Gittin 53a — the Talmud in English

This is “he rendered it medumma

the teruma among non-sacred produce. That is, from the fact that the Rabbis imposed a penalty upon one who renders produce medumma, it may be learned that even one who performs nisukh, that is, mixes, is liable. If so, this is difficult according to Shmuel: why did the tanna need to repeat his words?

But the other one

[Shmuel] could say to you:

The liability for rendering produce medumma

is a penalty

[a penalty imposed by the Sages] and not according to strict law,

and

a penalty

cannot be learned from a penalty,

for the entire penalty is a “novel enactment,” and from a “novel enactment” one does not learn to another place. For one may say: where the Rabbis imposed a penalty, they imposed a penalty, and where they did not impose a penalty, they did not impose a penalty; and even if it appears that the two cases are alike, one may not learn one from the other.

But Rav holds: one does learn a penalty from a penalty, if it is indeed reasonable to equate the cases and say that the Sages imposed a decree in both of them.

And we raise an objection:

And according to the one who learns a penalty from a penalty, all these

[rendering impure, rendering medumma, and performing nisukh]

why do I need them

to state all of them in the Mishna? Is it not possible to learn them one from the other?

And we answer:

It is necessary

to state all of them.

Because

if the Mishna taught

that one who

renders impure

is liable, it would not be possible to learn from it that one who renders produce medumma is also liable.

For what we learned, “renders impure,” can be interpreted either as rendering teruma impure, through which the teruma becomes forbidden to eat, or as rendering the non-sacred produce of the perushim impure, who are careful not to eat impure non-sacred produce.

And in either case, it is impossible to learn the law of rendering produce medumma from the law of rendering impure, because

if

[it is] rendering

teruma

that is under discussion,

I might have said:

the case of rendering teruma impure is different, for the Sages made him liable

because he causes it to be completely lost,

[the teruma]

completely,

for it becomes forbidden to eat.

But in the case of rendering produce medumma, the mixture is fit to be eaten by kohanim, and it has not been completely spoiled; perhaps the Sages did not impose a penalty upon him.

And if

the Mishna is dealing with

rendering non-sacred produce impure,

which is permitted to eat, except that it is not fit for the perushim during the days of their purity,

Even so, it is impossible to learn that the Sages imposed a penalty upon one who renders produce medumma, as they imposed a penalty upon one who renders impure, because the one who rendered it impure committed a prohibition,

for

this

is forbidden: to cause impurity to non-sacred produce in the Land of Israel,

so that the perushim would be able to eat non-sacred produce in purity.

But rendering produce medumma,

who did not commit a prohibition,

perhaps not

did the Rabbis impose a penalty upon him, and it is not comparable to rendering impure.

And if it had informed us

[if the Mishna had informed us] that

one who renders produce medumma

is liable, we would not have known that one who renders impure is liable.

Because

rendering produce medumma

is common,

for people do this, and in a matter that is common the Sages imposed a penalty in order to prevent him from doing it;

but in the case of rendering impure, which is not common, perhaps

[one may say]:

the Sages did not

impose a penalty upon him.

And if it had informed us

the Mishna

that one who renders impure and one who renders produce medumma

are liable, we would have said: indeed, they are liable to pay,

because there is no “he is liable for the greater”

[they are not subject to a greater punishment that exempts them from monetary liability.]

But in the case of one who performs nisukh,

who becomes liable for his life, and

“he is liable for the greater.” Perhaps

he is exempt, as Shmuel says, and

does not

pay.

It teaches us

that he is not exempt from paying

in accordance with

the words of

Rabbi Yirmeya,

for from the moment he lifts it he becomes liable to pay, and he does not become liable for his life at that moment, but only at the moment of performing nisukh.

And it follows that it is impossible to learn one penalty from another, because they are not alike one to the other; therefore the Mishna needed to state all three of them.

