Gittin 43a (מג.) — the Talmud in English

But

perhaps he admits

that the owner of the ox is liable to pay the fine,

and is exempt

from payment, since one who admits liability for a fine is exempt.

Based on this reasoning, it is obvious that if he sells the fine by itself, the sale is ineffective even according to Rabbi Meir. However, according to Rabbi Meir’s method, there is still room to inquire:

Should we say: Since he did not sell the fine itself, but rather sold the slave with regard to the fine, the sale is effective?

Or perhaps: Since the fine does not emerge from the slave’s body, it is not possible at all to sell a slave with regard to a fine. Consequently, he sold only the fine itself, and in this case even Rabbi Meir concedes that the sale is ineffective, since it is not something that is destined to come into existence?

And

how

would you raise the question according to the Rabbis?

After all,

the Rabbis stated their opinion only with regard to the following:

“A person cannot transfer ownership of something that has not yet come into the world,”

for example, the fruits of a date palm

themselves,

which at present do not exist

[as, at the time of the sale, the fruits do not yet exist].

But here,

he is not selling the fine itself; rather, he is selling the slave with regard to the fine. And

this

ox is standing here

[the ox is before us],

and this slave is standing here

[the slave is before us]. This is comparable to one who sells “a date palm for its fruit,” with regard to which even the Rabbis concede that the buyer acquires it.

Or perhaps we should say: Since the fine does not emerge from the slave’s body, it is not possible at all to sell “a slave for a fine.” Consequently, this is merely a sale of the fine alone, and that sale is ineffective even according to Rabbi Meir, and certainly according to the Rabbis.

And if so,

what

is the ruling in this uncertainty?

Rabbi Abba said: Come and hear

from that which was taught in a beraita: It is written: “And when a kohen acquires a person, the acquisition of his money, he may eat of it [teruma], and those born in his household [that is, the sons of his maidservant] may eat of his bread [that is, the teruma of the kohen].”

The beraita explains: This phrase in which the Torah says

“those born in his household”

may eat of his bread—

what does it teach

what does it come to teach us?

After all,

if

the acquisition of money

of a kohen

eats

of teruma, then

one born in his household

all the more so

eats of teruma. Why, then, did the Torah need to add this apparently obvious law? The beraita explains:

If it were so—

if the Torah had not explicitly stated that one born in a kohen’s household may eat teruma—then

I would have said:

Just as

an acquisition of money

that has monetary value

and therefore

eats

of teruma—

then one born in the household also,

only when

he has monetary value,

he

eats

of teruma.

And from where is it derived that even though he has no value at all

he nevertheless eats teruma?

Therefore,

the Torah states:

“one born in the household,”

which is superfluous, in order to teach that one born in the household eats teruma

in any event,

even though he has no value at all.

And I would still say:

Only

one born in the household—

whom the verse added—

whether he has monetary value

or

whether he has no monetary value,

he

eats

of teruma.

But

an acquisition of money

only when

he has monetary value

does he

eat

of teruma; but if he has no monetary value,

he does not eat

of teruma.

Therefore,

the Torah states:

“the acquisition of his money and one born in his household,”

meaning: For this reason the verse compares the acquisition of his money to one born in his household, in order to teach:

Just as one born in the household, even though he has no value at all,

he

eats,

since the Torah wrote this phrase in order to teach that he eats even in such a case,

so too an acquisition of money, even though he has no value at all,

he

eats.

The Gemara now proves from this beraita that a person cannot sell his slave for a fine:

For

if it enters your mind that a slave whom his master sold for a fine

is

sold,—

then you would never find a slave who has no value at all, because

is there a slave who cannot be sold for a fine

[could there be a slave whom it is impossible to sell for a fine]?! And if so, he does have value.

Rather, it must necessarily be impossible to sell a slave for a fine.

And we reject this proof:

No,

indeed

there is

a slave who is not worth selling for a fine, such as one who was

a slave with a fatal condition,

who is like a dead man, and no fine is paid for him.

And

we nevertheless ask: Even if he has a fatal condition, how could you find a slave who is not worth a peruta, since

he is fit to stand before him

[he is fit to stand before him] and perform light service?!

