Gittin 24a (כד.) — the Talmud in English

And the beraita continues: Since we learn this from women who are not believed,

from the very source from which you derived it

we must learn the matter from there in its entirety:

Just as there,

with regard to those women,

they must say

at the time of bringing the get,

“It was written in our presence and it was signed in our presence,”

as is the law with every agent who brings a get from overseas,

so too she

herself, who brings her get from overseas,

must say

“It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence.”

This is an explicit proof of the opinion of Abaye, that the law concerning women who are not believed is referring to overseas, when they say, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence.”

Rav Ashi said: The Mishna also proves this,

that it is referring to overseas.

As it teaches

at the end:

“The woman herself may bring her get, provided that she must say

“It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence.” This is evidently referring to overseas.

And we conclude: Indeed,

infer from this!

We raise an objection:

But Rav Yosef,

who establishes our Mishna in Eretz Yisrael, should find this difficult: Is it possible that

the first clause and the final clause are referring to overseas,

while

the middle clause is referring to Eretz Yisrael?

For Rav Yosef himself established the previous Mishna, “Everyone is fit to bring the get, except for a deaf-mute and a blind person,” as referring to overseas; and the final clause of our Mishna, which states that the woman herself may bring her get, is likewise speaking of overseas, whereas the middle clause, which is the first clause of our Mishna, speaks of women who are not believed in Eretz Yisrael!

We answer:

Yes!

Indeed,

the first clause and the final clause are referring to overseas,

while

the middle clause is referring to Eretz Yisrael.

From where

is it necessary to say that the middle clause is speaking of Eretz Yisrael?

As it teaches

in the Mishna:

“What is the difference between a get and a report of death? The written document provides proof,”

indicating that it is speaking of Eretz Yisrael, where the agent who brings the get does not need to say, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence”; rather, we rely solely on the written document, namely, on the get brought by the women who are not believed, and not at all on their testimony.

And it does not teach

“that the written document and the mouth provide proof,”

whereas according to Abaye, who says that it is referring to overseas, we also need the women’s testimony, that they say, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence.”

Abaye will explain the intention of the Mishna as follows: What is the difference between the “mouth” of a get, where the women are believed to say, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence,” and the “mouth” of a report of death, where they are not believed to say that her husband died? In the case of a get, the written document provides proof together with the “mouth,” because fundamentally we rely on the get itself, and not only on the women’s testimony.

We learned in the Mishna:

“The woman herself may bring

her get, provided that she must say, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence.”

We raise a difficulty: Why must she say, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence”? When she herself brings her get from overseas to Eretz Yisrael, she is not bringing it in the capacity of an agent, since

a woman, as soon as her get reaches her hand,

at the moment she receives the get from her husband overseas,

she is divorced by it.

She is immediately divorced there, and she may already burn the get. She need only bring it before us as mere proof of the divorce; in such a case, the law requiring her to say, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence,” should not apply!

Rav Huna said: Our Mishna is speaking of a husband who says to his wife: Do not

be divorced by this get

except before a particular court.

It follows that the get does not take effect until here, in Eretz Yisrael, before that court. Until then she was only an agent for delivering the get, and therefore she must say, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence.”

We challenge this:

Ultimately, when she arrives there,

when she comes before the court,

she is divorced by it.

She is divorced through the initial acceptance by which she received it from her husband, since he did not intend merely to impose a condition that she bring it to a particular place; rather, the condition has been fulfilled, and there is still no agency here that would require her to say, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence”!

We answer:

Rather, Rav Huna bar Menaḥem said

in the name of Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika: He said to her:

The husband said:

“When you arrive there,

when you reach that place,

place it on the ground,

put the get down on the ground,

and pick it up,

and take it again. Therefore, until she places the get on the ground, she serves as an agent for delivery, and by taking it from the ground she becomes divorced.

We challenge this:

If so, it would be

as though her husband had said to her:

“Take your get from atop the ground

and be divorced by it”!