And we raise an objection:

And concerning this

[that beraita]

which the father of Rabbi Avin taught: At first

[initially]

they used to say

[the Sages enacted]:

one who renders impure and one who performs nisukh

are liable, but one who renders produce medumma is exempt, and they did not impose a penalty upon him.

And afterward

they returned to say: even one who renders produce medumma

is liable.

And this is difficult for you:

why do I need all these

to state them? Is it really impossible to learn them one from the other?

And we answer:

It is necessary

for all of them.

For if it had informed us

that

one who renders impure

is liable, one might say: specifically one who renders impure is liable.

Because it is not

possible to say concerning him

“he is liable for the greater”; but in the case of one who performs nisukh, for whom “he is liable for the greater,” perhaps he is not

liable.

And if it had informed us that one who performs nisukh

is liable, and in accordance with Rabbi Yirmeya, one might say: specifically one who performs nisukh is liable,

because he causes it to be completely lost

[to the owner of the wine]

completely,

for it is forbidden even with regard to benefit.

But one who renders impure,

even teruma,

for he does not cause it to be completely lost,

since it is permitted to feed impure teruma to one’s animal and to use it as fuel beneath one’s cooking,

perhaps the Sages did not

impose a penalty upon him; therefore it is necessary to state one who renders impure and one who performs nisukh.

And if it had informed us of these two

[one who performs nisukh and one who renders teruma impure], one might say: specifically one who renders impure and one who performs nisukh are liable,

because the loss is substantial,

for they are forbidden to eat,

but one who renders produce medumma,

whose loss is only

slight,

for it is permitted to be eaten by kohanim, and he can sell it to them,

perhaps the Sages did not

impose a penalty upon him.

Therefore:

It is necessary

to state all of them, so that you should not say that in this case they imposed a penalty and in that case they did not; and it teaches us that in all of them the Sages imposed a penalty.

Now the Gemara returns to explain what we learned in the Mishna: one who acted unwittingly is exempt, and one who acted intentionally is liable.

Hezekiah said: According to Torah law

[according to Torah law], one who renders impure, one who renders produce medumma, and one who performs nisukh—

both one who acts unwittingly and one who acts intentionally

[whether he did so unwittingly or intentionally]—

is liable

to pay.

And

what is the reason

that he is liable? Because

damage,

even though it

is not visible

to the eye of the observer, as in these cases, where they did not change from the way they had been,

is called damage

[is considered damage] for all its laws.

And for what reason did they say

the Sages

that one who acts unwittingly is exempt,

when surely a person who causes damage unwittingly is liable?

So that he will inform

him

and

the one who caused the damage, who rendered it impure or rendered it medumma, and save him from eating a forbidden substance, for if he were liable to pay, we would be concerned that perhaps he would refrain from informing the owners, so that they would not make him liable to pay.

And we raise an objection:

If so,

if it is as you say, that the Sages exempted him so that he would inform him, even though according to strict law he is liable,

even when he acts intentionally as well

we should exempt him so that he would inform him!

And we answer: There is no need to exempt him, for even if he were liable to pay, the one who caused the damage would inform him, because

now

[behold] his entire purpose

is to cause him harm

and distress him;

would he not inform him

[would he really not inform him]? For if he did not come in order to provoke him, by informing him, for what purpose did he damage him?

And Rabbi Yohanan

disagrees with Hezekiah and

said: According to Torah law, both one who acts unwittingly and one who acts intentionally is exempt

himself.

And

what is the reason

that he is exempt? Because

non-visible damage is not called damage.

[It is not considered damage for which the Torah made one liable.]

And for what reason did they say

the Sages that

one who acts intentionally is liable

to pay?

So that every single person

who wishes to damage his fellow

would not go and render his fellow’s pure things impure and say

in his heart

“I am exempt

from paying, and I can damage him without losing my money.”

And therefore the Sages said: non-visible damage is considered complete damage, and one who intentionally damages his fellow is liable to pay.

