Gittin 23a (כג.) — the Talmud in English

The Mishna does not validate a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor to write a bill of divorce in every circumstance. Rather:

when an adult is standing over him,

and tells him: “Write it for the sake of so-and-so,” and he does so and writes it for her sake.

Rav Huna holds that the Mishna is in accordance with Rabbi Elazar, who says that it is the witnesses of delivery who effect the divorce. The essential writing of the bill of divorce that the Torah requires to be done for her sake does not refer to the signatures of the witnesses but to the writing of the bill itself. Therefore, an adult must stand over him while he writes.

And the statement in the Mishna, “the bill of divorce is validated only by its signatures,” refers to the witnesses of delivery. They are called “its signatories” because, in most cases, the witnesses of delivery also sign the bill of divorce].

This provides a reason only for the middle clause of the Mishna, “A woman may write her own bill of divorce,” because since the bill of divorce is validated only through witnesses of delivery, there is no concern that she might forge a bill of divorce by which she was not divorced. The requirement that it be written by the woman does not apply to the first clause, which states that a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor are fit to write the bill of divorce; in their case, the reason is that an adult stands over them.

Rav Naḥman

said to Rav Huna:

If that is so, a gentile

who wrote a bill of divorce,

with a Jew standing over him,

and instructing him to write it for her sake,

is it likewise valid!?

Just as you say with regard to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor!?

And if you would say: It is likewise,

that in fact it is valid—

but it was taught

in a beraita:

A gentile is disqualified

from writing a bill of divorce. This implies that he is disqualified even when an adult is standing over him!

And we answer:

A gentile—

acts according to his own mind!

He does not heed the instructions of those standing over him; rather, he acts according to his own understanding, since he is an adult and possesses intelligence. Therefore, even when a Jew stands over him and instructs him to write the bill of divorce for a particular woman, there is concern that he may have written it for another woman. But a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, who do not possess intelligence, intend to do what they have been instructed to do.

Rav Naḥman subsequently said: What I said was not a valid argument,

that I challenged Rav Huna from the case of a gentile, who is disqualified even when a Jew stands over him. In truth, according to the Mishna, a gentile is entirely fit to write a bill of divorce, even when no Jew stands over him. For our Mishna follows Rabbi Meir, who says that it is the witnesses of signature who effect the divorce. According to him, the essential writing required by the Torah’s statement “and he writes” is that the signatures of the witnesses be written for her sake, not that the bill itself be written for her sake. The bill itself is valid even if it was not written for her sake; therefore, a gentile is also fit for this purpose.

And the reason stated by the Mishna concerning a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor—that they are fit to write the bill of divorce—is likewise this reason, as the Mishna concludes: “the bill of divorce is validated only by its signatures.” This provides a reason for the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor in its plain sense: the bill of divorce is essentially validated through the witnesses’ signatures, and only the signatures must be written for her sake, not the writing itself. There is no need to establish the Mishna specifically where an adult stands over him, as Rav Huna does.

And proof that the Mishna follows Rabbi Meir and validates a gentile to write the bill of divorce is:

since it disqualifies a gentile with regard to bringing the bill of divorce,

the following Mishna states that a gentile is disqualified from serving as an agent to bring the bill of divorce from the husband to his wife, because he is not subject to the laws of bills of divorce and betrothal.

And since our Mishna, which discusses writing the bill of divorce, does not mention a gentile,

by inference

you learn that he is disqualified only with regard to bringing it,

whereas with regard to writing

he is

fit.

And this is included in the Mishna’s statement, “the bill of divorce is validated only by its signatures.” Therefore, a gentile too is fit to write a bill of divorce, just like a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor.

We challenge Rav Naḥman:

But it was taught: A gentile is disqualified!

And we answer:

That

beraita—

it is Rabbi Elazar, who says: It is the witnesses of delivery who effect the divorce,

and the witnesses’ signatures are not of Torah origin. The statement “and he writes” refers to the writing of the bill itself,

and we require that it be written for her sake.

And it is certainly the case that a

gentile acts according to his own mind,

and does not write it for her sake. Therefore, he is disqualified according to the beraita.

Rav Naḥman said: Rabbi Meir would say: Even if he found it

—the husband found the bill of divorce in a garbage dump, where it had certainly not been written for the purpose of divorcing his wife—

and signed it,

had witnesses sign it,

and gave it to her, it is valid.

Only the signatures must be written for her sake, not the writing itself.

Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman:

It is stated in the Torah:

“And he writes for her”,

which implies that he must write

for her sake.

