for people to violate a Torah prohibition.

on one who acted unintentionally because of one who acted intentionally, since people are unlikely to violate a Torah prohibition.

And we challenge:

But the one who pours

his fellow's wine as a libation to idolatry, which is a prohibition

from the Torah,

and Rabbi Meir does penalize

the one who pours it unintentionally!?

And we answer: Indeed, it is uncommon for people to violate a Torah prohibition, but nevertheless,

because of the severity of idolatry, he penalized him

Rabbi Meir, in order to distance him greatly from the prohibition.

It follows that Rabbi Meir against Rabbi Meir is not difficult, as explained.

And likewise,

Rabbi Judah against Rabbi Judah is not difficult!

Rather, his reasoning is the opposite of Rabbi Meir's reasoning, for Rabbi Meir holds that one should be stringent with a rabbinic prohibition and lenient with a Torah prohibition, since it is uncommon.

Whereas Rabbi Judah,

when he did not penalize

the one who acted unintentionally

with regard to a rabbinic prohibition,

it is because its prohibition is not so severe.

But

with regard to a Torah prohibition, he does penalize!

Therefore, with one who renders [produce] impure or mixes [teruma with ordinary produce], Rabbi Judah did not penalize the one who acted unintentionally, because they violated only a rabbinic prohibition; but with one who cooks on Shabbat, who violated a Torah prohibition, Rabbi Judah penalized even the one who acted unintentionally.

And we challenge:

But the one who pours

a prohibition

from the Torah

it is

and he did not penalize him!?

And we answer:

Because of the severity of idolatry, people separate themselves from it [they distance themselves and withdraw from it], and there is no need to penalize.

and abstain from it, so there is no need to impose a penalty.

And he raises

the earlier baraita according to

Rabbi Meir against Rabbi Meir,

against the following baraita, concerning whether one penalizes the one who acted unintentionally because of the one who acted intentionally

with regard to a Torah prohibition:

And likewise, he raises a contradiction from Rabbi Judah against Rabbi Judah:

A. One who plants on Shabbat performs a derivative of the labor of sowing, and is liable.

B. One who plants during the Sabbatical year is liable, as it is stated [Leviticus 25]: “And in the seventh year there shall be a complete rest for the land; your field you shall not sow,” etc.; and planting too is included in the prohibition.

As it was taught: One who plants on Shabbat, unintentionally may maintain

his planting, and he need not uproot it.

He planted

the tree shall be uprooted

as a penalty, as above. And specifically, they penalized him when he acted deliberately, but not when he acted inadvertently, as was explained above, with regard to one who cooks on Shabbat, according to Rabbi Meir.

And in the Sabbatical year, whether

he planted

inadvertently, whether

he planted

deliberately, it shall be uprooted,

for we penalize an inadvertent act on account of a deliberate one.

The words of Rabbi Meir.

It follows that in the Sabbatical year Rabbi Meir penalized an inadvertent act on account of a deliberate one, whereas with regard to one who cooks on Shabbat he did not impose a penalty, even though in both cases he performed a prohibition from the Torah!?

[And shortly afterward we raise the difficulty: is it not in the beraita itself that we see a distinction between Shabbat and the Sabbatical year, and this is not a difficulty from the beraita concerning one who cooks specifically!?]

Rabbi Judah says:

The matters are reversed:

in the Sabbatical year, when he acted inadvertently, he may maintain it,

and we do not penalize an inadvertent act on account of a deliberate one, but only

when he acted deliberately

alone

shall it be uprooted.

And on Shabbat, whether inadvertently or deliberately, it shall be uprooted,

because we penalize an inadvertent act on account of a deliberate one.

It follows that with regard to one who plants in the Sabbatical year, Rabbi Judah did not penalize one who acted inadvertently, whereas with regard to one who cooks on Shabbat, Rabbi Judah penalized an inadvertent act on account of a deliberate one!?

And we are astonished:

But according to your reasoning,

that you do not know how to distinguish between Shabbat and the Sabbatical year,

the matter itself should be difficult for you

[the beraita itself] from within itself, and you need not raise a difficulty from one beraita against another beraita!? For

since

[behold],

this

[cooking on Shabbat] is a prohibition

from the Torah

and

, and this

[planting in the Sabbatical year] is a prohibition

from the Torah

and if so,

what difference is there between Shabbat, and what difference is there between the Sabbatical year!?

Rather, there

[the beraita concerning one who plants] is not difficult,

as it states the reason

for the matter, in that very beraita.

Rabbi Meir said: For what reason do I say: On Shabbat, when he acted inadvertently, he may maintain it, but when he acted deliberately, it shall be uprooted; whereas in the Sabbatical year, whether he acted inadvertently or deliberately, it shall be uprooted!?

Because Israel count

whether their saplings

toward

the year

of the Sabbatical year.