Gittin 29a (כט.) — the Talmud in English

But

if his judgment had been finalized for execution

in a Jewish court, once the verdict had been issued for execution

[a verdict of execution had been issued], certainly

they execute him!

We may certainly assume that he has already died, and we do not apply to him the stringencies associated with one who is alive. And if he was an Israelite and his wife was the daughter of a kohen, she returns to her father’s home and eats teruma.

Abaye said

to Rav Yosef:

But if his judgment had been finalized in a

Jewish court, as well,

there is also reason to fear that he is still alive, because

it is possible that they saw

the court

a merit

[they found a grounds for acquittal] and exempted him from execution!

Rav Yosef said to him:

When they see

the court

a merit,

that is, when is it common for the court to find grounds for acquittal? Only

before the verdict is finalized

[before the conclusion of the trial].

But

after the verdict has been finalized,

anymore

it is not

common that

they see

the court

a merit!

Therefore, there is no concern that perhaps they ultimately acquitted him and exempted him from execution.

And we seek to prove this:

Let us say that the following Mishna supports him

Rav Yosef;

As we learned: If a man whose judgment was issued for execution fled,

wherever two

witnesses stand before another court

and say: “We testify concerning so-and-so that his judgment was finalized

for execution

in the court of so-and-so; and so-and-so

and so-and-so

are

his witnesses

who testified against him in that court that he committed a transgression punishable by execution—

he is executed

by this court, since it relies on the fact that his judgment had already been finalized by the other court.

Thus, we see that we do not fear that perhaps that court found grounds for acquitting him after the verdict had been finalized and exempted him from execution, in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yosef.

And we reject this: It is not proof from there, since there the case is one of a fugitive, and

perhaps a fugitive is different!

Since he fled, this proves that he is still liable to execution.

And furthermore, we seek to prove Rav Yosef’s opinion from the following beraita:

If one

hears

a witness

from

the

Jewish court saying: “So-and-so

was punished and

died

for a transgression that he committed [and the punishment for this transgression is to confine him until he dies on his own];

or if he heard them say:

“So-and-so was executed”

as his punishment—

they may marry off his wife

on the basis of this witness’s testimony, and we do not fear that he is still alive.

But if he heard this

from the commandants

[those appointed over executions]

of gentiles,

who said: “

So-and-so died,” or “

So-and-so was executed”—

they may not marry off his wife

on the strength of this testimony, because we fear that ultimately they did not execute him.

But

what is the distinction between “

died” and “

what” “

was executed,” as the beraita teaches?

If you say

that he heard from the court that so-and-so had already

actually died, and

had already

actually been executed—

that cannot be said, because:

If so,

similarly

[in a comparable case]

with regard to

a witness who heard it from the commandants of

gentiles,

who told him that he had already died and had already been executed—why

may they not marry off his wife

on the basis of this testimony?

But we have established that anyone who

relates

the death of the husband of a certain woman

casually

and without ulterior motive,

we accept his testimony as trustworthy

[we believe him] and permit the woman to marry on his testimony!

Rather, is it not

necessarily the case that “

died”

means that he heard from them that his judgment had been finalized and that he was

going out to die; and

“was executed”

means

that he was going out to be executed, and not that they saw him actually executed!

And

in that connection

it teaches

that if he heard this

in a Jewish court, they may marry off his wife!

Thus, we see that we do not fear that after the verdict had been finalized the court found grounds for acquitting him and exempted him, in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yosef.

And we reject this: It is not proof from there.

Actually,

he heard from the court that he

actually died, or that he

was actually killed;

was actually executed;

and it is specifically in this manner that they permit his wife to marry.

As for what is difficult for you: If so,

similarly, with regard to gentiles, why may they not

marry off his wife

; but we have established that anyone

who is a gentile

who relates something casually is accepted as trustworthy!?

That is not difficult, because

this applies when he is trustworthy

with regard to a matter in which he has no involvement!

They have no connection to this affair and do not boast about it.

But with regard to a matter in which he is involved,

when they take pride in having executed a person according to their laws,

they act to substantiate their falsehood!

They may lie and say that he was executed even though he was not yet executed, but had merely stood trial.

Mishna:

A messenger

who brings a bill of divorce in Eretz Yisrael

[where he need not say, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence”]

and fell ill, he

the messenger

may send it

the bill of divorce to the woman

by means of another person.

