Gittin 34a (לד.) — the Talmud in English

But did Rav Naḥman say in the name of Shmuel:

orphans

who are minors

who came to divide

an inheritance

from their father's property

after he died:

Then

the court appoints guardians for them

a separate guardian for each one of them,

and they select for them

the guardians—the guardian for each orphan over whom he is appointed—

a choice portion!

For each one will strive for the benefit of the orphan over whom he was appointed, and in this way the division will be equitable.

And if, after

they have come of age,

the orphans are dissatisfied with the portion that the guardians selected for them,

they can

themselves

protest

and annul the division and divide the inheritance anew.

But Rav Naḥman himself

[not in Shmuel's name]

said:

Even after

they have come of age, they cannot protest,

and annul the division made by the guardians.

For if so—

if the orphans can protest—

what is the force of the court's authority?!

For the guardians were appointed by authority of the court. Therefore, their authority is effective, and their division remains valid, even if the orphans ultimately do not approve of it.

This clearly indicates that Rav Naḥman holds that the authority of the court is effective, and it is impossible to annul what it did. If so, it is difficult: How could Rav Naḥman hold in accordance with Rabbi, that when one annuls a bill of divorce not in the presence of its agent, it is annulled?!

And we answer: This is not difficult.

There,

in the case of orphans, the matter is one of

monetary law

and with regard to property, certainly the authority of the court is effective, and it is impossible to annul its action. For we have established the principle: The ownerless property declared by the court is ownerless, as the Torah granted the Sages authority to render one person's property ownerless and give it to another.

But

here—

with regard to annulment—the matter is one of

prohibition

For according to Torah law, it is annulled, and the woman is forbidden to everyone else by the prohibition applicable to a married woman; and the Sages did not invalidate her betrothal in order to enhance the force of their enactment.

The Gemara relates an incident involving

Giddel bar Re'ilai

[a man's name]

who sent a bill of divorce to his wife

[he sent a bill of divorce to his wife] through an agent, and

the agent went and

he

found

the woman

who was sitting and weaving

[the agent went and found the woman sitting and weaving].

He said to her

the agent said to the woman: “

Here is your bill of divorce!”

He showed her the bill of divorce, but had not yet handed it to her.

She said to him

the woman said to the agent:

Go now for the time being, and come

[and come]

tomorrow

[go now, then, and come tomorrow], and then you will give me the bill of divorce!

The agent went

the agent left and returned

to him

Giddel, her husband,

and said to him:

This is what happened.

Giddel was happy that he had not given her the bill of divorce, and

began

Giddel

and said: “Blessed is He who is good and bestows good!”

Abaye and Rava disagreed concerning this law:

Abaye said:

The blessing

“Blessed is He who is good and bestows good”

is indeed appropriate here;

but

nevertheless, although he revealed his intention that he does not desire the agency for the divorce,

the bill of divorce is not annulled

by this revelation of intent, and the agent may give it to the woman.

And Rava said:

The blessing

“Blessed is He who is good and bestows good”

is appropriate here,

but

also

the bill of divorce is annulled,

since he revealed his intention that he does not desire the agency for the divorce, and the agent may no longer divorce her with it.

And we explain:

With regard to what do

Abaye and Rava

disagree

[a revelation of intent, without an explicit verbal annulment]

do they disagree,

whether it is effective?

For Abaye holds: A revelation of intent with regard to a bill of divorce is not significant

[it has no effect]. Therefore, the agency is annulled only through an explicit verbal annulment, and it is insufficient that he reveal his intention that he does not desire it.

And Rava holds: A revelation of intent with regard to a bill of divorce is significant!

Therefore, when the husband reveals his intention that he does not desire the agency, the agency is annulled.

Rava said: From where do I derive this

[from where did I say this, that a revelation of intent is sufficient with regard to a bill of divorce? I learned it from Rav Sheshet]:

For Rav Sheshet took a bill of divorce from a certain man

[he compelled a man to divorce] against his will—

and

before the bill of divorce was delivered to the woman,

the husband said to

the witnesses

who

had signed the bill of divorce: “I heard that

this is what Rav Sheshet said to you: Let the bill of divorce be annulled”

[let the bill of divorce be annulled]! By lying to the witnesses and saying in Rav Sheshet's name that the bill of divorce was annulled, he revealed his intention that he wanted the bill of divorce annulled.

And

because of this revelation of intent,

Rav Sheshet required

the husband to write

another bill of divorce

[a new bill of divorce]; this proves: “A revelation of intent with regard to a bill of divorce is significant.”

