Gittin 53a (נג.) — the Talmud in English

We have found that one who renders teruma mixed with non-sacred produce

renders teruma mixed with non-sacred produce. That is, from the fact that the Sages imposed a penalty on one who causes such a mixture, it can be inferred that one who libates wine for idolatry, that is, mixes it, is also liable. If so, this is difficult according to Shmuel: Why did the tanna need to repeat his statement?

And the other

[Shmuel] could say to you:

The liability for causing a mixture of teruma and non-sacred produce

is a penalty

[a rabbinic penalty] and not a liability based on law;

and

a penalty

cannot be derived from another penalty,

as the entire institution of a penalty is a ḥiddush, an innovation, and one cannot derive from an innovation to another case. For one can say: Wherever the Sages imposed a penalty, they imposed it, and wherever they did not impose a penalty, they did not impose it. Even if it appears that the two cases are equivalent, one cannot derive one from the other.

But Rav holds: A penalty can be derived from another penalty if it is indeed reasonable to equate the cases and say that the Sages imposed a penalty in both.

And we refute this:

But according to the one who derives a penalty from another penalty, why do I need all of these

[one who renders impure, one who causes a mixture, and one who libates wine for idolatry]

to be stated

in their entirety in the Mishna? They could all be derived from one another!

And we answer:

It is necessary

to state all of them.

Because

if the tanna had taught

in the Mishna that one who

renders impure

is liable, one could not derive from this that one who causes a mixture is also liable.

For the statement we learned, “one who renders impure,” can be interpreted as referring either to one who renders teruma impure, thereby forbidding the teruma for eating, or to one who renders non-sacred produce belonging to perushim impure, who take care not to eat impure non-sacred produce.

In either case, one cannot derive the law of one who causes a mixture from the law of one who renders impure. For

if

[the Mishna] is speaking of one who renders

teruma

impure,

I would say:

The case of one who renders teruma impure is different, for the Sages made him liable

because he causes it to be completely ruined

[the teruma]

entirely,

as it becomes forbidden for eating.

But in the case of one who causes a mixture, the mixture remains fit to be eaten by kohanim and is not completely ruined. Perhaps the Sages did not impose a penalty on him.

And if

the Mishna is speaking of one who renders

non-sacred produce

impure, which is permitted for eating but is unfit for perushim during the time when they observe the laws of purity,

even so, one cannot derive that the Sages imposed a penalty on one who causes a mixture, as they imposed a penalty on one who renders impure, because the latter committed a prohibition by rendering it impure,

as

it is

forbidden to cause non-sacred produce in Eretz Yisrael to become impure

so that the perushim will be able to eat non-sacred produce in purity.

But one who causes a mixture,

who committed no prohibition,

perhaps the Sages did not

impose a penalty on him, and his case is not comparable to that of one who renders impure.

And if the Mishna had informed us

[if the Mishna had informed us] that

one who causes a mixture

is liable, we would not know that one who renders impure is liable.

Because

one who causes a mixture

is common,

as people do this, and in a common case the Sages imposed a penalty in order to deter him from doing so;

but one who renders impure, which is not common, perhaps

[one might say]:

the Sages did not

impose a penalty on him.

And if the Mishna had informed us

that

one who renders impure and one who causes a mixture

are liable, we would say: Indeed, they are liable to pay

because he is not subject to a greater punishment that exempts him from monetary liability.

[They are not subject to a more severe punishment that exempts them from monetary liability.]

But one who libates wine for idolatry, who

becomes liable for his life and

is subject to a greater punishment that exempts him from monetary liability, perhaps

he is exempt, as Shmuel maintains, and

does not

pay.

It teaches us

that he is not exempt from paying

in accordance

with the words of

Rabbi Yirmeya,

who says that from the moment he lifts the item he becomes liable to pay, whereas he does not become liable for his life at that moment, but only at the time of the libation.

It follows that one cannot derive one penalty from another, because they are not comparable; therefore the Mishna had to state all three cases.

