Gittin 43a — the Talmud in English

But behold,

perhaps he admits

that the owner of the ox is liable for the fine,

and is exempt

from paying, for one who admits liability for a fine is exempt.

And on the basis of this reasoning, it is obvious that if he sells the fine alone, the sale is of no effect even according to Rabbi Meir; but according to the method of Rabbi Meir, there is room for doubt:

Should we say: since he did not sell the fine itself, but rather sold the slave with regard to the fine, the sale is therefore effective?

Or perhaps: since the fine does not emerge from the body of the slave, it is not applicable at all to sell a slave with regard to a fine, and therefore he sold only the fine itself, and in this even Rabbi Meir admits that the sale does not take effect, since it is not something that is destined to come?

And

how

would you pose the question according to the Rabbis:

Behold,

the Rabbis said only up to this point: “

A person cannot transfer ownership of something that has not yet come into the world,”

but only, for example, the fruits of a date palm

themselves,

which at present do not exist [at the time of the sale there are no fruits in the world].

[as, at the time of the sale, the fruits do not yet exist].

But here,

he is not selling the fine itself, but rather he is selling the slave with regard to a fine, and

this

ox is standing [behold, an ox is before us],

[the ox is before us],

and this slave is standing [and behold, a slave is before us], and this is similar to one who sells “a date palm for its fruits,” which even the Rabbis admit that the purchaser acquires.

This is similar to one who sells “a date palm for its fruits,” in which case even the Rabbis agree that the buyer acquires it.

Or perhaps we should say: since the fine does not emerge from the body of the slave, it is not applicable at all to sell “a slave for a fine,” and therefore this is nothing other than a sale of the fine alone, and this does not take effect even according to Rabbi Meir, and all the more so according to the Rabbis.

And if so,

what

is the law of this doubt?

Rabbi Abba said: ta shma

from that which was taught in a beraita: It is written: “And a priest, when he acquires a person, the acquisition of his money, he shall eat of it [the slave shall eat of it, of teruma], and those born in his household [that is, the son of his maidservant], they shall eat of his bread [that is, of the priest’s teruma].”

And the beraita explains: This that the Torah said, “

and those born in his household

shall eat of his bread,”

what does it come to teach

us?

For behold,

if

the acquisition of money

of a priest

eats

of teruma,

one born in the household

is it not all the more so

that he eats of teruma? And why did the Torah need to add this obvious law? And the beraita explains: For

if it were so—

if the Torah had not explained that one born in the household of a priest eats teruma—then

I would say:

Just as

an acquisition of money

that has monetary value,

and therefore he

eats

of teruma—

so also one born in the household,

only when

he has monetary value,

he

eats

of teruma;

and from where is it derived that even though he has no value at all

he nevertheless eats of teruma?

Therefore,

the verse states: “

one born in the household,”

which is superfluous, in order to teach that one born in the household eats teruma

in any event,

even though he has no value at all.

And I would still say:

Only

one born in the household—

whom the verse included—

whether he has monetary value,

and

whether he has no monetary value,

he

eats

of teruma.

But

an acquisition of money,

only when he

has monetary value

does he

eat

of teruma; but if he has no monetary value, he

does not eat

of teruma.

Therefore,

the verse states: “

the acquisition of his money and one born in his household,” meaning: therefore the verse compared the acquisition of his money to one born in his household, in order to teach:

meaning that the verse compared the property acquired with his money to one born in his household in order to teach:

Just as one born in the household, even though he has no value at all,

he

eats,

for the Torah wrote him for this purpose, to teach that even in this manner he eats,

so too an acquisition of money, even though he has no value at all,

he

eats.

And now we prove from this beraita that a person cannot sell his slave for a fine:

For behold,

if it enters your mind that: a slave whom his master sold for a fine,

he is

sold,

then you will not find a slave who has no value at all, because

is there a slave who cannot be sold for a fine [and is there such a slave]? And if so, he has value.

If so, he does have value.

Rather, necessarily, it is impossible to sell a slave for a fine.

And we reject this:

No,

indeed

there is

a slave who is not worth selling for a fine, such as one who was

a treifa slave,

for he is like a dead man, and no fine is paid for him.

And

we still raise an objection: even if he is a treifa, behold, in any event, how will you find a slave who is not worth a peruta, since

he is fit to stand before him [he is fit to stand before him] and serve him with a minor service!?

and perform a minor service for him?!

And we explain: You can find such a case

with one who is repulsive and afflicted with boils,

who is not fit to serve him at all; and as for the fine, for example, he is also a treifa.

