Gittin 29a — the Talmud in English

But

if his judgment was concluded for death

in an Israelite court, once the judgment has gone out for execution

[it was decided that he should die], certainly

they kill him!

And we presume with certainty that he has already died, and we do not give him the stringencies of life; and if he is an Israelite and his wife is the daughter of a kohen, she returns to her father’s house and eats teruma.

Abaye said

to Rav Yosef:

But surely, if his judgment was concluded in

an Israelite court, also

there is reason to fear that he is still alive, because

it is possible that they saw for him

the court

a merit

[they found a ground for acquittal], and exempted him from death!

Rav Yosef said to him:

When they see for him

the court

a merit,

that is to say: when is it common that the court finds him a merit? Only

before the judgment is concluded

[before the conclusion of the judgment].

But

after the conclusion of the judgment

it is

no longer

common that

they see for him

the court

a merit!

Therefore, there is no reason to fear that in the end they exempted him from death.

And we prove this:

let us say that the following Mishna supports him

in the words of Rav Yosef;

For we learned: A person whose judgment was decreed that he be killed, and he fled—

wherever two stand

as witnesses before another court,

and say: We testify concerning so-and-so that his judgment was concluded

to be killed

in the court of so-and-so; and so-and-so

and so-and-so

are

his witnesses

who testified against him in that court, that he violated a prohibition whose penalty is death—

he is killed

by this court! For it relies upon the fact that his judgment was already concluded in the other court.

It follows that we do not fear that perhaps that court found him a ground for merit after the conclusion of his judgment and exempted him from death, in accordance with the words of Rav Yosef.

And we reject this: It is not proof from there, for there it speaks of one who fled, and

perhaps one who flees is different!

Since he fled, this proves that he is still liable to death.

And furthermore, we prove this in accordance with Rav Yosef from that which was taught:

If

he heard

a witness

from

the mouth of

an Israelite court who were saying: So-and-so

was punished and

died

because of a transgression that he committed [and the punishment for this transgression is to confine him until he dies on his own];

or he heard them saying:

So-and-so was killed

as his punishment—

they shall marry off his wife

of this so-and-so on the basis of the testimony of the witness! And we do not fear that he is still alive.

And if he heard this

from commandants

[those appointed over the killing]

of gentiles

who said: “

So-and-so died,”

or: “

So-and-so was killed”—

they shall not marry off his wife

on the strength of this testimony! Because we fear that in the end they did not kill him.

But

what is the meaning of “

died,”

and what is the meaning of “

was killed,”

which the beraita teaches!?

If you say

that he heard from the mouth of the court that this so-and-so had already

actually died, and

had already

actually been killed—

this cannot be said, for:

If so,

similarly

[in a case resembling this]

with regard to

a witness from commandants of

gentiles,

who told him that he had already died and had already been killed—

why shall they not marry off his wife

on the basis of this testimony?

But we have an established principle: that every

gentile who

speaks

the foreigner

in the course of his ordinary conversation

that the husband of a certain woman died,

we rely reliably upon him

[we believe him] and permit the woman to marry on his word!

Rather, is it not so

that “

died”

means that he heard from their mouths that his judgment was concluded and he was

going out to die; and

likewise, “

was killed”

means

that he was going out to be killed,

and not that they saw him actually being killed!

And

with this

it teaches,

that if he heard this

in an Israelite court, they shall marry off his wife!

It follows that we do not fear that after the conclusion of the judgment the court found him a ground for merit and exempted him, in accordance with the words of Rav Yosef.

And we reject this: It is not proof from there.

Actually,

he heard from the court that he

actually died, or that he

was actually killed;

and

only in this manner do they permit his wife to marry;

And what is difficult for you is: if so,

similarly, with regard to gentiles, why not

marry off his wife

; but we have an established principle: that every

gentile who

speaks in the course of his ordinary conversation, we rely reliably upon him!?

It is not difficult;

these words

that he is trusted are

in a matter with which they have no connection!

They have no connection to this affair, and do not boast about it.

But in a matter with which they have a connection,

where they take pride in having killed a person according to their laws,

they act to substantiate their falsehood!

They may lie and say that he was killed, even though he has not yet been killed, but merely stood trial.

Mishna:

A messenger

who brings a bill of divorce in the Land of Israel

[who need not say, “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed”]

and fell ill, he may

the messenger

send it

the bill of divorce to the woman

by means of another.

