Gittin 44a (מד.) — the Talmud in English

Alternatively, if you wish, say:

this is how the difference between a field and a Jewish slave, and between a slave and a gentile, is to be explained: In both cases, the time had already arrived, but here, with what are we dealing?

With a case where he lent it in order to take it as collateral

and the time arrived,

but he did not take it as collateral

in practice.

And this is a case where they did not stipulate that the slave or the field would automatically become the property of the creditor when the time arrived; rather, when the time arrived, the creditor would have the option of taking them as his property, but he did not do so.

Therefore, a field differs with regard to tithe from a slave with regard to emancipation: In the case of a field, since the field did not become the property of the Jew, it remains a gentile’s field, which is exempt from tithe. But in the case of a slave, the Sages penalized him, since if the gentile wishes, he can take the slave and make him his property.

The Sages taught: If the gentile seized him

the slave

for a debt

without the Jew having initially borrowed money against the slave, and without the Jew willingly giving the slave to him; rather, the gentile coerced him and took the slave from him.

Or if a sikarikon took him

a gentile who is a murderer, and the Jew gives him the slave as ransom for his life, saying to him: “Take this slave and do not kill me.”

The slave does not go

free.

And we challenge this:

And

if the gentile took him

for a debt, does he not

the slave go free?

And we raise a contradiction:

But one can challenge this from that which was taught in a beraita:

If the king’s authorities coerced

the

granary

of a Jew:

If they coerced him for a debt

that is, he owed money to the king’s authorities, and the king’s authorities took his granary to repay the debt, he is

obligated to tithe

the grain in the granary, because this is considered as though he sold his granary to the king, in which case he is obligated to tithe produce of that field from elsewhere.

And

if they seized it as a loss [that is, without payment,]

they coerced him and took his granary, he is

exempt from tithing.

We have therefore learned that if they coerced him for a debt, this is considered a sale. If so, the same should apply when a gentile seizes his slave for a debt: It is considered as though he sold his slave to him. If so, why does the slave not go free!?

And we answer:

There, it is different—

with regard to the granary and the laws of tithing—for the law does not depend on whether the field was “sold”; rather, he is obligated to tithe

because he benefits from it

as he benefited from the granary, since his debt was repaid through it, and therefore he is obligated to tithe.

But with regard to the sale of a slave, where the reason for the law is a penalty for selling him to a gentile, he did not sell the slave willingly; rather, they seized the field from him against his will. If so, why should we penalize him?

Come and hear [a challenge] from that

which Rav said: One who sells his slave to a parhang

gentile

[a persecutor who fabricates accusations against him]

gentile,

that is, the gentile falsely accused him of owing some sum to the king’s authorities, and he gave the slave in exchange for those supposed debts,

the slave goes free.

And the difficulty is: What is the difference between this case and that of a sikarikon, concerning whom we learned in the beraita that the slave does not go free!?

And we answer:

There

with regard to a parhang—

he could have appeased him but did not appease him

he could have paid the supposed debt with something else, but he paid only with the slave, and therefore the slave goes free. But with regard to a sikarikon, the matter does not depend on him, and therefore the slave does not go free.

The essential statement itself: Rav said: One who sells his slave to a gentile parhang, the slave goes free:

And we challenge this: Does the slave’s master really have

what could he have done

to do

[what was in his power to do], that we should penalize him!?

And we explain:

He could have appeased him

with something else,

but did not appease him.

The Gemara presents here several uncertainties concerning the law of selling a slave to a gentile:

Rabbi Yirmeya raised a dilemma:

a.

If he sold him—

the master sold his slave—to a gentile

for thirty days

and after thirty days the slave would return to him,

what is

the law? Do we penalize him to redeem the slave, so that the slave goes free?

Come and hear

from that

which Rav said: One who sells his slave to a gentile parhang, the slave goes free,

and we initially understand that he gave the slave to the king’s authorities for some period of time in exchange for payment of his supposed debt. Thus, even though he gave the slave only for a limited period, the slave goes free.

