Gittin 24a — the Talmud in English

And the beraita continues: Since we learn this from women who are not believed,

from the place from which you came

we must learn entirely from there:

Just as there,

with those women,

they need to say

at the time of bringing the get, “

It was written in our presence and it was signed in our presence,”

as is the law concerning every agent who brings a get from overseas,

so too she

herself, who brings her get from overseas,

needs to say “

It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence.”

This is explicitly like Abaye, that the law of the women who are not believed is speaking of overseas, when they say, “It was written in our presence and it was signed in our presence.”

Rav Ashi said: The Mishna also is precise,

that it is speaking of overseas.

For it teaches

at the end:

“The woman herself brings her get, provided that she needs to say “

It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence.” That is, [the case is] overseas.

And we conclude: Indeed,

learn from it!

And we raise an objection:

But Rav Yosef,

who establishes our Mishna in the Land of Israel, this is difficult for him: Is it that

the beginning and the end are in overseas,

while

the middle is in the Land [of Israel]?

For Rav Yosef himself established the preceding Mishna [on the previous page], “Everyone is fit to bring a get, except a blind person,” in overseas, and the end of our Mishna, that the woman herself brings her get, also speaks of overseas, whereas the middle, which is the beginning of our Mishna, speaks of women who are not believed in the Land of Israel!

And we answer:

Yes!

Indeed,

the beginning and the end are in overseas,

while

the middle is in the Land [of Israel].

From where [do we know this]?

What is the necessity for saying that the middle is speaking of the Land of Israel?

Since it teaches

in the Mishna, “

What is the difference between a get and death? The writing proves it,”

it follows that it is speaking of the Land of Israel, where the agent who brings the get does not need to say, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence,” but we rely on the writing alone, that is, on the get that the women who are not believed bring, and not on their speech at all.

And it does not teach “

that the writing and the mouth prove it,”

whereas according to Abaye, who says that it is speaking of overseas, we also need the speech of the women, that they should say, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence.”

And Abaye will explain the intention of the Mishna: What is the difference between the “mouth” of a get, where the women are believed to say, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence,” and the “mouth” concerning death, where they are not believed to say, “Her husband died”? It is because with a get, the writing proves together with the “mouth,” for fundamentally we rely on the get itself and not only on the women’s speech.

We learned in the Mishna:

“The woman herself brings

her get, provided that she needs to say, ‘It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence.’”

And we raise an objection: Why does she need to say, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence”? But when she herself brings her get from overseas to the Land of Israel, she does not bring it in the capacity of an agent, for

a woman, as soon as her get reaches her hand,

at the moment when she receives the get from her husband overseas,

she is divorced by it,

she is immediately divorced there, and she can already burn the get. Rather, she needs to bring it before us merely as evidence of the divorce, and in such a case the law of “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence” does not apply!?

Rav Huna said: Our Mishna speaks of a case where the husband says to his wife: Do not

be divorced by this get

except before a certain court,

so it is found that the get takes effect only here, in the Land of Israel, before the court, and until then she was merely an agent for conveying the get. Therefore, she needs to say, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence.”

And we object:

Ultimately, when she arrives there,

when she arrives before the court,

she is divorced by it,

she is divorced through the first receiving by which she received it from her husband, for he did not intend merely to make an ordinary condition, that she should bring it to a certain place, and the condition has been fulfilled, and there is still here no agency in the legal sense such that she should need to say, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence”!

And we answer:

Rather, Rav Huna bar Menaḥem said

in the name of Rav Aha son of Rav Ika: [The case is] that he said to her,

the husband:

When you arrive there,

when you arrive at that place,

put it down on the ground,

put the get on the ground,

and pick it up,

and take it again. Therefore, until she puts the get on the ground, she serves as an agent for conveying it, and by taking it from the ground she is divorced.

And we object:

If so, it would be

as though her husband said to her:

“Take your get from atop the ground

and be divorced by it”!

