Gittin 23b (כג:) — the Talmud in English

From this

you may infer:

a slave is fit

to serve as an agent for delivery. For a Canaanite slave is superior to a gentile, since he is subject to mitzvot. And just as he is fit to serve as an agent for delivery, so too is he fit to serve as an agent for receipt, for there is no difference between them.

Rav Asi said that Rabbi Yohanan said: A slave cannot become an agent to receive a bill of divorce for a woman from her husband, because he is not subject to the laws of bills of divorce and betrothal,

as he cannot betroth or divorce a Jewish woman; therefore, he cannot become an agent in this matter.

Rabbi Elazar raised an objection to him: The reason,

the entire reason for Rabbi Yohanan’s statement that a slave is disqualified from serving as an agent for a bill of divorce is

for a matter in which he has no legal standing,

This is because it is a matter to which he does not belong. This implies:

but in a matter in which he does have legal standing,

such as teruma, since a slave is forbidden to eat untithed produce, and if he owns untithed produce—for example, if someone gave him untithed fruit on the condition that his master would have no rights to it—he is obligated to separate teruma from it, and the teruma takes effect properly, since a slave is obligated in all the mitzvot in which a woman is obligated. Shall we say that because he has legal standing with regard to teruma, he is

fit

to become an agent for separating teruma?

But a gentile, and a Samaritan, have legal standing with regard to their own teruma,

as they can separate teruma from their own produce,

as we learned

in tractate Terumot:

“A gentile or a Samaritan who separated teruma from their own produce—their teruma is teruma,”

and it is forbidden for one who is not a kohen to eat it, since a gentile can consecrate property and can therefore also separate teruma.

Nevertheless,

we learned

in tractate Terumot:

“A gentile who separated teruma

from

Jewish produce, even with permission,

meaning that the Jew appointed him as his agent for this purpose,

has not made his teruma teruma.”

What is the reason?

Is it not because it is written

concerning teruma: “So shall you separate

also you,”

and we derive from the superfluous word “also” that an agent, too, may separate teruma?

Now we derive an analogy from “you” to “also you”:

Just as “

you” means

Israelites, so too your agents

must be Israelites,

which teaches that a gentile is not fit for agency. A Canaanite slave likewise is not included among Israelites and is consequently entirely excluded from the law of agency. Why, then, did Rav Asi say that Rabbi Yohanan state that a slave is disqualified from agency with regard to a bill of divorce because he is not subject to the laws of bills of divorce and betrothal?

The Gemara answers:

The scholars of the house of Rabbi Yannai said: No.

Rather, this is how we should derive the analogy:

Just as “

you” means

members of the covenant,

circumcised and entered into the covenant of mitzvot,

so too your agents

must be members of the covenant.

Only a gentile is excluded by this derivation; a Canaanite slave, however, is both circumcised and a member of the covenant, as it is stated: “From the hewer of your wood to the drawer of your water, to enter into the covenant.” He is indeed fit to serve as an agent in every matter in which he has legal standing, such as teruma; he is disqualified only with regard to a bill of divorce, because he is not subject to the laws of bills of divorce and betrothal.

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yohanan said: A slave cannot become an agent to receive a bill of divorce for a woman from her husband, because he is not subject to the laws of bills of divorce and betrothal.

And although we learned

in a beraita in tractate Teruma: One who gives a bill of emancipation to his Canaanite maidservant and says to her,

“You remain a maidservant,”

meaning that you yourself shall remain a maidservant,

“and your offspring

shall be

free,”—

if she was

his maidservant

pregnant,

that is, if she was with child,

she acquires it for him

the emancipation of her offspring, and the offspring goes free.

Thus, a maidservant can receive a bill of emancipation on behalf of her offspring. Nevertheless, the ruling of Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba in the name of Rabbi Yohanan is correct, as will be explained.

The Gemara asks:

What is the meaning of

“If she was pregnant, she acquires it for him”?

That is, how does the law concerning the maidservant and her fetus contradict the ruling of Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba in the name of Rabbi Yohanan? He was speaking about a bill of divorce for a woman; what connection is there between a bill of emancipation and a bill of divorce for a woman? Surely a slave can receive a bill of emancipation on behalf of another, because he has legal standing in this matter with regard to himself and is subject to the laws of emancipation, whereas with regard to a bill of divorce for a woman, a slave is not subject to the laws of bills of divorce and betrothal!

The Gemara answers:

When Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda came, he said: Rabbi Yohanan stated two rulings!

In addition to the ruling stated above concerning a bill of divorce for a woman, Rabbi Yohanan stated another ruling, and it is that ruling to which the phrase “And although we learned” refers in citing the case of the bill of emancipation.

This is what Rabbi Yohanan said:

It appears that a slave can receive a bill

of emancipation

for his fellow slave

as his agent,

from his fellow’s master,

since, as stated, he can serve as an agent with regard to a bill of emancipation, for he has legal standing under the laws of emancipation.

But not from his own master.

If both slaves belong to the same master, one cannot receive a bill of emancipation for his fellow from their master, because “the hand of a slave is like the hand of his master,” and it follows that the bill has not yet left the master’s domain. This differs from receiving it from his fellow’s master, since with regard to that master the slave has a hand with which to receive the bill for his fellow, as that master is not his own master.

