Gittin 28b — the Talmud in English

Rava said

to resolve the contradiction between the Mishna and the beraita: the law of our Mishna differs from the law of the beraita, which states, “This is your bill of divorce one hour before my death,” for in our Mishna the concern is that perhaps the husband has already died, and

we do not

with

be concerned that he has died!

because we establish him on his presumption, that he is still alive.

But in the beraita, even if he has not yet died, but will die within an hour, his bill of divorce has already taken effect from now, and she immediately becomes forbidden to eat teruma; and

we are concerned that he may die!

For we are not coming to say that he has already died and thereby undermine the presumption of life, but are only concerned that he may die in the future.

Rav Adda bar Mattana understood from Rava’s words—which disputed Abaye, who established the Mishna and the beraita as a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda, who disputed the matter of the wineskin—that in his view both the Mishna and the beraita follow everyone’s opinion; and therefore:

He said

he challenged

Rav Adda bar Mattana to Rava:

But the wineskin

the wine, whose bursting Rabbi Meir did not fear,

for

indeed

it is like the possibility that he may die,

for if it bursts in the future after teruma has been separated from it, the teruma is retroactively nullified.

And

nevertheless

they dispute

in this matter, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda! It follows from this that Rabbi Meir is not concerned even about the possibility that he may die; and how will the beraita be explained according to his opinion!?

He said [

he answered]

Rav Yehuda of Diskarta:

The wineskin is different,

for Rabbi Meir did not fear that it might burst, because it is possible

that he gives it to a guardian

to guard it so that it will not burst; but regarding “the possibility that he may die,” even Rabbi Meir is concerned.

Rav Mesharsheya challenged him:

What benefit does giving it to a guardian provide to remove the concern that it may burst? After all,

your guarantor requires a guarantor [

the guarantor whom you brought also requires a guarantor; and it is an analogy, that even the guarantor himself, who is responsible for the borrower’s repaying his debt, also requires another person who will be his guarantor, to uphold his guarantee].

That is to say: there is concern that perhaps the guardian himself will be negligent in guarding it, and the wineskin will burst.

Rather, Rava said:

Indeed, it cannot be said that both the Mishna and the beraita are the opinion of everyone; rather:

We are not concerned that he may have died

even according to Rabbi Yehuda, who is concerned about the bursting of the wineskin, and our Mishna is properly explained according to everyone’s opinion.

But if we are concerned about

the possibility that he may die,

it is a dispute

of tannaim!

For Rabbi Meir is not concerned even about this, and only Rabbi Yehuda is concerned about it; and the beraita was taught according to his method.

We learned in the Mishna:

One who sends his sin-offering from overseas,

they offer it on the presumption that he is alive:

And we raise a difficulty:

But

with a sin-offering

I require placing of hands,

by the owner of the offering upon the head of his offering; and if so, how can he send his sin-offering through an agent!? After all, it is impossible for the agent to place his hands in his stead, as it is taught in the Sifra: “‘And he shall place his hand’—and not the hand of his agent”!

He said

he answered

Rav Yosef:

What are we dealing with here?

With an offering,

a sin-offering of

women,

and women do not place their hands, because it is stated: “Speak to the children of Israel, and he shall place, etc.” The children of Israel place their hands, but women do not place their hands!

Rav Pappa

answered and

said:

Our Mishna is dealing

with a bird sin-offering,

which does not require placing of hands, and therefore he can send it through an agent.

Here the Gemara returns to the three cases mentioned in our Mishna, which establish a person with a presumption of life:

A. One who brings a bill of divorce, and the agent left the husband old or ill, gives it to the woman on the presumption that her husband is alive!

B. An Israelite woman married to a priest, whose husband went overseas, may eat teruma on the presumption that he is alive! C. One who sends his sin-offering from overseas, they offer it on the presumption that he is alive—

And

the Gemara explains that

it is necessary

for our Mishna to teach this novelty in all three cases; and because:

Had it taught us

with regard to

a bill of divorce

alone, that we are not concerned about the husband’s death, I would have said that this law applies specifically to a bill of divorce,

because it is impossible

to divorce any woman when her husband is overseas unless we rely on his presumption of life.