What, is it not the meaning that “‘and he writes’ refers to”

the

writing of the bill of divorce,

and it must be done for her sake?

Rav Naḥman answers:

No! “‘And he writes’ refers to”

And he shall write” means

the

signatures of the witnesses,

and only they must be written for her sake. Rava raised an objection

to Rav Naḥman: We learned in the opening of the third chapter:

Any bill of divorce that was written not for the sake of

divorcing

a woman,

but in order to teach students the procedure for writing a bill of divorce,

is invalid.

This demonstrates that the writing must be done for her sake!

Rav Naḥman answers:

Say that the Mishna states as follows: Any bill of divorce

that

that was signed not for the sake of a woman is invalid.

But the writing need not be done for her sake.

Rava raised an objection

to Rav Naḥman: It was taught:

When he writes it, it is as though he writes it for her sake.

What, is it not the intention of the beraita to say that it is unnecessary to write the entire bill of divorce for her sake; it suffices to write the essential part of the bill for her sake?

the beraita intends to say that it is not necessary to write the entire divorce document for her sake; it is enough to write its essential section for her sake?

And this is what it means:

When he writes its essential text

—the names of the man and the woman and the date—

for her sake,

it is

as though he writes it

also

for the sake of the formula

of the bill

for her sake,

because the essential part of the bill is its essential text.

This indicates that, at the very least, the essential text must be written for her sake! Rav Naḥman answers:

No!

Rather, this is what the beraita says:

When he signs it

—the bill of divorce—

for her sake, it is as though he writes it for her sake.

Only the signature must be written for her sake.

And if you wish, say:

The Mishna and the beraita do not pose a difficulty for Rav Naḥman, although they imply that the writing must be done for her sake, because

who is the author of these Mishnayot?

It is Rabbi Elazar, who says: It is the witnesses of delivery who effect the divorce.

According to him, the bill must certainly be written for her sake. Rav Naḥman, however, is speaking according to Rabbi Meir, who says that it is the witnesses of signature who effect the divorce, and only the signatures must be written for her sake.

And Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said:

There is no need to establish the Mishna’s validation of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor to write the bill of divorce specifically where an adult stands over them, as Rav Huna says, nor specifically according to Rabbi Meir, as Rav Naḥman said. Rather, the Mishna is speaking of a case in which

he left

—the deaf-mute, the imbecile, or the minor—

the place of the essential text,

so that he wrote only the formula, while an adult of sound mind completed the essential text.

And this is according to Rabbi Elazar, who says that it is the witnesses of delivery who effect the divorce; even according to his view, it suffices for the essential text to be written for her sake.

And Rabbi Ḥaga likewise said in the name of Ulla: It is when he left the place of the essential text, and it is Rabbi Elazar.

And Rabbi Zerika said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is not Torah!

That is, we do not accept this interpretation.

And we explain:

What is the meaning of

“It is not Torah”?

Rabbi Abba said: Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that the Mishna does not follow Rabbi Elazar. Rather,

Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that the Mishna does not follow Rabbi Elazar. Rather,

here it informs you

that the Mishna treated the writing of the bill of divorce lightly, allowing it to be written even by a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor,

for there is no force to writing for her sake!

The requirement that it be written “for her sake” has no force with regard to the writing of the bill of divorce; it applies only to the signature.

And it is Rabbi Meir, who says: It is the witnesses of signature who effect the divorce.

We challenge this:

But Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan

said concerning the Mishna on page 21b, which states that one may not write a bill attached to the ground:

It is Rabbi Elazar!

How, then, could Rabbi Zerika say in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan that our Mishna follows Rabbi Meir?

And we answer:

They are amoraim who differ with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan.

The two amoraim, Rabbi Zerika and Rabba bar bar Ḥana, disagree about how Rabbi Yoḥanan establishes the Mishnayot in our chapter.

Mishna:

Everyone is fit

to serve as agents

to bring the bill of divorce

from the husband to his wife,

except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor; a blind person; and a gentile.

If the minor received

the bill of divorce from the husband in order to bring it to the woman while he was still a minor,

and then came of age

before giving it to her;

or if a

deaf-mute

received the bill of divorce

and then recovered

and became competent before giving it;

or if a

blind person received it and then regained his sight

and his eyes opened;

or if an

imbecile received it and then recovered

and became sane;

or if a

gentile received it and then converted,

in all these cases

the bill of divorce is invalid,

despite the fact that it was delivered validly, because when the agent received the bill of divorce from the husband, he was not fit to serve as an agent for this purpose.

