Gittin 24b (כד:) — the Talmud in English

Moreover,

even if

he had two wives, and their names were the same,

and

he wrote to divorce the older one,

but changed his mind,

he may not divorce the younger one with it.

Even though it was written for the sake of the divorcing husband, it was nevertheless not written for the sake of the woman being divorced.

Moreover,

even if

the man

who had two wives with the same names

said to the clerk [

a scribe]:

“Write me

a get, and

whichever

of them

I wish, I will divorce

with it

, it is invalid to divorce with it.”

Since “there is no retroactive clarification.” That is, we do not say that the matter became clarified retroactively, that he wrote the get for the sake of the woman whom he ultimately divorced. Rather, he must clarify at the time of writing who the woman being divorced is.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: Moreover,

he wrote to divorce his wife and reconsidered.

And

we challenge this:

But the first clause—what case does it concern?

That is, the first clause of our Mishna—“He was walking in the marketplace and heard the sound of scribes dictating, ‘So-and-so divorced so-and-so”—what case is it discussing? Is it not a case in which that particular man wished to divorce his wife but reconsidered, and his fellow came to use the same get? If so, what does the latter clause teach us?

Rav Pappa said:

The first clause

is discussing scribes who write for the purpose of study.

That get was not written for the purpose of divorce at all.

But the latter clause concerns a get that was written for the purpose of divorce, but designated for another woman.

Rav Ashi said: It is also precise [

the Mishna is precise in accordance with Rav Pappa’s statement]—

as it teaches, “scribes dictating,”

that is, teaching.

It does not teach, “scribes reading.”

Conclude from this

that it is as Rav Pappa said.

The Gemara continues to explain the Mishna:

What is the meaning of “Moreover”?

That is, what additional novelty is taught by each of the laws mentioned in the Mishna, where it says, “Moreover, he wrote to divorce his wife,” “Moreover, he had two wives,” and “Moreover, he said to the clerk”?

The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught:

This is the sequence of the novelties in the Mishna:

The first law concerns a case in which the get was not written for the purpose of divorce at all, but only for study.

The Mishna teaches

not

only that this get,

which was not written for the purpose of divorce,

is invalid,

but

that when he wrote to divorce his wife and reconsidered,

this too

is invalid. The novelty is that even though

it was written for the purpose of divorce,

since it was not written for the sake of the divorcing husband and the woman being divorced, it is

invalid.

And not

only this get,

which was not written for the purpose of his divorce,

is invalid,

but

moreover, if he had two wives with the same names and wrote to divorce the older one, he may not divorce the younger one with it.

The novelty is that

even this

get,

which was written for the purpose of his divorce,

that is, for the sake of the divorcing husband, is

invalid,

since it was not written for the sake of the woman being divorced.

And not

only this get,

which was not written for the purpose of this divorce,

that is, it was not written for the purpose desired by the husband, since initially he wrote it to divorce the other woman.

But moreover, even if he said to the clerk, “Write me a get for whichever of them I wish; I will divorce her,”

furthermore, even if he said to the scribe, “Write me a get for whichever of them I wish to divorce,”

this too

is invalid. And even though

it was written for the purpose of this divorce,

that is, the get was written for the divorce that was ultimately carried out with it, nevertheless, since “there is no retroactive clarification,”

it is invalid .

We inquire:

What is the reason?

That is, what is the source for each of the novelties taught in the Mishna?

The Gemara explains: The Torah states, “And he shall write for her a scroll of severance, and place it in her hand.” From the expression “a scroll of severance,” we learn the first law in the Mishna—that the get must be written for the purpose of severance. If it was written for study, it is invalid.

However,

if the Merciful One had written

only

“and he shall place a scroll of severance in her hand,” one might have thought

that the verse comes only

to exclude the first case [

the first law mentioned in the Mishna],

that he did not act [

that he did not write the get]

for the purpose of severance,

but only for study.

But the second law—“Moreover,

the second law—“furthermore, he wrote to divorce his wife and changed his mind”—he did act,

he wrote to divorce his wife and reconsidered; he acted” [

that he wrote the get]

for the purpose of severance; one might say

that it should be

valid.

Therefore

the Merciful One wrote, “And he shall write.”

That is, the husband is the one associated with the writing. We learn from here that the get must be written for the sake of the husband who divorces her.

However,

if the Merciful One had written

only

“and he shall write,” one might have thought

that the verse intends only

to exclude this case [

the second law in the Mishna],

that he did not write it for her,

but the third law—if

the third law—that if

he has two wives,

and he wrote to divorce one of them—one might have thought that since

he [

the husband]

wrote it for her, it should be valid.

Therefore

the Merciful One wrote, “for her.”

We learn that the get must be written

for her sake.

And

we challenge this:

The latter clause—“Moreover, he said to the clerk, ‘Write it for whichever of them I wish; I will divorce her, and it is invalid to divorce with it’”—

why do I need it?

We have already learned that the get must be written for his sake, for her sake, and for the purpose of divorce.

We answer:

This teaches us that “there is no retroactive clarification.”

That is, one should not say that it is retroactively clarified that at the time of writing he intended it for that woman. Rather, there must be complete clarification at the time of writing for whom he is writing it.

