Gittin 33a (לג.) — the Talmud in English

What is the procedure for a prozbul? The lender writes in a document:

“I transfer to you”

“so-and-so and so-and-so, the judges, who are in such-and-such a place,”

that I may collect from so-and-so any debt that I have with him whenever I wish.” And the judges sign below, or the witnesses.

And since we learned: “So-and-so and so-and-so, the judges,” this indicates that even two are called judges. And if so, this should likewise be understood with regard to the annulment of a bill of divorce: The “court” mentioned in our Mishna means two.

And

Rav Sheshet

held: It is not so; rather, a prozbul is also executed before three judges. And from the fact that we learned only “so-and-so and so-and-so,” there is still no proof that there are two and no more.

And is it because

the tanna is like a spice merchant

who announces his merchandise,

that he

must

enumerate and continue

and specify that there were three, and write: “So-and-so and so-and-so and so-and-so”?

And in response to this rejection,

Rav Naḥman said

to prove it from elsewhere:

From where do I say this?

That two judges suffice for a prozbul?

As we learned: The judges sign

on the prozbul

below,

at the bottom of the document, and attest that so-and-so transferred it before them,

or the witnesses

sign there and attest that the lender transferred his documents to the court.

And Rav Naḥman concludes his proof:

Is it not

that, since the tanna included them together, this indicates that

“judges”

are analogous

to

“witnesses”?

We have learned:

Just as

“witnesses”

that we learned are

two

witnesses, as with all testimony in the Torah,

so too

“judges”

mentioned in our Mishna

also

suffice as

two!

Thus, two suffice for a prozbul.

And

Rav Sheshet rejected this:

Is there necessarily a connection

[Is it indeed compelled] that the number of judges be equal to the number of witnesses? It may be said:

This—

“witnesses”—

is as it is

with all testimony in the Torah, namely, two.

And this—

“judges”—

is as it is

with every court in general, namely, three.

And here the Gemara returns to the Mishna in tractate Shevi'it, and raises the following question:

That which we learned: “The judges sign below, or the witnesses,”

why do I need it to state

also

judges, and why do I need it to state

also

witnesses?

Is it not obvious that either these or those suffice? Let it state “witnesses” alone, and we will know automatically that it is certainly valid even with the signature of the judges.

And we answer:

This teaches us

the following point: If the wording of the prozbul is written in a manner indicating that it was composed in their capacity as judges—for example, “We were the court, and so-and-so came and said, ‘I transfer it to you, the judges’”—one might have said that in such a case the judges must sign it in their capacity as judges, and not in their capacity as witnesses.

Likewise, if the wording of the prozbul is written in a manner indicating that it was composed in their capacity as witnesses—for example, “Record of the testimony that was before us [the record of the testimony that was before us], that so-and-so transferred his documents to the court”—one might have said that they must then sign it in their capacity as witnesses, and not in their capacity as judges.

It therefore teaches us

that it makes no difference

whether

it is written in the language of judges and they sign

it in the language of

witnesses,

for example, “I, so-and-so, witness,”

and it makes no difference

whether

it is written in the language of witnesses, and

they sign it below in the language of

judges,

for example, “I, so-and-so, judge”; the prozbul is valid.

We learned in the Mishna: Initially, he would establish a court in another place and annul the bill of divorce before it. Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that they should not do so

for the betterment of the world.

The Gemara explains:

What

“for the betterment of the world”

means: What was the reason for which Rabban Gamliel instituted that they should annul the bill of divorce only in the presence of the agent or the woman?

Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

Rabban Gamliel instituted this

for the protection of mamzerim,

that is, so that there would not be mamzerim among the Jewish people.

For if he annulled the bill of divorce without the knowledge of the agent or the woman, they would not know of the annulment, and the agent would give her the bill of divorce. She would thereby become divorced and marry another man. Consequently, the sons born to her from the second husband would be mamzerim, since the bill of divorce was annulled and she remains the married woman of the first husband.

And

Reish Lakish said:

The reason for the institution is

for the protection of agunot!

For if the husband were able to annul the bill of divorce where he was, without having to trouble himself to go to the place of the agent or the woman, he would be more inclined to annul it readily, and as a result agunot would become numerous among the Jewish people.

And once the Sages instituted that he may not annul it where he is, but required him to go to the agent or the woman, he would no longer trouble himself to annul the bill of divorce and leave his wife an aguna.

And we explain:

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: For the protection of mamzerim,

because

he agrees

Rabbi Yoḥanan

with Rav Naḥman, who said:

Before Rabban Gamliel’s institution, he would annul the bill of divorce

in the presence of two!

