Gittin 44a — the Talmud in English

And if you wish, say:

this is how the distinction between a field belonging to an Israelite and a slave belonging to a gentile is to be explained: in both this and that case, it is when the time has already arrived, but here, with what are we dealing?

With one who lent it in order to take it as collateral

and the time arrived,

but he did not take it as collateral

in practice.

And, for example, they did not write that the slave or the field would become vested automatically when the time arrived, but rather that when the time arrived the creditor would be able to make them his, and he did not do so.

And therefore a field is different with regard to tithe from a slave with regard to emancipation: for with a field, since he did not make the field vested in an Israelite, it is a gentile’s field, which is exempt from tithe. But with a slave, the Sages penalized him, since if the gentile wishes, he can take the slave and make him his.

The Sages taught: If the gentile seized

the slave

for his debt,

without the Israelite having initially borrowed against the slave, and the Israelite did not give the slave to him willingly, but rather the gentile coerced him and took the slave from him.

Or a sikrikon took him

a gentile who is a murderer, and the Israelite gives him a slave as ransom for his life, saying to him: Take this slave and do not kill me.

He did not become

the slave

free.

And we raise an objection:

But

if the gentile took him

for his debt, did he not

the slave become free?

And we pose a contradiction,

for there is a difficulty from that which was taught in a beraita:

If the king’s household forcibly seized

the

granary

of an Israelite:

If they seized it for his debt,

that is, he owed money to the king’s household, and the king’s household took his granary to settle the debt, he is

obligated to tithe

the granary, because this is considered as though he sold his granary to the king, and he is obligated to tithe for it from another place.

And

if they seized it as a loss [that is, at a loss and for nothing] they forcibly seized his granary, he is

they coerced him and took his granary, he is

exempt from tithing.

We have therefore learned that if they seized it for his debt, it is like a sale; and if so, the same is true when a gentile seizes his slave for his debt: it is as though he sold his slave to him. And if so, why did the slave not become free!?

And we answer:

There

with regard to the granary and with regard to tithe, the law does not depend on the fact that the field is “sold,” but rather he is obligated to tithe because

he profited from it,

for he benefited from the granary through his debt being settled by means of it, and therefore he is obligated to tithe.

But with regard to the sale of a slave, where the reason for the law is a penalty for selling him to a gentile, he did not sell the slave willingly; rather, they seized the field from him against his will, and if so, why should we penalize him?

Come and hear [a difficulty] from that

which Rav said: One who sells his slave to a parhang

which Rav said: One who sells his slave to a parhang

[a persecutor who fabricates accusations]

gentile,

that is, the gentile falsely accused him of owing some sum to the king’s household, and he gave the slave in exchange for those supposed debts, he

becomes free.

And let us raise a difficulty: what is the difference between this and a sikrikon, concerning whom we learned in the beraita that the slave does not become free!?

And we answer:

There,

with regard to the parhang

he should have appeased him but did not appease him,

he should have paid his supposed debt with something else, but he paid only with the slave, and because of this the slave became free; but with regard to a sikrikon, the matter does not depend on him, and therefore the slave did not become free.

The substance of the matter: Rav said: One who sells his slave to a parhang gentile becomes free:

And we raise a difficulty: Is it so?

What was it possible for

the master of the slave

to do [what was in his power to do], and why should we penalize him!?

And we explain:

And we explain:

He should have appeased him

with something else,

but did not appease him.

The Gemara brings here several uncertainties concerning the law of selling a slave to a gentile:

Rabbi Yirmeya raised a question:

a.

He sold him

—the master sold his slave—to a gentile

for thirty days,

and after thirty days the slave would return to him;

what is

the law: do we penalize him to redeem him, and does the slave become free?

Come and hear

from that

which Rav said: One who sells his slave to a parhang gentile becomes free,

and it entered our minds that he gave the slave to the king’s household for some period of time, in exchange for payment of his supposed debt; thus, even though he gave the slave only for a limited period, he became free.

And we reject this: It can be said that

there

in Rav’s statement

he was dealing with a parhang gentile who does not return him.

b.