And Rava said:

If one says to his wife:

“Take your get from atop the ground,”

he has said nothing,

and she is not divorced, because the get must be given from the husband’s hand into the woman’s hand, as it is stated: “And he shall place it in her hand”!

We answer:

Rather, he said to her: Be

an

agent for delivery until you arrive there,

until you reach that place,

and when you arrive there,

when you reach that place,

be

your own

agent for receipt

of the get,

and receive your get

from your own hand.

We challenge this:

But the agency did not return to the husband!

For we have an established principle that an agent is called an agent only when he is sent from one person to another and is capable of returning to his sender and saying to him: “I carried out your agency for your fellow.” Here, the woman cannot return to her husband, who appointed her, and say this, because immediately upon completing her agency she becomes an agent for receipt and becomes the principal party to the act itself; the agency is nullified before she can return to her sender. And in such a case the law of agency does not apply!

We answer: The case is one where he said to her:

“Be an agent for delivery until you arrive

there,”

and when you arrive there, appoint

when you come there, appoint another person as an

agent for receipt,

who will receive the get from your hand on your behalf. Thus, when she completes her agency for delivery, she has not yet withdrawn from her agency and can then return to her husband, who appointed her, and say to him, “I carried out your agency to deliver the get.”

We challenge this:

That works according to the one who says

“A woman may appoint an agent to receive her get from her husband’s agent.”

But according to the one who says that a woman may not appoint an agent to receive her get from her husband’s agent,

rather, she herself must receive the get from her husband’s agent, as the reason is explained below,

what can be said?

How can she appoint an agent to receive the get on her behalf from her husband’s agent, who is in this case she herself? We answer:

What is the reason

for the rule that a woman may not appoint an agent to receive her get from her husband’s agent? It is

because this would cause the husband humiliation.

He thinks that she is humiliating him by not wishing to receive the get herself. He therefore would not have sent the get with this understanding, and consequently the get is invalid. [But when he himself hands the get to the woman’s agent, we see that he does not object to this.]

But

in this case,

the husband does not object!

For he himself instructed her to do so.

We challenge this:

That works according to the one who says

that the entire reason is

because of the husband’s humiliation;

here, the husband suffers no humiliation.

But according to the one who says

that the reason is

because

this resembles

“her courtyard that comes into her possession afterward,”

lest people come to validate a case in which the husband threw the get into another person’s courtyard and afterward the woman purchased the courtyard from him. For if we say that acquisition through a courtyard is based on the law of “agency,” as though the courtyard were an agent, then at first the courtyard was like the husband’s “agent for delivery,” and afterward, when the woman acquired it, the courtyard became like the woman’s “agent for receipt.” In truth, in the stated case the get is invalid. A “courtyard” does not acquire on the basis of agency, but on the basis of “hand,” since a person’s courtyard is considered as though it were his hand. The get must be given from the husband’s hand into the woman’s hand or into her courtyard, whereas here, at the time of the giving, the courtyard did not yet belong to her.

Therefore, the Sages decreed that a woman may not appoint an agent to receive her get from her husband’s agent.

And according to this authority,

what can be said?

For this reason also applies in our case. How can she appoint an agent for receipt to receive the get from her hand, when she is the husband’s agent?

We answer: Here, the case is one where he said to her:

“Be an agent for delivery until you arrive there, and when you arrive there, appoint an agent,”

appoint another agent for delivery.

During that interval, she can return to her sender and say, “I carried out your agency,” and this constitutes “the agency returning to the husband.”

And afterward,

“receive your get from him,”

from the agent for delivery.

In this manner, the Mishna says that the woman must say, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence.” For the law is that when the first agent appoints a second agent, he must do so before a court, and then say before them, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence.” Here, the woman is the first agent, and she must say before the court, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence,” when she appoints the second agent.

Alternatively, if you wish, say that he said to her: Be an agent for delivery until you arrive there. And when you arrive there, say before the court

say before the court:

“It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence.”

And the court appoints an agent,

the court itself appoints another agent for delivery,

and he shall give it to you,

and that agent will hand the get to you.

