Gittin 44b — the Talmud in English

b.

And

even

if you should say, as that side of the ibba'ya about which they were uncertain in Moed Katan 10a concerning one who had work to do, who could either begin it and finish it before the intermediate days of the festival, or not begin it at all until after the intermediate days of the festival—

in accordance with that side of the dilemma raised in Moed Katan 10a concerning one who had work to do, who could either begin it and complete it before the intermediate days of the festival, or not begin it at all until after the intermediate days—

but if he

deliberately arranged his work for the festival, having begun to do it close to the festival, so that if he did not finish it during the festival, it would be a “matter of loss,” which is permitted as a matter of law to do during the intermediate days of the festival,

and he

and he died

before the festival,

they did not penalize his son after him

by preventing him from doing it during the festival, just as they penalized his father because he deliberately arranged his work for the festival.

You cannot resolve our matter from there, for it may be said:

That case is different

because the father did not commit

the

prohibition

[the father did not commit a prohibition], that is: his father died before the festival, and he had not yet come into the realm of prohibition, and no law had yet taken effect.

But

here, since an obligation had already taken effect upon his father to redeem him,

where an obligation to redeem the slave had already taken effect upon his father,

what

is the law regarding his son? Is it

with regard to him—the father who sold him—that

the Sages penalized him, but

he is no longer here

[for he has already died]?

Or perhaps: with regard to his property,

[the father’s property],

the Sages penalized him,

that they must redeem the slave from it,

and it is here

[for the assets are before us].

Rabbi Asi said

to Rabbi Yirmeya:

You have learned it, for we already learned this law in the Mishna in tractate Sheviit:

we have already learned this law in a Mishna in tractate Sheviit:

The following Mishna is explained according to Rashi’s words in Moed Katan 13a.

A field from which thorns were removed during the Sabbatical year,

that he removed from it thorns and barkanin that had been detached and scattered in it, in order to beautify it, and it is forbidden to do so during the Sabbatical year by rabbinic law, this field

may be sown after the Sabbatical year,

and the Sages did not penalize him by forbidding benefit from work that he performed unlawfully during the Sabbatical year, since this is not important labor.

But if the field

was fertilized during the Sabbatical year,

that he fertilized it by bringing manure to it from another place, and it is forbidden to do so by rabbinic law,

or if it

was

was made into an animal pen,

that he brought an animal pen there and the animals fertilized it, since this is important labor, the Sages penalized him and

it may not be sown

the field

after the Sabbatical year.

then

And Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Hanina said: We have received

[a tradition from our fathers, a practice from our teachers]:

If the father improved

the field during the Sabbatical year

and died,

then

his son may sow it,

and they did not penalize his son after him.

Thus,

it is proven that

with regard to him

[the transgressor himself]

the Sages imposed a penalty, whereas

and he is liable to pay if he did so intentionally—

with regard to his son

[the transgressor’s son]

the Sages did not impose a penalty.

And if so, also with regard to the sale of a slave, the Sages imposed a penalty upon him alone, but did not penalize his son after him.

Abaye said: We have received,

that we adopt as practical law:

If one rendered his fellow’s pure food impure—

and he is liable to pay if he did so intentionally—

and died, the Sages did not penalize his son after him

to pay, even from real property that he inherited from his father, from which he pays his father’s other debts.

What is the reason? “

Damage that is not perceptible

[such as impurity imparted to pure food, which is not perceptible in it],

is not called damage” as a matter of law,

and he is not liable to pay;

and a rabbinic penalty

in general

it is

that makes him liable to pay, so that everyone should not go and render his fellow’s pure food impure.

And if so,

the Sages penalized him, whereas

the slave

the Sages did not penalize his son.

We learned in the Mishna: One who sells his slave to a gentile

or outside the Land of Israel, he goes free:

the slave goes free:

The Sages taught: One who sells his slave outside the Land of Israel goes free, and requires a deed of emancipation from his second master,

for he owns his person.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Sometimes the slave

the slave

goes free through a sale outside the Land of Israel,

through a sale outside Eretz Yisrael,

and sometimes the slave

the slave

does not go free.

But if the seller said: “I sold so-and-so, my slave,

How so?