And Abaye—

who holds that a revelation of intent with regard to a bill of divorce is not significant—would say to you:

It is impossible to interpret the husband's intention literally. For,

is it so that Rav Sheshet annuls the bills of divorce of other people

as well

?!

Surely only the husband can annul his bill of divorce.

Rather, certainly

he

himself

annulled it

with these words,

and the reason that he said this to them

—that the bill of divorce was annulled—in Rav Sheshet's name

was because of the people beating him

[men who were striking him], since Rav Sheshet's agents were beating him and compelling him to divorce, and he was afraid to annul the bill of divorce himself; therefore, he attributed his words to Rav Sheshet.

And since there was here an explicit annulment of the bill of divorce, Rav Sheshet required him to obtain another bill of divorce. But as for “a revelation of intent with regard to a bill of divorce,” one may say that it is not significant.

And Abaye said: From where do I derive this

that a revelation of intent with regard to a bill of divorce is ineffective? I learned it from an incident involving Rav Yehuda.

For Rav Yehuda took a bill of divorce

[he compelled him to divorce]

from the son-in-law of Rav Yirmeya Bir'a

[the son-in-law of the amora Rav Yirmeya Bir'a], and compelled him to say to the witnesses: “Write and give a bill of divorce to my wife.”

And

after the bill of divorce had been written,

he annulled it

the husband.

And again

the tanna

Rav Yehuda

took it from him

[he again compelled him] to instruct them to write another bill of divorce,

and

again

he annulled it

the husband.

He again taught and took it from him

[Rav Yehuda again returned and compelled him]

against his will

a third time;

and he said to them

Rav Yehuda said to the witnesses:

Put pieces of squash in your ears

[place thin pieces of squash in your ears], so that if he again wishes to annul it, you will not hear his words;

and write it for him

a bill of divorce and give it to his wife.

And Abaye concluded his proof:

And if it could enter your mind: “

A revelation of intent with regard to a bill of divorce is significant,”

then even if they do not hear the husband's words, the bill of divorce is nevertheless annulled. For

they saw him

the witnesses saw the husband

running after them

[he was running after them], and he thereby reveals his intention that he wants to annul the bill of divorce. Necessarily, a revelation of intent with regard to a bill of divorce has no effect.

And Rava—

who holds that a revelation of intent with regard to a bill of divorce is significant—would say to you:

There is no proof from there, because his running after the witnesses does not yet constitute a revelation of intent to annul it. They did not hear his words, and they can interpret it as meaning that

the reason he is running after them

[that is why he is running after them] is

that he said to them: “Hurry, give it to her quickly, so that the suffering of that man will come to an end!”

[“Be strong and give her the bill of divorce quickly, so that the suffering of the divorce will pass from me quickly.”]

And Abaye said

further:

From where do I derive this

that “a revelation of intent with regard to a bill of divorce is not significant”? I learned it from Shmuel's statement.

That certain

man

who

gave a bill of divorce to his wife, and

said to them

to the witnesses at the time he delivered the bill of divorce: “

If I do not come

by the end of

thirty days, let it be a bill of divorce!”

That is, he made the effectiveness of the divorce conditional on his not returning to this city by the end of the thirtieth day from the day he left; if he returned within this period, the divorce would be annulled.

He left from there, and

came

[he came to his city] toward the end of the stated period. He reached the vicinity of the city, but could not enter it, because

the ferry passage was cut off

[the water crossing separated him; the ferry was on the other side of the river, and he could not cross].

He said to them

from his place on the far side of the river, to the people of the city:

See that I have come, see that I have come

[see that I have come, see that I have come]! By this he intended to say: Since I have come, the divorce does not take effect, for the condition was that it would take effect only “if I did not come”; I have come, and the condition was not fulfilled.

And Shmuel said: This is not considered coming

[this is not considered arrival in the city]. That is, although he did not enter the city because of circumstances beyond his control, this is not considered as though he came; therefore, the condition he stated—“if I do not come”—was fulfilled, and the divorce took effect at the end of the thirtieth day.

From here Abaye learned that “a revelation of intent with regard to a bill of divorce is not significant”:

For since he said, “If I do not come, let it be a bill of divorce,” and did not add “from now,” the divorce takes effect only from the time the condition is fulfilled, and until then he can still annul it.

And if Shmuel held that “a revelation of intent with regard to a bill of divorce is significant,” he should have said: Since, before the divorce took effect, the husband said, “See that I have come, see that I have come,” he revealed his intention that he did not desire the divorce, and the divorce should have been annulled. Necessarily, Shmuel holds: “A revelation of intent with regard to a bill of divorce is not significant.” And Rava

would say to you: There is no proof from there, since there was no revelation of intent to annul the divorce. For

is it so there

—in his statement, “See that I have come”—

and was he trying

to annul the bill of divorce?!

