Gittin 53b (נג:) — the Talmud in English

And

a

Rava said: The water of purification

that was used to weigh weights is fit!?

And we answer:

This is not difficult; this [the beraita that disqualifies it] is referring to a case in which he weighed

the beraita that disqualifies the water refers to a case in which he weighed

with them themselves,

for example, the water was in a vessel with markings indicating the quantity of water, and by placing the meat into the water, he knows its volume, because the water rises from one mark to the next. And

this [Rava’s statement that deems it fit] is referring to

Rava’s statement that permits the water refers to a case in which he weighed

a case in which he weighed

it,

against them, and since he did not perform an act with the water itself, it does not become disqualified.

and since he did not perform an act with the water itself, it does not become disqualified.

And we challenge this: If the beraita that disqualifies it is speaking of a case in which he weighed

with them themselves,

then

he performed an act with them, that is, the disqualification takes effect through an act that he performed with the water, and not through mere intention.

meaning that the disqualification takes effect through an act he performed with the water, and not through mere thought.

But if

as Ḥizkiya maintains:

non-discernible damage is considered damage, he should also be liable under human law

at least when he acted intentionally!?

And we conclude:

Rather, the mere fact that he weighed against the water does not disqualify it.

the mere fact that he weighed against the water does not disqualify it.

Both this and that [both the beraita that disqualifies it and Rava’s statement] are referring to

a case in which he weighed

a manner in which he weighed

against them.

Before water of purification is consecrated with the ashes of the purification offering, it requires safeguarding, so that one not divert his attention from it, as it is stated [Numbers 19:9]: “For a safeguard for the water of sprinkling.” If he diverted his attention from safeguarding it, it becomes disqualified even if he did not perform labor with it,

And this is not difficult!

This [the beraita], for example, is a case where he

the beraita, for example, is a case in which he

diverted his attention

from safeguarding it while engaged in weighing.

And

this [Rava’s statement] is referring to a case where he weighed and

Rava’s statement refers to a case

in which

he weighed and

did not divert his attention.

Rav Pappa challenged

from

Ḥizkiya

with regard to his statement: A. One who robs another is obligated to return the stolen object to him, and is not permitted to give him its monetary value, as it is stated [Leviticus 5]: “When a person sins … or commits robbery … and he shall return the robbery that he robbed.”

B. If the object was lost, the robber pays the value of the object as it was at the time of the robbery.

C. If the value of the object declined, the robber may say to the victim: “Here is what is yours before you,” and he is not obligated to return its value as it was at the time of the robbery, provided that he returns to him the same object that he robbed.

D. If the object changed from the state in which it was, I do not apply to it the verse “and he shall return the robbery that he robbed,” because we require the object to be “like that which he robbed.” Therefore, he must give him the value of the stolen object as it was when he robbed it.

If he robbed a coin and it was invalidated

through the king’s order that it not be used, so that this coin has no value.

Or if he robbed

or if he stole

teruma and it became impure,

and it is unfit for human consumption.

Or if he robbed

leavened bread and Passover elapsed over it,

and it is now prohibited to derive benefit from it.

The robber

says to him [the victim]:

the victim:

Here is

the object

that is yours before you,

and he need not pay him the value of the object that he robbed from him.

But if you say: Non-discernible damage is considered damage,

the object has changed and is not “like that which he robbed,” and he has not fulfilled his obligation of returning it.

But still,

this

man

is a robber,

and

he must pay full monetary compensation

[he is obligated to pay genuine money] in order to fulfill his obligation.

And we conclude: Indeed,

it is a refutation of Ḥizkiya, because this beraita proves the view of Rabbi Yoḥanan, that non-discernible damage is not considered damage; therefore, he may say to him: “Here is what is yours before you.”

Shall we say that it is a dispute between tannaim

[shall we say that the dispute between the amoraim]

is a dispute between the tannaim]: One who renders [produce] impure, one who mixes [teruma with non-sacred produce], or one who pours wine as a libation,

whether he is unwitting

[whether he is unwitting, unaware that this harms his fellow],

or whether he is intentional—he is liable; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yehuda says: If he acted unwittingly, he is exempt; if intentionally, he is liable,

he is liable; these are the words of Rabbi Meir.

and our mishna follows Rabbi Yehuda.

What, is it not that Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda

disagree about this:

One master [Rabbi Meir]

holds: “Non-discernible damage is considered damage,”

and therefore he is liable whether he acted intentionally or unwittingly [and we do not exempt him so that people will inform him].

And the other master [Rabbi Yehuda]

holds:

non-discernible damage

is not considered damage.

Therefore, one who acted unwittingly is exempt as a matter of law, while one who acted intentionally is liable by virtue of a penalty, so that he will not go and harm his fellow.

