Gittin 21a — the Talmud in English

Rava said: And what is the difficulty?

From the elder?

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An elder is different, for he knows how to transfer ownership.

He is a learned man, and he knows that the document is valid only if it belongs entirely to the borrowers, and therefore he resolves in his mind to transfer ownership of it to them with a complete acquisition. But a woman does not know so much, and she does not transfer complete ownership of the get to her husband; rather, only by way of an ordinary loan.

Rather, Rava said: From here

let us resolve the problem of Rami bar Hama: whether a woman knows how to transfer complete ownership or not:

For we learned in tractate Bava Batra:

A guarantor who appears after

the completion of the signatures of the document,

that is, after the witnesses signed the loan document and the borrower gave the document to the lender, the guarantor added in his own handwriting, beneath their signatures, “I, so-and-so son of so-and-so, am a guarantor,”

the lender collects

his debt only

from unsold property

of the guarantor, in a case where the borrower does not pay, but not from encumbered property, that is, from real estate that the guarantor sold after signing the guarantee. Since the witnesses did not sign the guarantee, but he signed after them, the matter has no public notice; therefore, its law is like that of a loan made orally, which is collected only from unsold property.

But this document, when the guarantor signed it, was already in the lender’s possession; how, then, does the guarantor’s unsold property become encumbered to the lender through this document? For the document must belong to the transferor of ownership, namely, the guarantor, who is now transferring his obligation, after the document has already left the borrower’s possession and reached the lender’s possession! Rather, certainly, it is because the lender transfers ownership of the document to the guarantor for the purpose of his obligation, even though he is destined to return it immediately.

It follows that every person knows how to transfer complete ownership, even when the transfer of ownership is only temporary.

Rav Ashi said: And what is the difficulty? Perhaps a man is different, for he knows how to transfer ownership,

unlike a woman.

Rather, Rav Ashi said: From here

let us resolve the problem:

For we explicitly learned later in our chapter:

A woman writes her get,

and transfers ownership of it to her husband, and he then gives it back to her for the purpose of divorce.

And a man writes his receipt,

a document that the woman gives to her husband as proof of payment of the ketuba; the husband himself may write it and transfer ownership of it to the woman, and she has witnesses sign it and returns it to him.

For the validation of the get is only through its signatories.

Rava said: If he wrote her a get, placed it in the hand of his slave, and wrote her a deed of gift for him,

for the slave, by which he gives him to her as a gift,

she acquired him

the slave through the deed of gift that her husband gave her,

and she is divorced through it,

through the get in his hand, for the slave becomes like her courtyard, and “her get and her courtyard come to her simultaneously”; thus, the get has reached the woman’s courtyard.

And we raised a difficulty concerning this:

And why

should the giving of the slave to the woman be effective like placing the get in the woman’s courtyard?

For the walking slave is considered, with regard to acquisition through a courtyard, as

a walking courtyard, and a walking courtyard does not acquire!

For the Sages said that a person’s courtyard acquires for him only when it is not walking!

And if you would say,

perhaps you will say that Rava is speaking

about

a slave who

is standing

and is not walking, and then he serves as a courtyard with regard to the get!

But Rava said: Anything that, if it were walking, would not acquire—

standing or sitting

also

does not acquire,

because since it is fit to walk, it is not comparable to a courtyard, and therefore it does not have the status of a courtyard!

And we conclude:

And the halakha is: When bound.

The slave was bound, so that he was not fit to walk; then he has the status of a courtyard.

And Rava said: If he wrote her a get, placed it in his courtyard, and wrote her a deed of gift for it,

for the courtyard,

she acquired it

the courtyard and the get within it,

and she is divorced through it,

through the get, for the get has reached her courtyard.

And it is necessary

to inform us of both the slave and the courtyard.

For if he had informed us of the slave, I would have said that specifically

with a

slave

is the get valid.

But with a courtyard, let us issue a decree because of her courtyard that comes afterward.

Perhaps people will also permit the case in which the husband gave her a get in another person’s courtyard, and afterward the owner of the courtyard gave or sold the courtyard to the woman. In such a case she is not divorced, since the giving of the get must be from the husband’s hand to the woman’s hand; here, when the husband placed the get into the courtyard, it was not yet hers, and when she acquired the courtyard, she did not acquire it through her husband, but from another person, and it is impossible to say, “Her get and her courtyard come to her simultaneously.” Therefore, the case in which he placed the get in his courtyard and transferred it to her must also be disqualified.

And if he had informed us of the courtyard, I would have said that specifically a courtyard.

But with a slave, let us issue a decree

concerning giving to a slave

that is bound,

so that she should not be divorced through it,

lest it be confused with

giving the get to a slave

who is not bound.

For we said above that the case concerns only a bound slave.

It teaches us

both.

Abaye said: Since

indeed

a courtyard—from where is it derived

that a woman is divorced through a get that enters her courtyard?—

From “

her hand”!

For it is written, “And he gives it into her hand,” that is, into her possession, and her courtyard is also included.

And if so, let us derive:

Just as “her hand” is found both with her consent and against her will,

for the husband can divorce her by giving the get into her hand even against her will,

so too her courtyard,

specifically in a manner

that is found both with her consent and against her will,

that is, when the courtyard belonged to her beforehand, before the husband throws the get into it, and she is divorced even against her will.

But,

as for the gift,

when he gives her the courtyard together with the get, it is only

found with her consent,

whereas

against her will, it is not found!

For if she does not want to be divorced, she can say: “I do not want the courtyard as a gift!” And consequently she did not receive the get into her possession, and she is not divorced.

And if so, even when she agrees to accept the courtyard as a gift, she cannot be divorced through such a courtyard, which is effective only with her consent!

Rav Shimi bar Ashi challenged him

concerning Abaye’s difficulty:

But the agency for receiving,

whereby the woman appoints an agent to receive the get from her husband,

is found with her consent, but not against her will,

for the agent is not appointed as her agent against her will,

and

nevertheless

he becomes an agent for receiving

when it is with her consent.

It follows that the get applies even in a case where it is only with her consent; so what does Abaye challenge concerning the courtyard, that it should apply only in a manner that is also against her will?

And Abaye

answers according to his position:

Is the agency from “

her hand”

derived?

It is derived from “

and he sends” “

and sends her”

derived!

For it is written, “And he sends her from his house,” and we expound it as though it were written “and he sends her” without the final he, which means that she appoints an agent to receive the get. And what I said—that it must be like “her hand,” both with her consent and against her will—applies only to a courtyard, which is derived from “her hand,” but not to agency, which is derived from another verse.

And if you wish, I will say:

Even if we derived agency from “her hand,” it is also not difficult.

For

we also find agency for receiving

that it can be

against her will

of the woman.

For a father receives a get for his daughter

the

minor against her will,

for he is as though her agent, and he becomes her agent even against her will.

We learned in the Mishna: For everything they write

on an olive leaf

and on the horn of a cow, and he gives her the cow; on the hand of a slave, and he gives her the slave.

And we raised a difficulty concerning this:

Granted, the hand of a slave,