Gittin 43b (מג:) — the Talmud in English

And I do not

say: Before she was emancipated, the first one's betrothal took effect upon the half of her that was a free woman, and now that she was completely emancipated and the second one betrothed her, the second one's betrothal took effect upon the half of her that had been in bondage; and if so, I

read in her: “

the wife of two dead men

a woman subject to the levirate bond of two deceased husbands,” for it is by virtue of both of them that she comes to enter levirate marriage with Levi.

For

in either case,

whether you say that one who betroths a woman who is half a maidservant and half a free woman has betrothed her, or whether you say that he has not betrothed her, this is not the wife of two dead men:

If Reuben’s betrothal is betrothal,

and because one who betroths a woman who is half a maidservant and half a free woman has betrothed her,

then Shimon’s betrothal is not

betrothal,

for she had already been betrothed to Reuben, and betrothal does not take effect with regard to a married woman; she is subject only to Reuben’s levirate bond.

And if Shimon’s betrothal is betrothal,

then

Reuben’s betrothal is not betrothal,

meaning: You cannot say that she was betrothed to Shimon unless you say that she was not betrothed to Reuben, because one who betroths a woman who is half a maidservant and half a free woman does not betroth her.

If so, she is not the wife of two dead men.

It was stated: A woman who was half a maidservant and half a free woman, who was betrothed to Reuben, and then was emancipated, and afterward was betrothed to Shimon.

Rav Yosef bar Hama said that Rav Naḥman said:

When she was emancipated,

the first betrothal was nullified.

But

Rav Zeira said

in the name of

Rav Naḥman: The first betrothal was completed,

for until then it had not been a complete betrothal, but a betrothal that rendered one who engaged in intercourse with her liable to a guilt-offering—since a woman who is half a maidservant and half a free woman is the “maidservant designated for a man,” with regard to whom the Torah made one who engages in intercourse with her liable only for a guilt-offering—and now, once she was emancipated, the betrothal was completed, and she became the fully married wife of the first man, so that one who engages in intercourse with her is liable to death.

Rav Zeira said: In accordance with my view

—in the name of Rav Naḥman—

it is more plausible,

as my view is more plausible: that the first betrothal was completed, since

it is written

with regard to a designated maidservant: “

They shall not be put to death

—the adulterer and the adulteress—

because she was not emancipated.”

And this implies:

Had she been emancipated

after she had been betrothed and then committed adultery,

they shall be put to death,

because his betrothal was completed.

Abaye said to him: And according to the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael, who says:

“And she is a maidservant designated for a man,”

the verse is speaking of a Canaanite maidservant betrothed to a Hebrew slave,

will you

likewise

interpret what the Torah says, “They shall not be put to death because she was not emancipated,”

that if she was emancipated

after she had been designated for a Hebrew slave and then committed adultery,

they shall be put to death,

the adulterer and the adulteress?

But surely this is not so, for the betrothal of a Canaanite maidservant has no substance, and it is impossible for it to be completed.

Rather,

necessarily,

what can you say

according to Rabbi Yishmael concerning the statement “They shall not be put to death because she was not emancipated”? It does not mean that if she was emancipated after she had been designated, they would be put to death, but rather

that she was emancipated and then was again betrothed,

meaning: If she was emancipated before she was betrothed, then they would be put to death. And if so,

likewise

according to the one who says that the verse is speaking of a woman who is half a maidservant and half a free woman, you must interpret it as follows:

that she was emancipated and then was again betrothed,

and then they would be put to death. But if she was emancipated and was not again betrothed, what basis is there for saying that the first betrothal would be completed?

Rav Huna bar Ketina said that Rabbi Yitzḥak said:

There was an incident involving a woman who

was

half a maidservant and half a free woman, and they compelled her master and made her a free woman.

The Gemara considered:

In accordance with whose view?

In accordance with whose view did they do this? For one cannot compare a man who is half a slave and half a free man, whose master is compelled to emancipate him because of the mitzva of procreation, as explained in our Mishna, to a woman who is not obligated in the mitzva of procreation.

Was this

in accordance with the view of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka,

who did this,

as he says: Concerning both of them

[concerning Adam and Eve]

He says: “

God blessed them and God said

to them:

Be fruitful and multiply and fill

the earth and subdue it,” teaching that a woman, too, is commanded in the mitzva of procreation?

And therefore they compelled her master, for until the master emancipated her, she could marry neither a slave nor a free man.

He said—

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak

explained: No,

they did not compel her master because of the mitzva of procreation; rather, because

a practice of licentiousness

[sexual immorality]

had become prevalent with her, since she was not designated for one man, as everyone was forbidden to her. Therefore, they compelled her master so that she would be able to marry a man.

since she was not designated to any one man, as they were all forbidden to her. Therefore they compelled her master, so that she would be able to marry a man.

Mishna:

The Sages prohibited selling one’s Canaanite slave to a gentile, because this removes him from the mitzvot, since he cannot observe them in the home of his gentile master, as he is enslaved to his work, and if he sold him, the court fines him to redeem him from the gentile.

One who sells his slave to gentiles,

and the slave flees from his master, or the court fines him to redeem the slave from the gentile, and he redeems him.

Or

that they sold him in Eretz Yisrael, even to a Jew, in order to take him

outside Eretz Yisrael.

