Gittin 20b — the Talmud in English

And if it should enter your mind

that the making of the impression on the dinar is done in the manner of

cutting grooves,

and the writing of the tzitz is also done in this manner, the difficulty is:

but I require

that the tzitz be made in the form of writing, as it is stated:

“writing”

of engraved seals,

and

according to your words, that this writing is cutting grooves,

there is none,

there is no writing here!? And we answer: The writing on the tzitz was

like that on gold dinars, but not like that on gold dinars.

Like that on gold dinars —

that it protrudes.

But not like that on gold dinars

entirely.

For there,

on gold dinars, he would strike the dinar

from the inside,

on the side of the figure, around the figure, and it would take shape by itself.

But

here,

on the tzitz, he would press the letters themselves

from the outside,

from its other side, until the letters protruded from its opposite side.

Rava asked Rav Naḥman: If he wrote a get for her on a sheet of gold, and said to her: Accept your get, and accept your ketובה!

That the sheet of gold upon which the get was written should also serve as payment of the ketובה,

what is

the law? Is this get valid? The uncertainty is whether it is possible to give a get whose giving is also considered the giving of payment of a debt.

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman:

She has received her get, and she has received her ketובה!

That is, the get is valid, and the ketובה has also been paid through this.

He raised an objection to him

Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman from that which was taught in a beraita: He said to her,

“Accept your get. And the remainder,”

the rest of the get, outside the place of the letters, shall be

for

payment of

your ketובה; she has received her get, and the remainder is for her ketובה.

And we infer:

The reason is that there is “remainder,”

for only the remainder is designated for payment of the ketובה.

But where there is no “remainder,”

and he intended to give the get itself for the ketובה,

no!

The get is not valid, because the place of the get must be given to the woman solely for the purpose of divorce, and not for the purpose of payment, as it is stated: “And he shall give.”

This is difficult for Rav Naḥman, who validates it even when he gave the entire get for the purpose of payment of the ketובה!

And we answer:

The same law applies even though there is no remainder;

the get is valid.

And this it teaches us

the beraita:

that even

though there is a remainder

which could serve for payment of the ketובה,

if he says to her

explicitly that it shall be for payment of the ketובה,

yes; if not, no.

What is the reason?

It is the blank space of the scroll.

It is the margin of the get, attached to it, and it does not serve for payment of the ketובה so long as the husband did not stipulate this explicitly.

The Sages taught:

He said to her:

“This is your get, and the paper

shall all remain

mine”; she is not divorced,

for he has given her nothing, and the letters are flying in the air.

But if he said to her: “This is your get

on the condition that you return the paper to me”

afterward,

she is

divorced,

and afterward she returns the paper to him. It is considered as though she received the get, for “a gift on the condition of returning” is called a gift.

Rav Pappa raised a problem:

The husband retained for himself ownership of the paper between

one line and another,

between one line and another, or

between one word and another—what is the law?

And we conclude:

Let it stand.

And we raise a difficulty:

And let him derive it

that it is disqualified because

the Merciful One said, “one scroll,” and not two or three scrolls!?

For the woman’s portion of the get is not joined together, but is separated into line after line, and it is like two or three scrolls?

And we answer:

It is necessary [to state the problem] when it is joined.

There is some connection between all the parts of the get belonging to the woman, for example, the letters at the beginning of each word were elongated from one line to another.

Rami bar Hama raised a problem: They were known to hold that the slave was his,

for it was known that the slave belonged to the husband,

and a get was written on his hand, and he emerges from beneath her authority,

for the woman brings the slave before us and says, “My husband gave me the slave and divorced me through him,” and such a get is valid, as we learned in our Mishna,

what is the law?

Is she believed to say this without bringing witnesses to delivery?

Do we say: He transferred him to her

the slave, as she claims, for he is now in her possession?

Or perhaps, he entered by himself.

The slave entered her possession by himself, and she was never divorced through him.

Rava said: And let him derive it

that a get written on the hand of a slave is disqualified because

it is writing that can be forged,

perhaps some condition was written in the get and he erased it!?

We raise a difficulty:

But according to Rava, the Mishna is difficult,

for it teaches that one may write a get

on the hand of a slave,

yet it can be forged!

And we answer:

Granted, the Mishna is not difficult according to Rava.

For it is speaking of a case in which the slave, together with the get written on the slave’s hand, was delivered to the woman

in the presence of witnesses to delivery,

and they read the get and know its contents. And the husband cannot forge it,

and it is the view of Rabbi Elazar,

who holds: “Witnesses to delivery effect the divorce.”

But according to Rami bar Hama, it is difficult.

For his problem concerns a case in which there were no witnesses to delivery, and such a get can be forged!

And we answer:

According to Rami bar Hama as well, it is not difficult.

For he is speaking of a get that was written on the slave’s hand

as a tattoo,

which is never erased.

Now that you have arrived at this, the Mishna too is not difficult.

There is no need to establish the Mishna specifically with witnesses to delivery; rather, it can be established

with a tattoo.

And the Gemara discusses:

What has become of it,

concerning Rami bar Hama’s problem, whether the woman is believed when a slave emerges from beneath her authority?

Come and hear, for Reish Lakish said: “Animals,”

a designation for livestock [based on “folds of sheep”],

have no presumptive ownership.

If a person seized livestock known to belong to another person, and the latter claims that he robbed it from him, he must return it, and he cannot claim that its owners sold it to him. Although concerning other movable property he can make such a claim, and he is believed, since we do not suspect him of having robbed it from the other’s possession, concerning livestock, since it is possible that they entered his possession by themselves, and he did not rob them by force, he is not believed to claim that he acquired them.

And the same law applies to a slave: The woman is not believed to say that she received him from her husband, for it is possible that he entered her possession by himself.

Rami bar Hama raised a problem: They were known to hold concerning a tablet

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that it was hers, and a get was written upon it, and it emerges from beneath his authority

of her husband, who divorces her with this get,

what is the law?

Do we say: She transferred it to him

the tablet to her husband for the purpose of the divorce, and it is his, so he can divorce her with it.

Or perhaps, she did not know how to transfer

wholeheartedly something that she did not intend to give as a complete gift, for he is destined to return the get to her, and she gives it to him only as a loan; consequently, he divorced her with her get, which is invalid, for it is stated, “And he shall give” [what is his]!

Abaye said: Come and hear

from that which we learned in tractate Eduyot:

“He too,”

Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava,

testified concerning a small village that was beside Jerusalem, and there was one elder in it, and he would lend to all the inhabitants of the village, and write

the promissory note

in his own handwriting,

on his own document,

and others would sign.

And an incident came before the Sages, and they declared it valid,

the document!

And why

did they declare it valid?

But I require “

a document of acquisition,”

that the document belong to the one who effects the acquisition; and in a promissory note the document must belong to the borrower, who grants his lien to the lender,

and there is none,

for the document belonged to the elder! And it is obvious to the Gemara that the parchment belonged to the elder, for if not, what did Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava testify?

Rather, is it not because we say: he transfers it to them

The elder transfers the debt document to the villagers who are borrowing, for the purpose of the loan, through a complete acquisition, despite his knowing that the document is destined to return to him. And the same is true: the woman transfers the tablet to her husband, so that he may write the get upon it, through a complete acquisition.