Gittin 44b (מד:) — the Talmud in English

b.

And

even

if you should say,

in accordance with that side of the dilemma raised in Moed Katan 10a concerning one who had work to do, who could either begin it and complete it before the intermediate days of the festival, or not begin it at all until after the intermediate days—

and if he

deliberately arranged for his work to be done during the intermediate days,

having begun it near the festival, so that if he did not complete it during the intermediate days it would be a “matter involving loss,” which is permitted by law to be done during the intermediate days,

and he died

before the festival,

his son was not penalized after him

and required to refrain from doing it during the intermediate days, just as his father was penalized because he had deliberately arranged for his work to be done during the festival. Do not resolve the matter from there with regard to our case, for one can say:

It is different there

because the father

did not commit

the father

a prohibition [the father did not commit a prohibition];

that is, his father died before the festival, before he had reached the point of prohibition, and no law had yet taken effect.

But

here,

where an obligation had already taken effect upon his father to redeem him,

what

is the law concerning his son? Is it

with regard to him,

the father who sold him, that the Sages

imposed the penalty, but he is no longer here [for he died]?

Or perhaps: with regard to his property [the father’s property]

the Sages imposed the penalty

that the slave should be redeemed from it,

and it is here [for the assets are before us].

so that the slave must be redeemed from that property,

Rabbi Asi said to Rabbi Yirmeya:

You have learned it;

we have already learned this law in the Mishna in tractate Shevi'it: The following Mishna is explained according to Rashi’s words in Moed Katan 13a.

A field that was cleared of thorns during the Sabbatical year,

from which thorns and thistles that had been detached and scattered throughout it were removed

in order to improve it—and doing so is prohibited by rabbinic decree during the Sabbatical year—

may be sown after the Sabbatical year,

and the Sages did not penalize him by prohibiting benefit from work that he performed unlawfully during the Sabbatical year, since this is not significant agricultural labor.

meaning that thorns and weeds that had been detached and scattered throughout it were removed in order to improve it—and doing so is forbidden by rabbinic law during the Sabbatical Year—

But

if it was fertilized,

the field during the Sabbatical year, by bringing manure to it from another place—a practice prohibited by rabbinic decree— or if it

was made into an animal pen,

by bringing a pen of animals there, which then fertilized it, since this is significant agricultural labor, the Sages penalized him, and

it may not be sown

the field

after the Sabbatical year.

And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: We have it as a tradition [a tradition from our fathers, an established practice from our teachers]:

If the father improved

the field during the Sabbatical year,

and died,

then

his son may sow it,

and they did not penalize his son after him.

Apparently,

it is proven that

with regard to him [the transgressor himself]

the Sages imposed a penalty,

whereas

with regard to his son [the son of the transgressor]

the Sages did not impose a penalty.

And if so, with regard to the sale of a slave as well, the Sages imposed the penalty upon him alone, but they did not penalize his son after him.

Abaye said: We have it as a tradition,

that we adopt as practical halakha:

If one rendered the pure food of another impure—

and he is liable to pay if he did so intentionally—

and died, the Sages did not penalize his son after him

by requiring him to pay, even from real property that he inherited from his father, from which he normally pays his father’s other debts.

What is the reason? “

Damage that is not discernible [such as ritual impurity imparted to pure food, which is not physically discernible in it],

is not termed damage”

by law, and he is not liable to pay;

and the rabbinic penalty

alone

is

that he is required to pay, so that everyone will not go and render another’s pure food impure.

And if so,

the Sages penalized him,

whereas

they did not penalize his son.

We learned in the Mishna: One who sells his slave to a gentile

or outside Eretz Yisrael,

the slave goes free:

The Sages taught:

One who sells his slave outside Eretz Yisrael, the slave goes free, and he requires a deed of emancipation from his second master,

for the latter owns his person.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Sometimes

the slave

goes free through being sold outside Eretz Yisrael,

and sometimes

the slave

does not go free.

How so?

If

the seller

said: “

I sold so-and-so, my slave, to a certain Antiochian [a man of Antioch],”

he

does not go free,

for “Antiochian” means only that he was born in Antioch; it does not mean that he lives there. Therefore, even if the buyer takes him outside Eretz Yisrael, the slave does not go free from him, since it is possible that the buyer intends to return.

does not go free.

But if the seller said: “I sold so-and-so, my slave,

to the Antiochian who is in Antioch,”

he

goes free,

because this wording indicates that the Antiochian is from Antioch, and therefore presumably he will take him there; consequently, the slave goes free.

The Gemara raises an objection:

But was it not taught

in another beraita: If the seller said, “

I sold him to an Antiochian,” he

goes free? Only if he said, “I sold so-and-so, my slave,

to the Antiochian residing in Lod [in Eretz Yisrael],” is it the case that he

does not go free.

The Gemara answers:

It is not difficult.

This—the beraita in which we learned, “I sold him to a certain Antiochian; he does not go free”—is referring to a case

where he has [the Antiochian has]

a house in Eretz Yisrael [a house in Eretz Yisrael], and therefore the slave does not go free.

Whereas

this—the beraita in which we learned, “I sold him to an Antiochian; he goes free”—is referring to a case in which that Antiochian has no house in Eretz Yisrael, even though

he has lodging [an inn]

in Eretz Yisrael.

It was stated in Yevamot 66a: A woman who brings assets of the type called “iron-flock assets” to her husband brings him property whose value the husband assessed when she brought it to him, and he undertakes in her marriage contract to pay her this assessed value when he dies or divorces her, whether the property appreciates or improves, or depreciates or is lost.

When her husband divorces her, if the utensils or real property that she brought are still extant, she says: “I will take the very utensils that I brought, according to the value of the obligation that you undertook for them in my marriage contract; I do not want to take money.” And he says: “I will give only money, as I undertook through the assessment recorded in your marriage contract for the iron-flock assets. From that time, they became my responsibility and are mine, and I do not wish to give her those very items.”

Rav Yehuda said: The law is with her, and she takes her utensils; Rabbi Ami said: “The law is with him.”

Rabbi Yirmeya raised a dilemma: A Babylonian who married a woman in Eretz Yisrael, and she brought him

in her marriage contract

male and female slaves

as “iron-flock assets,”

and he intends to return

to Babylonia,

what is the law:

should bringing the slaves to the husband as “iron-flock assets” be considered like selling slaves to one who is outside Eretz Yisrael?

The Gemara explains:

Let this dilemma arise

according to the one

who says that when a woman demands at the time of divorce that her husband return to her the very items that she brought him in her marriage contract,

the law is with her.

[lodging].

And

let this dilemma also arise

according to the one who says that the law is with him, and he is not required to give her specifically the items that she brought him; it is sufficient for him to give her money according to the value at which those items were assessed at the time of the marriage.

Let the dilemma arise according to the one who says that the law is with her:

should we say,

since the law is with her, they are considered hers [they are considered to belong to her]?

Or perhaps, since he is granted use of their produce [since he uses them for his work],

they are considered his [they are considered to belong to him].

to Babylonia,

what

And let the dilemma arise according to the one who says that the law is with him:

should we say,

since the law is with him, they are considered his [they are considered to belong to him]?

Or perhaps, since he does not acquire the slave’s person

completely—for if he does not give her money and wishes to give her an equivalent item, he cannot dismiss her and give her some other equivalent item if the very items that she brought him still exist; and the orphans must also return these assets that she brought, although for payment of another debt of their father they are not required to pay from movable property that they inherited from their father [Meiri]—and if so,

they are considered hers [they are considered to belong to her].

the law is with her.

And

this dilemma may also be raised

The Gemara concludes:

Teyku.

Rabbi Abbahu said: Rabbi Yoḥanan taught me: A slave who went out after [with]

his master to Syria [which is Aram Tzova, and with regard to selling slaves it has the status of outside Eretz Yisrael, and the same applies to the rest of outside Eretz Yisrael],

and his master sold him there

to one of the local residents—the slave

goes free.

Or perhaps, since he has the use of their produce

[since he uses them for his work],

they are considered his

Even though initially the slave left of his own accord and not at the master’s initiative, since the master could not compel him to leave for outside Eretz Yisrael;

nevertheless, the master was penalized, and the slave went free. And

the Gemara raises an objection:

Rabbi Ḥiyya taught:

A slave who went out after his master to Syria

lost

the slave

his right

to be freed by his master!?

