Gittin 32b — the Talmud in English

has two meanings:

a.

It indicates that it was canceled

from the outset.

b.

And it indicates that it should be canceled

from now onward. And therefore:

With regard to a bill of divorce—

when he says, “This bill of divorce is canceled,” \-

we assume that

he is using the expression that is effective concerning it

in the case of a bill of divorce,

he is saying

[meaning, he intends the expression that is effective concerning a bill of divorce], namely, that the bill of divorce should be canceled from now onward, since specifically this meaning is effective concerning a bill of divorce.

Whereas

with regard to a gift—

when he says, “This gift is canceled”—we assume that

he is using the expression that is effective concerning it

in the case of a gift,

he is saying!

That is, the gift had been canceled from its beginning, and even before he received it he did not wish to acquire it, since he cannot cancel the gift from now onward.

The following discussion is explained in accordance with the method of Tosafot.

Abaye said: We have received the tradition

[a tradition from our fathers, a practice from our teachers]:

An agent for a gift is like an agent for a bill of divorce!

And we explain:

The practical difference

in what we say—that an agent for a gift is like an agent for a bill of divorce—

with regard to

“deliver”

is not like

“acquire”

it is considered!

That is, if he said, “Deliver this bill of divorce to my wife,” or if he said, “Deliver this gift to so-and-so,” he can retract until the bill of divorce and the gift reach the hands of the woman and the recipient.

For just as, if the husband gave a bill of divorce to an agent of delivery and said to him, “Deliver this bill of divorce to my wife,” the husband can cancel it as long as the bill of divorce has not reached the woman’s hand, since she has not yet acquired it—for even if we interpret the husband’s intention as saying, “Acquire this bill of divorce for my wife,” the agent cannot acquire it for her, since the divorce is a disadvantage for her, and “one cannot cause a disadvantage to a person in his absence”—

so too is the law concerning a gift: if the sender placed a gift in the agent’s hand and said to him, “Deliver this gift to so-and-so,” the giver can retract as long as the gift has not reached the recipient’s hand, since he has not yet acquired it, until it comes into his hand.

And although, in the case of a gift, if the sender says to the agent, “Acquire this gift for so-and-so,” the agent acquires the gift for the recipient immediately when it comes into his hand—for a gift is a benefit for the recipient, and we hold that “one may acquire a benefit for a person in his absence”—

nevertheless, when the sender says to him, “Deliver this gift to so-and-so,” the sender does not intend to acquire the gift for him immediately; rather, his wish is that the recipient acquire the gift only when it reaches his hand. And this is because the meaning of “deliver it to him” is not like saying, “Acquire it for him.”

Ravina found Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak, who

was

leaning and standing in the doorway

[Ravina found Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak, who was leaning and standing on the threshold of the door],

and he was asking

and Ravina was uncertain:

If the husband said to the agent, “This bill of divorce is

canceled,”

and did not add and say, “It

is”—

what is the law? Does the expression “canceled” alone indicate that it should be canceled from now onward, and is it effective?

Or perhaps, since he did not say, “It is canceled,” its meaning is only that the bill of divorce was canceled from the outset, and his words have no effect.

And we conclude:

Let it stand unresolved!

Rav Sheshet said, and some say

that already

it was taught in a baraita,

they taught so in a beraita:

If the husband said to the agent or to the woman,

“This bill of divorce will not be effective,”

or he said,

“It will not release,”

or he said,

“It will not send away”

[that is, it will not remove the woman from her husband], or he said,

“It will not send,”

“and it will not

[or: it will not]

divorce,”

or he said,

“Let it be pottery”

[it will have no power to divorce, like mere pottery], or he said,

“Let it be like pottery”:

Behold,

his words stand!

And all these expressions are effective to cancel the bill of divorce, since their meaning is cancellation from now onward.

But if he said, “This bill of divorce

is not effective,”

or

“does not release,”

or

“does not send away,”

or

“does not send,”

or

“does not divorce,”

or he said,

“It is pottery,”

or

“It is like pottery”—

he has said nothing!

For he is not canceling it; rather, he is saying concerning it that it has been invalid from before, whereas our eyes see that it has no invalidity whatsoever.

They raised a question before them:

If the husband said:

“Behold, it is pottery”—

what is the law?

Does this expression indicate cancellation from now onward and is it effective, or does it indicate the past and is not effective?

He said,

he raised an objection,

to Rav Aḥa son of Rava, and some say,

that

Rav Aḥa son of Rava said to Rav Ashi:

What is the uncertainty in this matter? For

what difference is there

between one who says, “Behold, it is pottery,”

and

one who says, “This matter,

behold, it is consecrated,” or one who says, “This matter,

behold, it is ownerless”?!

is hereby ownerless”?

