Gittin 33a — the Talmud in English

What is the procedure of the prozbol? The lender writes in the document:

“I hereby transmit to you” ![](pamud.bmp "

exact column location")

“so-and-so and so-and-so, the judges, who are in such-and-such a place,

that every debt that I have with so-and-so, I shall collect it whenever I wish.” And the judges sign below, or the witnesses.

And from what we learned: “so-and-so and so-and-so, the judges,” it follows that even two are called judges. And if so, this too should be interpreted in this way with regard to the annulment of the get: the “court” mentioned in our Mishna means two.

And

Rav Sheshet

held: It is not so; rather, even a prozbol is made before three judges. And from what we learned: “so-and-so and so-and-so” alone, there is still no proof that they are two and no more.

And because

is the tanna like a spice merchant

[who sells bundles of spices] announcing his merchandise,

that

he must

count and go on

and specify that there are three, and write: “so-and-so and so-and-so and so-and-so”?!

And because of this rejection

Rav Naḥman said

to prove it from another place:

From where do I say this

that two judges suffice for a prozbol?

For we learned: The judges sign

on the prozbol

below,

at the bottom of the document, and confirm that so-and-so transmitted it before them,

or the witnesses

sign there and confirm that the lender transmitted it to the court.

And Rav Naḥman concludes his proof:

Is it not

that since the tanna included them together, it follows that

“judges”

are analogous

to

“witnesses”?

We have thus learned:

Just as

“witnesses”

that we learned are

two

witnesses, as with all testimonies in the Torah,

so too

“judges”

that we learn in the Mishna

also

suffice as

two!

It follows that two suffice for a prozbol.

And

Rav Sheshet rejects this:

Is there necessarily a correspondence

[and is it obligatory] that the number of judges be equal to the number of witnesses?! For one can say:

This—

“witnesses”—

as found

in all the testimonies in the Torah, namely, two.

And this—

“judges”—

as found

in every ordinary court, namely, three.

And here the Gemara returns to the Mishna in tractate Sheviit, and we raised the following question:

That which we learned: “The judges sign below, or the witnesses,”

why is it necessary to teach

also

judges, and why is it necessary to teach

also

witnesses?!

Is it not obvious that either these or those suffice? Let it teach “witnesses” alone, and we would know automatically that it is certainly valid even with the signature of the judges.

And we answer:

This teaches us

the Mishna: If the wording of the prozbol is written in a manner implying that it was written in their capacity as judges—for example, “We were the court, and so-and-so came and said, ‘I hereby transmit to you, judges’”—we might have said that in such a case the judges must sign it in their capacity as judges, and not in their capacity as witnesses.

And likewise, if the wording of the prozbol is written in a manner implying that it was written in their capacity as witnesses—for example, “Record of the testimony that was before us [the record of the testimony that was before us], that so-and-so transmitted his documents to the court”—we might have said that then they must sign it in their capacity as witnesses, and not in their capacity as judges.

It teaches us:

it makes no difference

whether

it is written in the language of judges and they sign

it in the language of

witnesses,

such as, “I, so-and-so, witness,”

and it makes no difference

whether

it is written in the language of witnesses, and

they sign below in the language of

judges,

such as, “I, so-and-so, judge”—the prozbol is valid.

We learned in the Mishna: “At first, he would establish a court in another place and annul it. Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that they should not do so”

for the betterment of the world:

The Gemara explains:

What

“for the betterment of the world,”

on account of which Rabban Gamliel instituted that they should annul the get only in the presence of the agent or the woman?

Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

Rabban Gamliel instituted this

for the betterment of mamzerim,

that is, so that there would not be mamzerim among Israel!

For if he annuls the get not in the presence of the agent or the woman, they will not know of the annulment, and the agent will deliver the get to her, and she will be divorced through it and marry another. And it will be found that the sons born to her from the second husband are mamzerim, for the get was annulled, and she is the wife of the first man.

And

Reish Lakish said:

The reason for the institution is

for the betterment of deserted wives!

For if the husband could annul the get where he is, and would not need to trouble himself to go as far as the place of the agent or the woman, he would be more inclined to annul it easily, and through this deserted wives would increase in Israel.

And because the Sages instituted that he should not annul it where he is, but rather troubled him to go as far as the agent or the woman, he will no longer trouble himself to annul the get and cause his wife to remain deserted.

And we explain:

Rabbi Yoḥanan said, “For the betterment of mamzerim,”

because

he follows

Rabbi Yoḥanan

Rav Naḥman, who said:

Before Rabban Gamliel’s institution, he would annul the get

in the presence of two!

