Gittin 24b — the Talmud in English

Furthermore,

even

if he had two wives whose names were the same.

And

he wrote to divorce the elder one,

and reconsidered,

he may not divorce the younger one with it.

And even though it was written for the sake of the husband who divorces, in any event it was not written for the sake of the woman being divorced.

Furthermore,

even

if

the one who had two wives whose names were the same said

to the scribe [

a scribe] -

“Write me

a get, and

whichever

of them

I wish, I will divorce

with it

, it is invalid for divorcing with it.

Since “there is no retroactive clarification ”. That is, we do not say that the matter became clarified retroactively that he wrote the get for the sake of the woman whom he ultimately divorced. Rather, he must clarify at the time of writing who the woman being divorced is.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: “Furthermore,”

he wrote to divorce his wife, and reconsidered.

And

we object:

“But the first clause—in what case!?”

That is, the first clause of our Mishna—“He was walking in the marketplace and heard the voice of scribes reciting, ‘So-and-so divorced his wife so-and-so’”—what case does it deal with? Is it not a case in which that so-and-so wished to divorce his wife and reconsidered, and his fellow came to use that same get?! And if so, what does the latter clause teach?

Rav Pappa said:

The first clause

deals with scribes who are accustomed to write for the purpose of learning.

And that get was not written for the sake of divorce at all.

But the latter clause deals with a get that was written for the sake of divorce, except that it was designated for another woman.

Rav Ashi said: It is also precise [

Rav Pappa’s words are also precise from the Mishna] -

for it teaches, “scribes reciting,”

that is, teaching.

And it does not teach, “scribes reading.”

Conclude from it

in accordance with Rav Pappa’s words.

And the Gemara continues to explain the Mishna:

What is “furthermore”?

That is, what additional novelty is there in each law mentioned in the Mishna, where we learned, “furthermore, he wrote to divorce his wife,” “furthermore, he had two wives,” “furthermore, he said to the scribe”?

The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught:

This is the order of the novelties in the Mishna:

The first law deals with a case in which the get was not written for the sake of divorce at all, but rather for the purpose of learning.

And the Mishna teaches

not

only a get

this one, which was not written for the sake of divorce,

is invalid,

but

furthermore, he wrote to divorce his wife and reconsidered,

this too

is invalid. And the novelty is: even though

it was written for the sake of divorce,

since it was not written for the sake of the divorcing husband and the divorced wife,

it is invalid.

And not

only a get

this one, which was not written for the sake of his divorce,

is invalid,

but

furthermore, he had two wives whose names were the same, and he wrote to divorce the elder one—he may not divorce the younger one with it.

And the novelty is that

even

this get

which was written for the sake of his divorce,

that is, for the sake of the husband who divorces,

is invalid.

Since it was not written for the sake of the woman being divorced.

And not

only this get,

which was not written for the sake of this divorce,

that is, it was not written for the purpose that the husband now desires, for initially he wrote it to divorce the other wife.

But

furthermore, even if he said to the scribe, “Write me one for whichever of them I wish; I will divorce,”

this too

is invalid. And even

though it was written for the sake of this divorce.

That is, the writing of the get was for the sake of the divorce effected with it in the end, in any event, since “there is no retroactive clarification,”

it is invalid .

And we inquire about this:

What is the reason?

That is, what is the source for each of the novelties taught in the Mishna?

And the Gemara explains: It is stated in the Torah, “And he shall write for her a scroll of severance, and he shall place it in her hand.” From the expression “a scroll of severance,” we learned the first law in the Mishna—that the get must be written for the sake of severance. And if it was written for the purpose of learning, it is invalid.

But

if the Merciful One had written

only

“and he shall place a scroll of severance in her hand,” we would have thought

that the verse came only

to exclude the first case [

the first law mentioned in the Mishna],

that he did not perform [

that he did not write the get]

for the sake of severance,

but rather for the purpose of learning.

But

the second law—“furthermore,

he wrote to divorce his wife and reconsidered, that he did perform” [

that he wrote the get]

for the sake of severance; let us say

[that perhaps it will be]

valid.

Therefore,

the Merciful One wrote, “And he shall write.”

That is, the husband is the one who writes. And we learn from here that the get must be written for the sake of the husband who divorces.

But

if the Merciful One had written

only

“and he shall write,” we would have thought

that the verse’s intention was only

to exclude this one

[the second law in the Mishna],

since it was not he who wrote it for her,

but

the third law—that if

he has two wives,

and he wrote to divorce one of them, we would have thought that since

he

[the husband]

wrote it for her, let us say it is valid,

Therefore

the Merciful One wrote, “for her.”

And we learn that the get must be written

for her sake.

And

we object:

The latter clause - “furthermore, he said to the scribe, ‘Write for whichever of them I wish; I will divorce,’ and it is invalid for divorcing with it”—

why do I need it?

We already learned that the get must be written for his sake, for her sake, and for the sake of divorce?

And we answer:

This teaches us that “there is no retroactive clarification.”

That is, do not say that it became clarified retroactively that at the time of writing his intention was for that woman. Rather, there must be complete clarification at the time of writing for whom he is writing.