And we reject this:

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:

It is not on this point that they disagree, because

everyone agrees: Non-discernible damage is not considered damage.

And everyone agrees that one who causes damage intentionally is liable by virtue of a penalty.

Here, [in the beraita,] they disagree

about penalizing

one who causes damage unwittingly

because of [i.e., on account of] one who causes damage

intentionally: Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda.

One master [Rabbi Meir]

holds: They penalized one who acted unwittingly because of one who acted intentionally.

one who causes damage

And the other master [Rabbi Yehuda]

holds: They did not penalize one who acted unwittingly because of one who acted intentionally.

And they raise

a contradiction

from Rabbi Meir

who holds here that they penalized one who acted unwittingly because of one who acted intentionally,

against Rabbi Meir elsewhere, who said that they did not penalize one who acted unwittingly because of one who acted intentionally.

And

so too

they raise a contradiction from Rabbi Yehuda against Rabbi Yehuda,

who, with regard to non-discernible damage, did not penalize one who acted unwittingly because of one who acted intentionally, but elsewhere did penalize him.

As it was taught in a beraita: One who cooks on Shabbat unwittingly,

the cooked food is not prohibited at all, and therefore even the one who cooked it

may eat

it if he wishes, even on Shabbat. But if he cooked

intentionally, he may not eat it.

The statement of Rabbi Meir,

And

likewise

they raise a contradiction between Rabbi Yehuda’s statement and Rabbi Yehuda’s statement,

for with regard to imperceptible damage he did not impose a penalty on one who acted unintentionally because of one who acted intentionally, while elsewhere he did impose one.

As it was taught in a beraita: One who cooks on Shabbat unintentionally,

the cooked food is not prohibited at all; therefore even the one who cooked it

may eat it

if he wishes, even on Shabbat itself. But if he cooked

intentionally, he may not eat it.

and it follows that Rabbi Meir did not penalize one who acted unwittingly because of one who acted intentionally.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

One who cooks

unwittingly may eat

it himself

at the conclusion of Shabbat

[at the conclusion of Shabbat, after waiting the time in which it would have been possible to cook it permissibly after Shabbat].

But on Shabbat itself he may not eat it, because we penalize one who acted unwittingly because of one who acted intentionally. And if he cooked

intentionally,

it is appropriate to penalize him more severely,

and therefore

he himself may not eat it

himself

ever,

and others are permitted to eat it.

Rabbi Yoḥanan the sandal-maker says:

One who cooks

unwittingly may eat

the cooked food

at the conclusion of Shabbat

only others,

and

not he himself,

because the one who cooked it himself was penalized unwittingly because of intentionally.

And if he cooked

intentionally, he may not eat

the cooked food

ever—not he and not others.

For Rabbi Yoḥanan the sandal-maker holds: “an act performed on Shabbat”—that is, something done on Shabbat through prohibited labor intentionally—is prohibited to eat, as it is stated [Exodus 31:14]: “You shall observe the Shabbat, for it is holy to you,” and we expound [Bava Kamma 71a]: Just as sacred things are prohibited to eat, so too acts performed on Shabbat are prohibited to eat.

But the Sages disagree and hold that an “act performed on Shabbat” is not prohibited to eat, because they expound: “It is holy to you”—it, Shabbat itself, is holy, but its acts are not holy.

The Gemara now returns to the earlier matter, in which Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagreed as to whether one who acted unwittingly was penalized because of one who acted intentionally, and concludes:

There is a difficulty from Rabbi Meir against Rabbi Meir,

because with regard to non-discernible damage, Rabbi Meir penalized one who acted unwittingly because of one who acted intentionally, whereas with regard to one who cooks on Shabbat, he did not penalize him!?

And likewise,

there is a difficulty from Rabbi Yehuda against Rabbi Yehuda,

because with regard to non-discernible damage, Rabbi Yehuda did not penalize one who acted unwittingly, whereas with regard to one who cooks on Shabbat, he did penalize one who acted unwittingly because of one who acted intentionally!?

And we answer:

The difficulty from Rabbi Meir against Rabbi Meir is not difficult!

For

when

Rabbi Meir

penalized

one who acted unwittingly because of one who acted intentionally, it was

in a case where he committed a

a case in which he committed a

rabbinic prohibition,

such as one who rendered produce impure or mixed it with teruma, where he did not violate a Torah prohibition, since the damage is non-discernible.

And with regard to a rabbinic prohibition, Rabbi Meir holds that one should penalize more severely, because the words of the Sages require reinforcement, to give their words force so that people will not come to violate them.

But

in a case where he committed a

a case in which he committed a

Torah prohibition,

such as one who cooks on Shabbat, Rabbi Meir

did not penalize

one who acted unwittingly because of one who acted intentionally, because people are not commonly likely to violate a Torah prohibition. And we challenge this:

And they challenge this:

But what of one who pours

his fellow’s wine as a libation to idolatry, which is a

Torah

prohibition,

and yet Rabbi Meir penalizes one who pours it as a libation unwittingly!?

And we answer: Indeed, it is not common for people to violate a Torah prohibition; nevertheless,

because of the severity of idolatry, he penalized him

Rabbi Meir, in order to distance him greatly from the prohibition.

It follows that the difficulty from Rabbi Meir against Rabbi Meir is not difficult, as explained.

And likewise,

the difficulty from Rabbi Yehuda against Rabbi Yehuda is not difficult!

His reasoning is the reverse of Rabbi Meir’s reasoning. Rabbi Meir holds that one should be stringent with a rabbinic prohibition and lenient with a Torah prohibition, since violation of the latter is uncommon.

But Rabbi Yehuda,

when he did not penalize

one who acted unwittingly

with regard to a rabbinic prohibition,

it was because its prohibition is not so severe.

But

with regard to a Torah prohibition, he did penalize!

Therefore, with regard to one who renders produce impure or mixes it, Rabbi Yehuda did not penalize one who acted unwittingly, because he violated only a rabbinic prohibition. But with regard to one who cooks on Shabbat, who violated a Torah prohibition, Rabbi Yehuda penalized even one who acted unwittingly.

And we challenge this:

But what of one who pours

a libation, which is a

Torah

prohibition,

and yet he did not penalize him!?

And we answer:

Because of the severity of idolatry, people distance themselves from it

[they distance themselves and withdraw from it], and there is no need to penalize them.

And they raise a contradiction between the earlier beraita according to the view

the earlier beraita, according to the view

of Rabbi Meir, against Rabbi Meir,

from the following beraita, concerning whether one penalizes one who acted unwittingly because of one who acted intentionally

with regard to a Torah prohibition:

And likewise, they raise a contradiction from Rabbi Yehuda against Rabbi Yehuda:

A. One who plants on Shabbat performs a derivative of the labor of sowing and is liable.

B. One who plants during the Sabbatical year is liable, as it is stated [Leviticus 25:4]: “But in the seventh year shall be a complete rest for the land; your field you shall not sow,” etc., and planting is also included in the prohibition.

As it was taught in a beraita: One who plants on Shabbat unwittingly may allow his planting to remain

and need not uproot it.

He planted;

the tree shall be uprooted

as a penalty, as stated above. This applies specifically when he planted intentionally, for in that case they penalized him, but not when he planted inadvertently, as explained above regarding one who cooks on Shabbat, according to Rabbi Meir.

And with regard to the Sabbatical year, whether

he planted

inadvertently, or whether

he planted

intentionally, it shall be uprooted,

for we penalize inadvertence on account of intentional action.

These are the words of Rabbi Meir.

It follows that with regard to the Sabbatical year, Rabbi Meir penalized inadvertence on account of intentional action, whereas with regard to one who cooks on Shabbat, he did not impose such a penalty, even though in both cases he committed a Torah prohibition!?

And shortly afterward we ask: Is it not evident from the beraita itself that there is a distinction between Shabbat and the Sabbatical year, so that this is not specifically a difficulty from the beraita concerning one who cooks!?]

Rabbi Yehuda says:

The positions must be reversed:

with regard to the Sabbatical year, if he planted inadvertently, it shall remain,

and we do not penalize inadvertence on account of intentional action; only

when he planted intentionally

alone

shall it be uprooted.

And with regard to Shabbat, whether he planted inadvertently or whether he planted intentionally, it shall be uprooted,

for we penalize inadvertence on account of intentional action.

It follows that with regard to one who plants during the Sabbatical year, Rabbi Yehuda did not penalize inadvertence, whereas with regard to one who cooks on Shabbat, Rabbi Yehuda did penalize inadvertence on account of intentional action!?

And we wonder:

In your view,

since you do not know how to distinguish between Shabbat and the Sabbatical year,

the difficulty should apply to the beraita itself

[the beraita itself], from within itself; you need not raise a difficulty from one beraita against another!? For

since

[after all],

this

[cooking on Shabbat] is a prohibition

of Torah origin

and

, and this

[planting during the Sabbatical year] is a prohibition

of Torah origin

, if so,

what is the difference between Shabbat and the Sabbatical year!?

Rather, there

[the beraita concerning one who planted] is not difficult, and

as it states the reason

for the matter in that very beraita.

Rabbi Meir said: Why do I say: With regard to Shabbat, if he planted inadvertently, it shall remain, but if intentionally, it shall be uprooted; whereas with regard to the Sabbatical year, whether he planted inadvertently or intentionally, it shall be uprooted!?

Because the Jews count

whether their saplings

are for

the year

of the Sabbatical year.