The fact that a slave can receive a bill of emancipation for himself, despite the principle that his hand is like his master’s hand, is based on the principle that “his bill and his hand come into being simultaneously,” since through that same bill he is emancipated from his master. Rashi.

This is the explanation of the phrase “And although we learned”:

If someone whispers in your ear

to raise the objection, and

say:

Here is

a ruling that was taught,

that he can receive a bill for his fellow even from his own master, for thus we learned:

“If she was pregnant, she acquired it for him.”

For the maidservant acquires from her master a bill of emancipation for her offspring—

Say to him: Two of the great sages of the generation explained the matter!

They are

Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Shmuel bar bar Yitzhak.

One said:

The reason for the matter is:

Who is the author of this,

this beraita concerning the maidservant?

It is Rabbi, who says: “One who emancipates half of his slave acquires

that half of the slave, and it goes free, so that he is half slave and half free, because with regard even to half of him we say that “his bill and his hand come into being simultaneously,” and he has a hand with which to receive the bill. Therefore the maidservant can receive a bill from her master on behalf of her offspring.

And one said,

he adds and concludes his explanation of the matter:

What is the reason for Rabbi’s ruling in this case?

After all, the maidservant and her offspring are two bodies, unlike the case of one who emancipates half of his slave!

He holds

that Rabbi holds:

A fetus

is its mother’s thigh! And

when he emancipates the offspring,

it is as though he transferred to her

the maidservant

one of her limbs,

and this is comparable to emancipating half of his slave.

Mishna:

We learned in tractate Yevamot that the Sages instituted, on account of igguna, that a woman may marry on the basis of the testimony of a single witness who testifies that her husband has died.

Witnesses who are disqualified from testimony are also deemed credible for this testimony. Therefore, a woman, a relative, and even the woman herself may testify concerning her husband’s death. The only exceptions are the five women listed below, who are not deemed credible to testify that her husband has died, because they hate her, and there is concern that they may testify falsely in order to harm her, causing her to marry another man and thereby become forbidden both to him and to her husband.

Our Mishna comes to teach that

even

those

women who are not deemed credible

to testify and

say

that

her husband has died,

nevertheless they are

deemed credible to bring

to the woman

her bill of divorce

from her husband, and we do not fear that, because of their hatred, they will harm her, as the reason will be explained below.

These are the women who are not deemed credible to testify concerning a woman’s husband’s death:

her mother-in-law,

her husband’s mother,

her mother-in-law’s daughter,

her husband’s sister,

her rival wife,

another woman married to her husband,

her yevama,

the wife of her husband’s brother, and

her husband’s daughter,

born to another woman.

What is the difference between a bill of divorce and death?

Why are they deemed credible concerning the bill of divorce more than concerning testimony of the death? Because

with

the bill of divorce,

the written document provides proof,

and we rely primarily on the bill itself that she brings with her, and not solely on her testimony.

The woman herself may bring her bill of divorce

from overseas,

provided that she must say

“It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence,”

as is required of every agent who brings a bill of divorce from overseas.

Gemara:

The Gemara raises a contradiction between the beraita and the Mishna:

But was it not taught: Just as the five women are not deemed credible

to

say, “Her husband has died,” so they are not deemed credible to bring

her

bill of divorce!

The Gemara answers:

Rav Yosef said: It is not difficult:

Here it is in Eretz Yisrael, and there it is outside Eretz Yisrael.

In Eretz Yisrael, where we do not rely on her statement,

we need not rely at all on her credibility, since an agent who brings a bill of divorce in Eretz Yisrael need not say, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence”; there is only the agency itself,

she is deemed credible

to bring the bill of divorce.

But

outside Eretz Yisrael, where we do

rely on her statement,

since she must say, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence,” when she brings the bill,

she is not deemed credible

to say, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence,” because perhaps she is lying in order to harm her, causing her to marry with an invalid bill of divorce.

Abaye said to him

to Rav Yosef:

On the contrary! The reverse is more reasonable.

In Eretz Yisrael, where, if the husband comes

and

protests,

saying that he did not write the bill of divorce,

we heed him,

we accept his protest, since the agent did not say concerning the bill, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence,” and it was not authenticated in court. Since

it is possible to say that she intends to cause harm,

there is concern that the bill is in fact forged and that she intends to harm her, so that after she marries another man, her husband will come and protest concerning the bill, and his protest will be accepted, causing her to become forbidden to both men. Therefore,

she is not deemed credible

to bring the bill.

But

outside Eretz Yisrael,

where she cannot harm her, since even

if the husband comes and protests, we do not heed him,

and the bill remains valid because it has already been authenticated in court through the agent’s statement, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence.” Therefore,

she is deemed credible

to bring the bill and say, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence.”

A beraita was taught in accordance with Abaye’s opinion: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Akiva: A woman is deemed credible to bring

her

bill of divorce

from overseas.

We learn this

by means of a kal va-chomer: If even women concerning whom the Sages said

that they

are not deemed credible to say, “Her husband has died,”

nevertheless they are

deemed credible to bring

her

bill of divorce,

she

herself,

who is deemed credible to say that her husband has died—is it not logical that she is deemed credible to bring

her

bill of divorce?