And

behold,

two have no public voice

[something done in the presence of two has no public voice], for the news of the annulment is not publicized through two alone,

and

if so,

she did not hear

of the annulment

and did not know

that she was still a married woman,

and she goes and marries

[marries another man] with this get and bears him sons,

and there are mamzerim.

And Reish Lakish said: “

For the betterment of deserted wives,”

because

he follows

Reish Lakish

Rav Sheshet, who said:

Even before Rabban Gamliel’s institution, he would annul the get only

in the presence of three.

And

behold,

three have a public voice

[there is a public voice for what is done in the presence of three],

and she heard

of the annulment

and knew

that she was a married woman,

and she does not marry.

And

because of this there is no concern for mamzerut, but only

for the betterment of deserted wives is there

a need for concern.

The Sages taught:

If the husband transgressed Rabban Gamliel’s institution and

annulled

the get not in the presence of the agent, but in the presence of a court — it is

annulled!

And although he transgressed Rabban Gamliel’s institution, after the fact the agency is annulled, and he cannot divorce—

the words of Rabbi.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: He cannot—

a.

annul it

completely when not in the presence of the agent! And even after the fact the get is not annulled. And if the agent delivered it to the woman, she is divorced.

b.

And

likewise he

cannot

the husband

add to his condition!

That is, if there was a condition in the get and he wishes to change something in it, he cannot do so except in the presence of the agent or the woman.

For if so,

a person can nullify Rabban Gamliel’s institution and annul the get not in the presence of a court,

what power does the court

of Rabban Gamliel

have?!

And we ask:

Is there such a thing, that according to Torah law the get is annulled

[and is it possible that there should be such a reality, that a man gives a get which according to Torah law is not a get],

and because of

the reasoning of

“what power does the court have,”

we permit a married woman to everyone

[we permit a married woman to everyone]?! For by the Sages’ nullifying the annulment, they validate the get and permit the Torah prohibition of a married woman. And we answer:

No,

indeed the Sages have the power to do so, because

whoever betroths

a woman

does so on the understanding of the Sages;

he

betroths

her,

and the Sages expropriate the betrothals

that were first

from him.

That is: At the time a person betroths, his intention is that the betrothal should take effect according to the law established by the Sages of Israel, and they said that the betrothal would be removed through this get despite its having been annulled; therefore the betrothal is removed, for he betrothed her on this condition. Ravina said to Rav Ashi:

and they said that the betrothal would be annulled through this bill of divorce despite his having nullified it. Therefore the betrothal is annulled, since he betrothed her on that condition.

That works

this answer, where

the husband

betrothed

her

with money

[monetary betrothal]! For in this case there is room to say that through this get the Sages expropriated the initial betrothal, because they removed from the money the status of “betrothal money” and made it “gift money,” and consequently the betrothal was removed.

But where he

betrothed through intercourse, what

expropriation

can be said to exist

through this intercourse?! And we answer:

The Sages made his intercourse the intercourse of licentiousness,

the Sages made his intercourse—through the get that he gives her—intercourse of licentiousness, and removed from the intercourse the status of “betrothal intercourse”! And through this the betrothal is removed even according to Torah law, for if the Sages wished the betrothal to be nullified, he too did not betroth her on this condition.

Our Rabbis taught:

A. A husband who said to ten people, “Write a get for my wife,” need not have all of them be witnesses to the matter; rather, one [whichever it may be] writes, and two [whichever they may be] sign. And if he said to them, “All of you write,” then one of them writes and all of them sign, and “therefore, if one of them dies, this is an invalid get,” as all this is explained in the Mishna below, 66b.

B. If he said to ten people at one time: “

Write

and give”

a get to my wife”

[and he did not say, “All of you”], this

he can cancel

it

even not in the presence of one another.

That is, even not in the presence of his colleagues,

the words of Rabbi.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: He cannot cancel except this one in the presence of that one;

and the Gemara explains it and proceeds.

The Gemara asks:

Over what do they disagree

Rabbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel? And what is the reason of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who holds that he must cancel this one in the presence of that one? For if it is because of the enactment of Rabban Gamliel, then it is enough that he cancelled him in his presence; why does he need to cancel him in the presence of his colleagues? And we explain: The reason for their disagreement is because of the enactment of Rabban Gamliel, and over the principle: “

Testimony of which part was invalidated was entirely invalidated”

it is that they

disagree!

That is: If the husband commanded several witnesses to sign the get, and afterward cancelled the command for some of them, does his command become void even for those whom he did not cancel, and is the testimony of all of them invalidated?

Or perhaps: Specifically those who were cancelled become disqualified from serving as witnesses, but the remaining witnesses are not invalidated, and they can still write the get and give it.