And Rava said:

If one says to his wife:

“Take your get from atop the ground”—

he has said nothing,

and she is not divorced, because the get must be given from the husband’s hand to the woman’s hand, as it is stated, “And he gives it into her hand”!?

And we answer:

Rather, he said to her: Be

—be

an agent for conveying it until you arrive there,

until you arrive there,

and when you arrive there,

and when you arrive there,

be

you yourself

an agent for receiving

your get,

and receive your get

from your own hand.

And we object:

But the agency did not return to the husband!?

For it is an established principle for us that an agent is called an agent only when he is sent from one person to another, and he is fit to return to his sender and say to him, “I carried out your agency for your fellow.” But here the woman cannot return to the husband who sent her and say this, because immediately upon the completion of her agency, she becomes an agent for receiving, and becomes the principal actor herself, and the agency is nullified before she returns to the sender. And in such a case the legal status of agency does not apply!

And we answer: that it is speaking of a case

where he said to her: Be an agent for conveying it until you arrive

there.

And when you arrive there, appoint,

and upon your arrival there appoint another person as

an agent for receiving,

who will receive the get from your hand on your behalf. Thus, when she completes her agency for conveying it, she is still not detached from her agency, and she can then return to the husband who sent her and say to him, “I carried out your agency for conveying the get.”

And we object:

This works according to the one who says “

A woman may appoint an agent to receive her get from her husband’s agent.”

But according to the one who says: A woman may not appoint an agent to receive her get from her husband’s agent,

but rather she herself must receive the get from her husband’s agent, as the reason is explained below,

what is there to say?

How can she appoint an agent to receive the get on her behalf from her husband’s agent, that is, from herself? And we answer:

What is the reason

for which a woman may not appoint an agent to receive her get from her husband’s agent? It is

because there is humiliation of the husband.

For he thinks that she humiliates him by not wishing to receive the get herself. And with this understanding he would not have sent the get, and therefore the get is invalid. [But when he himself delivers the get into the hand of the woman’s agent, we have seen that he does not insist on this.]

And

if

here, the husband does not insist!

For he himself commanded her to do so.

And we object:

This works according to the one who says

that the entire reason is

because of the humiliation of the husband,

for here there is no humiliation of the husband.

But according to the one who says

that the reason is

because

this resembles

“her courtyard that comes afterward,”

lest they come to validate also a case where the husband threw the get into another person’s courtyard, and afterward the woman purchased the courtyard from him. For if we say that acquisition through a courtyard is by virtue of “agency,” as though the courtyard were an agent, then at first the courtyard was like the husband’s “agent for conveying,” and afterward, when the woman acquired it, the courtyard became like the woman’s “agent for receiving.” But in truth, in the stated case the get is invalid. For a “courtyard” does not acquire by virtue of agency but by virtue of “hand,” since a person’s courtyard is considered as though it were his hand. And the get must be given from the husband’s hand into her hand or into the woman’s courtyard, whereas here, at the time of the giving, the courtyard was still not hers.

Therefore, they decreed that the woman should not appoint an agent to receive her get from her husband’s agent.

And according to this opinion,

what is there to say?

For this reason also applies in our matter. How can she appoint an agent for receiving who will receive the get from her hand, which is the husband’s agent?

And we answer: Here it is speaking of a case

where he said to her: Be an agent for conveying it until you arrive there, and when you arrive there, appoint an agent,

make another agent for conveying it.

And during that interval, she can return to the sender and say, “I carried out your agency,” and this is “the agency returned to the husband.”

And afterward

receive your get from him,

from the agent for conveying it.

And in this manner, the Mishna says that the woman needs to say, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence.” For the law is that when the first agent appoints a second agent, he must do so before a court, and then he says before them, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence.” Here, the woman is the first agent, and she needs to say before the court, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence,” when she appoints the second agent.

And if you wish, say instead: He said to her: Be an agent for conveying it until you arrive there. And when you arrive there, say before the court [

say before the court] “

It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence.”

And the court appoints an agent,

the court itself appoints another agent for conveying it,

and let him give it to you,

and that agent gives the get to you.