He sold him

the slave

except for his labor,

that is, he sold his body to the gentile on the condition that he not enslave him, for the gentile needed the slave only in order to mate him with his maidservant so that he would have offspring,

what is

the law: do we penalize him to redeem him, and does the slave become free?

For it may be said: since the gentile does not enslave him, the master does not cause the slave to desecrate Shabbatot, and we have no reason to penalize him.

c. He sold the slave

except for the mitzvot,

that is, he stipulated with the gentile that he would not be able to remove him from the mitzvot [Meiri],

what is the law?

d. He sold the slave

except for Shabbatot and Festivals,

so that the gentile would not force him to desecrate Shabbatot,

what is

the law: is he penalized and does the slave become free?

e. He sold the slave to one who is not a complete gentile, such as

a ger toshav [a person who accepted upon himself not to worship idols, but he does eat carrion], or

to

an Israelite apostate, what is the law: did they penalize specifically in the case of a gentile, or perhaps whenever the master removes his slave from the mitzvot, they penalize him?

f. He sold him

f. He sold him

to a Kuti,

what is the law?

Resolve at least one [from the following beraita]

one

of the uncertainties explained above:

of the uncertainties explained above:

For we learned in a beraita:

a ger toshav is like a gentile,

and if he sells him to him, the slave becomes free.

And concerning one who sells him

to a Kuti or an Israelite apostate,

the amoraim disagreed:

Some say to him: like a gentile,

there are those who say that for this matter he is like a gentile, and the slave becomes free.

And some say to him [and there are those who say]

[and there are those who say]

like an Israelite,

he is, and the slave does not become free.

They asked Rabbi Ami

[they asked Rabbi Ami]:

A slave who threw

himself to

the military forces, and his master cannot remove him

from there,

neither according to Jewish law nor according to gentile law—what is the law concerning his taking his value?

And the uncertainty is whether the Sages decreed that he may not take his value, so that he would not come to sell his slave willingly.

Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Zerika: Go, examine your tractate

[go into the depth of study, and examine the Mishna arranged for you, so that we will know what to answer]!

Rabbi Zerika went out

and

and examined deeply and found [he went into the depth of study, examined carefully, and found]

a proof concerning this uncertainty.

For it was taught: One who sells his house

in the Land of Israel

to a gentile,

and transgressed “You shall not show them favor,” which is the prohibition against granting a gentile settlement in land in the Land of Israel,

its money is forbidden,

for the Sages penalized him in this way so that he would not sell.

And

if

a gentile forcibly seized an Israelite’s house, and its owner cannot remove him

from it,

neither according to Jewish law nor according to gentile law, it is permitted to take its money.

And he writes

the gentile writes him a document for the value of the house,

and he presents

the Israelite presents the document

in their courts

for signature and confirmation, and the Israelite has no concern, even though it is significant that the Israelite brings his document to the courts to have it signed,

because he is like one rescuing from their hands.

We have therefore learned that it is not forbidden to take its value if he did not sell it willingly, and we do not decree lest he come to sell it willingly and transgress “You shall not show them favor.”

And if so, the same is true in our case concerning a slave: it is permitted to take his value, and we do not decree lest he come to sell him willingly.

And we reject this:

But perhaps these words apply

—that the Sages did not decree lest he sell it willingly—

in

a house, since because he cannot manage without a house [a person cannot be without a house], therefore it is reasonable that

he will not come to sell it [he will not come to sell his house].

[he will not come to sell his house].

But a slave, since he can manage without a slave [but with regard to a slave, a person can manage without a slave], it may be said that we are concerned lest

[but with regard to a slave, a person can manage without one], it may be said that we are concerned lest

he come to sell him [lest he come to sell him willingly],

[lest he come to sell him willingly],

or

perhaps

not

do we decree against him.

He sent to them [to those who asked him]

[to those who had asked]

Rabbi Ami

a message in these words: “

From

[from]

me, Ami son of Natan, instruction shall go forth

[this ruling]

to all Israel:

A slave who threw himself to the military forces, and his master cannot remove him, neither according to Jewish law nor according to gentile law, it is permitted to take his value, and he writes and presents it in gentile courts, because he is like one rescuing from their hands.