But

if he was

competent

when he received the bill of divorce

and then became deaf

afterward

and subsequently recovered

when he delivered it; or if he was

sighted, became blind, and subsequently regained his sight; or if he was

sane, became an imbecile, and subsequently recovered, he is fit

to deliver the bill of divorce.

to deliver the bill of divorce.

This is the general rule: Anyone whose beginning and end are with intelligence,

meaning that the agent possessed intelligence when he received the bill of divorce and when he delivered it, even though in the interim he was a deaf-mute or an imbecile, the bill of divorce is

valid.

Gemara:

We inquire about this:

Granted, a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor

are disqualified from serving as agents with regard to a bill of divorce because

they are not possessed of intelligence,

and one who does not possess intelligence is not fit to serve as an agent. For with regard to agency, the term “man” is stated: “[They shall take for themselves] a man, a lamb for each parental household,” meaning an adult possessing intelligence.

A gentile also

is not fit to serve as an agent with regard to a bill of divorce because

he is not subject to authorization,

as he is not subject to the laws of bills of divorce and betrothal; and a person cannot serve as an agent for something to which he himself has no connection at all.

But a blind person—why is he not

fit to serve as an agent with regard to a bill of divorce? And we answer:

Rav Sheshet said: Because he does not know from whom he receives it and to whom he gives it!

He does not recognize either the husband or the woman, and therefore he is disqualified from agency.

Rav Yosef challenged this:

According to your reasoning,

how may a blind man be intimate with his wife?

Perhaps this is not his wife?

And

how may people be intimate with their wives at night?

Rather, through recognition of the voice,

they recognize their wives by their voices.

Here too, with regard to a bill of divorce, through recognition of the voice

a blind person can recognize the husband and the woman. Why, then, is he not fit to serve as an agent? And we answer:

Rather, Rav Yosef said: Here we are dealing with outside Eretz Yisrael, where

the agent

must say

in court:

“It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence.”

But a blind person

cannot say “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence,” since he did not see the writing of the bill of divorce or its signing. Therefore, he cannot become an agent.

“It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence,” since he did not see the writing or signing of the divorce document. Therefore, he cannot serve as an agent.

Abaye said

to Rav Yosef:

If that is so,

if the agent was

sighted

when the bill of divorce was written

and became blind

when it was delivered,

can he say “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence”? Would

it likewise be valid?

is the document also valid?

But it is taught

in the Mishna:

“He was sighted, became blind, and subsequently regained his sight—he is valid.”

This implies that only when he

subsequently

regained his sight is he valid;

but if he

did not subsequently regain his sight, is he not invalid!?

And we answer:

The same law applies: Even though he did not subsequently regain his sight,

he is valid.

And since

the Mishna incidentally

teaches

“

sane, became an imbecile, and subsequently recovered,”

there

the reason

is only because he

subsequently recovered

when he delivered the bill of divorce, he is valid;

if he did not subsequently recover, he is not,

for he must possess intelligence until the completion of his agency. Therefore,

it also teaches “

sighted, became blind, and subsequently regained his sight,” even though in this case he does not need to regain his sight.

even though in this case he does not need to regain his sight.

Rav Ashi said: This too can be inferred.

It is possible to infer from our Mishna that a blind person does not need to regain his sight.

Since it teaches:

“This is the rule: Anyone whose beginning and end are with legal awareness is fit,”

which implies that only those who are disqualified in the Mishna because they lack legal awareness must have legal awareness from beginning to end.

But it does not teach:

“Anyone whose beginning and end are in a state of fitness is fit,”

which would imply that a blind person must also be in a state of fitness until the end.

Infer from this

that a blind person does not need to be fit at the end, since the entire reason a blind person is disqualified is that he cannot say, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence.” It is enough for him to be able to see at the beginning, because in that way he can say, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence".

They asked Rabbi Ami: A slave

a Canaanite slave,

what is the ruling on his being appointed

to be a

messenger to receive a wife's bill of divorce from her husband?

If a woman appointed a slave as her messenger to go and receive her bill of divorce from her husband, does she become divorced through his receiving it? The same question applies to appointing a messenger to deliver the bill of divorce, when the husband appoints a slave to deliver it to his wife. However, the question was asked in the house of study specifically about a messenger to receive it.

Rav Ami said to them: Since the Mishna disqualifies a gentile,

meaning that the Mishna disqualifies only a gentile from serving as a messenger to deliver the bill of divorce,