Gittin 33b (לג:) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi holds: Once part of the testimony has been nullified

the entire testimony is not nullified,

rather, only the one whom he nullified from being a witness is himself disqualified. Therefore, he need not nullify him in the presence of the other witnesses, so that they will know of this witness’s nullification.

And

because even

if these others go

[if the remaining witnesses go], and

write and give

her a bill of divorce [and write and give her a bill of divorce]—

let them write and give it

[let them write and give it], and it makes no difference, since they were not disqualified from being witnesses or from being agents.

Therefore, it is sufficient to nullify him from being a witness in his presence. But when he is not in his presence, he cannot nullify him from being a witness, because, since he is also an agent for delivery, if he does not know of the nullification, there is concern that he will sign a bill of divorce together with his fellow, give it to the woman, and this too is included in the enactment of Rabban Gamliel.

And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds: Once part of the testimony has been nullified,

the entire testimony is nullified,

and even those witnesses whom he did not explicitly nullify are legally disqualified.

And

from this point onward, there is concern that

these

[the remaining witnesses] whom he did not nullify in their presence

do not know

of the nullification,

and go and write

a bill of divorce

and give

it to the woman [for they too are agents for delivery, since he said to them, “Give it to her”], and she will go and marry another man by virtue of it,

and

it will emerge

that they have permitted a married woman to everyone

[and they have permitted a married woman to everyone], for in truth she was not divorced, since the husband’s instruction regarding this bill of divorce was completely nullified.

Alternatively, if you wish,

you may explain the dispute between Rabbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel as follows:

They did not dispute this matter. Rather,

everyone

holds:

Once part of the testimony has been nullified, the entire testimony is not nullified!

Even according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, this does not involve the enactment of Rabban Gamliel, since those witnesses in whose presence he did not nullify it can write and give the bill of divorce, and there is no concern of mishap here.

Here, this is the reason for Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s position

when he says, “He cannot nullify it except in the presence of everyone”:

for he holds:

Every

matter performed in the presence of ten requires ten in order to remove it

[every matter performed in the presence of ten requires ten to undo and remove it]! Since the husband instructed each one to write in the presence of ten men, he can nullify it only in the presence of those ten and in the manner in which it was performed; as long as he has not done so, his nullification is ineffective.

They raised a dilemma:

If the husband said to the witnesses: “

All of you

write and sign a bill of divorce for my wife,” and afterward he went and nullified one of them in his presence and not in the presence of the others—

what

is the law in this case according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and does he dispute Rabbi in this case as well?

Is

the reason for Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel’s position

when he said to ten people without saying “all of you” that he cannot nullify one without the other present—

because he holds: Once part of the testimony has been nullified, the entire testimony is nullified,

and we are concerned that those whom he nullified in their absence may write and give her the bill of divorce?

If so,

these

[these ten],

since he said to them “

all of you

write and sign,” there is no reason for such concern, since

they cannot—

the remaining witnesses whom he did not nullify in their presence—

write and give

[write a bill of divorce and give it] before they have all signed, since he stipulated specifically that they all sign. And since the two whom he nullified in their presence know of the nullification, there is no concern that the others will prepare the bill of divorce without them.

Or perhaps: The reason for Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel’s position

is the second explanation presented above,

for he holds: “

Every matter performed in the presence of ten requires ten in order to remove it”—

and therefore, even

when he said to them: “

All of you

write and sign,”

also

his nullification is ineffective, according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

Come and hear

that even when he says “all of you,” Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that he cannot nullify one without the other present, as it was taught in a beraita:

If he said to two people: “

Give a bill of divorce to my wife”—

he can nullify one without the other present, the statement of Rabbi.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: He cannot nullify one except in the presence of the other!

And it was initially understood that the beraita is discussing one who said to two people, “Write and give a bill of divorce to my wife.” Therefore, the Gemara proves:

But

when he says to

two

people, “Write and give a bill of divorce,”

for when

he says, “

All of you

give,”

it is comparable!

For both of them are necessarily required to prepare the bill of divorce, since a bill of divorce must be signed by at least two witnesses. There is no concern that the second one may write and deliver the bill of divorce by himself, such that we would say: Since the first was nullified through the other’s nullification, the second will thereby permit a married woman to everyone.

