Gittin 25a (כה.) — the Talmud in English

But the removal of the shoe of a

minor,

or

of

one who removed for him

an anpilya

[cloth shoe] instead of a sandal,

is entirely invalid

and

there is

no designation of halitza upon them at all, and therefore they do not

disqualify

the woman from entering into yibbum with the brothers.

But Shmuel disputes the בני מערבא regarding the halitza of a minor, since we learned in Yevamot [105b]: “A woman who performs halitza with a minor—her halitza is invalid.” And according to Shmuel, wherever the term “invalid halitza” is stated, the meaning is “invalid, and it disqualifies her from the brothers.” And not in accordance with the opinion of בני מערבא.

Ze’eiri said: All of them,

that is, all the invalid bills of divorce mentioned in the Mishna,

do not disqualify

the woman from marrying into the priesthood, and they do not even contain “the scent of a bill of divorce,”

except for

the case

last

mentioned in the Mishna: If he had two wives whose names were identical, and he said to the scribe: “Write me a bill of divorce, and I will divorce whichever of them I wish with it.”

And in such a case, although the bill of divorce is invalid because there is no retroactive determination, nevertheless, as a stringency we say that there is retroactive determination, and she is disqualified from marrying into the priesthood, since we are concerned that perhaps she is divorced.

And Rav Asi likewise said —

All of them do not disqualify her, except for the last one.

The discussion of retroactive determination

And Rabbi Yohanan said: Even

the bill of divorce

last

mentioned in the Mishna

also does not disqualify her.

Since there is no retroactive determination, whether as a stringency or as a leniency.

And Rabbi Yohanan follows his own reasoning

[Rabbi Yohanan follows his own position].

For Rav Asi said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: Brothers who divide

their father’s inheritance

are purchasers.

That is, we do not say that it is established retroactively that each one received his portion as an inheritance from his father. Rather, when they divide the inheritance, it is considered as though each one purchased his portion from his brother,

and

therefore

they return to one another

what they divided

in the Jubilee,

in accordance with the law governing purchasers who bought land. And they then take it again, as it was originally.

It is clear that Rabbi Yohanan held that there is no retroactive determination. Therefore, in our discussion as well, there is no retroactive determination even as a leniency. If he wrote her a bill of divorce through retroactive determination, it is not a bill of divorce at all, and she is not disqualified from marrying into the priesthood.

And

if you say: Why did Rabbi Yohanan need to teach us twice that there is no retroactive determination?

One can say

—

It was necessary. For if it had been stated in this case,

if Rabbi Yohanan had taught us that there is no retroactive determination only with regard to bills of divorce, we would have said: Only

in this case

[with regard to a bill of divorce]

did Rabbi Yohanan say that there is no retroactive determination, because we require

that the bill of divorce be written

“for her

sake,”

whereas in the case where he had two wives whose names were identical, at the time of writing it was not known for whom he was writing the bill of divorce. Therefore, it is invalid.

But there

[with regard to the brothers who divided their inheritance], we would have said that there is retroactive determination, and they need not return the land in the Jubilee, since now, at the time of the division, it is established retroactively that each one acquired the portion he received as an inheritance. Only with regard to

a sale did the Torah say that he must return it

[only with regard to a sale did the Torah introduce the requirement to return the purchased land]

in the Jubilee, but

in the property they acquired through

inheritance or a gift, it did not.

And

conversely,

if he had taught us

that there is no retroactive determination only with regard to the division of a

field,

we would have said: Only there is there no retroactive determination

because as a stringency

we say that they must return the land in the Jubilee. But where it is necessary to say that there is no retroactive determination as a leniency, such as with regard to an invalid bill of divorce, which does not disqualify the woman from marrying into the priesthood, perhaps Rabbi Yohanan would agree that we are concerned.

Alternatively,

it is specifically with regard to the division of a field that they must return it in the Jubilee, not because there is no retroactive determination, but

because

just as the field belonged

originally

to a single person, so now too it must be returned to a single domain.

But here,

with regard to a bill of divorce,

say that it is not so,

and say that there is retroactive determination.

Therefore

it was necessary

[Rabbi Yohanan needed] to teach his ruling twice.

Rav Hoshaya asked

[asked]

Rav Yehuda:

What is the law if the husband

said to the scribe—

“Write

me a bill of divorce

for whichever

woman

leaves through the doorway first; what is the law?”

Do we say that it is established retroactively that the bill of divorce was written for the woman who left first?

He said to him,

Rav Yehuda

, you have learned it

[we learned this question in the Mishna]!

For it is stated in our Mishna:

“Furthermore, if he said to the scribe, ‘Write

me a bill of divorce, and

whichever

of my wives

I wish, I will divorce

with it,’

it is invalid for him to divorce with it.”

Apparently,

the Mishna teaches that

“there is no retroactive determination.”

Likewise, if he writes a bill of divorce for whichever of them leaves through the doorway first, it is invalid, since there is no retroactive determination.