They raised a dilemma:

One who is half slave and half free man, who betrothed a free woman,

who is fit for the half of him that is free,

what

is the law: is she betrothed to that half?

And

if you should find to say

to resolve this doubt: We have an established ruling [Kiddushin 7a]:

An Israelite man who said to an Israelite woman “

be betrothed to my half,”

she is

betrothed, and if so, in this case as well, his betrothal is a betrothal.

This proof cannot resolve the question, because the case there is different,

Do not resolve it thus, for the case there is different,

because she is fit for all of him [the woman is fit for all of him], and therefore she is betrothed, since she was betrothed to all of him; and although he said, “Be betrothed to my half,” he intended only to say: “Even when you become betrothed to all of me, I will be able to take another wife together with you,” and therefore she is betrothed.

[the woman is suitable for all of him]. Therefore, she is betrothed, because she became betrothed to all of him; and although he said, “Become betrothed to my half,” he intended only to say: “Even when you become betrothed to all of me, I will be able to take another wife in addition to you.” Therefore, she is betrothed.

But

this one [this free woman] is

is

not fit for all of him [she is not fit for all of him], for the half of him that is slave is not fit to betroth her. Therefore, these are literally betrothals to “half a man,” and one may say that she is not betrothed.

[she is not suitable for all of him], since the slave half within him is not fit to betroth her. Consequently, this is truly betrothal to “half a man,” and one may say that she is not betrothed.

And if you should find to say: Since these betrothals are literally to his half, then let us resolve it in the opposite direction, from what we have established [there]:

Since this betrothal is truly to half of him, the opposite conclusion can be drawn from what we have established [there]:

An Israelite man who betroths half a woman is not betrothed,

because it is stated: “When a man takes a woman,” and not half a woman.

For we did not generally distinguish between “Be betrothed to my half,” in which case she is betrothed, and “Your half is betrothed to me,” in which case she is not betrothed, except because when he said, “Be betrothed to my half,” he intended only to say that he would be able to marry another woman together with her, whereas with half a woman it is not applicable to say this, for a woman is not fit for two men; necessarily, he intended to betroth literally half of her, and therefore she is not betrothed. And if so, the same law applies when he betroths literally to his half: she is not betrothed.

Do not resolve it even thus:

for

there, regarding half a woman, he

left something over in his acquisition,

for he did not betroth in her all that he could have betrothed, and the same law applies when he betrothed her literally to his half: she is not betrothed, since he left something over in his acquisition.

And

if

this slave,

who has one half that is slavery,

had not left something over in his acquisition,

for everything that he was fit to acquire, he acquired—and if so,

what

is the law in this matter? Is she betrothed or is she not betrothed?

ta shma

from the beraita mentioned on the previous page:

If the ox killed

the

one who was half slave and half free man,

then the owner of the ox

gives half the fine to his master, and half the ransom to his heirs,

of the deceased.

And if you say: His betrothals are not betrothals,

then

from where does he have heirs [from where does he have heirs]?

For the relatives he had before he became a slave—once he became a slave, their kinship was severed, and he is like a newborn; and if so, he has no other relatives except sons. And if you should say that he has no betrothals, from where does he have sons!?

For the relatives he had before he became a slave lost their familial relationship to him once he became a slave, and he is like a newborn. If so, he has no other relatives except children; and if you say that his betrothal is ineffective, from where could he have children!?

Rav Adda bar Ahava said:

This that they said in the beraita, “If the ox killed,” does not mean that it actually killed him, but rather

when it made him a treifa,

for he is like “a dead man,”

and what is “

heirs,”

which

we learned in the beraita? He himself takes half the ransom.

Rava said: There are two answers [refutations]

of this answer

to the matter:

One: “

his heirs”

it teaches, and he himself is not called “his heirs.”

and he himself is not called “his heirs.”

And furthermore,

behold,

ransom

[and not a fine]

is

what we are coming to obligate him to pay him,

and Reish Lakish said: Ransom is collected only after death,

for regarding ransom the verse says: “And he killed a man or a woman,” and if he only made him a treifa, you cannot call it: “And he killed.”

Rather, Rava said:

Actually, his betrothals are not betrothals. And as for what is difficult for you—“from where does he have heirs?”—this is not difficult: for indeed he is

fit

to

take

half the ransom

but he has none,

for he has no heirs.

Rava said: Just as one who betroths half a woman is not betrothed, so too, one who is half maidservant and half free woman and was betrothed—her betrothals are not betrothals.