And we explain: It can be found

in the case of one who is repulsive and afflicted with leprosy,

who is not fit to serve him at all; and as for the fine, this is possible when he also has a fatal condition.

They raised a dilemma:

What is the law concerning one who is half slave and half free, who betrothed a free woman

who is suitable for the free half within him?

What

is the law—does she become betrothed to that half?

And

if you say

that this dilemma should be resolved: We have established [Kiddushin 7a] that

when a Jewish man says to a Jewish woman

“Become betrothed to my half,”

she is

betrothed,

and therefore, in this case too, the betrothal should be effective.

Do not resolve it this way, because the case there is different,

as she is suitable for all of him

[the woman is suitable for all of him]. Therefore, she is betrothed, because she became betrothed to all of him; and although he said, “Become betrothed to my half,” he intended only to say: “Even when you become betrothed to all of me, I will be able to take another wife in addition to you.” Therefore, she is betrothed.

But

this one

[this free woman] is

not suitable for all of him

[she is not suitable for all of him], since the slave half within him is not fit to betroth her. Consequently, this is truly betrothal to “half a man,” and one may say that she is not betrothed.

And if you say:

Since this betrothal is truly to half of him, the opposite conclusion can be drawn from what we have established [there]:

When a Jewish man betroths half a woman, she is not betrothed,

because it is stated: “When a man takes a woman,” and not half a woman.

For the only reason we distinguish generally between “Become betrothed to my half,” in which case she is betrothed, and “Half of you is betrothed to me,” in which case she is not betrothed, is that when he says, “Become betrothed to my half,” he intends only to say that he will be able to marry another woman in addition to her. But with regard to half a woman, this cannot be said, because a woman is not suitable for two men; necessarily, he intended to betroth only half of her, and therefore she is not betrothed. If so, the same should apply when he betroths her to half of him literally: She should not be betrothed.

This too does not resolve it:

For

in the case there, with regard to half a woman,

he left over part of his acquisition,

as he did not betroth her in all the way that he could have betrothed her. The same applies when he betroths her to half of him literally: She is not betrothed, since he left over part of his acquisition.

And

if

this slave,

who has one-half of a slave status,

did not leave over part of his acquisition,

since he acquired everything that he was fit to acquire—if so,

what

is the law in this case? Is she betrothed or is she not betrothed?

Come and hear

from the beraita mentioned on the previous page:

If the ox killed

the

one who was half slave and half free,

the owner of the ox

gives half the fine to his master and half the ransom to his heirs,

of the deceased.

And if you say that his betrothal is not betrothal,

then

from where does he have heirs

[how can he have heirs]?

For the relatives he had before he became a slave lost their familial relationship to him once he became a slave, and he is like a newborn. If so, he has no other relatives except children; and if you say that his betrothal is ineffective, from where could he have children!?

Rav Adda bar Ahava said:

The statement in the beraita: “If the ox killed” does not mean that it actually killed him. Rather, it means

when it rendered him a person with a fatal condition,

which is like “a dead man.”

And what does “his heirs”

in the beraita mean?

He himself

[he himself] takes half the ransom.

Rava said: There are two refutations

[objections]

to this:

One:

“His heirs”

is what the beraita teaches,

and he himself is not called “his heirs.”

Furthermore,

it is

ransom

[and not a fine]

that

we are coming to obligate him to pay,

and Reish Lakish said: Ransom is collected only after death,

as, with regard to ransom, the verse states: “And he killed a man or a woman.” If the ox merely rendered him subject to a fatal condition, one cannot apply to him the phrase: “And he killed.”

Rather, Rava said:

Actually, his betrothal is not betrothal. And as for your difficulty, “From where does he have heirs?”—do not raise it: For indeed, he is

fit

to

receive

half the ransom,

but he has none,

because he has no heirs.

Rava said: Just as one who betroths half a woman does not betroth her, so too, when one who is half maidservant and half free woman becomes betrothed, her betrothal is not betrothal.

And likewise,

Rabba bar Rav Huna expounded

this teaching publicly, and said:

Just as one who betroths half a woman does not betroth her, so too, when one who is half maidservant and half free woman becomes betrothed, she is not betrothed.