We shall return to you, chapter “The One Who Brings a Get.”

Opening

It is stated in the Torah, in the section concerning gittin: “And he shall write for her a scroll of severance.” The verse teaches that the writing of the get must be for the sake of the husband who divorces [as it is written, “and he shall write,” that the writing should be for his sake], and for the sake of the wife who is being divorced [as it is written, “for her,” that the writing should be for her sake]. And if it was not written for their sake, the get is invalid.

And likewise we learned from here that the get must be written for the sake of divorcing the woman, that is, for the sake of “severance,” as it is written, “a scroll of severance.” But if the get was written for the purpose of learning how to write a get, it is invalid for divorcing with it.

And the tannaim disputed the nature of writing lishmah.

According to Rabbi Meir, “the signatures of the witnesses effect [the divorce],” meaning that the primary validity of the get is effected by the witnesses’ signing upon it. Therefore, the Torah’s intention is that the witnesses sign the get for the sake of the husband and for the sake of the wife, and for the sake of divorce. But the form of the get itself does not need to be written lishmah.

And according to them, even if the husband found the get in a garbage heap and had witnesses sign upon it lishmah, this get is valid for divorcing with it.

But according to Rabbi Elazar, “the witnesses of delivery effect [the divorce],” meaning that the essential testimony in the get is not the witnesses’ signing upon the document, but rather the presence of the witnesses at the delivery of the get from the husband’s hand to the woman. And according to him, as a matter of basic law, the witnesses do not need to sign upon the get at all; rather, their presence at the time of delivery of the get from the husband’s hand to the woman is sufficient.

And according to him, necessarily, since the Torah requires the get to be written lishmah, its intention is the writing of the get itself, and not its signing.

Our Mishna discusses and explains the parameters of writing lishmah.

Five forms of

“not for its sake”

there are:

The first -

A scribe who wrote the get not for the sake of divorce at all, but rather in order to learn how to write a get—the get is invalid, since it was not written for the sake of a bill of divorce.

The second -

A scribe who wrote forms of gittin for himself, intending to use them when people would come before him to divorce their wives. And even if he saw a quarrel between a man and his wife and wrote a get for them, the get is invalid. Since the get was not written at the husband’s command, there is no writing for the sake of severance.

The third -

The scribe wrote the get at the husband’s command for the sake of divorce, but the husband changed his mind about the divorce and gave the get to his fellow, whose name and whose wife’s name were the same—the get is invalid, since it was not written for the sake of the divorcing husband and the divorced wife.

The fourth -

He wrote the get for the sake of one of his wives, then reconsidered and wished to divorce his second wife, who had a similar name—the get is invalid, since it was not written for the sake of the woman being divorced.

The fifth -

He had two wives whose names were the same, and he wrote a get intending that he be able to divorce whichever of them he wished—the get is invalid. Since at the time of writing it was not clarified for whom he intended it, whereas the Torah says, “and he shall write for her”—that it must be clarified at the time of writing for whom the get was written. [Based on Tosafot and the Ramban].

Mishna:

Any get

that was written

not for the sake of

divorcing

a woman is invalid.

The same law applies if it was not written for the sake of the husband who divorces, as stated in the opening to our Mishna.

And the Mishna explains,

How?

He was passing through the marketplace and heard the voice of scribes reciting [

that is, the voice of scribes teaching the writing of gittin] and instructing their students to write:

“So-and-so divorces so-and-so, from such-and-such a place.”

And he said -

“This is my name and this is my wife’s name. It is invalid for divorcing with it.”

Since it was not written for his sake and not for the sake of divorce.

Furthermore,

even if he

wrote

a get in order

to divorce his wife, and reconsidered [

changed his mind], ,

and

his fellow townsman found him and said -

“My name is the same as your name, and my wife’s name is the same as your wife’s name,

give me the get and I will divorce my wife with it” ,

it is invalid for divorcing with it,

even though it was written for the sake of divorce; in any event, that get was not written for the sake of the divorcing husband and the divorced wife.