And

indeed,

two do not have publicity

[an act performed in the presence of two does not become publicly known], since news of the annulment is not publicized by only two people,

and

if so,

she did not hear

of the annulment

and did not know

that she still remained a married woman,

and she went and married

[married another man] with this bill of divorce and bore him sons,

and there are mamzerim.

And Reish Lakish said:

“For the protection of agunot,”

because

he agrees

Reish Lakish

with Rav Sheshet, who said:

Even before Rabban Gamliel’s institution, he would annul the bill of divorce only

“in the presence of three.”

And

indeed,

three do have publicity

[there is publicity for an act performed in the presence of three],

and she heard

of the annulment

and knew

that she was a married woman,

and she would not marry.

And

for this reason there is no concern about mamzerut; rather, there is only

a concern for the protection of agunot

to be considered.

The Sages taught:

If the husband violated Rabban Gamliel’s institution and

annulled

the bill of divorce without the knowledge of the agent, but in the presence of a court — it is

annulled!

Although he violated Rabban Gamliel’s institution, after the fact the agency has been annulled, and he cannot effect the divorce. This is the statement of Rabbi.

Rabbi.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: He cannot—

a.

annul it

completely without the knowledge of the agent. Even after the fact, the bill of divorce is not annulled. And if the agent gave it to the woman, she is divorced.

b.

And

likewise, he

may not

the husband

add to his condition!

That is, if there was a condition in the bill of divorce and he wishes to alter something in it, he may not do so except in the presence of the agent or the woman.

For if so,

a person can nullify Rabban Gamliel’s institution and annul the bill of divorce without the presence of a court,

what validity does the court

of Rabban Gamliel

have?!

And we ask:

Is there indeed a case in which, according to Torah law, the bill of divorce is annulled

[Is it possible that there should be a situation in which a man gives a bill of divorce that is not a bill of divorce according to Torah law],

and because of

the reasoning of

“what validity does the court have,”

we permit a married woman to everyone

[we permit a married woman to everyone]? For by annulling the annulment, the Sages have validated the bill of divorce and permitted a Torah prohibition involving a married woman. And we answer:

No,

indeed the Sages have the authority to do so, because

whoever betroths

a woman

does so on the understanding of the Sages;

he

betroths

her

and the Sages have annulled the betrothal

first

from him.

That is: At the time a person betroths a woman, his intention is that the betrothal should take effect in accordance with the law established by the Sages of Israel,

and they said that the betrothal would be annulled through this bill of divorce despite the fact that he annulled it. Therefore, the betrothal is annulled, since he betrothed her on this condition.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi:

That works

as a resolution, where

he betrothed

her—the husband—

with money

[money betrothal]! In that case, there is room to say that through this bill of divorce the Sages annulled the original betrothal, because they removed from the money the status of “betrothal money” and made it “a monetary gift,” and consequently the betrothal was annulled.

But where he

betrothed her through intercourse, what

annulment

can be said to exist

through this act of intercourse? And we answer:

The Sages rendered his intercourse intercourse of licentiousness,

the Sages made his intercourse—through the bill of divorce that he gives her—intercourse of licentiousness, and removed from the intercourse the status of “intercourse for betrothal.” Consequently, the betrothal is annulled even according to Torah law, for if the Sages wished the betrothal to be annulled, he too did not betroth her on that condition.

The Sages taught:

A. If a husband said to ten people, “Write a bill of divorce for my wife,” it is not necessary for all of them to be witnesses to the matter. Rather, one [whoever he may be] writes, and two [whoever they may be] sign. But if he said to them, “All of you write,” then one of them writes and all of them sign. “Therefore, if one of them dies, this bill of divorce is void,” as all this is explained in the Mishna below, 66b.

B. If he said to ten people simultaneously: “

Write

and give

a bill of divorce to my wife”

[and he did not say, “All of you”], then he

can cancel

it

even not in the presence of one another.

That is, even not in the presence of his fellow agents,

the statement of Rabbi.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: He can cancel it only in the presence of one another;

and the Gemara proceeds to explain this.

The Gemara asks:

In what do they differ,

Rabbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel? And what is the reasoning of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who holds that he must revoke the authorization in the presence of one another? If it is because of Rabban Gamliel’s ordinance, it should suffice that he revoked it in the presence of that one; why must he revoke it in the presence of his colleagues as well? And we explain: Their dispute is indeed due to Rabban Gamliel’s ordinance, but it is with regard to the principle:

When part of testimony is invalidated, all of it is invalidated

that they

differ!

That is: If the husband instructed several witnesses to sign the bill of divorce, and afterward revoked the authorization with regard to some of them, is his authorization thereby revoked even with regard to those whose authorization he did not revoke, so that the testimony of all of them is invalidated?

Or perhaps: Only those whose authorization was revoked are disqualified from serving as witnesses, but the remaining witnesses are not invalidated; they can still write the bill of divorce and give it.