And we reject this: It may be said that

there—

in Rav’s statement—

the gentile parhang does not return him.

b.

If he sold him

the slave

excluding his labor,

meaning, he sold his physical person to the gentile on condition that the gentile would not enslave him, because the gentile needed the slave only in order to marry him to his maidservant, so that he would have offspring,

what is

the law? Do we penalize him to redeem the slave, so that the slave goes free?

For it may be said that since the gentile does not enslave him, the master does not cause the slave to desecrate Shabbat, and we should not penalize him.

c. He sold the slave

excluding the mitzvot,

meaning, he stipulated with the gentile that the gentile would not be able to remove him from observance of the mitzvot [Meiri],

what is the law?

d. He sold the slave

excluding Shabbatot and Festivals,

so that the gentile would not force him to desecrate Shabbatot,

what is

the law? Do we penalize him, and does the slave go free?

e. He sold the slave to one who is not a complete gentile, such as

a resident alien

[who accepted upon himself not to engage in idolatry, but eats carrion,] or

to an apostate Jew, what is the law? Is he penalized specifically for selling to a gentile, or does the penalty apply whenever the master removes his slave from the mitzvot?

f. He sold him

f. He sold him

to a Samaritan,

what is the law?

Resolve at least one matter [from the following beraita]

one

of the uncertainties explained above:

For we learned in a beraita:

A resident alien has the status of a gentile,

and if one sells his slave to him, the slave goes free.

And with regard to one who sells him

to a Samaritan or an apostate Jew,

the amoraim disagree:

Some say that he is like a gentile,

some say that he has the status of a gentile in this regard, and the slave goes free.

And some say

[and there are those who say]

that he is like a Jew,

and the slave does not go free.

They asked Rabbi Ami

[they questioned Rabbi Ami]:

A slave who cast

himself

into the military forces, and his master cannot extract him

from there,

neither according to Jewish law nor according to gentile law—what is the law regarding taking his money?

The uncertainty is whether the Sages decreed that he may not take the slave’s money, so that he would not come to sell his slave willingly.

Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Zerika: Go and examine your text

[go deeply into the analysis, and examine the Mishna arranged for you, so that we will know what to answer]!

Rabbi Zerika went out

and

examined and found

[he delved deeply, examined, and found] evidence concerning this uncertainty.

As it was taught: One who sells his house

in the Land of Israel

to a gentile,

thereby violating “You shall not give them a resting place,” which prohibits giving a gentile a foothold in land in the Land of Israel,

the money is forbidden,

as the Sages penalized him in this way so that he would not sell.

And

if

a gentile seized a Jew’s house, and its owner cannot extract it

from him,

neither according to Jewish law nor according to gentile law, it is permitted to take its money.

And he writes

the gentile writes him a document for the value of the house,

and he presents

the Jew presents the document

in their courts

for signature and confirmation, and the Jew need not be concerned, even though it is significant that the Jew brings his document before their courts for signature,

because he is like one rescuing property from their hands.

We have therefore learned that it is not forbidden to take its money when he did not sell it willingly, and we do not decree lest he come to sell it willingly and violate “You shall not give them a resting place.”

If so, the same should apply in our case, concerning a slave: It is permitted to take his money, and we do not decree lest he come to sell him willingly.

And we reject this:

Perhaps these words apply—

that the Sages did not decree lest he sell it willingly—only with regard to

a house, since he cannot manage without a house

[a person cannot exist without a house]; therefore, it is reasonable that

he will not come to sell it

[he will not come to sell his house].

But a slave, since he can manage without a slave

[but with regard to a slave, a person can manage without one], it may be said that we are concerned lest

he come to sell him

[lest he come to sell him willingly],

or

perhaps

we do not

impose such a decree upon him.