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said:

One who sells his slave to a gentile, they penalize him

to redeem him from the purchaser of the slave

up to one hundred times his value,

[up to one hundred times his worth].

The Gemara is uncertain: Is “up to one hundred times his value”

specifically

so,

or not specifically,

and we do not penalize him to such an extent, and the expression “up to one hundred times his value” is merely an exaggeration?

Come and hear

from that

which Reish Lakish said:

a. One may not sell large livestock to a gentile, as we learned in the Mishna in tractate Avoda Zara 14b: “And everywhere one may not sell large livestock to a gentile.”

b.

One who sells large livestock to a gentile, they penalize him

to purchase his animal from the gentile

up to ten times its value;

we have therefore learned that where the Sages penalize him to redeem it, they do not penalize him to such an extent as one hundred times his value; thus, it is not specifically so.

And we reject this:

But perhaps a slave is different, for every single day

he removes him from the mitzvot [for every single day he removes him from the mitzvot],

for he cannot fulfill them in his master’s house, since he is obligated to perform his master’s labor.

And there are those who say,

there are those who say that this is what

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: One who sells his slave to a gentile, they penalize him up to ten times his value.

And the Gemara is uncertain: Is this measure

specifically,

and beyond this he need not redeem him,

or not specifically

is it, and even beyond this he must redeem him?

Come and hear

from that

which Reish Lakish said:

One who sells large livestock to a gentile, they penalize him up to one hundred times its value,

so we see that where the Sages penalized him to redeem it, they penalized him even beyond ten times its value.

And we reject this: But perhaps

a slave is different,

whom they do not penalize to such an extent, since

even

after he redeems him, again

it does not return to him [he does not again become enslaved to him], and therefore they penalize him only up to ten times his value.

[he will not again be able to enslave him]; therefore, he is penalized only up to ten times his value.

And we question this distinction:

But an animal,

which we penalize him to redeem at ten times as much as in the case of a slave—for your reasoning,

what is the reason,

what is the reason that we are so stringent with him,

because it returns to him [because it returns to him].

[because it returns to him].

But if this is the entire reason for the distinction—that this one returns and that one does not return—then

let us penalize him one more

only [let us penalize him for large livestock by only one part more than for a slave], that is, eleven times its value, so that when the animal returns to him, the penalty will be ten times its value, as in the case of a slave; but what reason is there to penalize him to redeem it one hundred times its value because of the distinction concerning its return!?

Rather,

because of this difficulty, the Gemara explains another distinction that can be stated between a slave, whom they penalize only up to ten times his value, and an animal, up to one hundred times its value:

A slave

sold to a gentile is

a matter that is uncommon [an uncommon matter],

[an uncommon occurrence],

and concerning an uncommon matter the Sages did not decree [the Sages do not enact decrees concerning an uncommon matter].

[the Sages do not issue decrees concerning something uncommon].

Rabbi Yirmeya asked Rabbi Asi:

He sold his slave

to a gentile,

and he died—what is the law: do they penalize his son after him

to redeem him with money that he inherited from his father?

The Gemara explains the uncertainty in greater detail and discusses the resemblance of this uncertainty to similar uncertainties raised elsewhere: a. And even

if you should say

according to that side in the ibaya concerning which the Gemara was uncertain in Bekhorot 34b:

If the priest damaged [blemished, slightly cut]

the

ear

of the

firstborn,

and made him blemished so that he could slaughter and eat him,

and he died, they penalize his son after him,

so that he may not slaughter the firstborn on the basis of this blemish, just as they penalized his father so that he would not slaughter it on its basis, because he violated the verse [Leviticus 22:21]: “There shall be no blemish in it,” which is the prohibition against inflicting a blemish on consecrated animals.

In any event, this does not resolve the matter for our case, that they should also penalize his son after him to redeem him; for it may be said: there it is different

because it is a prohibition from the Torah

that his father transgressed,

but here

his father transgressed merely

a rabbinic prohibition

when he sold him.