But

with regard to

teruma, for

even if we forbid the woman to eat it,

it is possible

for her to subsist by eating non-sacred food,

say no

we rely on the presumption, and we are concerned about the husband’s death.

And had it taught us

with regard to

teruma

that we are not concerned about the husband’s death, I would have said that this law applies specifically to teruma, because

there are times when it is impossible

for her to subsist without eating teruma—for example, when she is poor, and all her sustenance comes from what she receives as teruma at the threshing floors.

But

with regard to

a bird sin-offering,

I might say:

Because of the doubt

let him not bring it in [

we will not permit bringing]

non-sacred property into the Temple courtyard!

For if he has died, the sin-offering is not fit to be offered.

Therefore,

it is necessary

for our Mishna to teach, with regard to all three of these cases, that the person is maintained in the presumption of being alive.

Mishna:

Rabbi Elazar ben Parta said three things

before the Sages, and they upheld his words [

they agreed with these matters]!

And these are they:

A.

Concerning a city that was surrounded by a siege [

a siege by an enemy] with people inside it.

B.

And concerning a ship in distress at sea,

which has not yet sunk and has people inside it.

C.

And concerning a person going out to be judged

before a court regarding a matter whose punishment is death, and whose verdict has not yet been finalized for execution—

That

all these people, although they are in danger of death, as long as we do not know what became of them in the end, are

presumed to be alive!

And if they are priests, their wives are permitted to eat teruma, and we are not concerned that perhaps their husbands have died.

And likewise with regard to a bill of divorce: if one of them gave a bill of divorce into the hand of an agent, and before the agent gave it to the woman the husband entered one of these dangers to life, the agent gives it to the woman.

But a city that

has already

been conquered by the siege, [

the enemy that besieged it], they are concerned about the people inside it, that perhaps they have died.

And

likewise

a ship that

has already

been lost at sea,

they are concerned about the people inside it, that perhaps they have died.

And

likewise one whose verdict has already been finalized for death, and he is

going out to be executed—

these are not presumed alive; rather, they are of uncertain life and uncertain death, and therefore

they are given the stringencies of the living and the stringencies of the dead!

Thus, if

If an Israelite woman

is married

to

one of them who is a

priest, she may not eat teruma! For we are concerned that perhaps he has died, and she is forbidden to eat teruma.

she may not eat teruma, because we are concerned that he has died, in which case she is prohibited from eating teruma.

And

in contrast, if

a priest’s daughter

is married

to

one of them who is

an Israelite,

she too

may not eat teruma!

For we are concerned that perhaps her Israelite husband has not died, and as long as she is under his authority, her status is that of an Israelite woman, and she does not eat teruma.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: And one going out to be executed is given the stringencies of the living and the stringencies of the dead!

Rav Yosef said:

They taught

in our Mishna that one going out to be executed is only of uncertain death

but

with one going out to be executed

by an Israelite court!

And the reason is that even after his verdict has been finalized, if a basis for acquittal of the defendant is revealed to the court, they overturn the judgment and exempt him from death. Therefore, as a stringency, we are concerned that perhaps he is still alive.

But

one going out to be executed

by a gentile court,

is presumed certainly dead, and even as a stringency we are not concerned that perhaps he is alive.

Because

once his judgment has been finalized for execution, they execute him!

After they finalized his judgment for execution, they do not retract it, and certainly killed him in the end.

Abaye said to him:

But

a gentile court as well

sometimes overturns the judgment and exempts the defendant, because

they accept bribes [

a bribe] in order to acquit him! And if so, even with one going out to be executed by their court, one should be concerned and be stringent that perhaps he is still alive.

He said to him,

Rav Yosef:

When do they take [

when do they accept bribes]? Only

before they sign the pursi shenmag! [

before the verdict is signed; “pursi shenmag” is a judgment in the Persian language].

But

after the pursi shenmag has been signed, they do not take bribes

the gentile judges do not take bribes! And in such a case it is certain to us that he was killed in the end.