And we raise an objection:

But with regard to that

[that beraita]

which the father of Rabbi Avin taught: Initially

[at first]

they would say

[the Sages enacted]:

one who renders impure and one who libates wine for idolatry

are liable, but one who causes a mixture is exempt, and the Sages did not impose a penalty on him.

And afterward

they reconsidered and said: Even one who causes a mixture

is liable.

And this is difficult for you:

Why do I need all of these

to be stated? Is it not possible to derive them from one another!?

And we answer:

It is necessary

to state all of them.

For if the Mishna had informed us

that

one who renders impure

is liable, one could say that specifically one who renders impure is liable.

Because it is not

possible to say in his case

that he is subject to a greater punishment that exempts him from monetary liability; but in the case of one who libates wine for idolatry, who is subject to a greater punishment that exempts him from monetary liability, perhaps he does not

become liable.

And if the Mishna had informed us that one who libates wine for idolatry

is liable, and this is in accordance with Rabbi Yirmeya, one could say that specifically one who libates wine for idolatry is liable

because he causes it to be completely ruined

[the owner’s wine]

entirely,

as it is forbidden even for deriving benefit.

But one who renders impure,

even teruma,

does not cause it to be completely ruined,

as it is permitted to feed impure teruma to one’s animal and to use it as fuel beneath one’s food,

perhaps the Sages did not

impose a penalty on him. Therefore, it is necessary to state both one who renders impure and one who libates wine for idolatry.

And if the Mishna had informed us of these two

[one who libates wine for idolatry and one who renders teruma impure], one could say: Specifically one who renders impure and one who libates wine for idolatry are liable

because the loss is substantial,

as they are forbidden for eating;

but one who causes a mixture, who

causes only

a minor loss,

as it remains permitted for kohanim to eat and he can sell it to them,

perhaps the Sages did not

impose a penalty on him.

Therefore:

It is necessary

to state all of them, so that one should not say that the Sages imposed a penalty in one case but not in another; it teaches us that the Sages imposed a penalty in all of them.

The Gemara now returns to explain what we learned in the Mishna: one who acts unwittingly is exempt, and one who acts intentionally is liable.

Hezekiah said: By Torah law

[according to Torah law] one who renders impure, one who causes a mixture, and one who libates wine for idolatry is

liable whether unwittingly or intentionally

[whether he did so unwittingly or intentionally]

liable

to pay.

And

what is the reason

that he is liable? Because

damage,

even though it

is not recognizable

to the eye of the observer, as in these cases, where the items have not changed from their previous state,

is considered damage

[it is considered damage] for all its legal ramifications.

And for what reason did

the Sages

say that one who acts unwittingly is exempt,

when one who causes damage unwittingly is liable!?

In order that he inform

the

owner, the one who caused the damage, who rendered the produce impure or caused a mixture, and thereby save him from eating prohibited food,

for if he were liable to pay, we would be concerned that he might refrain from informing the owner, so that the owner would not make him liable to pay.

And we refute this:

If so,

if, as you say, the Sages exempted him so that he would inform the owner, even though by law he is liable,

he should also be exempt even when he acts intentionally,

so that he will inform the owner!?

And we answer: There is no need to exempt him, for even if he were liable to pay, the one who caused the damage would inform the owner, because

now

[after all] his entire purpose

is to cause him damage

and distress;

would he not inform him

[is it conceivable that he would not inform him]? If he had not come in order to vex him, then, by informing him, for what purpose did he damage him?

And Rabbi Yohanan

disagrees with Hezekiah and

said: By Torah law, whether one acts unwittingly or intentionally, he is exempt

from paying.

And

what is the reason

that he is exempt? Because

unrecognizable damage is not considered damage.

[It is not considered damage for which the Torah imposed liability.]

And for what reason did

the Sages say

that one who acts intentionally is liable

to pay!?

So that every individual

who wishes to damage his fellow

will not go and render his fellow’s pure produce impure, and say

to himself

I am exempt

from paying, and I can damage him without losing my money.

Therefore the Sages said: Unrecognizable damage is considered complete damage, and one who intentionally damages his fellow is liable to pay.