And

nevertheless,

they dispute, Rabbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that he cannot nullify one without the other present. Necessarily, the reason for Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is: “Every matter performed in the presence of ten requires ten in order to remove it.” Here too, since he made them witnesses in one another’s presence, he must nullify them in one another’s presence.

Rabbi Ashi said:

There is no proof from here. Because if

it were

that

he were speaking

of

one who said to two

writing witnesses,

meaning that they were also writing witnesses in addition to being agents for delivery, and he said to them, “Write and give a bill of divorce to my wife,”

so too

there would be proof from here for your claim.

Rather,

what are we dealing with here? With

agents for delivery

alone, to whom he said, “Give this bill of divorce to my wife,” so that one does not need the other in order to carry out the agency.

The reason for Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s position is that we say: “Once part of the agency has been nullified, the entire agency is nullified” and it follows that by nullifying one, the other was also nullified. Since they do not need one another, there is concern that the agent who did not know that he had been disqualified will go and give the bill of divorce to the woman, with the result that she will marry unlawfully, since his agency was nullified when the first agent was nullified.

And we prove:

This too is indeed reasonable,

for the matter is speaking only of agents for delivery:

But

it

is taught

in the

conclusion

of this beraita: If he

said to this one individually

“Give a bill of divorce to my wife,”

and to that one individually

he said the same,

he can nullify

this one

without the other present!

Even according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

Granted, if you say

that the case speaks

only of agents for delivery, then

it is well

that he can appoint each one separately, since this is not testimony in which the two witnesses must see the event together, but merely agency.

It is also understandable why it is permitted to nullify the agency of one of them without the other present. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s reason, “Once part of the agency has been nullified, the entire agency is nullified,” does not apply here, since he did not appoint them in a single appointment. Rather, these are two separate agencies, and even if one of them is nullified, the other can still divorce her, and there is no concern whatsoever.

But if you say

that the case also speaks

of writing witnesses, and

that

can they join together—when he told each one separately to sign—to form a valid group of two witnesses?!

Their testimony concerns the fact that the husband instructed them to sign. If so, although there is testimony here from two people concerning the husband’s instruction, nevertheless they testify concerning two separate instructions, and their testimony cannot join—

for

the master said: The testimony of two witnesses does not

join together until both of them see

the act

the act

as one

, and if one witness says, “In my presence he admitted” that he owed a hundred dinars to so-and-so, and the second witness likewise says this, their testimony does not join, because the second does not testify concerning what the first testifies. Although there is testimony here from two people that so-and-so owes so-and-so a hundred dinars, their testimony does not combine.

And we reject this: It is still possible to explain that the beraita also concerns writing witnesses, because

perhaps the tanna of the beraita holds like Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha,

who says that two witnesses join together even if they saw two separate acts—for example, one says, “In my presence so-and-so admitted that he owed so-and-so a hundred dinars,” and the other says, “In my presence he admitted or lent to that same person a hundred dinars.”

If so, even if the husband instructed each of the signing witnesses separately,

it is well that they join together as a single testimony concerning the bill of divorce.

Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda said: I heard from Rabbi Abba

[I heard from Rabbi Abba] that he issued a halakhic ruling concerning these

two

disputes between Rabbi and Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel stated above [a. If he nullified them, is it nullified? b. Nullification of one without the other present].

In one

dispute Rabbi Abba ruled

like Rabbi, and

in the

other

dispute Rabbi Abba ruled

like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel; but I do not know

in

which

of them he ruled

like Rabbi, and

in

which

of them he ruled

like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel?

Rav Yosef said: Let us examine the matter

[let us consider the matter], where it is appropriate to rule like Rabbi and where like Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel;

for when Rav Dimi came, he said:

An incident occurred, and Rabbi acted in accordance with the words of the Sages,

who taught: “The appraisal of judges [judges who appraised the borrower’s property for the creditor without the borrower’s presence] that was reduced by one-sixth [of the property’s true value, thereby causing the borrower a loss], or increased by one-sixth [above its true value, thereby causing the creditor a loss]—[then] the sale [of the judges who sold the borrower’s property to the creditor] is void,” and they disagreed with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who would say: “The sale is valid; otherwise, what force would the court’s enactment have?”—

And an incident occurred in which they erred, and Rabbi nullified the sale in accordance with the opinion of the Sages.