In both this case and that case,

the slave went

free,

a free man,

because the Sages penalized his master.

That is, when he sold him to a gentile, we penalize the seller, so that the slave becomes free from him even if afterward the slave fled back to him or was redeemed by him. When he sold him outside Eretz Yisrael, we penalize the Jewish purchaser, so that the slave becomes free from him without payment and without a price, and the seller does not return to him the money that he paid him for the slave.

Gemara:

The Sages taught:

One who sells his slave to gentiles

he is

free

when he flees from the gentile or when a Jew redeems him from the gentile, and the Jew may no longer enslave him, because the Sages penalized him.

But

nevertheless

the slave needs

the slave

a deed of emancipation from his first master

in order to terminate his slavery completely, for when he sold him to a gentile, he sold him only the slave’s labor, whereas ownership of the slave’s person still remained with the first master. The Sages’ penalty did not terminate the first master’s ownership of the slave’s person, and therefore the first master must emancipate him.

Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel said:

In what case is this statement said?

When

he did not write him—

the seller—

his ono

[the Gemara proceeds to explain this],

but if he wrote him his ono, that is his emancipation.

And the Gemara explains:

What is meant by

“his ono”?

Rav Sheshet said: He wrote him—

the master wrote to the slave when he sold him to a gentile—

as follows: “

When you flee from him

[from the gentile],

I have no dealings with you.”

The Sages taught: If he borrowed

the master

against him

[against his slave]

from a gentile,

so that he pledged the slave to the gentile as security for the debt that the Jew owed the gentile,

once the gentile performed his nimos for him

[the Gemara proceeds to explain this] and the slave fled from the gentile, he is

free,

and his first master may no longer enslave him.

What is his nimos?

Rav Huna bar Yehuda said: Shackles

[a mark of slavery that they hang around the slaves’ necks]. Once the gentile hangs this mark on the slave, it is as though the Jew sold him to the gentile, and he may no longer enslave him, even if the slave flees from the gentile or if he redeems him, in accordance with the Sages’ enactment.

Rav Sheshet raised an objection

to Rav Huna bar Yehuda’s interpretation from the following beraita:

Sharecroppers

who received a field from a gentile to work it, on the condition that they would divide the produce with the landowner, whether by half, by a third, or by a quarter.

And tenant farmers,

who leased a field from a gentile to work it and take its produce, on the condition that they would give the gentile a fixed amount of produce from the field, whether it yielded much or little.

And

even

sharecroppers by ancestral arrangement,

who have a permanent sharecropping arrangement with the gentile, and whose fathers had already been sharecroppers for the fathers of the gentile who owns the field.

And when a gentile mortgages his field to a Jew

for a debt that the gentile owes the Jew,

even though he performed for him

the gentile performed for the Jew

his nimos.

This field is

exempt from tithes,

like a gentile’s field, and we do not say that the Jew is the owner of the field and must therefore give tithes from his share.

And if it should enter your mind

that “nimos” means

shackles,

then

is a field subject to shackles

[is there a “nimos” for a field]?!

Rather, said

Rav Sheshet

and explained:

The statement we made regarding a slave—“once the gentile performed his nimos for him”—means

a set time,

that a time was fixed at which the slave would become definitively the gentile’s if the Jew did not repay him by that time.

Likewise, “when a gentile mortgages his field to a Jew, even though he performed his nimos for him” means that a time was fixed at which the field would become definitively the Jew’s.

And the Gemara asks:

The set time concerning the slave, who became definitively the gentile’s, in which case we say that this is equivalent to selling the slave to a gentile and he goes free, is difficult

in light of the set time

concerning the field that became definitively the Jew’s, for even though the time arrived at which the field was to become definitively the Jew’s, we do not regard the field as sold to the Jew such that it would be obligated in tithes!?

for the field, which became definitively owned by the Jew, because although the time arrived at which the field should become definitively owned by the Jew, we do not consider the field sold to the Jew so that it would become obligated in the agricultural tithe?!

And we answer:

It is not difficult:

For

this

case concerning the slave, in which we regard this as a sale, is one in which

its time arrived

[the time fixed for its becoming definitive had arrived], and therefore it is a “sale.”

This

case concerning the field, in which we do not regard it as sold to the Jew, is one in which

its time had not arrived.

And we ask:

But concerning the slave,

according to your statement, we are dealing with a case in which

its time arrived;

and is it really necessary

to say

that it is equivalent to a sale!?

Rather, both this

[the slave to a gentile]

and that

[the field to a Jew] are cases in which

its time had not arrived, and it is not difficult: This

case concerning the slave sold to a gentile, in which we say that it is equivalent to a sale even though the time had not arrived, is one in which the Jew pledged the slave to him

with regard to the slave’s person,

so that the slave would belong entirely to the gentile if the Jew did not repay him by a specified time; and the Sages penalized him by treating this as a sale, even though its time had not yet arrived.

And that

case concerning the field mortgaged to a Jew, in which we do not regard it as sold to the Jew, is one in which the gentile mortgaged the field to the Jew

for its produce

only. He said to him: Consume the produce of this field from the time we set until I repay you your money. Since the Jew has no ownership of the field’s person, it is not a field belonging to a Jew, and it is therefore exempt from tithes.