The Gemara answers: It is not difficult: Here—in the beraita in which we learned that he goes free— it is a case

where his master intended to return, and when the slave went out to outside Eretz Yisrael, he went out with the intention that his master would return; consequently, when the master sold him outside Eretz Yisrael, it was as though he had taken him from Eretz Yisrael to outside Eretz Yisrael.

Here—in the beraita in which we learned that the slave lost his right—

it is a case

where his master did not intend to return, so that when the slave left on his own, he left with the intention not to return. Consequently, the master did not take him from Eretz Yisrael to outside Eretz Yisrael; rather, he took himself there.

The Gemara supports this distinction: And was it not taught [as an unchallenged statement]:

A slave goes out after his master to Syria.

Before completing the support, the Gemara questions the wording of the beraita:

But is it correct to say that the slave “

goes out,” implying that he has no choice but to leave [that the slave is obligated to leave with his master]!? And that is not so, for this is what we learned [Ketubot 110b]: “ Everyone may be compelled to ascend with him to Eretz Yisrael, but not everyone may be compelled to leave [from Eretz Yisrael to outside Eretz Yisrael]”; and “everyone” comes to include slaves.

nevertheless, the master was penalized, and the slave goes free.

Rather,

this is how the beraita should be taught:

A slave who went out after his master to Syria, and his master sold him there; if his master wished

when he left Eretz Yisrael

to return, meaning that he left with this intention,

he is compelled

to free him.

And if his master did not intend to return,

if he did not intend to return when he left,

he is not compelled.

Rav Anan said: I heard two things from Mar Shmuel,

two matters concerning which I heard Shmuel rule as halakha:

One:

with regard to

this, the law of one who sells his slave outside Eretz Yisrael,

[what is to be done with the money, as the Gemara will explain].

Here,

in the beraita in which we learned that the slave forfeited his right,

And the other:

concerning that

which was stated: a. One who sells his ancestral field [a field inherited from his ancestors, which has been in the possession of his family since the division of Eretz Yisrael in the days of Joshua], it returns to its owners at the Jubilee, as it is stated: “In this Jubilee year you shall return, each man, to his ancestral land.”

b.

One who sells his field in the Jubilee year itself:

Rav said: It is sold

and

it leaves immediately, and the purchaser loses his money, since a sale took place.

And Shmuel said: It is not sold at all.

The reason is a kal va-chomer: If a field that has already been sold leaves now, then with regard to this field, which has not yet been sold, is it not logical that it should not be sold at all?

With regard to one

of these laws, I heard from Shmuel that

the sale is reversed [the purchase money is returned to the purchaser].

that is not so, for this is what

we learned

[Ketubot 110b]: “

Everyone

may be brought up [a person may compel his household to go up with him] to Eretz Yisrael,

but no one may be taken out

[from Eretz Yisrael to outside Eretz Yisrael].” And “everyone” comes to include slaves.

Rather,

the beraita should be worded as follows:

A slave went out after his master to Syria, and his master sold him there; if his master intended

when he left Eretz Yisrael

to return,

meaning that he left with that intention,

he is compelled

to emancipate the slave.

But if his master did not intend to return,

meaning that he had no intention of returning when he left,

he is not compelled.

Rav Anan said: I heard two things from my master, Shmuel,

two matters in which I heard Shmuel rule:

One:

in

this matter,

the law concerning one who sells his slave outside Eretz Yisrael, what is to be done with the money, as will be explained].

And the other:

in this matter

that was stated: a. One who sells his ancestral field [a field inherited from his ancestors, which has belonged to his family since the division of Eretz Yisrael in the days of Joshua], it returns to its owners in the Jubilee Year, as it is stated: “In this Jubilee Year, you shall return each man to his ancestral property.”

b.

One who sells his field in the Jubilee Year itself:

Rav said: It is sold

and

leaves

the buyer’s possession immediately, and the buyer loses his money, since a sale did take place.

And Shmuel said: It is not sold at all.

His reasoning is based on an a-fortiori inference: If a field that has already been sold leaves the buyer’s possession now, then this field, which has not yet been sold, should certainly not be sold at all.

With regard to one

of these laws, I heard from Shmuel that

the sale money is returned

[the purchase money is returned to the buyer].

lo haderi zavinei

lo haderi zavinei