Gittin 25a — the Talmud in English

But the halitza of a

minor,

or

or

one for whom she performed halitza with a

felt slipper [cloth footwear] instead of a sandal,

cloth shoes] instead of a sandal,

are invalid

entirely,

and there is

no designation of halitza upon them at all, and therefore they do not

disqualify

the woman from entering yibbum with the brothers.

But Shmuel disputes the inhabitants of the West regarding the halitza of a minor, since we learned in Yevamot [105b]: “A woman who performs halitza with a minor—her halitza is invalid.” And according to Shmuel, everywhere that “invalid halitza” is stated, the meaning is “invalid and disqualifying from [marrying] the brothers.” And not in accordance with the view of the inhabitants of the West.

Zeiri said: All of them,

that is, all the invalid bills of divorce mentioned in the Mishna,

do not disqualify

the woman from [marrying into] the priesthood, and there is not even “the scent of a bill of divorce” in them,

except for

the

last

law mentioned in the Mishna—if he had two wives whose names were identical, and he said to the scribe: “Write me a bill of divorce, and I will divorce with it whichever of them I wish.”

And in such a case, even though the bill of divorce is invalid, since there is no berera, nevertheless, as a stringency we say that there is berera, and she is disqualified from [marrying into] the priesthood, for we are concerned that perhaps she is divorced.

And Rav Asi likewise said—

all of them do not disqualify. Except for the last one.

The discussion of berera.

And Rabbi Yohanan said: Even

the

last

bill of divorce brought in the Mishna

also does not disqualify.

Since there is no berera, both as a stringency and as a leniency.

And Rabbi Yohanan followed his own reasoning

[Rabbi Yohanan follows his own position].

For Rav Asi said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: Brothers who divided

their father’s inheritance

are purchasers.

That is, we do not say that it became clear retroactively that each one received his portion as an inheritance from his father; rather, when they divide the inheritance, the matter is considered as though each one purchased his portion from his brother,

and

therefore

they return to one another

what they divided

in the Jubilee,

according to the law of purchasers who purchased land. And they return and take again, as at the beginning.

And it is explained that Rabbi Yohanan held that there is no berera. Therefore, also in our discussion, there is no berera even as a leniency. And if he wrote her a bill of divorce through berera, it is not a bill of divorce at all, and she is not disqualified from [marrying into] the priesthood.

And

if you should say: Why did Rabbi Yohanan need to teach us twice that there is no berera”?

It may be said—

it is necessary.

For if it had been stated in this case,

if Rabbi Yohanan had taught us that there is no berera only regarding bills of divorce, we would say: Only

in this case [with a bill of divorce]

with regard to a bill of divorce]

did Rabbi Yohanan say that there is no berera, because we require

that the bill of divorce be written

“for her

sake,”

whereas in the case where he had two wives whose names were identical, at the time of the writing it was not known for whose sake he wrote the bill of divorce. And therefore it is invalid.

But there

[regarding the brothers who divided], we would say that there is berera, and they do not need to return [the land] in the Jubilee, since now, at the time of the division, it became clear retroactively that each one acquired the portion he received as an inheritance. And only regarding

a sale did the Merciful One say that he must return it [only regarding a sale did the Torah establish that the acquired land must be returned]

only with regard to a sale did the Torah introduce the requirement to return the purchased land]

in the Jubilee, but

what they acquired through

inheritance and a gift, they do not.

And

likewise conversely,

if he had taught us

that there is no berera only regarding the division of a

field,

we would say: Only there is there no berera

because as a stringency

we say that they must return [the land] in the Jubilee. But where we must say that there is no berera as a leniency, such as regarding an invalid bill of divorce, which does not disqualify the woman from [marrying into] the priesthood, perhaps Rabbi Yohanan agrees that we are concerned.

Alternatively,

only regarding the division of a field must they return [it] in the Jubilee, and not because there is no berera, but

since

just as the field belonged

at first

to one man, so now too it must be returned to one domain.

But here,

regarding a bill of divorce,

say no,

and let us say that there is berera.

Therefore

it is necessary [Rabbi Yohanan needed] to repeat his law twice.

[A0097]Rav Hoshaya asked [asked]

Rav Hoshaya asked [

asked]

Rav Yehuda:

What is the law if the husband

said to the penman—

“Write

me a bill of divorce

for whichever

woman

will leave through the doorway first”—what is [the law]?

Do we say that it becomes clear retroactively that the bill of divorce was written for the sake of the one who left first?

He said to him:

Rav Yehuda

, you have learned it

[we learned this question in the Mishna]!

As it is stated in our Mishna:

“Furthermore, he said to the penman, ‘Write me

a bill of divorce, and

whichever

of my wives

I wish, I shall divorce

with it,”

it is invalid for divorcing with it.

It follows

that it is explained in the Mishna that

“there is no berera.”

And likewise, if he writes a bill of divorce for whichever of them will leave through the doorway first, it is invalid, since there is no berera.

He raised an objection to him [Rav Hoshaya objected to Rav Yehuda’s words]: But we learned—

Rav Hoshaya challenged Rav Yehuda’s statement]: We learned

“One who says to his sons, ‘Behold, I am slaughtering the Paschal offering for the one among you who will go up first to Jerusalem; once the first enters

the

first one his head and most of his body

into Jerusalem,

he has acquired his portion, and he grants his brothers a portion with him.’”

And simply, he acquired his portion because of berera, for it became clear retroactively that the sacrifice had been slaughtered for him. If so, also regarding bills of divorce, let us say that there is berera”?