We learned in the Mishna: “He had two wives whose names were the same,”

he wrote to divorce the elder one; he may not divorce the younger one with it:

And the Gemara infers: Specifically,

it is the younger one whom he cannot divorce with it. But

the

elder one,

for whose sake the get was written,

he can divorce with it.

And even though there is no proof from the get that his intention was for her, and there would be room to be concerned that perhaps it was written for her fellow and fell from her, and this woman found it, nevertheless we are not concerned, since the get is in her possession; there is a presumption that it was written for her sake.

Rava said: This indicates,

from this law we learn that if there were

two

men called

Yosef ben Shimon, living in one city, they may produce promissory notes against others.

That is, if one of them produced a promissory note against another, he may collect money from him, and the borrower is not believed to say, “I borrowed not from you but from your fellow, whose name is the same as yours, and it fell from him and you found it.” Since the document is in his possession, he certainly borrowed from him.

And we learned this law from our Mishna: We are not concerned that the husband divorced her fellow, and the get fell from her and this woman found it; rather, since the get is in her possession, there is a presumption that it was written for her sake.

Abaye said to him: If so, then

if you infer from the Mishna that we are not concerned lest the get fell from her fellow and she found it, you should also infer from what

the first clause teaches:

“He wrote [a get] to divorce his wife, and then changed his mind, and his townsman found it and said to him

‘My name is the same as your name,

and my wife’s name is the same as your wife’s,”

[the get] is disqualified for divorcing with it.”

And here too it is possible to infer: only the

second one is unable to divorce with it,

since it was not written for his sake;

but the first one is able to divorce with it.

And we are not concerned lest it was not written for his sake, and [the first one] received it from the second, whose name is the same as his.

But

it is impossible to say this! For

we say

in tractate Bava Batra [172b]: “Two Yosef ben Shimon who were in one city cannot produce a promissory note against one another, nor can another person produce a promissory note against them,

”

since each one of them can say: “It was not I who borrowed from you, but my fellow, and he handed you this promissory note.” And here too there is concern lest it was not this woman’s husband who wrote it, but another Yosef ben Shimon wrote it for his wife, changed his mind, and did not divorce her, and deliberately threw it away to be lost, and this woman who wishes to be divorced took it.

Rather, what can you say?

Rather, certainly it is necessary to establish the first clause

as referring to witnesses of delivery, and it is the opinion of Rabbi Elazar.

That is to say: We are not concerned lest he did not divorce her, since we have witnesses to the delivery of the get, in accordance with the view of Rabbi Elazar, who says: “Witnesses of delivery effect the divorce.”

And consequently, no proof can be brought from here to a place where there is doubt concerning the delivery itself.

And if so,

here too

in the latter clause, you should not infer in accordance with Rava, since it is possible to establish it

as referring to witnesses of delivery, and

in accordance with the words of

Rabbi Elazar.

Therefore, we are not concerned lest he divorced not her but her fellow, since there were witnesses present when he handed her the get.

And consequently, there is no proof for Rava’s words, mentioned above, and it is possible to say that two people whose names are the same cannot produce a promissory note against others .

The sugya of “the scent of the get”

We learned in the Mishna: Every get that was written not for her sake is disqualified.

And

Rav said: All of them

all the disqualified gittin taught in our Mishna

disqualify [the woman] from the priesthood.

That is to say: If her husband is a priest, she becomes forbidden to him by the law applying to a divorcee. And even though the get is disqualified, and her divorce did not take effect, nevertheless “the scent of the get” disqualifies her from the priesthood. That is, since there was an aspect of divorce—since the get was written for the purpose of divorce—she was thereby disqualified from the priesthood.

Except for the

get

first

get taught in the Mishna, which was not written at all for the purpose of divorce, but in order to learn from it, and in it there is no aspect of divorce at all. Therefore, it does not disqualify her from the priesthood.

And Shmuel said: Even

the

first one also disqualifies.

For in any event there is a slight “scent of a get” in it, since ultimately it was given to a woman.

And Shmuel follows his own reasoning,

and Shmuel follows his own view,

, for Shmuel said

“Every place where the Sages taught

the expression

‘a disqualified get,’

their intention is to say: Indeed, it is

disqualified, and

nevertheless

it disqualifies

for the priesthood, because of “the scent of the get.”

And likewise, when the Sages taught

“a disqualified chalitza,”

their intention is to say:

disqualified,

for it does not permit her to marry outside the levirate bond, and nevertheless

it disqualifies her from the brothers,

so that she may no longer undergo yibbum with the brothers; rather, they perform a valid chalitza with her again.

Only where they taught “it is not a get,” or “it is not chalitza,” is their intention to say that the get or the chalitza is entirely void, and she is permitted to the priesthood or to undergo yibbum.

But

in the West

in the Land of Israel

they said in the name of Rabbi Elazar:

Chalitzot performed with the

left

foot,

or

at

night, are disqualified,

and she must undergo chalitza a second time. Since the Sages expounded in tractate Yevamot [104a] that chalitza must be performed specifically with the right foot , and during the day.

And

nevertheless these chalitzot

disqualify

her from undergoing yibbum with the brothers, since the name chalitza applies to them, but they were not performed validly.