And if he said to him

the one who appointed the messenger:

“Take for me from her

[from the woman]

a certain article,”

he

may not send him by means of another person,

because

the will

of the one who appointed him

is that his deposit should be in the possession of another person.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: A messenger who brings a bill of divorce in Eretz Yisrael and falls ill may send it by means of another person:

Rav Kahana said: “

Falls ill”

we learned

in our Mishna: He may send it by means of another person, because he is under duress; but if he did not fall ill, he may not send it by means of another person. The Gemara wonders: But is it not

obvious

that he may not send it by means of another person unless he fell ill, since

“falls ill”

it teaches

in our Mishna!?

And we answer: Rav Kahana needed to teach us this, because

it might enter your mind to say: The same law applies even though he did not fall ill

and he may send it by means of another person, and

the reason it teaches

in our Mishna

“falls ill”

is only because

it teaches the ordinary course of events

[I might have said that “falls ill” is mentioned only because this is the usual circumstance in which he sends it, when he is sick and unable to send it himself]—

therefore,

it teaches us

Rav Kahana that he may not send it by means of another person unless he fell ill.

And we ask:

What are the circumstances

of the Mishna, which states that if he fell ill he may send it, but if he did not fall ill he may not send it?

If he said to him

the one who appointed the messenger to the messenger: “

Take

this bill of divorce to my wife,” and he did not say to him, “You take it”—

if so,

even though he did not fall ill, as well,

he may send it by means of another person, as is implied by the beraita cited below.

And if he said to him

the one who appointed the messenger to the messenger: “

You take”

and insisted that he himself be the messenger, then

even if he fell ill, as well, he may not

send it by means of another person, as is implied by that beraita.

And if

our Mishna is the opinion of

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,

who disagrees with the first tanna in that beraita, then even if he said to him merely, “Take,” and

even if he fell ill, he may not

send it by means of another person—

For

this

is taught:

One who says to his agent: “

Take this bill of divorce to my wife,”

he may send it by means of another person, implying: even if he did not fall ill.

But if he said to him: “

You take this bill of divorce to my wife,”

he may not send it by means of another person, since the husband insisted that he himself transport it, implying: even if he fell ill.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: In either case—

whether he said to him, “Take,” or whether he said to him, “You take”—

the messenger may not appoint another messenger, implying that this applies even if he fell ill.

If so, how is our Mishna to be understood!?

The Gemara explains our Mishna in three ways:

1.

Alternatively,

our Mishna follows the opinion of the first tanna, and deals with a case where the one who appointed the messenger said to him: “

Take”

alone,

and he fell ill. It is in this case that the first tanna said that he may send it by means of another person; but if he did not fall ill, he may not send it by means of another person. Therefore, our Mishna teaches: “And he fell ill.”

2.

Alternatively, our Mishna follows the opinion of the first tanna, and deals with a case where he said to him: “

Our Mishna follows the opinion of the first tanna, and it speaks of a case in which he said to him: “

You take,”

but if he fell ill, it is different, since even when he said to him, “You take,” he may send it by means of another person.

3.

Alternatively, our Mishna follows the opinion of

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, but if he falls ill, it is different, since Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel concedes that he may send it by means of another person.

We learned

in our Mishna:

A messenger who brings a bill of divorce in Eretz Yisrael and falls ill may send it by means of another person:

And we juxtapose it with another teaching,

raising a difficulty from the Mishna below, on page 66a:

One who wished to write and give a bill of divorce to his wife, and

said to two men: “Give”

[meaning: Write and give]

a bill of divorce to my wife,” even though he did not explicitly say to them, “Write and give,” which would imply, “You write it,” and not another—

or

if he said

to three

explicitly: “

Write and give a bill of divorce to my wife”—

in either case

they must write and give it

themselves, and they may not tell a scribe to write it.

That is, when there are two men who are not a court, even when he did not explicitly tell them that they themselves, and no one else, should write it, they cannot appoint another messenger, because they alone were appointed messengers to write the bill of divorce, and no one else. But when there are three, since they constitute a court, they need not write it themselves unless he explicitly said to them, “Write and give”; whereas when he did not say to them, “Write,” they are permitted, in their capacity as a court, to appoint a messenger to write the bill of divorce.

We have therefore learned that when he says to two men—who are not a court—“Give a bill of divorce,” then

they themselves

are the ones who

can

indeed write the bill of divorce,

but a messenger

of theirs

cannot

write it; whereas our Mishna teaches that a messenger may appoint another messenger!?

Abaye

said

in explanation:

There,

in the Mishna below, where he appointed them as messengers to write a bill of divorce,

what is the reason

that they cannot appoint another messenger?