He said before him

[before Rabbi]

Rabbi Perta,

who was

the son of Rabbi Eliezer ben Perta

the elder—that is, he was

the grandson of Rabbi Perta the elder:

If

you do

so

and annul the valuation,

what force does the court possess?!

For surely we must enhance the authority of the court, and not nullify what it has done.

And Rabbi reconsidered and acted in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,

who says, “Their sale is valid,” for this reason!

And since we find that Rabbi accepted the reasoning of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, “If so, what force does the court possess,” it is certainly the case that “if he nullified it, it is not nullified,” in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, because of the principle, “If so, what force does the court possess.”

And from

this

matter—in this dispute—Rabbi Abba ruled the halakha

in accordance with

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,

which necessarily means that Rabbi Abba ruled in

this

dispute [about “this nullification, not in the presence of the other”]

in accordance with Rabbi.

For Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda testified that in one dispute he ruled in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel, and in the other he ruled in accordance with Rabbi.

And Rabbi Yoshiyya of Usha as well held

in

one

of the aforementioned disputes

in accordance with Rabbi; and

in

one

of them he held

in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

As Rabba bar bar Ḥana said:

We were five elders before Rabbi Yoshiyya of Usha

[we were five elders before Rabbi Yoshiyya of Usha], when

a certain man came before him

before Rabbi Yoshiyya,

and he took it

Rabbi Yoshiyya

the get against his will

[a certain man came before Rabbi Yoshiyya, and Rabbi Yoshiyya compelled him to give his wife a get], because that man was among those whom the court compels to divorce and to pay the marriage settlement; and the husband instructed the witnesses to write and deliver a get to his wife.

And immediately

he said to them

Rabbi Yoshiyya said to the witnesses to the get:

Go and hide

[go and conceal yourselves]

and write it for her

for his wife, so that you will not be readily available for him to nullify you in your presence.

And from here one can derive his position regarding the two disputes in which they disagreed:

A. Rabbi Yoshiyya’s position was that “if he nullified it, it is not nullified,” in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. For

if it enters your mind

that Rabbi Yoshiyya of Usha held

in accordance with Rabbi,

that “if he nullified it, it is nullified,”

what would hiding accomplish

[what benefit would the witnesses’ hiding have brought]?! He would still be able to violate Rabban Gamliel’s ordinance and nullify it before a court, whether in their presence or not in their presence.

Rather, conclude from here: Rabbi Yoshiyya held in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel

that “if he nullified it, it is not nullified,”

he held

that this was Rabbi Yoshiyya’s position!

B. Rabbi Yoshiyya’s position was that “he need not nullify this one in the presence of the other,” in accordance with Rabbi.

And

because

if it enters your mind

that

in the other

dispute

as well

he held

in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel—and he cannot nullify this one without the other present—

if so,

why

did

he

Rabbi Yoshiyya say to the witnesses

to hide?

Would it not have been sufficient for them

to disperse in all directions

[to scatter], and not remain together in one place? Since he would not find them together, he would not be able to nullify them.

And it concludes:

Rather, conclude from here

that Rabbi Yoshiyya held in

one

dispute

in accordance with Rabbi!

He held that one can nullify this one without the other present. Therefore, it was not sufficient for them merely to disperse and not remain in one place, and that is why Rabbi Yoshiyya instructed them to hide: so that he would not find them at all and would be unable to nullify them.

And

in

one

dispute he held

in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel!

Whenever one nevertheless nullified it in the other’s absence, the nullification is invalid even post facto, as explained.

And Rava said

in the name of

Rav Naḥman: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi in both matters!

Thus, if he annulled it without the other’s presence, it is not annulled, but one may initially annul one without the presence of the other.

And we challenge this:

And

for

does Rav Naḥman not hold

according to the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel,

“What force does the court possess”?!

Does he not maintain that the authority of the court must be enhanced, and that a nullification carried out contrary to the ordinance of the Sages is ineffective?!