Rabbi Ami sent

[to those who had asked]

Rabbi Ami

a message in the following wording: “

From

[me,]

Ami bar Natan, let instruction go forth

[this ruling]

to all Israel:

A slave who cast himself into the military forces, and whose master cannot extract him, neither according to Jewish law nor according to gentile law, may have his money taken; and he writes and presents the document in the courts of gentiles, because he is like one rescuing property from their hands.

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said:

One who sells his slave to a gentile is penalized

to redeem him from the purchaser

up to one hundred times his value,

[up to one hundred times his worth].

The Gemara is uncertain: Is “up to one hundred times his value”

specifically

so,

or not specifically,

and we do not penalize him to such an extent, and the expression “up to one hundred times his value” is merely an exaggeration?

Come and hear

from that

which Reish Lakish said:

a. One may not sell large livestock to a gentile, as we learned in the Mishna in tractate Avoda Zara 14b: “And everywhere one may not sell large livestock to a gentile.”

b.

One who sells large livestock to a gentile is penalized

to purchase his animal from the gentile

up to ten times its value;

we have therefore learned that where the Sages penalize him to redeem it, they do not penalize him as much as one hundred times its value; thus, the figure is not exact.

And we reject this:

Perhaps a slave is different, since every single day

he removes him from the mitzvot

[for each and every day he removes him from the mitzvot, since the slave cannot fulfill them in his master’s house, as he is obligated to perform his master’s labor].

And there are those who say,

there are those who say that this is what

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: One who sells his slave to a gentile is penalized up to ten times his value.

The Gemara is uncertain: Is this measure

specifically

so, and he need not redeem him for more than this,

or not specifically

so, and he must redeem him even for more than this?

Come and hear

from that

which Reish Lakish said:

One who sells large livestock to a gentile is penalized up to one hundred times its value,

so we see that where the Sages imposed a redemption penalty, they imposed it even beyond ten times its value.

And we reject this: Perhaps

a slave is different,

as he is not penalized to such an extent, since

because

even after he redeems him, he will again

not return to him

[he will not again be able to enslave him]; therefore, he is penalized only up to ten times his value.

And we challenge this distinction:

But livestock,

which we penalize him to redeem at ten times the amount imposed for a slave—according to you,

what is the reason

that we are so stringent with him?

Because it returns to him

[because it returns to him].

But if this is the entire reason for the distinction—that one returns and the other does not—then

let us penalize him only one more

[let us penalize him in the case of large livestock by only one additional multiple beyond the slave], namely, eleven times its value. When the animal returns to him, the penalty would then be ten times its value, as in the case of a slave. Why, then, should we penalize him to redeem it at one hundred times its value merely because the animal returns!?

Rather,

on the basis of this difficulty, the Gemara explains a different distinction between a slave, whom one penalizes only up to ten times his value, and livestock, which one penalizes up to one hundred times its value:

A slave

who is sold to a gentile

is an uncommon matter

[an uncommon occurrence],

and the Sages do not institute decrees concerning an uncommon matter

[the Sages do not issue decrees concerning something uncommon].

Rabbi Yirmeya asked Rabbi Asi:

If one sold his slave

to a gentile

and died, what is the law? Do we penalize his son after him

to redeem him with money that he inherited from his father?

The Gemara explains the uncertainty in greater detail and discusses its similarity to comparable uncertainties raised elsewhere: a. And even

if you should say

as that side of the dilemma raised by the Gemara in Bekhorot 34b:

If a priest damaged

[blemished, cut slightly] the

ear

of the

firstborn animal,

making it blemished so that he could slaughter and eat it, and

he died, his son after him is penalized,

so that he may not slaughter the firstborn on the basis of this blemish, just as his father was penalized and prohibited from slaughtering it on that basis, because he violated the verse [Leviticus 22:21]: “It shall have no defect,” which prohibits inflicting a blemish on consecrated property.

In any event, this cannot resolve our matter, that his son should likewise be penalized to redeem him. For it may be said: There, it is different,

because it is a prohibition by Torah law

which his father violated,

but here,

his father violated only

a rabbinic prohibition

when he sold him.