Rav Hisda said to him:

But

are they comparable

—one who betroths a woman who is half maidservant and half free, and one who betroths half a woman?!

There,

when he betroths half a woman,

he leaves over part of his acquisition,

whereas

here,

when he betroths one who is half maidservant and half free,

he does not leave over part of his acquisition,

because it is possible to betroth only the free half within her.

Rabba bar Rav Huna then appointed an interpreter before him

[Rabba bar Rav Huna appointed an interpreter to repeat and expound his words],

and

thus

expounded:

It is written:

“And this stumbling block is under your hands.”

Why were words of Torah called a “stumbling block”? Because

a person

does not master words of Torah unless he first stumbles over them

by teaching an error and being embarrassed because of it. Through this, he pays attention and understands. I, too, stumbled in my ruling, and I retract it and say:

Although the Sages said

that

one who betroths half a woman does not betroth her,

this applies only to a woman whom he could betroth in her entirety.

But when one who is half maidservant and half free becomes betrothed, her betrothal is effective.

What is the reason? Because

there, he left over part of his acquisition, whereas

here, he did not leave over part of his acquisition.

Rav Sheshet said: Just as one who betroths half a woman does not betroth her, so too, when one who is half maidservant and half free becomes betrothed, her betrothal is not betrothal, and one does not distinguish between a case in which he left over part of his acquisition and one in which he did not leave over part of his acquisition.

and there is no distinction between a case in which he leaves something over in his acquisition and one in which he does not leave something over in his acquisition.

And if someone would whisper to you

an objection to this ruling, based on what we learned:

“Who is a betrothed maidservant?”

—“a maidservant betrothed to a man,” for whose intercourse the Torah requires a guilt-offering—

this is one who is half maidservant and half free and betrothed to a Hebrew slave.

You see that betrothal applies to her?!

Tell him

to reject the objection:

Go

[go away]

to Rabbi Yishmael,

who says there:

The verse speaks of a Canaanite maidservant betrothed to a Hebrew slave,

when it says: “And she is a maidservant betrothed to a man.”

And

because

she is a Canaanite maidservant who is betrothed [

betrothed]

she is,

until Rabbi Ishmael calls her “betrothed”!?

Rather,

necessarily,

what can you say

about Rabbi Ishmael’s statement:

what does “

betrothed”

mean? Designated.

And if so,

here—

in the view of the one who says that the verse speaks of a woman who is half maidservant and half free woman, betrothed to a Hebrew slave—

also

you can say:

what does “betrothed” mean? Designated,

and kiddushin never takes effect with her.

It is written in the section concerning yibbum [Deuteronomy 25:5]: “When men dwell together, and one of them dies and has no son, the wife of the dead man shall not be outside, for a strange man; her yavam [the brother of the dead man] shall come upon her, take her to himself as a wife, and perform yibbum with her.”

It is written in the passage concerning yibum [Deuteronomy 25:5]: “If brothers dwell together, and one of them dies and has no son, the wife of the dead man shall not be married to an outsider; her yavam [the brother of the deceased] shall come to her, take her to himself as a wife, and perform yibum with her.”

Since the verse says, “and one of them dies,” we learn that a woman undergoes yibum only when she has a bond of yibum arising from the death of one man; but if she has a bond of yibum arising from the deaths of two men [“the wife of two dead men”], she does not undergo yibum.

What is the case? For example, she was married to Reuben, who died, and then his brother Simeon went and gave her kiddushin by money or by a document [“maamar”]. That maamar takes effect with her, and when Simeon dies, she is bound on his account to perform yibum with his brother. However, the bond arising from the first deceased has not yet been dissolved either, for it is dissolved only when his brother performs yibum with her, and not when he gives her maamar. It follows that when Simeon dies, she is bound to perform yibum with Levi on account of two deceased men: on account of Reuben, whose bond has still not been dissolved, and on account of Simeon, who gave her maamar.

Rav Hisda said:

a woman

who was half maidservant and half free woman and was betrothed to Reuben [and the status of her kiddushin is uncertain, since the amoraim above disputed this law ],

and she was freed and then became betrothed again to Simeon

during Reuben’s lifetime,

and both of them died.

She

undergoes yibum with Levi,

the brother of Reuben and Simeon.