Gittin 28a (כח.) — the Talmud in English

And if

they found it tied in a pouch, wallet, or ring

and he recognizes them,

or if they found

the get

among his belongings,

then

even

if they found it

after a considerable time,

it is

fit.

It was stated: Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is

that a get is returned only when

no person has stayed there

in accordance with the opinion of the anonymous authorities in the beraita.

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rav Yitzḥak bar Shmuel said: The halakha is that no person passed there,

in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.

And we raise an objection: Since these amoraim went to the trouble of specifying the measure,

let the Master say [

let one of them say]:

The halakha is in accordance with the Master [

the anonymous authorities],

and the other Master

should say

the halakha is in accordance with the Master [

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar].

And we answer:

Because they reverse them [

there were those who reversed the names of the tannaim]. What this one stated according to the beraita before us, another stated according to their version; therefore, they were compelled to state the ruling itself and could not suffice with referring to the names of those who expressed the opinions.

We learned in the Mishna:

If they found it in a ḥafisa or a deluskema:

And we explain:

What is a ḥafisa?

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said: A small wineskin

made of leather, in which wine is placed.

And

what is a deluskema?

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said:

A talika of the elders,

a box in which old people store their utensils so that they will not have to search for them.

Mishna:

a. An agent

who brings a get

to a woman at the instruction of her husband,

and

when the agent received the get from the husband,

he left him [

that is, separated from him] when the husband was

old or ill—

the agent

gives it to her

and she is divorced by means of it.

We are not concerned that perhaps the husband died before the get was delivered to the woman, in which case the agency was annulled; rather, we establish the husband as

presumed to be alive

at the time of delivery! This is in accordance with the established principle throughout the Torah: leave a matter in its presumptive status. Since the husband was alive when the agent separated from him, we assume that no change occurred in his previous status until we know clearly that he died.

b. Likewise,

an Israelite woman married to a kohein,

who eats teruma as long as she is married to him, but after he dies, if she has no offspring from him, she may no longer eat teruma—

and her husband went

the kohein

to a distant land,

she

may eat teruma!

Although she does not know with certainty that he is still alive, she need not be concerned that perhaps he died, because we establish him

as presumed to be

still

alive!

This too is because we follow the presumption of life.

c. Likewise,

a

person who became liable to bring a sin-offering, and who is in a distant land,

sends

his

sin-offering from

the place where he resides in

the distant land,

and

it is offered

on his behalf!

Although if he died in the meantime the sin-offering would not be fit to be offered—and as we have established: a sin-offering whose owner died is left to graze until it dies—and we would consequently be offering non-sacred animals in the Temple courtyard, we are not concerned that perhaps he died, because we establish him

as presumed to be alive!

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: An agent who brings a get and left the husband old or ill gives it to her, relying on the presumption that he is alive:

Rava said: They taught

this

only

with regard to

an old man who had not reached

the age of

eighty!

He was not yet eighty years old [“strength” means eighty, as it is written: “The days of our years are seventy, and if by strength, eighty years”].

And

likewise, the

“ill”

person mentioned in the Mishna is an ordinary ill person, concerning whom we are not concerned that perhaps he died, because

most ill people

are destined to rise

to life!

But

if the agent left the husband when he was

an old man who

had already

reached eighty,

the agent may not divorce with it until we know clearly that the husband is still alive, because we are concerned that perhaps he died in the meantime.

And

likewise, if he left him when he was

in the throes of death,

we are concerned that perhaps he died in the meantime, because

most people in the throes of death

are destined

to die;

therefore,

he may not

deliver it to the woman.

Abaye raised an objection

to Rava from the following beraita:

An agent

who brings a get, and

when he separated from the husband

left him

when he was

old,

of advanced age—

even

if he

was one hundred years old, he gives it to her, because we establish him

as

presumed to be alive!

We have therefore learned that even after he reached eighty, we are not concerned about his death, which is a difficulty against Rava. And we conclude: indeed,

it is a refutation [

a difficulty] against Rava from this beraita!

And if you wish, say:

there is no difficulty from here against Rava, because specifically when he reached an extremely advanced age, such as one hundred years, we are not concerned that he died, since

once he has advanced so far, he has advanced so far!

That is: Since he has departed from the path of other people and lived so many years, he is not as close to death as other people, and it is reasonable that he will continue to live longer. But if he passed the age of eighty, without having reached such an extreme old age, and he is eighty-one or older, up to ninety years, he is subject to concern that he may die.

He raised it [

he posed this difficulty]

Abaye to Rabba,

concerning that which we learned in our Mishna:

An agent who brings a get and left him old or ill gives it to her, relying on the presumption that he is alive!

And he contrasts it

with that which was taught in a beraita:

A kohein who gives a get to his Israelite wife and says to her: “

This is your get,

and the divorce shall take effect

one hour before my death

[

of the husband]”—she is

immediately forbidden to eat teruma

when he gives her the get, because at every moment there is concern that perhaps he will die immediately afterward, in which case the divorce will have taken effect retroactively at this moment, since he stipulated that the divorce should take effect one moment before his death. Once she is divorced from him and is no longer the wife of a kohein, she is forbidden to eat teruma.

This proves that we are concerned about death and do not establish him as presumed alive, which is difficult against our Mishna, where it was explained that we are not concerned about death!? He said

in reply

to him,

Rabba said to Abaye:

What, then, are you comparing

teruma to gittin

[

are you raising an objection]? They are not comparable. For specifically with regard to

teruma,

the Sages were concerned about the death of her kohein husband and prohibited her from eating teruma, because

it is possible

for the woman to live without eating teruma; she can eat non-sacred produce.

But with regard to

a get,

they were not concerned about the husband’s death, because

it is not possible

for us to be concerned about this. If we were concerned about the husband’s death, no one could send a get to his wife from a distant land, and women would remain agunot.

And

nevertheless

he raises [

another difficulty] even from

teruma against teruma:

For in our Mishna

we learned: An Israelite woman married to a kohein, whose husband went to a distant land,

she

may eat teruma, relying on the presumption that he is alive!

This indicates that even with regard to teruma, we are not concerned that her husband died and that she thereby became forbidden to eat teruma.

And he contrasts it:

But was it not taught in a beraita: A kohein who gives a get to his wife and says to her: “

This is your get,

and it shall take effect

one hour before my death”—she is

immediately forbidden to eat teruma!

For we are concerned at every moment that perhaps he will die.

He said

in reply,

Rav Adda, son of Rav Yitzḥak:

In fact, we are not concerned about death; rather, we follow the presumption of life, as is demonstrated by our Mishna.

It is different there,

in the beraita that prohibits the woman from eating teruma, because

he has already prohibited her one hour before his death!

For it is certain that the husband will eventually die, and the divorce will take effect one hour beforehand, at which point the woman will become forbidden to eat teruma. Therefore, at every moment we must be concerned that perhaps this is the moment at which the woman is destined to become forbidden.

Rav Pappa challenged

Rav Adda:

But even when he divorces her one hour before his death, there is no certainty that she will ever become forbidden to eat teruma, since

from where do we know that he will die first [

how do we know that the husband will die first], so that the divorce will take effect one hour beforehand!?

Perhaps she will die first [

the woman will die first], and the divorce will never take effect; consequently, she will never become forbidden to eat teruma throughout her life.

The difficulty returns: Why do we not establish the husband as presumed alive!?

Rather, Abaye said: It is not difficult

to reconcile the contradiction between the beraita and our Mishna.

This—

our Mishna—

is the opinion of Rabbi Meir,

who

is not concerned about death

of the husband and establishes him as presumed alive.

And

this—

the beraita—

is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda,

who

is concerned about death,

and does not rely on the presumption of life. Therefore, he prohibits the woman from eating teruma, because he is concerned that perhaps the husband will die, in which case the woman will retroactively be divorced one hour beforehand.

As we learned:

One who purchases wine from the Cutheans,

and has no vessels into which to separate the teruma and tithes of the wine—

he

says: “Two log

[

out of one hundred log of wine] that I am destined

to separate eventually,

are teruma!

This is the measure of teruma for an average eye, one-fiftieth.

And

ten

log [ out of the one hundred log] that I am destined to separate are

the first tithe!

And

nine

log out of the ninety log of untithed wine remaining are

the second tithe!

And he redeems [

he transfers the sanctity of] the second tithe onto money that he has at home! The second tithe itself may not be eaten outside Jerusalem; rather, it must be redeemed onto money, and the money assumes the sanctity of the second tithe.

And

after doing so, he

immediately drinks

the wine, even before he has separated the teruma and the tithe, which are still mixed into the wine. This is because it will become clear retroactively that those log that he will eventually separate had the sanctity of teruma and tithe take effect upon them from the outset, while all the rest of the wine is considered properly tithed non-sacred produce.

The words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yehuda, Rabbi Yosei, and Rabbi Shimon prohibit

doing this! They are concerned that after he drinks some of the wine, the wineskin may burst and the rest of the wine will be lost; he will then be unable to separate the tithes from it and designate retroactively the teruma and tithe, with the result that retroactively he drank untithed produce.

Just as Rabbi Yehuda is concerned that the wineskin may burst and does not establish it as presumed to remain intact, so too he is concerned about the husband’s death and does not rely on the presumption; the beraita that prohibits the woman from eating teruma is stated in accordance with his opinion.

And Rabbi Meir, who is not concerned that the wineskin may burst but relies on its presumption of remaining intact, likewise is not concerned about the husband’s death, and our Mishna is stated in accordance with his opinion.