That is, was his intention to invalidate the divorce by annulling it?

But

there, he was seeking to fulfill his condition,

that is, he wanted the divorce annulled by virtue of the condition he had stipulated initially. Since he had come as far as the river, he believed that the condition had not been fulfilled and that the divorce had automatically been annulled.

But

in truth, this was not so, for

his condition had not been fulfilled

[that is, the event that would annul the divorce—his arrival—had not occurred].

There was an incident involving

a certain

man

who

gave a bill of divorce to his betrothed, and

said to them

to the witnesses at the time he delivered it:

I hereby divorce you on the condition that

if I do not marry

by the end of

thirty days, let it be a bill of divorce

[if I do not marry my betrothed by the end of thirty days, the divorce will take effect]! But if I marry her within this period, this is not a bill of divorce!

When thirty days arrived

[when the thirtieth day arrived and the day had not yet ended], the appointed time, by which he would have to marry her for the bill of divorce to take effect,

he said to them

the divorcing man said:

Here, I have been occupied

[I am occupied] with the preparations for the wedding, and I am prevented by circumstances beyond my control from marrying her.

And the Gemara explains that certainly the divorce took effect, for

why should we be concerned about it

and say that the divorce should not take effect?!

If it is because of the circumstances beyond his control,

as we have established throughout the Torah, “circumstances beyond one's control—God exempts him,” and even a divorce effected through a condition fulfilled under duress is not a divorce—this is not so, for we have established:

there is no

claim of

duress with regard to bills of divorce.

And

if it is because

he claimed and said: “The condition was not fulfilled, because ‘I have been occupied,’” and this constitutes

a revelation of intent

that he wants the divorce annulled, which had not yet taken effect until the end of the thirty days—

this matter

is subject to the dispute between Abaye and Rava

and according to Abaye, a revelation of intent with regard to a bill of divorce is not significant; and the halakha follows him, as explained below.

There was an incident involving

a certain

man

who

gave a bill of divorce to his betrothed, and

said to them

to the witnesses:

If I do not marry her

by

the

end of

the beginning of the month

[the beginning of the month]

of Adar, let it be a bill of divorce

[if I do not marry her by the end of the beginning of the month of Adar, the divorce will take effect]; but if I marry her by that time, it will not be a bill of divorce.

When the beginning of the month of Adar arrived

[when the beginning of the month of Adar arrived] and he had still not married her,

he said to them: I

indeed

was referring to the beginning of the month of Nisan

[I said “the beginning of the month of Nisan”]! That is, he did not marry her because he thought he had stipulated the beginning of Nisan rather than Adar.

And the Gemara explains that in this incident too the divorce certainly took effect at the end of the day, for

why should we be concerned about it?!

If it is because

he did not marry her because of his error, since he thought that the time ended at the beginning of the month of Nisan, and it follows that his condition was fulfilled because of

duress—

we have established:

there is no

claim of

duress with regard to bills of divorce!

Since the condition was ultimately fulfilled, the divorce takes effect.

And if it is because of a revelation of intent,

that by claiming that the divorce should be annulled he reveals his intention that he does not desire it—this

is dependent on the dispute between Abaye and Rava,

and the halakha follows Abaye.

Three disputes were stated in our sugya:

A. The dispute between Rav Naḥman and Rav Sheshet [above, 32b]: In the presence of how many people can a husband annul a bill of divorce before the enactment of Rabban Gamliel the Elder—whether in the presence of two or in the presence of three.

1. The dispute between Rav Naḥman and Rav Sheshet [above, 32b]: In the presence of how many people may a husband annul a bill of divorce before the enactment of Rabban Gamliel the Elder—before two people or before three?

b. The dispute between Rav Nahman and Rabbi Abba and Rabbi Yashya [above, 33b]: Does the halakha follow Rabbi in both disputes in which he disagreed with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel [regarding the law that “if he nullified it, it is nullified,” and regarding the law that “this cancellation may be done without the presence of the other”], or does the halakha follow Rabbi in only one of them?

c. The dispute between Abaye and Rava [here]: Does expressing one's intention regarding a bill of divorce have legal significance, or not?

And the Gemara rules the halakha in all these matters.

And the halakha is in accordance with Nahman,

that before the enactment he would cancel it only in the presence of two people!

And the halakha is in accordance with Nahman:

that the halakha follows Rabbi in both matters—both regarding what he said, “If he nullified it, it is nullified,” and regarding what he said: “He can cancel this one without the presence of the other”"!