And if he said to him

the sender to the messenger:

Take for me from her

[from the woman]

a certain object,

then

he may not send him by means of another,

because

it is not his wish

of the sender

that his deposit should be in the hands of another.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: A messenger who brings a bill of divorce in the Land of Israel and fell ill may send it by means of another:

Rav Kahana said: “

fell ill”

we learned

in our Mishna, that he may send it by means of another, because he is compelled; but if he did not fall ill, he may not send it by means of another. The Gemara wonders: Is it not

obvious

that he may not send it by means of another unless he fell ill, for

“

fell ill”

it teaches

in our Mishna!? And we answer: Rav Kahana needed to teach us this, because

it might enter your mind to say: the same law applies even though he did not fall ill

that he may send it by means of another,

and the fact that it teaches

in our Mishna

“fell ill”

is only because

it teaches the ordinary course of events

[I might have said that we taught “fell ill” only because this is the way: he sends it when he is ill and cannot send it himself]—

therefore

it informs us

Rav Kahana that he may not send it by means of another unless he fell ill.

And we raise an objection:

what are the circumstances,

in what manner does our Mishna speak when it says that if he fell ill he may send it, and if he did not fall ill he may not send it?

If he said to him

the sender to the messenger: “

Take

this bill of divorce to my wife,” and he did not say to him, “You take it”—

if so,

even though he did not fall ill also

he may send it by means of another, as is implied by the beraita brought below.

And if he said to him

the sender to the messenger: “

You take”

and was particular that he should be the one who sends it, then

even if he fell ill also, he may not

send it by means of another, as is implied by that beraita.

And if

our Mishna is the opinion of

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,

who disagreed with the first tanna in that beraita, if so, even if he said to him simply, “Take it,” and

even if he fell ill, also he may not

send it by means of another—

For

this

was taught:

One who says to his messenger: “

Take this bill of divorce to my wife,”

he may send it by means of another, and the implication is: even if he did not fall ill.

But if he said to him: “

You take this bill of divorce to my wife,”

he may not send it by means of another, since the husband was particular that he should take it, and the implication is: even if he fell ill.

he may not send it by means of another person, since the husband insisted that he himself transport it, implying: even if he fell ill.

посланец не может назначить другого посланца, и из этого следует: даже если он заболел.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: In either case—

whether he said to him “Take it” or whether he said to him “You take it”—

the messenger does not appoint a messenger, and the implication is: even if he fell ill.

Можно сказать иначе: наша Мишна следует мнению первого танна и говорит о случае, когда отправитель сказал посланцу:

And if so, how is our Mishna to be understood!?

The Gemara explains our Mishna in three ways: A.

1.

If you wish, say:

Our Mishna follows the opinion of the first tanna, and it speaks of a case in which the sender said to the messenger: “

Take it”

alone,

and he fell ill; it is in this that the first tanna said that he may send it by means of another, but if he did not fall ill he may not send it by means of another, and therefore we learned in our Mishna: “and fell ill.” B.

Или можно сказать иначе: наша Мишна следует мнению

2.

And if you wish, say:

Our Mishna follows the opinion of the first tanna, and it speaks of a case in which he said to him: “

You take it,”

but if he fell ill it is different, for even when he said to him “You take it,” he may send it by means of another. C.

3.

And if you wish, say

our Mishna is the opinion of

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and if he fell ill it is different, for Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel concedes that he may send it by means of another.

Тот, кто хотел написать и вручить разводное письмо своей жене и

We learned

in our Mishna:

A messenger who brings a bill of divorce in the Land of Israel and fell ill may send it by means of another:

And we juxtapose it,

and raise a difficulty from the Mishna below, 66a:

One who wished to write and give a bill of divorce to his wife, and

said to two: Give

[that is, write and give]

a bill of divorce to my wife, even though he did not explicitly say to them “Write and give,” which would imply “you write,” and not another—

но посланец

or

he said

to three

explicitly: “

Write and give a bill of divorce to my wife”—

in both this case and that case,

they themselves shall write and give it, and they shall not tell a scribe, “Write.”

themselves, and they may not tell a scribe to write it.

That is, with two who are not a court, even when he did not explicitly tell them that they should write it and not another, they cannot appoint another messenger, because they alone were made messengers for writing the bill of divorce, and not another; but with three, since they are a court, they need not write it themselves, unless he explicitly said to them, “Write and give,” whereas when he did not say to them “Write,” they are permitted, in their capacity as a court, to appoint a messenger to write the bill of divorce.

We have therefore learned that if he said to two—who are not a court—“Give a bill of divorce,” then

they themselves

indeed

can

write the bill of divorce,

but a messenger

of theirs

cannot

write it; whereas in our Mishna we learned that a messenger appoints a messenger!?