We shall return to you, chapter “The One Who Brings a Get.”

Introduction

The Torah states in the passage concerning gittin: “And he shall write for her a scroll of severance.” The verse teaches that the get must be written for the sake of the husband who divorces her, as it is written, “And he shall write,” indicating that the writing must be for his sake, and for the sake of the woman being divorced, as it is written, “for her,” indicating that the writing must be for her sake. If it was not written for their sake, the get is invalid.

We also learn from here that the get must be written for the purpose of divorcing the woman—that is, for the purpose of “severance,” as it is written, “a scroll of severance.” However, if the get was written for the purpose of studying how to write a get, it is invalid for use in divorce.

The tannaim disagree concerning the nature of writing for her sake.

According to Rabbi Meir, “the signatures of the witnesses effect the divorce,” meaning that the essential validity of the get is established by the witnesses’ signatures on it. Therefore, the Torah’s intention is that the witnesses sign the get for the sake of the husband, for the sake of the woman, and for the purpose of divorce. But the text of the get itself need not be written for her sake.

According to them, even if the husband found the get in a garbage heap and had witnesses sign it for her sake, this get is valid for use in divorce.

However, according to Rabbi Elazar, “the witnesses to delivery effect the divorce,” meaning that the essential testimony concerning the get is not the witnesses’ signatures on the document, but the witnesses’ presence when the get is delivered from the husband to the woman. According to him, as a matter of fundamental law, the witnesses need not sign the get at all; their presence when the get is delivered from the husband to the woman is sufficient.

According to him, it necessarily follows that since the Torah requires the get to be written for her sake, its intention is that the get itself be written for her sake, and not that it be signed for her sake.

Our Mishna discusses and explains the parameters of writing for her sake.

The following are five cases of

“not for her sake”

:

The first –

A scribe who wrote the get with no intention of divorce at all, but only to study how to write a get—the get is invalid, since it was not written for the purpose of a divorce get.

The second –

A scribe who wrote forms of gittin for himself, intending to use them when people would come before him to divorce their wives. Even if he saw a quarrel between a man and his wife and wrote a get for them, the get is invalid. Since the get was not written at the husband’s instruction, it was not written for the purpose of severance.

The third –

The scribe wrote the get at the husband’s instruction and for the purpose of divorce, but the husband reconsidered and abandoned the divorce, and gave the get to his friend, whose name and his wife’s name were the same as those written in the get—the get is invalid, since it was not written for the sake of the divorcing husband and the woman being divorced.

The fourth –

He wrote the get for the sake of one of his wives, then reconsidered and wished to divorce his second wife, who had a similar name—the get is invalid, since it was not written for the sake of the woman being divorced.

The fifth –

He had two wives with the same names, and wrote a get in order to be able to divorce whichever one he wished—the get is invalid. Since at the time of writing it was not clarified for whom he intended it, whereas the Torah states, “And he shall write for her,” indicating that it must be clear at the time of writing for whom the get was written. [Based on Tosafot and the Ramban.]

Mishna:

Any get

that was written

not for the sake of

divorcing a

woman is invalid.

The same law applies if it was not written for the sake of the husband who divorces her, as stated in the introduction to our Mishna.

The Mishna explains,

How?

He was passing through the marketplace and heard the sound of scribes dictating [

that is, the sound of scribes teaching the writing of gittin] and instructing their students to write:

“So-and-so divorces so-and-so, from such-and-such a place.”

And he said:

“This is my name and this is my wife’s name. It is invalid to divorce with it.”

Since it was not written for his sake or for the purpose of divorce.

Moreover,

even if he

wrote

a get in order

to divorce his wife, and reconsidered [

he changed his mind],

and

his fellow townsman found it and said to him:

“My name is the same as yours, and my wife’s name is the same as your wife’s

; give me the get and I will divorce my wife with it” ,

it is invalid to divorce with it,

even though it was written for the purpose of divorce; nevertheless, that particular get was not written for the sake of the divorcing husband and the woman being divorced.