We learned in the Mishna: He had two wives with the same names,

he wrote to divorce the older one; he may not divorce the younger one with it:

The Gemara infers: Specifically,

it is the younger one whom he may not divorce with it. But

the

older one,

for whose sake the get was written,

he may divorce with it.

Even though the get itself contains no evidence that he intended it for her, and there would be reason to fear that it was written for her fellow and fell from her, and this woman found it, nevertheless we do not raise this concern. Since the get is in her possession, there is a presumption that it was written for her sake.

Rava said: That is to say,

this law teaches that if there were

two

men named

Yosef ben Shimon living in one city, they may produce promissory notes against others.

That is, if one of them produces a promissory note against another person, he may collect money from him, and the borrower is not believed to say, “I borrowed not from you but from your fellow, whose name is the same as yours; it fell from him and you found it.” Since the document is in his possession, it is certain that the borrower borrowed from him.

We learn this law from our Mishna: We do not suspect that the husband divorced the other woman and that the get fell from her and this woman found it. Rather, since the get is in her possession, there is a presumption that it was written for her sake.

Abaye said to him: If that is so,

if you infer from the Mishna that we are not concerned that perhaps the get fell from her fellow and she found it, you should also infer from

the first clause, as it teaches: “

He wrote a get to divorce his wife, then changed his mind, and found a townsman and said to him:

My name is the same as your name

and my wife’s name is the same as your wife’s,

it is invalid for him to divorce with it.”

Here too, one could infer: Only

the second man cannot divorce with it,

since it was not written for him;

but the first man can divorce with it.

And we are not concerned that perhaps it was not written for him, and that he received it from the second man, whose name was the same as his.

But

it is impossible to say this! For

we say

in tractate Bava Batra [172b]: “Two men named Joseph son of Simeon who lived in one city cannot produce a promissory note against one another,

nor can another person produce a promissory note against them,”

since each one can say: “It was not I who borrowed from you, but my fellow, and he gave you this promissory note.” Here too, we must be concerned that perhaps it was not the husband of this woman who wrote it; rather, another Joseph son of Simeon wrote it for his wife, then changed his mind and did not divorce her, deliberately threw it away, and this woman, who wishes to be divorced, took it.

But what alternative can you say?

Rather, certainly the first clause must be established as referring

to witnesses of delivery, and it is the opinion of Rabbi Elazar.

That is, we are not concerned that perhaps he did not divorce her, since we have witnesses to the delivery of the get, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, that “witnesses of delivery effect the divorce.”

Consequently, no proof can be brought from here to a case in which there is uncertainty regarding the delivery itself.

And if so,

here too

in the final clause, you cannot infer as Rava said, since it is possible to establish it

with witnesses of delivery, and

according to the opinion of

Rabbi Elazar.

Therefore, we are not concerned that perhaps he divorced not her but her fellow, since there were witnesses when he delivered the get to her.

Consequently, there is no proof for Rava’s statement mentioned above, and it is possible to say that two men with the same name cannot produce a promissory note against other people.

The discussion of “the scent of a get”

We learned in the Mishna: Any get that was not written for her sake is invalid.

And

Rav said: All of them

all the invalid gittin listed in our Mishna

disqualify her from the priesthood.

That is, if her husband is a priest, she becomes forbidden to him as a divorcee. And although the get is invalid, and her divorce did not take effect, nevertheless “the scent of a get” disqualifies her from the priesthood. That is, since there was an aspect of divorce—since the get was written for the purpose of divorce—she thereby became disqualified from the priesthood.

Except for the

get

first

get mentioned in the Mishna, which was not written for the purpose of divorce at all, but only for study, and in it there is no aspect of divorce whatsoever. Therefore, it does not disqualify her from the priesthood.

And Shmuel said: Even

the

first one also disqualifies her.

For in any event, it contains a slight “scent of a get,” since ultimately it was given to a woman.

And Shmuel follows his own reasoning,

and Shmuel follows his own approach,

as Shmuel said:

Whenever the Sages taught

the wording

“an invalid get,”

their intention was to say: Although it is

invalid, it

nevertheless

disqualifies

her from the priesthood, because of “the scent of a get”.

And similarly, when the Sages taught

“an invalid halitza,”

their intention was to say: It is

invalid,

meaning that it does not permit her to marry outside the levirate bond, but nevertheless it

disqualifies her from the brothers,

meaning that she may no longer enter into yibbum with the brothers; rather, they perform halitza for her again, this time validly.

Only when the Sages taught “it is not a get” or “it is not halitza” did they mean that the get or halitza is entirely void, and she is permitted to the priesthood or to undergo yibbum.

However,

in the West

in Eretz Yisrael

they said in the name of Rabbi Elazar:

Halitzot performed with the

left

foot,

or

at

night, are invalid,

and she must undergo halitza a second time. Since the Sages expounded in tractate Yevamot [104a] that halitza must be performed specifically with the right foot and during the day.

And

nevertheless, these halitzot

disqualify

her from undergoing yibbum with the brothers, since they bear the designation of halitza, although they were not performed validly.