Abaye

answered

and explained:

There,

in the later Mishna, where he made them messengers to write a bill of divorce,

what is the reason

that they cannot appoint a messenger?

Because

it is to be assumed that he is particular because of

the husband’s disgrace,

since he should have written the bill of divorce himself, and it is a disgrace to him that he does not know how to write a bill of divorce, and he does not want other people to know any further of his disgrace.

But

here,

in our Mishna, where he made him a messenger to deliver the bill of divorce,

the husband is not particular

if he appoints another messenger, and therefore he may send it by means of another.

Rava said

there is another distinction between a messenger for writing the bill of divorce and a messenger for delivering the bill of divorce:

There, in that Mishna, for this reason he cannot appoint a messenger to write the bill of divorce,

because they are merely words,

for he conveyed to them nothing but words, saying to them to write a bill of divorce,

and words cannot be transferred to a messenger,

for mere words do not have the power to be returned and transferred to another messenger; but in our Mishna, where he made him a messenger for delivering the bill of divorce, and the bill of divorce has tangible substance, in this case even the messenger has the power to appoint another messenger. And we explain:

what difference is there between them,

between Abaye’s explanation and Rava’s explanation?

The difference between them is: a messenger

for writing a deed of

gift,

whether he can appoint another messenger:

For according to Abaye, since the reason in the case of a bill of divorce is only because of the husband’s disgrace, in the case of a deed of gift he can appoint another messenger, since with a gift it is the recipient who pays the scribe’s fee; there is no disgrace to the giver if he gives it to another to write at the recipient’s expense.

But according to Rava, a messenger for writing a deed of gift cannot appoint another messenger, since in the end they are merely words, and words cannot be transferred to a messenger.

And

this dispute between Abaye and Rava

is in the dispute between Rav and Shmuel,

for they too disagreed in this dispute:

And as it was stated:

Rav said: A gift is not like a get,

and the two of them can say to the scribe to write.

And Shmuel said: A gift is indeed like a get,

and they cannot say to another to write.

We learned in the Mishna:

And if he said to him, “Take for me from her a certain object,”

he may not send him by the hand of another, since it is not his will that his deposit should be in the hands of another:

Reish Lakish said:

This that we learned, “He may not send him by the hand of another,” means that he may not send [another] to take the deposit by the hand of another; and the essential law here is a monetary law, that the owner who entrusted the deposit does not want the deposit to be in the hands of the agent, and

here

in this Mishna

Rabbi taught

us

[the following]:

A borrower may not lend, and a renter may not rent out,

because it is not his will that his deposit should be in the hands of another.

Rabbi Yohanan said to him: This—

this halakha that you are saying: A borrower may not lend, and a renter may not rent out—

even schoolchildren know it,

and there is no need for Rabbi to teach us this.

Rather,

this that we learned: “He may not send him by the hand of another, since it is not his will that his deposit should be in the hands of another,” we learned regarding the get: “He may not send him by the hand of another,” because it is not the husband’s will that the deposit should be in the hands of the woman, as the Gemara proceeds to explain all this.

And for what reason should he not send the get because of the deposit?

Because

sometimes—

there are times when, because of the husband’s request to take the deposit from her—

the get too is not a get

the get itself is also invalid—

for

in certain circumstances

the sender becomes

the one who sent him

like one who said to him

to the agent, by her having requested to take the object from her:

“Do not divorce her except in the house,” and

the agent went and

divorced her in an upper room,

so that the get is not a get—

and it is like one who said to his agent:

“Do not divorce her except with the right hand, and he divorced her with the left,”

so that the get is not a get, because he made him an agent only in the manner that he stated; and here too, he made him an agent for delivery only if he himself would take the deposit from the woman, and the Gemara later explains in what manner the get is not a get.

And because of those times when the get is not a get, therefore, in all circumstances, whenever he requested of his agent to take the deposit from the woman, the agent should not make another agent, as will be explained later.

And the Gemara explains in what circumstances even the get is not a get according to Rabbi Yohanan, while according to Reish Lakish the get is valid:

Everyone—

both Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yohanan—agree that

where

the agent made another agent to give her a get and to take the object from her, and

the woman went out

to meet him

toward him

the agent’s agent

and gave him

that

object, and afterward she took

the woman

from him

the agent’s agent

the get

in a manner that the woman went out to meet the agent’s agent and gave him the object, and afterward he gave her the get—

In this manner, even though even schoolchildren know that it is not the husband’s will that the deposit should be in the hands of the agent, nevertheless

everyone agrees that the get is a fully valid get

the get is a valid get, since this is not a reason to annul his agency concerning the get.

When they disagree—

Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish—

where he said to him

the sender to the first agent: