Gittin 21a (כא.) — the Talmud in English

Rava said: And what is the difficulty?

From the case of an elderly man?

Perhaps

An elderly man is different, as he knows how to effect a transfer of ownership.

He is a scholar and knows that the document is valid only if it belongs completely to the borrowers. Therefore, he fully resolves to transfer ownership of it to them through a complete acquisition. But a woman does not know this as well, and she does not transfer complete ownership of the bill of divorce to her husband; rather, she transfers it only as an ordinary loan.

Rather, Rava said: From here

we can resolve the question of Rami bar Ḥama: Does a woman know how to effect a complete transfer of ownership, or not?

As we learned in tractate Bava Batra:

A guarantor who appears after

the completion of the signatures on the document,

meaning, after the witnesses had signed the promissory note and the borrower had given the note to the lender, the guarantor added in his own handwriting, beneath their signatures: “I, so-and-so son of so-and-so, am a guarantor,”

the lender may collect

his debt only

from the guarantor’s unencumbered property

if the borrower does not pay, but not from encumbered property, meaning land that the guarantor sold after signing the guarantee. Since the witnesses did not sign the guarantee, but he signed after them, the matter has no public notice. Therefore, his status is like that of a creditor holding an oral loan, who may collect only from unencumbered property.

But this document, when the guarantor signed it, was already in the lender’s possession. How, then, do the guarantor’s unencumbered assets become liened to the lender through this document? The document must belong to the one effecting the transfer of ownership—in this case, the guarantor, who is now transferring his lien, after the document has already passed from the borrower to the lender! Rather, it must be because the lender transfers ownership of the document to the guarantor for the purpose of his obligation, even though he is destined to return it immediately.

It follows that everyone knows how to effect a complete transfer of ownership, even when the transfer is only temporary.

Rav Ashi said: And what is the difficulty? Perhaps a man is different, as he knows how to effect a transfer of ownership,

whereas a woman does not.

Rather, Rav Ashi said: From here

we can resolve the question:

As we learned explicitly later in our chapter:

A woman writes her bill of divorce,

and transfers ownership of it to her husband, and he then gives it back to her for the purpose of divorce.

And a man writes his receipt,

the document that the woman gives her husband as evidence that the marriage contract has been paid. The husband himself may write it and transfer ownership of it to the woman, and she has witnesses sign it and returns it to him.

For the validity of the bill of divorce depends only on its signatures.

Rava said: If he wrote her a bill of divorce, placed it in the hand of his slave, and wrote her a deed of gift for him,

concerning the slave, whereby he gives him to her as a gift,

she acquired him

the slave through the deed of gift that her husband gave her,

and she is divorced through it,

through the bill of divorce in his hand, since the slave becomes like her courtyard, and “her bill of divorce and her courtyard come to her simultaneously.” Thus, the bill of divorce has reached the woman’s courtyard.

And we raised a difficulty concerning this:

And why

should giving the slave to the woman be effective like placing the bill of divorce in the woman’s courtyard?

The slave who walks is considered, with regard to acquisition through a courtyard, like

a walking courtyard, and a walking courtyard does not effect acquisition!

For the Sages said that a person’s courtyard acquires property for him only when it is not walking.

And if you would say,

perhaps Rava is speaking

of

a slave who

is standing

and not walking, in which case he serves as a courtyard with regard to the bill of divorce!

But Rava said: Anything that would not acquire if it were walking—

standing or sitting

also

does not acquire,

because since it is capable of walking, it is not comparable to a courtyard, and therefore it does not have the legal status of a courtyard!

And we conclude:

And the halakha is: When he is bound.

The slave must have been bound, so that he is incapable of walking; only then does he have the legal status of a courtyard.

And Rava said: If he wrote her a bill of divorce, placed it in his courtyard, and wrote her a deed of gift for it,

for the courtyard,

she acquired it

the courtyard and the bill of divorce within it,

and she is divorced through it,

through the bill of divorce, since it has reached her courtyard.

And it is necessary

to teach us this both with regard to a slave and with regard to a courtyard.

For had he taught us only the case of a slave, I would have said that specifically

with regard to a

slave

is the bill of divorce valid.

But in the case of a courtyard, let us issue a decree because of a courtyard that comes afterward.

Perhaps people will also permit the case in which the husband placed the bill of divorce in someone else’s courtyard, and afterward the owner of the courtyard gave or sold it to the woman. In such a case she is not divorced, since the act of giving the bill of divorce must be from the husband’s hand to the woman’s hand. Here, when the husband placed the bill of divorce in the courtyard, it did not yet belong to her, and when she acquired the courtyard, she did not acquire it from her husband but from another person. It is therefore impossible to say that “her bill of divorce and her courtyard come to her simultaneously.” Consequently, the case in which he placed the bill of divorce in his courtyard and transferred it to her should also be disqualified.

And had he taught us only the case of a courtyard, I would have said that specifically a courtyard is effective.

But with regard to a slave, let us issue a decree

concerning giving the bill of divorce to a

bound

slave, so that she should not become divorced through it,

lest it be confused with

giving the bill of divorce to a slave

who is not bound.

For we said above that the case concerns only a bound slave.

It teaches us

both cases.

Abaye said: Now,

since

from where is a courtyard derived

—that a woman can become divorced through a bill of divorce that enters her courtyard?—

from

“her hand”!

As it is written, “and he places it in her hand,” meaning in her domain; and her courtyard is included as well.

If so, let us derive as follows:

Just as “her hand” is present both with her consent and against her will,

for the husband can divorce her by placing the bill of divorce in her hand even against her will,

so too, her courtyard

only in a situation

where it is present both with her consent and against her will,

meaning, when the courtyard already belonged to her beforehand, before the husband threw the bill of divorce into it, and she becomes divorced even against her will.

But

as for a gift,

when he gives her the courtyard together with the bill of divorce, it is effective only

with her consent,

whereas

against her will, it is not effective!

For if she does not want to become divorced, she can say: “I do not want the courtyard as a gift!” Consequently, she has not received the bill of divorce into her domain, and she is not divorced.

If so, even when she agrees to accept the courtyard as a gift, she cannot become divorced through such a courtyard, since it is effective only with her consent!

Rav Shimi bar Ashi challenged

Abaye’s difficulty:

But an agent for receipt,

whereby the woman appoints an agent to receive the bill of divorce from her husband,

is present with her consent but not against her will,

for the agent cannot become her agent against her will,

and

nevertheless

he becomes an agent for receipt

when she appoints him willingly.

It follows that a bill of divorce can take effect even in a manner that is only with her consent. Why, then, does Abaye object to the courtyard being effective only in a manner that is also against her will?

And Abaye

answers according to his approach:

Is the law of agency derived from

“her hand”

?

It is derived from

“and he sends”—

“and sends her”—

it is derived!

As it is written, “and he sends her from his house,” and we interpret it as though it were written “and he sends her,” without the final he, which implies that she appoints an agent to receive the bill of divorce. What I said—that it must be like “her hand,” both with her consent and against her will—applies only to a courtyard, which is derived from “her hand,” and not to agency, which is derived from another verse.

And if you wish, say:

Even if we were to derive agency from “her hand,” there is still no difficulty.

For

we likewise find that an agent for receipt

can be

against her will

of the woman,

for a father receives a bill of divorce for his daughter

the

minor against her will,

as though he were her agent, and he becomes her agent even against her will.

We learned in the Mishna: For everything one may write

on an olive leaf

and give her the cow; or on the hand of a slave, and give her the slave.

And we raised a difficulty concerning this:

Granted, the hand of a slave,