And likewise

Rabba bar Rav Huna expounded

a homily publicly, and said in it:

Just as one who betroths half a woman is not betrothed, so too, one who is half maidservant and half free woman and was betrothed, is not betrothed.

Rav Hisda said to him:

But

are they comparable,

one who betroths one who is half maidservant and half free woman and one who betroths half a woman!?

There,

when he betroths half a woman,

he leaves something over in his acquisition,

whereas

here,

when he betroths one who is half maidservant and half free woman,

he does not leave something over in his acquisition,

for it is possible to betroth only the half of her that is free.

Rabba bar Rav Huna then appointed an interpreter over him [Rabba bar Rav Huna appointed an interpreter in order to expound again],

[Rabba bar Rav Huna appointed an interpreter to repeat and expound his words],

and

thus

he expounded:

It is written: “

And this stumbling-block is under your hands,”

why were words of Torah called “a stumbling-block”? Because

a person does not stand upon words of Torah unless he stumbles in them

and teaches an error, and they embarrass him, for through this he pays attention and understands; and I too stumbled in my ruling, and I retract it, and say:

by teaching an error and being embarrassed because of it. Through this, he pays attention and understands. I, too, stumbled in my ruling, and I retract it and say:

Even though the Sages said

that

one who betroths half a woman is not betrothed,

this applies only to a woman whom he can betroth in her entirety,

but one who is half maidservant and half free woman and was betrothed—her betrothals are betrothals.

What is the reason?

For

there he leaves something over in his acquisition; here he does not leave something over in his acquisition.

Rav Sheshet said: Just as one who betroths half a woman is not betrothed, so too, one who is half maidservant and half free woman and was betrothed—her betrothals are not betrothals,

and there is no distinction between a case in which he leaves something over in his acquisition and one in which he does not leave something over in his acquisition.

And if a person whispers to you

a refutation of this law, from what we learned: “

Which is a shifha harufa [‘and she is a maidservant betrothed to a man’], for whose intercourse the verse obligates a guilt-offering?

[As it says: “And she is a maidservant designated to a man,”] for whose intercourse the Torah obligates one to bring a guilt offering:

This is one who is half maidservant and half free woman, and betrothed to a Hebrew slave.”

Behold, betrothal is applicable to her!? Thus

say to him

to reject him:

Go [go away]

[go away]

to Rabbi Ishmael,

who says there:

The verse—“and she is a maidservant betrothed to a man”—speaks of a Canaanite maidservant betrothed to a Hebrew slave.

and not of a woman who is half maidservant and half free woman.

And

because

a Canaanite slave woman, a daughter of an engaged woman [

betrothal ]

she is,

until Rabbi Ishmael calls her “betrothed”!?

Rather,

necessarily,

what can you say

concerning Rabbi Ishmael’s words:

what is “

betrothed”

[but] designated.

And if so,

here—

in the words of the one who holds that the verse speaks of one who is betrothed to a Hebrew slave in the case of a woman who is half slave and half free woman—

also

you can say:

what is “betrothed”? Designated,

and in reality betrothal does not take effect with her.

It is written in the section concerning yibbum [Deuteronomy 25:5]: “When men dwell together, and one of them dies and has no son, the wife of the dead man shall not be outside, for a strange man; her yavam [the brother of the dead man] shall come upon her, take her to himself as a wife, and perform yibbum with her.”

And from the fact that Scripture said, “and one of them dies,” we have learned that a woman is subject to yibbum only if she has a bond of yibbum on account of one dead man; but if she has a bond of yibbum on account of two dead men [“the wife of two dead men”], she does not undergo yibbum.

How so? For example, she was married to Reuven, and he died, and his brother Shimon went and performed with her a betrothal through money or a document [“maamar”], so the maamar takes effect with her, and when he dies, she is bound on his account to perform yibbum with his brother. However, even the bond resulting from the first dead man has not yet lapsed, for it lapses only when his brother performs yibbum with her, and not when he performs maamar with her. It follows that when Shimon dies, she is bound to perform yibbum with Levi on account of two dead men: on account of Reuven, whose bond has still not lapsed, and on account of Shimon, who performed maamar with her.

Rav Hisda said:

A woman who

was half slave and half free woman and became betrothed to Reuven [

and her betrothal is doubtful, since the amoraim disputed this law above ],

and was freed, and then became betrothed to Shimon

during Reuven’s lifetime,

and both of them died.

This woman

performs yibbum with Levi

the brother of Reuven and Shimon.