We have learned: According to Hezekiah, one who acts unwittingly is exempt for the sake of the betterment of the world, while one who acts intentionally is liable by law. According to Rabbi Yohanan, one who acts unwittingly is exempt by law, while one who acts intentionally is liable for the sake of the betterment of the world.

And we refute Hezekiah’s statement that one who acts intentionally is liable by law:

But

we learned:

The kohanim who invalidated

in the Temple

a sacrifice by thinking during the sacrificial rites to eat from its meat after its allotted time, thereby invalidated it, and if they were

acting intentionally, they are liable

to pay the owners its value.

And it was taught concerning it

in a beraita:

For the sake of the betterment of the world,

and it implies: “Those who act intentionally are liable for the sake of the betterment of the world.”

Granted, if one says that “unrecognizable damage is not considered damage,” one can say: Even though the Sages imposed a penalty on one who renders impure, one who causes a mixture, and one who libates wine for idolatry, nevertheless they did not impose a penalty in every place, because a penalty cannot be derived from another penalty. But

if you say that unrecognizable damage is considered damage,

surely those who act intentionally are liable by law. If so,

this

tanna

should have needed to say, “Those who act unwittingly are exempt for the sake of the betterment of the world”!

[That is what he should have said.]

And we answer: Indeed,

this is also what he said

[this is what the tanna of the beraita intended to say]: We learned in the Mishna that

those who act intentionally are liable,

and it implies—

those who act unwittingly are exempt.

This law, which is derived by inference from the Mishna, is

for the sake of the betterment of the world.

Rabbi Elazar raised an objection

[he raised a difficulty]

to Rabbi Elazar

according to Hezekiah:

a. A red heifer with which work was performed becomes invalid.

b. After the red heifer has been burned, its ashes are placed upon “living water,” meaning water drawn from a spring.

c. From the time the water is drawn until the ashes are placed upon it, it is forbidden to perform work with it, and if one performed work with it, it becomes invalid. d. This water is called “water of purification,” since it purifies and cleanses one who became impure through contact with the dead.

One who performs work with the water of purification, and

likewise one who performs work

with the red heifer

[the red heifer], thereby invalidates them.

And if they belonged to others, he is

exempt

from

human courts,

meaning that he is not liable to pay,

but

nevertheless he is

liable

to receive punishment

at the hands of Heaven

for the loss he caused a Jew.

And

granted, according to Rabbi Yohanan, who holds that unrecognizable damage is not considered damage and that the Sages imposed a penalty, one can say: This type of damage is uncommon, and they did not impose a penalty even when it was done intentionally.

But

if you say that damage that is not discernible is deemed damage

[as in the view of Hizkiya], and he is legally liable, then

he should also be liable in a human court,

at least when he acted intentionally! And we conclude:

he

[Rabbi Elazar]

raises this objection

[he posed this difficulty]

and he resolves it

[he answers it]:

Here, with what case are we dealing? With a case in which he did not damage it directly, but it became disqualified as a result of his intention; consequently, it is considered gerama, and one is exempt for gerama in cases of damage.

In

the cow

that became disqualified, we are dealing with a case in which he did not perform labor on it directly, but

he brought it into the cattle pen

[the place where the animals are gathered and tied ]

in order that it nurse

from its mother,

and

his intention was also that it

thresh

the grain.

Had he intended this solely for its benefit, it would not have become disqualified, even though it performed labor, rather, he also intended it for his own benefit, and therefore it became disqualified; and since his intention caused the cow to become disqualified, this is gerama, and he is exempt for damage. And likewise, with regard to

the water of purification,

the case is not one in which he performed a direct action, but rather one in which

they

were suspended from one pan of a balance, and he knew their weight, and

he weighed with them

[an equal amount] in the other pan

weights,

such as meat whose weight he wished to determine; and since he did not perform a direct action with them, they became disqualified through his intention, and he is exempt.

And we challenge this: Is it really the case that the water of purification becomes disqualified by weighing weights with it!?