Because

one must assume that he is particular because of

the husband’s humiliation,

since he was supposed to write the bill of divorce, and it is humiliating for him that he does not know how to write a bill of divorce, and he does not want other people to know of his humiliation.

But

here,

in our Mishna, where he appointed him as a messenger to transport the bill of divorce,

the husband is not particular

if he appoints another messenger, and therefore he may send it by means of another person.

Rava said

there is another distinction between a messenger for writing a bill of divorce and a messenger for transporting a bill of divorce:

There, in that Mishna, the reason he cannot appoint a messenger to write the bill of divorce is

because they are merely words;

he conveyed to them nothing tangible, but merely told them to write a bill of divorce,

and words cannot be conveyed to a messenger

and transferred onward to another messenger. But in our Mishna, where he appointed him as a messenger to transport the bill of divorce, and the bill of divorce is a tangible object, the messenger has the authority to appoint another messenger. And we explain:

What is the difference between them,

between Abaye’s answer and Rava’s answer?

The difference between them is: a messenger

for writing a deed of

gift,

whether he can appoint another messenger:

According to Abaye, since the reason in the case of a bill of divorce is only the husband’s humiliation, in the case of a deed of gift he can appoint another messenger. Since in the case of a gift it is the recipient who pays the scribe’s fee, there is no humiliation to the giver if he gives it to someone else to write at the recipient’s expense.

But according to Rava, a messenger for writing a deed of gift cannot appoint another messenger, since ultimately they are merely words, and words cannot be conveyed to a messenger.

And

this dispute between Abaye and Rava

is identical to the dispute between Rav and Shmuel,

who also disagreed concerning this matter:

And as it was stated:

Rav said: A gift is not like a get,

and the two of them may tell the scribe to write it.

And Shmuel said: A gift is indeed like a get,

and they may not tell another person to write it.

We learned in the Mishna:

And if he said to him, “Take for me from her a certain object,”

he may not send him through another person, because he does not want his deposit to be in the possession of another person:

Reish Lakish said:

That which we learned, “He may not send him through another person,” means that he may not send him to take the deposit through another person. The fundamental basis of this law is a monetary law: The owner who deposited the item does not want the deposit to be in the possession of the agent.

Here,

in this Mishna,

Rabbi taught

us

the following:

A borrower may not lend the item onward, and a renter may not rent it onward,

because he does not want his deposit to be in the possession of another person.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: This—

this halakha that you are stating, that a borrower may not lend the item onward and a renter may not rent it onward—

even schoolchildren know it,

and there would have been no need for Rabbi to teach us this.

Rather,

that which we learned: “He may not send him through another person, because he does not want his deposit to be in the possession of another person,” was stated with regard to the get. It is with regard to the get that we learned, “He may not send him through another person,” because the husband does not want the deposit to be in the possession of the woman. The Gemara proceeds to explain all of this.

And why may he not send the get because of the deposit?

Because

sometimes—

when, because of the husband’s request to take the deposit from her—

the get is also not valid

[the get itself is invalid]—

that

in certain circumstances

the sender becomes

the one who sent him

as though he had said to him

to the agent, because she had asked him to take the object from her:

“Do not divorce her except in the house,” and

the agent went and

divorced her in the upper room,

in which case the get is not a valid get—

and it is as though he had said to his agent:

“Do not divorce her except with the right hand,” and he divorced her with the left hand,

in which case the get is not a valid get, because he made him an agent only in the manner that he stated. Here too, he made him an agent for delivery of the get only on condition that he take the deposit from the woman. The Gemara subsequently explains in what manner the get is not a valid get.

And because of those instances in which the get is not a valid get, in every case where he asked his agent to take the deposit from the woman, the agent may not appoint another agent, as will be explained below.

And the Gemara explains in which circumstances even the get is not a valid get according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, whereas according to Reish Lakish the get is valid:

Everyone—

both Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yoḥanan—agrees that

where

the agent appointed another agent to give her the get and take the object from her, and

the woman went out

to meet

him,

the agent’s agent,

and gave him

that

object, and afterward she took

the woman

from him

the agent’s agent

the get

[in a case where the woman went out to meet the agent’s agent and gave him the object, and afterward he gave her the get]—

In this case, although even schoolchildren know that the husband does not want the deposit to be in the possession of the agent, nevertheless

everyone agrees that it is a completely valid get

[the get is valid], because this is not a reason to invalidate his agency with regard to the get.

When do they disagree—

Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish—

where he said to him

the sender said to the first agent: