Gittin 27b — the Talmud in English

We have learned,

indeed ![](pamud.bmp "

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when the husband admits it, at any rate, he must return it to the woman, even after a long time, and

this is not like what we learned in our Mishna—!?

And he answered:

Rabbi Zeira too follows Rabba: It is not difficult:

Here—

in our Mishna—

in a place where caravans are found.

Here,

in the beraita—

in a place where caravans are not found.

There are those who say,

in Rabbi Zeira’s view:

Even when caravans are found,

and it is when [people with these names] have become established—

it is that he must not return it

only when identical names too have become established may he not return it—,

and

Rabbi Zeira’s position

is the same as Rabba’s.

And there are those who say:

When caravans are found,

even though [identical names] have not become established, he must not return it

he must not return it—,

and it disagrees

with Rabbi Zeira,

with Rabba

who holds: only when caravans are found and [identical names] have also become established may he not return it.

And the Gemara explains the reason for Rabba and Rabbi Zeira: Rabba stated his principle in resolving the contradiction between our Mishna and the Mishna in Bava Metzia, whereas Rabbi Zeira stated that very same principle in resolving the contradiction between our Mishna and the beraita:

Granted, Rabba did not say as Rabbi Zeira,

because

the Mishna is stronger for raising a difficulty against it

it is preferable to raise a difficulty from a Mishna than from a beraita, because the Mishnayot are more fundamental than the beraitot.

But as for Rabbi Zeira, what is the reason that he did not say as Rabba!?

He could say to you:

If we come to raise a difficulty from the Mishna in Bava Metzia, there is no difficulty here at all, for

does it teach

in that Mishna, “

If he said, ‘Give it,’ they give it, even after a long time,” so that we should raise a difficulty against our Mishna, which did not validate it after a long time—!?

so that we could challenge our Mishna, which did not deem it fit after a long time!?

For

perhaps

the Mishna’s intention is only that

if he said “

Give it,”

they give it,

but in any event

as we hold

in our Mishna, that

immediately

alone is it valid, but after a long time—not.

Rabbi Yirmeya said

to resolve both Rabba’s difficulty from the Mishna in Bava Metzia against our Mishna and Rabbi Zeira’s difficulty from the beraita against our Mishna:

That Mishna and that beraita are dealing with

a case where witnesses say: ‘We have never signed except on one divorce document of Yosef ben Shimon’,

so that there is no concern about another divorce document.

And we raise an objection:

If so,

the beraita that teaches: “When the husband admits it, he returns it to the woman,”

what does it teach us

what innovation is there in this? For since there is no concern about another divorce document, and there is not even concern that they had been written and he changed his mind about giving them, since the husband admits it, what did the beraita teach us—!?

And we answer:

You might say: Let us be concerned, perhaps it happened

that a divorce document of another couple fell here,

whose names are the same as the names

their names are the same as those of the couple in this document,

and

other witnesses signed it, whose names are

the same as the witnesses

who signed this document—

It teaches us

that we are not concerned about this.

Rav Ashi said

to resolve the difficulty from the Mishna in Bava Metzia and from the beraita:

For example, he says:

There is a perforation in it

in the divorce document

beside a particular letter

which would be a distinctive identifying mark ,

and through this identifying mark it is returned.

And the Gemara explains: Rav Ashi specifically said, “There is a perforation in it

beside a particular letter,”

and because

it would be—

this mark—

a distinctive identifying mark,

and there is no clearer testimony than this.

But an ordinary perforation,

where the loser did not say in which place the document was perforated,

is not

an identifying mark by which to return the document.

And why did Rav Ashi say specifically a distinctive identifying mark? Because

it is doubtful to him

to Rav Ashi

whether identifying marks are from the Torah

and one relies on them even concerning a divorce document, which comes to permit a Torah prohibition,

or

whether identifying marks are only

rabbinic,

and one relies on them only in monetary law, because “the ownerlessness declared by the court is ownerlessness,” but to permit a Torah prohibition through a positive act, they did not say [that one may rely on them]—

And because Rav Ashi was uncertain about this, he validated only through a distinctive identifying mark, which certainly helps even by Torah law to permit the prohibition of a married woman.

Rabba bar bar Hana—

when he was an agent to bring a divorce document—

his divorce document was lost in the house of study

he lost the divorce document in the house of study,

he said

Rabba bar bar Hana to the scholars who entered the house of study, who had found the divorce document:

If I have an identifying mark in it

if you wish me to give you an identifying mark—I have one in it.

If I have visual recognition

I have it in it

and if you want visual recognition, I have that in it as well.

And

they returned it to him

they returned the divorce document to Rabba bar bar Hana.

He said,

Rabba bar bar Hana:

I do not know:

Whether because of the identifying mark—

which was not distinctive—

they returned it

did they return it to me because of the mark,

and they hold: identifying marks are from the Torah,

and therefore relied even on a non-distinctive mark to return a divorce document and thereby permit the Torah prohibition of a married woman.

Or,

they hold that identifying marks are from the Torah, and would not rely on this non-distinctive mark, but

because of visual recognition

they returned it to me,

and specifically

because I am a

Torah scholar

they returned it to me,

but not an ordinary person,

they would not return it to him, for the mark is not a distinctive mark, and they do not rely on his visual recognition because he is suspected of lying.

We learned in the Mishna: If they found it immediately, it is valid,

but if not, it is invalid:

The Sages taught:

Which is one that was not found immediately,

which they do not return to him:

Rabbi Natan says: one that remained

the amount of time

for a caravan to pass and to camp

to stop there, even if it did not come.

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says:

There is no “measure” for this, and the divorce document is valid only

for the time it takes a person

to stand and see that no person passed there,

meaning: a person indeed stood there and saw that no other person besides the loser of the divorce document passed there.

And some say:

that a person should stand and see

that

no one passed and

that no person remained

there

there,

but if someone passed and did not remain there, we are not concerned that something fell from him.

Rabbi Meir says:

The measure of remaining is

the time it takes to write the divorce document.

This is the measure of “one that was not found immediately.”

Rabbi Yitzhak says:

The measure is:

the time it takes to read it,

the divorce document, which is a shorter measure, and beyond this it is not “immediately.”

Others say:

The measure is:

the time it takes to write it and

also

to read it.

And

they return the divorce document to him

even if it remained and it has identifying marks

that are distinctive,

testifying concerning it,

meaning: they return the divorce document through identifying marks; and what identifying marks?

For example,

they say: There is a perforation in it beside a particular letter.

But

however

they do not testify concerning bodily identifying marks

of the divorce document, namely,

they say: It is long

the divorce document,

and short

is the divorce document, for these are not identifying marks of anything, since there are many like these.