If

the seller said: “

I sold so-and-so my slave to so-and-so the Antiochian

[a man of Antioch],” this one

does not go free, for “Antiochian” indicates only that he was born in Antioch, but does not indicate that he lives there; therefore, even if the purchaser took him outside the Land of Israel, the slave does not go free from him, for it may be that his intention is to return.

because “Antiochian” indicates only that he was born in Antioch, but does not indicate that he lives there. Therefore, even if the buyer takes him outside Eretz Yisrael, the slave does not go free from him, because it may be that the buyer intends to return.

But if the seller said: “I sold so-and-so my slave

to the Antiochian who is in Antioch,” this one

then he

goes free, for this wording indicates that the Antiochian is from Antioch, and if so, presumably he will take him there with him; therefore he goes free.

because this wording indicates that the Antiochian is from Antioch, and therefore, presumably, he will take him there; consequently, the slave goes free.

And we raise an objection against this:

But it was taught

in another beraita: If the seller said: “

I sold him to an Antiochian,” this one

goes

goes free. And only if he said: “I sold so-and-so my slave

he has lodging [an inn]

to the Antiochian residing in Lod

[which is in the Land of Israel],” then he

does not go free.

And we answer:

It is not difficult.

This—

the beraita in which we learned, “I sold him to so-and-so the Antiochian; he does not go free”—is in a case

where he has

[that Antiochian has]

a house in the Land of Israel

[a house in the Land of Israel], and therefore he does not go free.

Whereas

this—the beraita in which we learned, “I sold him to an Antiochian; he goes free”—is in a case where that Antiochian has no house in the Land of Israel, even though

—the beraita in which we learned, “I sold him to an Antiochian; he goes free”—is referring to a case in which that Antiochian has no house in Eretz Yisrael, even though

he has lodging

[temporary accommodation]

in the Land of Israel

[lodging].

In tractate Yevamot 66a it was stated: A woman who brings soneh to her husband, that is, she brought him iron-flock assets, whose value the husband assessed when she brought them to him, and he undertook in her marriage contract to pay her this assessment when he dies or divorces her, whether the assets increase in value or improve, or whether they decrease in value or are lost.

And when her husband divorced her, and the utensils or lands that she had brought were still in existence, if she says: “I will take the very utensils that I brought, according to the value of the obligation that you undertook toward me for them in my marriage contract, and I will not take money”; while he says: “I will give only money, as I accepted upon myself in the assessment in the obligation of your marriage contract for the iron-flock assets, and from then on they were under my responsibility and are mine, and I do not wish to give those very items.”

Rav Yehuda said: The law is with her, and she takes her utensils; while Rabbi Ami said: “The law is with him.”

Rabbi Yirmeya raised a dilemma: A Babylonian who married a woman in the Land of Israel, and she brought him

in her marriage contract

male and female slaves

as “iron-flock assets,”

and his intention was to return

to Babylonia,

what is the law?

Is bringing the slaves to the husband as “iron-flock assets” considered like selling slaves to one who is outside the Land of Israel?

And the Gemara explains:

Let this uncertainty

be raised

according to the one who says

that when a woman, at the time of divorce, demands from her husband that he return to her those very things that she brought him in her marriage contract,

the law is with her.

And

let this uncertainty

also be raised

according to the one who says that the law is with him,

and he is not required to give her specifically those very things that she brought him; it is sufficient for him to give her money according to the value at which those things were assessed at the time of the marriage.

Let it be raised according to the one who says that the law is with her:

Should we say,

since the law is with her, they are considered hers

[they are considered as belonging to her]?

Or perhaps, since he is subjugated to their produce

[since he is subjugated to them for his labor],

they are considered his

[they are considered as belonging to him].

And let it be raised according to the one who says that the law is with him:

Should we say,

since the law is with him, they are considered his

[they are considered as belonging to him]?

Or perhaps, since he does not acquire the slave’s person

completely—for if he does not give her money and wishes to give her an object of equivalent value, he cannot reject her and give her another object of equivalent value if those things that she brought him still exist; and the orphans likewise must return these assets that she brought, although for payment of another debt of their father they do not have to give movable property that they inherited from their father [Meiri]—and if so,

they are considered hers

[they are considered as belonging to her].

And we conclude:

teyku.