He challenged him

[Rav Hoshaya challenged Rav Yehuda’s statement]: But we learned—

“One who says to his sons: ‘I am slaughtering the Paschal offering for whichever of you comes up to Jerusalem first; once

the

first one has brought his head and the majority of his body

into Jerusalem,

he has acquired his portion, and he grants his brothers a portion with him.’”

In the straightforward understanding, he acquired his portion by virtue of retroactive determination, as it was established retroactively that the offering had been slaughtered on his behalf. If so, with regard to bills of divorce as well, should we say that there is retroactive determination?

He said to him,

Rav Yehuda said:

Hoshaya, my son

[my son],

what connection do the laws of the Paschal offerings have to the laws of bills of divorce?!

It was stated concerning it

[the Mishna you cited concerning Paschal offerings]—

Rabbi Yohanan said:

The statement in the Mishna, “Once the first one enters, he acquires his portion,” does not mean that only the first one acquires his portion by virtue of retroactive determination. Rather, the father truly appointed all of them to the offering, and only

in order to encourage them in the mitzvot

did he say this to them.

And

it is also precise

[this is also precise from the language of the Mishna],

as it teaches—

“Once the first one has brought his head and the majority of his body into Jerusalem, he has acquired his portion, and he grants his brothers a portion with him.”

And we infer:

Granted, if you say that he appointed them from the outset, this is well!

[If we say that the father appointed all his sons to the offering, and merely told them that it would be slaughtered for the one who first came up to Jerusalem in order to encourage them in the mitzvot, it is entirely understandable why, in the end, when the first one acquired his portion, his brothers acquired a portion through him as well].

But if you say that he did not appoint them

[but rather, his intention was only to appoint the one who came up first, by means of retroactive determination],

then how, after the first one acquired his portion, did his brothers acquire a portion through him?

And is it possible that

after slaughtering, they could be appointed

[is it possible to be appointed to a Paschal offering after it has already been slaughtered]?!

And

indeed

we learned: They may be registered

for a Paschal offering

and withdraw from it

[retract their registration]

until it is slaughtered.

But after slaughter, it is impossible to register for it or reconsider one’s registration!

In the case under discussion, since the offering had already been slaughtered, the brothers could no longer register for it. Inevitably, then, the case is one in which the father truly appointed all of them before the slaughter, and merely said what he said in order to encourage them in the mitzvot. If so, no proof can be brought from here that there is retroactive determination.

It was taught likewise

[and so we learned, that his intention was only to encourage them]:

“An incident occurred, and the daughters preceded the sons, and the daughters were found to be diligent and the sons indolent!”

It was not stated that the sons did not acquire their portions. It is clear that all of them had been appointed to the offering.

This concludes the exchange between Rav Hoshaya and Rav Yehuda.

Abaye said:

I do not understand the statements of Rav Hoshaya and Rav Yehuda. Apparently, each of them was speaking about a different subject?

For

he was asking him

[Rav Hoshaya asked Rav Yehuda] about

“a matter dependent on the will of others”

[what the law is concerning retroactive determination when it depends on the will of others], that is, if he said, “Write me a bill of divorce for whichever woman leaves first,” in which case the matter does not depend on the husband’s will, but on the woman’s will. Rav Hoshaya was uncertain in this case whether there is retroactive determination.

And

if Rav Yehuda

resolved his question

[resolved his uncertainty] from our Mishna, which deals with retroactive determination where it

depends on one’s own will,

that is, whether he will wish to divorce the first woman or the second.

And then he challenged him

[Rav Hoshaya again challenged his statement] with a case involving

“a matter dependent on the will of others,”

namely, “I am slaughtering the offering for whichever one comes up first to Jerusalem,” where the matter does not depend on the father’s will, but on who comes up first.

But this is difficult, for the case under discussion is not comparable to the proof?

Rava said: What difficulty is this? Perhaps, one who has

it

[one who holds] that there is

“retroactive determination”

holds that it

makes no difference

whether it is a case in which the matter

depends on one’s own will, or whether it depends on the will of others;

in every case

he holds that there is retroactive determination.

And one who does not hold that there is “retroactive determination”

holds that it

makes no difference whether it depends on one’s own will or whether it depends on the will of others;

in every case

he does not hold that there is retroactive determination.

If so, Rav Yehuda properly resolved Rav Hoshaya’s uncertainty.

Rav Mesharsheya said to Rava:

How can you say that there is no difference between “a matter dependent on the will of others” and “a matter dependent on one’s own will” with regard to retroactive determination?

But

we find the position of

Rabbi Yehuda, who

in a case of

“a matter dependent on one’s own will” does not hold that there is retroactive determination, but

in a case of

“a matter dependent on the will of others” holds that there is retroactive determination?

And where are these statements of Rabbi Yehuda taught?

In a matter dependent on one’s own will, he does not hold that there is retroactive determination—

as it was taught: One who purchases wine from among the Samaritans,

and does not have a vessel with which to separate terumot and tithes,

says: ‘Two log

from one hundred

that I am destined to separate shall be teruma

from the wine.

Ten

log,