He said to him,

Rav Yehuda:

Hoshaya, my son [my son],

my son],

what connection do Paschal offerings have with bills of divorce?!

This was stated about it [it was stated regarding the Mishna you brought concerning Paschal offerings]—

this is what was said concerning the Mishna you cited about Paschal offerings]:

Rabbi Yohanan said:

What is stated in the Mishna, “Once the first entered, he acquired his portion,” does not mean that only the first acquires his portion by virtue of berera. Rather, in truth, the father appointed all of them for the sacrifice, and only

in order to urge them in the mitzvot

did he say this to them.

And

this too may be inferred [it is also precise from the wording of the Mishna],

this is also indicated precisely by the language of the Mishna],

for it teaches—

“Once the first entered, his head and most of his body, he acquired his portion, and he grants his brothers a portion with him.”

And we infer:

If you say that he appointed them from the outset, it is well! [If we say that the father appointed all his sons for the sacrifice, and only in order to urge them in the mitzvot did he tell them that he would slaughter it for the one who went up first to Jerusalem, then it is entirely understandable why, in the end, when the first acquired his portion, his brothers acquired theirs through him].

If we say that the father designated all his sons as participants in the offering, and merely told them that it would be slaughtered for whoever ascended first to Jerusalem in order to encourage them in the mitzvot, then it is well understood why, once the first acquired his portion, his brothers acquired their portions through him.]

But if you say that he did not appoint them [but if you say that he did not appoint them, and his intention was only to appoint the one who would go up first, by virtue of berera],

but if you say that he did not designate them, and intended only to designate whoever ascended first, by means of “retroactive clarification”],

then how, after the first acquired his portion, did his brothers acquire theirs through him?

And is it that

after slaughtering, they can be appointed [is it possible to be appointed to a Paschal offering after it has already been slaughtered]?!

can one become designated as a participant in the Paschal offering after it has already been slaughtered]?!

And

indeed

we learned: People may enroll

in a Paschal offering,

and withdraw their hands from it [retract their enrollment]

withdraw from their designation as participants]

until it is slaughtered.

But after slaughtering, it is impossible to enroll or reconsider!

And in the matter under discussion, since the sacrifice had already been slaughtered, the brothers could no longer enroll in it. And necessarily, it is speaking of a case where the father truly appointed all of them before the slaughtering, and only in order to urge them in the mitzvot did he say what he said. If so, one cannot prove from here that there is berera.

It was likewise taught [and so we learned, that his intention was only to urge them]:

“An incident occurred, and the daughters preceded the sons, and the daughters were found to be zealous and the sons lowly!”

And it was not said that the sons did not acquire their portions. It is explained that all of them had been appointed for the sacrifice.

Thus far was the discussion that took place between Rav Oshaya and Rav Yehuda.

This concludes the exchange between Rav Hoshaya and Rav Yehuda.

Abaye said:

I do not understand the words of Rav Oshaya and Rav Yehuda. For seemingly, each one of them is speaking about a different subject?

For

he was asking him [Rav Oshaya asked Rav Yehuda]

Rav Hoshaya asked Rav Yehuda] about

“one who makes it dependent on the דעת of others” [what is the law of berera when he makes it dependent on the דעת of others], that is, if he said, “Write me a bill of divorce for whichever one will leave first,” in which case the matter does not depend on the husband’s דעת, but on the woman’s דעת. And in this Rav Oshaya was uncertain whether there is berera.

what the law is concerning retroactive clarification when the matter depends on the decision of others], that is, when he said, “Write me a bill of divorce for whichever woman leaves first,” in which case the matter does not depend on the husband’s decision but on the woman who leaves first. Rav Hoshaya was uncertain whether in such a case there is “retroactive clarification.”

And

whereas Rav Yehuda

resolved it for him [resolved the doubt for him] from our Mishna, which deals with berera in a case where he

resolved his uncertainty] from our Mishna, which concerns retroactive clarification where the matter

makes it dependent on his own דעת,

that is, whether he will wish to divorce the first or the second.

And then he raised an objection to him [Rav Oshaya again objected to his words] from a case dealing with

Rav Hoshaya again challenged his statement] from a case involving

“one who makes it dependent on the דעת of others,”

namely, “Behold, I am slaughtering for the one who will go up first to Jerusalem,” where the matter does not depend on the father’s דעת, but on whoever goes up first.

And it is difficult: is the subject under discussion comparable to the proof?

Rava said: What difficulty is there? Perhaps, one who has

it [one who holds] that there is

whoever holds] that there is

“berera,”

holds that it

makes no difference

whether it is a case where he

makes it dependent on his own דעת, or makes it dependent on the דעת of others;

in every case

he holds that there is berera.

And one who does not hold “berera,”

holds that it

makes no difference whether he makes it dependent on his own דעת or makes it dependent on the דעת of others;

in every case

he does not hold berera.

And if so, Rav Yehuda properly resolved Rav Oshaya’s doubt.

Rav Mesharsheya said to Rava:

How can you say that there is no difference between “one who makes it dependent on the דעת of others” and “one who makes it dependent on his own דעת” regarding berera?

But

we find the view of

Rabbi Yehuda, that in

in the case of

“one who makes it dependent on his own דעת” he does not hold berera, but

in the case of

in “one who makes it dependent on the דעת of others” he does hold berera?

And where are these words of Rabbi Yehuda taught?

“One who makes it dependent on his own דעת does not hold berera”—

as it was taught: One who purchases wine from among the Samaritans,

and does not have a vessel with which to separate tithes and terumot,

says: ‘Two log

out of one hundred

that I am destined to separate, behold, they are teruma

within the wine.

Ten

log,