Rabbi Abbahu said: Rabbi Yohanan taught me: A slave who went out after

[with]

his master to Syria

[which is Aram Zova, which is like outside the Land of Israel with regard to the sale of slaves, and the same applies to the rest of outside the Land of Israel],

and his master sold him there,

to one of the residents of the place—the slave

goes free.

And even though at first the slave went out of his own accord and not through the master, for the master could not compel him to go outside the Land of Israel;

nevertheless, they penalized the master by having the slave go free.

And

we raise an objection against this:

Rabbi Hiyya taught:

A slave who went out after his master to Syria

lost

the slave

his right

to be emancipated from the master!?

And we answer:

It is not difficult:

Here—

in the beraita in which we learned, “he goes free”—

when

it was

his master’s intention to return,

and when the slave went outside the Land of Israel, he went with the intention of returning; consequently, when the master sold him outside the Land of Israel, it was as though he took him from the Land of Israel to outside the Land of Israel.

Here—

in the beraita in which we learned, “the slave lost his right”—

when it was not his master’s intention to return,

and consequently, when the slave went out on his own, he went with the intention not to return; therefore the master did not take him from the Land of Israel to outside the Land of Israel, but he took himself out.

And the Gemara supports this:

And it was taught

[as an affirmative statement]:

The slave goes out after his master to Syria.

And before completing the support, the Gemara is perplexed by the wording of the beraita:

But does it say “

goes out” concerning the slave, which implies

which implies

that he has no choice but to go out

[that the slave is obligated to go out with his master]!?

And

this is not so, for thus

we learned

[Ketubot 110b]: “[A0266]]Everyone is taken up [a person may compel the other to go up with him] to the Land of Israel,

Everyone

may be brought up [a person may compel his household to go up with him] to Eretz Yisrael,

but no one may take everyone out

[from the Land of Israel to outside the Land of Israel]”; and “everyone” comes to include slaves.

Rather,

change the wording of the beraita as follows:

The slave went out after his master to Syria, and his master sold him there; if his master intended

when he went out from the Land of Israel

to return,

that is, he went out with this intention,

we compel him

to emancipate him.

But if his master did not intend to return,

if he did not intend to return when he went out,

we do not compel him.

Rav Anan said: I heard two things from Mar Shmuel,

two matters in which I heard Shmuel rule as law:

One:

with regard to

this,

the law of one who sells his slave outside the Land of Israel, [what should be done with the money, as he goes on to explain].

And the other:

with regard to this

that was stated: A. One who sells his ancestral field [a field inherited from his ancestors, which is held by his family from the time of the division of the Land of Israel in the days of Joshua], it returns at the Jubilee to its owners, as it is stated: “In this Jubilee year you shall return each man to his ancestral holding.”

B.

One who sells his field in the Jubilee year itself:

Rav said: It is sold

and

leaves immediately, and the purchaser has lost his money, for there was a sale.

the buyer’s possession immediately, and the buyer loses his money, since a sale did take place.

And Shmuel said: It is not sold at all.

And his reason is by means of kal va-chomer: Just as a field that is already sold leaves now, is it not logical that this one, which is not yet sold, should not be sold at all?

With regard to one

of these laws, I heard from Shmuel that

the sale money returns

[the purchase money returns to the purchaser].

And in one

of these laws I heard that

the sale money does not return [

the money of the sale does not return to the buyer].

And I do not know which of them [

which of them is the one concerning which he ruled thus, and concerning which of them he ruled thus].

Rav Yosef said: Let us examine

the matter:

From what is taught in a beraita: One who sells his slave to outside the Land, he goes free and requires a deed of manumission from his second master.

Infer from it: his second master acquired him

, for he gives a deed of manumission,

and

if so, in the sale of a slave to outside the Land,

the sale money does not return [

the money of the sale does not return], for the sale took effect.

And

it is necessarily that

when Shmuel said

his ruling that the sale money returns,

there

concerning a field he said it, to say that it

is not sold

at all,

and the money returns

, for Rav Anan heard that in one case the sale money returns, and in the other the sale money does not return; and since we have established that in a sale to outside the Land the sale money does not return, it is necessarily that in a sale during the year of the Jubilee the sale money returns, and the buyer did not lose his money.