We have learned: according to Hezekiah, one who acts unwittingly is exempt because of the repair of the world, and one who acts intentionally is liable according to strict law. And according to Rabbi Yohanan, one who acts unwittingly is exempt according to strict law, and one who acts intentionally is liable because of the repair of the world.

And we raise an objection to the words of Hezekiah, who says that one who acts intentionally is liable according to strict law:

But

we learned: the kohanim who rendered the offering pigul

the offering

in the Temple,

by thinking during the sacrificial rites to eat from its flesh after its appointed time, thereby invalidated it; and if they were

intentional, they are liable

to pay the owners its value.

And it was taught concerning it

in a beraita:

because of the repair of the world,

and it is implied: “If they acted intentionally, they are liable because of the repair of the world.”

And granted, if [the principle is that] “non-visible damage is not called damage,” one may say: even though the Sages imposed a penalty upon one who renders impure, one who renders produce medumma, and one who performs nisukh, nevertheless, they did not impose a penalty in every place, because a penalty cannot be learned from a penalty. But

if you say that non-visible damage is called damage,

surely those who act intentionally are liable according to strict law. If so,

this

tanna

should have needed to say, “Those who act unwittingly are exempt because of the repair of the world,”

[that is what he should have said]!

And we answer: Indeed,

this is also what he says

[this is what the tanna of the beraita intended to say]: We learned in the Mishna that

those who act intentionally are liable,

and it is implied—

those who act unwittingly are exempt;

and this law, which is to be inferred from the Mishna, is

because of the repair of the world.

Rabbi Elazar raised an objection

[he raised a difficulty]

to Hezekiah’s

view:

a. A red heifer with which work was performed becomes invalid.

b. After they burn the red heifer, they place its ashes upon “living water,” that is, water drawn from a spring.

c. From the time the water is drawn until they place the ashes upon it, it is forbidden to perform work with it, and if one performed work with it, it becomes invalid. d. This water is called “water of purification,” since they purify and cleanse with it one who became impure through contact with a corpse.

One who performs work with the water of purification, and

likewise one who performs work

with the heifer of purification

[the red heifer], thereby renders them invalid.

And if they belonged to others,

he is exempt

himself

according to human laws,

that is, he is not liable to pay,

but

nevertheless he is

liable

to receive punishment

according to the laws of Heaven

for the loss that he caused to Israel.

And

granted, according to Rabbi Yohanan, who holds that non-visible damage is not called damage, and that it is a penalty that the Sages imposed, one may say: this damage is not common, and they did not impose a penalty upon him even when acting intentionally.

But

if you say that damage that is not perceptible is considered damage

(according to the opinion of Hizkiya), and he is legally liable, then

he should likewise be liable under human law

at least when he acted intentionally!? And we conclude:

he

[Rabbi Elazar]

raises it as an objection

[he raised this objection]

and he resolves it

[he answers it]:

Here, with what are we dealing? With a case such as where he did not damage with his hands, but rather, because of his thought, they became invalid; and since that is so, it is considered gerama, and one is exempt for gerama in cases of damage.

With a

cow

that became invalid, it is speaking of a case where he did not perform work upon it with his hands, but rather

he brought it into the cattle pen

[the place where the animals are gathered and tied ]

in order that it suckle

from its mother,

and

his intention was also in order that it

thresh

the grain.

And if he intended only for its needs, it would not have become invalid, even though it performed work, but he also intended for his own needs, and therefore it became invalid; and since his thought caused the cow to become invalid, it is gerama, and he is exempt for damage. And likewise concerning

purification waters,

it is not speaking of a case where he performed an act with his hands, but rather, for example,

that

they were suspended on one pan of a balance, and he knew their weight, and

he weighed with them

[an equivalent amount] on the other pan

weights,

such as meat whose weight he wanted to determine; and since he did not perform an act upon them with his hands, it became invalid through thought, and he is exempt.

And we challenge this: Is it really the case that the water of purification becomes disqualified by weighing weights with it!?