For in several mishnayot in tractate Nedarim it is explicit that this expression is effective for consecrating and declaring ownerless. Necessarily, it refers to the future, since otherwise it would not become consecrated or ownerless through this. And if so, concerning a bill of divorce as well, this expression should be considered cancellation from now onward.

Here the Gemara returns to the fundamental law of cancellation explained in the Mishna and in the beraitot mentioned in the Gemara, and it discusses a husband who canceled the bill of divorce with one of the expressions effective for cancellation, and afterward changed his mind and again wishes to divorce with it: whether

he may again divorce with it

with this bill of divorce, because only the agency was canceled, while the bill of divorce itself remains valid.

Or

that he

may not again divorce with it,

because the bill of divorce itself has already been canceled.

Rav Naḥman said: He may again divorce with it

with this bill of divorce, because only the appointment of the agency was canceled, but the bill of divorce itself was never canceled. And if he again commands the agent to divorce with it, the woman is divorced with that same bill of divorce.

And Rav Sheshet said: He may not again divorce with it

with that bill of divorce! For not only was the agency canceled, but the bill of divorce itself was also canceled, and it is like mere pottery; and if he wishes to divorce her, he must write her another bill of divorce.

And

we conclude:

The halakha is in accordance with Rav Naḥman!

And he may again divorce with that very same bill of divorce.

And we object:

Is that so?

Is this not so?!

For Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish disagreed concerning one who said to a woman, “Become betrothed to me with this money, and the betrothal will take effect after thirty days,” and within the thirty days the woman retracted from the betrothal.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: She may retract! For the betrothal was canceled before the time arrived for it to take effect.

And Reish Lakish said: She may not retract! Because the act of acquisition of the betrothal has already been performed, and speech cannot come and cancel speech.

And we hold

in that dispute:

The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said: She may retract!

And if so, it is difficult: here too, the husband’s retraction should be effective to cancel the bill of divorce itself, just as the woman’s retraction is effective to cancel the act of betrothal itself. How, then, was the halakha decided here—that the husband may again divorce with this bill of divorce?!

And we answer:

Is it comparable?!

What is the comparison?! Surely the cancellation of a bill of divorce is not at all comparable to the woman’s retraction from betrothal!

For

there, it is speech and speech!

Since the betrothal does not take effect until after thirty days, the act of betrothal during this period is considered mere speech.

Therefore,

speech

of the woman, when she retracts from the betrothal,

comes and cancels

the

speech

of the first betrothal.

But

here, in the cancellation of a bill of divorce,

with regard to the cancellation of the bill of divorce,

even though he canceled the agency of the agent

[even though the husband canceled the agent’s agency], and his cancellation is effective because “speech comes and cancels speech”—but

can the bill of divorce itself be canceled

[the bill of divorce itself—can it possibly be canceled]?! For we have found only that speech is canceled; but the body of the bill of divorce, which is present and is not mere speech, certainly is not canceled and invalidated, since speech cannot come and cancel an act. We learned in the Mishna:

At first he would make

a court in another place and cancel it before them.

It was stated: Before how many

people

does he

[the husband]

cancel it

without the ordinance of Rabban Gamliel?

Rav Naḥman said: Before two

people! For this is not like monetary law, which requires a court of three judges; rather, it is merely the husband’s declaration, and therefore two are sufficient.

And Rav Sheshet said: Before three!

And the Gemara explains:

Rav Sheshet said "

he annuls it

before three,"

because this is proven from the words of the Mishna, for it says, "At first he would make

a court."

It teaches

in our Mishna, and "court" means three people.

And Rav Nahman said "

he annuls it

before two,"

for he holds that this is no proof, since

even for two, "

a court"

they call them,

[for we also find that two are called "a court"], as he explains and proceeds.

Rav Nahman said: From where do I say this,

that even two are called "a court"?

Since we learned [in tractate Sheviit, and it is brought below, on 36a] concerning the enactment of the Prozbul: if the lender wishes that the Sabbatical year should not release his debts, he hands over his debt to the court, and through this he withdraws from claiming the debt; and the court are the ones who descend to the borrower's property and collect the debt. And from now on, we no longer apply to it, "he shall not exact."

in tractate Shevi'it, and it is cited below, on page 36a, concerning the ordinance of the prozbul: If a lender wishes to prevent the Sabbatical Year from canceling his debts, he hands over his debt to a court. In this way, he withdraws from personally claiming the debt, and the court is the one that takes the borrower’s property and collects the debt. From that point onward, the verse “he shall not press him for payment” no longer applies to him.