He raised an objection

to Rav Yosef from what we learned:

A person whose judgment was finalized by a court for execution, and he fled:

Wherever two people stand and say: “We testify concerning so-and-so that his judgment was finalized

for execution

by the court of so-and-so; and so-and-so and so-and-so

are

his witnesses

who testified against him in that court that he transgressed a prohibition punishable by death”—

he shall be executed

by this court! And although this court did not investigate the testimony of the witnesses to the transgression, it relies on the fact that his judgment was already finalized by the other court.

We have thus learned that we are not concerned that perhaps that court found a basis for acquittal after his judgment was finalized and exempted him from death, because this is not common; and this is difficult for Rav Yosef!?

And we answer:

Perhaps a fugitive is different!

Since he fled from the place where he was sentenced to death, this proves that his finalized judgment still stands, and that they did not exempt him from death.

Come and hear,

not in accordance with Rav Yosef, from what is taught in a beraita:

If

he heard

a witness

from

the mouth of

an Israelite court, which were saying:

“So-and-so has died,”

a natural death resulting from his having committed a transgression—not that they killed him with their hands, but that they placed him in a cell until he died on his own; for example, he committed a transgression for which one is liable to lashes and was lashed, then committed that transgression again and was lashed for it, and when he sinned a third time, they place him in a cell.

Or if he heard them say:

“So-and-so was killed,”

by one of the four forms of execution by court—

although he is not testifying about the death itself,

they may permit his wife to marry

on the basis of this man’s testimony! And they are not concerned that perhaps he is still alive and she remains a married woman.

But if the witness heard

from execution officers [

officials appointed over the execution of those liable to death]

of gentiles

who said: “

So-and-so has died”!

For example, he was judged according to royal law to be confined in a house filled with earth until he died on his own—or they said: “

So-and-so was killed” —

they may not permit his wife to marry

on the basis of this testimony.

And behold:

What is “

died,”

and what is “

was killed,”

as the beraita teaches!?

If you say that “

“

died”

means that he heard them say

that he actually died, and

likewise “

was killed”

means that they said that he

was actually killed, and his sentence had already been carried out, and in this it was said that if he heard this from an Israelite court, they permit his wife to marry—

and his sentence had already been carried out, and it is in this sense that it says that if he heard this from an Israelite court, they may marry off his wife—

it is impossible to say this, because:

For

if so,

like it [

similar to this manner]

regarding

a witness from execution officers of

gentiles—

who told him that he had already died or had already been killed—

why

does the beraita teach that

they may not permit his wife to marry!!

And

is it not established that whenever

the gentile

speaks innocently

that a certain woman’s husband has died,

we trust him [

we believe him] and permit her to marry on his word? Since he does not know that we rely on him to permit the woman, and he is not saying this as testimony, but merely as someone recounting events, he is not suspected of lying.

Rather, is it not

necessarily the case that “

died”

means that they told him that his judgment had been finalized and he was

going out to die, and likewise

“

was killed”

means

that he was going out to be executed,

and they did not see him actually die and be killed?!

And nevertheless it teaches that if he heard this

in the court

of

Israel, they may permit his wife to marry!

It is thus proven that we are not concerned that perhaps, after his sentence had been decreed, the court found a basis for acquittal and exempted him from death; and this is difficult for Rav Yosef!?

And we answer:

In truth

we are dealing with a case in which he heard from them

that he truly died, and

he likewise heard that he

was truly killed,

and only in this manner do they permit his wife to marry.

And as for what you say

to object,

that

if so,

why, with regard to gentiles, is it not the same

that they should marry his wife,

for it is established

for us:

that everyone who speaks casually is deemed trustworthy!?

This is not difficult, for

these words apply

when the gentile is deemed trustworthy in testimony concerning a woman when he speaks casually, that is only

in a matter with which they have no connection!

For they have no connection to this story, and do not boast about it.

But in a matter with which they have a connection,

and they boast that they killed a person in their court, they are not trustworthy. For

they act to substantiate their lie

[they may lie] and say that he has already been killed, even though they saw him only standing trial in a capital case.

There are those who say: Rav Yosef said: They taught [this] only

with regard to one going out to be executed—upon whom they impose the stringencies of the living and the stringencies of the dead—

but

when he was sentenced to death

in a court of gentiles!

For as long as he has not yet been killed, there remains the possibility that he will bribe the judges, and they will exempt him from death.